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A B S T R A C T
The main object of this study is to determine the basis of British legal authority in 
Uganda, with a special emphasis on Buganda, and to trace its development from the time 
the territory was declared a British sphere of influence up to 1938. I propose the thesis 
tha t ,  according to the prevailing view of the British administration and its legal advisers, 
both in England and locally, the Crown’s powers were restricted by international law 
a n d /o r  municipal law at various stages during this period: by the concept of sphere of 
influence; by the theory of protectorates; and by virtue of the agreements which the 
Crown made with the kings and chiefs of Buganda. Through an evolutionary process 
which involved partly a change in the perception of the law and partly a series of 
subsequent agreements with the local rulers, the legal authority of the Crown was 
extended.
The investigation is primarily based upon official correspondence, minutes, 
memoranda, and contemporary documents, kept in London at the Public Records Office, 
the Foreign Office Library, and the British Museum Library. I also examined semi­
official and private records kept at Rhodes House, Oxford. For political and other 
reasons it was not possible to do research in Uganda. However, I had access to Professor 
Anthony Low’s personal notes taken at the Entebbe Secretariat Archives.
This study demonstrates that, contrary to the views of previous writers, lawyers 
and historians, the law acted as an impediment upon the Uganda Protectorate 
Government,. It shows th a t  the administrators a t  the time believed tha t  they were under 
various inescapable legal constraints. They did not appreciate tha t  the Crown, in the 
light of later advances in legal theory, had always been entitled to exercise plenary powers 
in Buganda; for it was only at the end of the period studied tha t  the Uganda High Court 
held th a t ,  on the basis of judicial precedents from other jurisdictions, the Crown’s legal 
powers in the Protectorate were unlimited.
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1C H A P T E R  1 
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The period during which Britain gained control over U ganda is known to historians 
as “T he Scram ble” because a num ber of European  countries were competing to acquire 
terr itories  in Africa and the Pacific. They used a range of legal “tools” to  accomplish 
their imperial designs. These included: en ter ing  into bi-lateral trea ties , recognising zones 
as in each o th e r ’s sphere of influence; g ran tin g  charters  to  private  companies; declaring 
protec tora tes ;  and, finally, annexation. A lthough none of these methods was necessarily 
new in in terna tional relations, the c ircum stances under which they were applied were 
significantly different from those in which they were previously used. From a legal 
viewpoint th is  resulted in a complex s i tua t ion  with few ap p ro p ria te  precedents to guide 
the policy m akers and their legal advisers. Inevitably new legal concepts in both 
in terna tional and m etropolitan  law were gradually  developed in response to a series of 
perhaps contrad ic tory  factors, to accom m odate  the s ta te  of affairs. Some of the legal 
issues raised were: the ex ten t of the  powers and au tho ri ty  to  which a s ta te  claiming a
sphere of influence or a p ro tec to ra te  over a terr ito ry  was entitled; the nature and ex tent 
of its obligations; w hether the sovereignty of the local p o ten ta te  was recognised for 
in terna tional law purposes, and so on.
1.1 S ta tem en t o f the P rob lem
This s tudy  concerns the developm ent of B ri ta in ’s legal au tho ri ty  in Uganda, with a 
special em phasis on Buganda, from the  tim e the area  was declared a British sphere of 
influence up to  1938. The decision to  concen tra te  on B uganda  was made partly  to  limit 
the  scope of the inquiry, especially in view of the available research materials, bu t mainly
2because Buganda was the only terr ito ry  in the region which came under British protection 
following a t rea ty .  Thereafte r  its relations with Britain  were regulated by an Agreement 
which raised a num ber of political and legal issues. T he o ther p a r ts  of the P ro tec to ra te  
will be referred to mainly by way of co n tra s t  with Buganda. The reason for choosing 
1938 as the cut-off da te  is explained below.
The study is not a full-scale historical investigation of the period, of which there are 
already several; nor is it a purely legal investigation; it is a  com bination of parts  of both, 
to bridge the gap which usually exists between studies of both kinds. Its main object is to 
determ ine the basis of British legal au th o r i ty  in B uganda, and to trace its development. 
The hypothesis pu t forward is th a t ,  according to  the prevailing view of the British 
adm in is tra to rs  and  their legal advisers (both  in England and locally), the C row n’s powers 
were legally restr icted a t  various stages during  this period: by the concept of sphere of 
influence; by the  theory of pro tec tora tes ; and by virtue of the agreem ents which the 
Crown made with the kings and the chiefs of Buganda. Through an evolutionary process 
which involved partly  a change in the perception of the law and partly  a series of 
subsequent am ending agreem ents with the local rulers, the legal au tho ri ty  of the Crown 
was extended.
I examine the legal argum ents  and the decisions which were made by the 
adm in is tra to rs  and their legal advisers, and show th a t  a t  the m ateria l times the 
assum ption  was th a t  the C row n’s au th o r i ty  was legally limited by in ternational law 
a n d /o r  British municipal law; and 1 describe the ex ten t  of such limitation . It is not, to 
stress the point, the object of my s tudy  to establish w ha t  the law actually  was a t  the 
time, nor to prove th a t  the ad m in is tra to rs  were right or wrong in their in terpre ta tion  of 
the legal position. R ather  I am  in terested  in the influence, if any, according to their 
in te rp re ta tion ,  which in terna tional law a n d /o r  municipal law had on B ri ta in ’s policy and
adm in is tra tion  in Buganda.
3There are several studies of Brit ish-Buganda relations, especially with reference to 
the Buganda Agreement. Invariably these studies concentra te  on the  socio-political and 
economic forces which they regard  as having been the “r e a r  l im itation  of B ri ta in ’s 
au tho ri ty  in Buganda. Legal factors are usually not examined, since they are generally 
viewed as exercising, a t best, an insignificant influence on the course of the policy and 
adm inis tra tion . For instance, C ranford  P ra t t ,  after a brief discussion of the legal 
relations between Buganda and  Britain , observes th a t  “Any consideration of the 
significance of the [BjUganda A greem ent which limits itself to the legal aspects is bound 
to be most inadequa te” . Later in the same chapter  he speculates th a t ,  if there had been 
any strong reasons for the British to wish to  break away from the  Agreement, “legal 
means to do so would have been found” . P r a t t ’s conclusion is th a t  the P ro tec to ra te  
G overnm ent was restrained, not by the law, bu t by political and adm inistrative 
considerations. For this reason he decided to  limit his inquiry to  the la tter  factors . 1 
P r a t t ’s com m ent cannot be contested , if only because the law is neither made, nor does it 
operate, in a vacuum. But by dismissing the legal considerations, after only a brief 
discussion, he leaves the impression th a t  the law, as a  sem i-autonom ous factor, played no 
par t  a t  all in these m atters .  It is p a r t  of the object of this study to establish whether th a t  
was indeed the case.
Anthony Low, co-author with P ra t t ,  argues in the same book th a t  the Buganda 
Agreement (which he refers to as a “quas i- trea ty” because “the  British had never 
recognised the sovereignty of the B aganda” ) did not deter the adm in is tra to rs  of the 
P ro tec to ra te  from formulating policy for Buganda. He is em phatic  th a t  the Agreement 
was ju s t  a political in s trum ent which was employed to exert control over the Baganda. 
Low claims th a t ,  as supplem entary  agreem ents became difficult to procure, there were 
two possible courses of action open to the adm in is tra tion :
1 Anthony Low and Cranford Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule 1900- 1958 (Oxford, 
University Press, 1900), at p.193.
4They could, first of all, em ulate  the B aganda  by insisting on British rights 
under the Agreements; they could either play a t ru m p  card of finding a clause in 
the  A greem ent which specifically implied su p p o r t  for the policy they advocated, 
and  so close discussion prom ptly , or they could revert to  one of the general 
dec lara tions  in the tex t.  Alternatively they could pursue policies quite 
independently  of the B uganda G overnm ent.
He concludes th a t  in ac tual practice there were only tw o bases for a successful 
B r i t ish /B u g an d a  relationship: the use of force and an alliance with B uganda’s ruling 
class.^
Similar views are expressed by o ther historians and political scientis ts .0 The only 
detailed s tudy  of the B ri t ish /B u g an d a  re la tionship  within a legal framework is th a t  by 
Henry Morris and Jam es Read, in their Indirect Rule and Search For Justice : Essays m 
East Africa Legal History .** W ith  reference to  the Buganda A greem ent of 1900 Morris 
notes th a t  to the Baganda it:
was in the na tu re  of a t rea ty  between tw o Kingdoms, binding upon both and 
unalte rab le  save by m utual consent, by the  term s of which the  Kabaka had 
surrendered certain of his sovereign rights in re turn  for the protection of the 
British Crown, whilst in respect of the rest he remained an au tonom ous ruler.
On the  o ther hand he claims th a t  even though the British did not construe the Agreement
in a s imilar m anner, and they were under no legal obligation to comply with its term s,
they nevertheless followed it a lm ost to the letter  and som etimes in the sp ir i t .5 Read
argues th a t  the significance of the Agreem ent was not to be found in legal lim itations,
^Ibid., at p.155.
For instance, Godfrey Uzoigwe, in a recent book, Godfrey Uzoigwe, ed., Uganda: The Dilemma  
of Nationhood (N.Y., Nok Publishers International, 1982), at p.72, asserts that: “The British ... 
knew that ... [ the Agreement] was a curious document — a constitutional anomaly. But they were 
also aware that it was dictated by military and political expediency rather than by a sense of strict 
constitutionality and legal legitimacy.” See also generally: Samwiri Karugire, A Political History 
of Uganda (Nairobi, Heinemann, 1980); David Apter, The Political Kingdom iri Uganda  
(Princeton, University Press, 1961).
*(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1972). See also a more general study by the same authors, Uganda  
and the Development of [ts Laws and Const it u tion , (London, Stevens and Sons, 1966).
5Ibid., at pp. 37- 38.
5which he stresses it did not have, but in the political and moral restraints it engendered.®
On the question of the legal significance of the Buganda Agreement in British 
municipal law, the conclusions of Morris and Read are indisputable. However, it must be 
emphasised tha t  this issue was settled by judicial decision many years subsequent to the 
Agreement. In 1907 the Uganda High Court held in the case of Katosi v Kahizi,6 7 tha t  all 
Protectorate legislation, including the Orders in Council, was subject to the agreements 
entered into by the kings and chiefs of Buganda, Ankole and Toro. It was not till 1937,
Q
in the case of Rex v Besweri Kiwanuka, th a t  the decision was reversed by the High 
Court of Uganda. What was the position prior to the latter  case? How did the 
administration construe the status of these agreements: did it regard them as legal 
constraints? Morris admits that for many years the decision of Katosi v Kahizi 
dominated the official view as to the legal efficacy of the agreements.®
A claim by Grace lbingira, a Ugandan lawyer, tha t  the British entered into the 
agreements knowing all along that they were not legally binding, is highly questionable.1® 
The decision of the High Court of Uganda referred to above is prima facie  evidence that 
this was not the case. Even from an international law point of view, although many 
authorities in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries expressed the view 
tha t  agreements entered into with African rulers were not treaties in the international law
6 •Ibid., at p.277. See also Karugire, A Political History of U ganda. At p. 120, he claims that 
whatever concessions the British made to the Baganda and other communities, were given on 
grounds of “political expediency and not bejcjause of any legal or constitutional requirement.”
7 (1907), U.L.R. 22.
^Unreported, Uganda High Court Criminal Appeal No. 38 of 1937.
^Indirect Rule and the Search for .1 nstice, at p.55. In the same chapter, at pages 58-59, Morris 
notes that as late as I960, although by then the question of the legal validity of the agreements had 
been clearly settled, the matter was still being argued in the Uganda courts.
1()The Forging of an African Nation (N.Y., The Viking Press, 1973), at p. 17. Ibingira’s views 
are shared by Karugire, A Political History of U ganda, at p.119, he com m ents that it is a mystery 
that British administrators found it necessary to make these agreements, “for they must have 
known them for the fraudulent fictions they were.”
6sense, a num ber of writers in recent years have raised queries w hether th a t  in fact was 
so.** Even more significant, a  recent In terna tional C ourt  of Justice  advisory opinion in 
the Western Sahara Case has added w eight to  the doubts  as to w hether the views of the
i o
earlier writers were consistent with the s ta te  practice of the time. If the legal position 
regarding these agreements is still considered uncertain , it could scarcely have been any
t o
clearer a t  the time when they were m ad e . 1 0
Although most of this investigation will focus on the agreements and  their 
in te rp re ta t ion ,  the concept of sphere of influence and th a t  of p ro tec tora tes  need to be 
discussed. In the late n ineteenth  cen tury , the  British imperial policy makers were in a 
d ilem m a with regard to Africa and the Pacific. On one hand, they were unwilling to 
annex territories in these regions either because they did not w an t Britain to assume 
adm in is tra t ive  responsibility; or they did not w an t the indigenous people to become 
British subjects which would entitle them  to the legal rights and privileges which th a t  
s ta tu s  carried; or for dip lom atic  reasons.** On the o ther hand , although Britain already 
had many colonies all over the world, the  British could not afford to let o ther European 
countries, notably France and G erm any, colonise the whole African continent and the 
Pacific. The devices of sphere of influence and p ro tec to ra tes  were employed as a half-way 
house solution to the problem.
**For example: M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in 
International Law (London, 1926, reprinted ed., N.Y. Negro Press, 1969), at pp. 170-77; C.H. 
Alexandrowicz, The European African Confrontation: A Study i_n Treaty Making (A.W. Sijthoff- 
Leiden, 1973), at pp. 47, and 99-100; See also same author, “The Partition of Africa,” in 
K.Ingham, ed., Foreign Relations in African States (Colston Papers, no. 25, 1975) at pp. 129-133.
12 I.C.J.Rep., p.6. The advisory opinion of the Court was sought on the question as to whether 
the Western Sahara at the time of its conquest by the Spanish, in 1884, was “terra n u l l i us ”. It held 
that it was not. The Court declined to make any specific findings on what it said were “differing 
views” expressed during the proceedings on the legal value of the agreements between local chiefs 
and Europeans, since the issue was not within its terms. However, as Gordon Bennett comments,  
“it is difficult to see how such agreements can be devoid of legal effect if at one and the same time 
they constitute derivative roots of title.” See his article “Aboriginal Rights in International Law,” 
Occasional Paper no.37, of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 1978, 
at pp. 5-6.
1 9
The discussion of the implications of this situation for legal theory or doctrine is outside my 
scope of study.
* *T.Baty, “Protectorates and Mandates,” 1921-22 B.Y.l.L 109, at p. 113.
7A sphere of influence was defined by Henry Jenkyns as a  “portion of non-Christian 
or uncivilised country, which is the  subject of diplomatic ar rangem en ts  between European 
s ta tes ,  bu t has not yet developed into a P ro tec to ra te .” On the o ther hand, he defined a 
British p ro tec to ra te  as “a country  which is not within the British dominions, bu t as 
regards its foreign relations is under the  exclusive control of the King, so th a t  its 
governm ent cannot hold direct com m unication  with any foreign power, nor a  foreign 
power with th a t  governm ent.” *^ A British p ro tec to ra te  differed from a colony in th a t  it 
was a foreign terr ito ry , and its in h ab i tan ts  were foreigners. This  distinction led to  many 
legal issues, as will be dem onstra ted  in this s tudy .
British p ro tec tora tes  are classified by many writers  into two groups: protected
s ta tes  and colonial p r o t e c t o r a t e s . A c c o r d i n g  to M artin  W ight,  a protected s ta te  was 
distinguished from a  colonial p ro tec to ra te  on the ground th a t  in the former, by trea ty ,  the 
external and some of the internal sovereignty of the s ta te  were ceded to the Crown 
whereas in the la t te r ,  a lthough in some cases the p ro tec to ra te  s ta tu s  m ight have 
originated by agreement with native chiefs, these agreem ents  “are not considered as 
t rea ties  in in terna tional law; neither have the treaties  any validity in the constitu tional 
law of the E m pire .”11 The general view of writers is th a t ,  while in protected s ta tes  the 
C ro w n ’s powers were limited, in colonial p ro tec to ra tes  they were absolute. It is 
no tew orthy  th a t ,  a l though W ight classified the Uganda P ro tec to ra te ,  as well as the  other 
black Africa British p ro tec to ra tes  and the Solomon Islands, as a colonial p ro tec to ra te ,  he
* "’Brit ish Rule and Jur isdic t ion Beyond t he Seas (London,  1902), at  pp. l  and 165.
*^Some classify them into three or  even more groups;  while others  argue tha t  classification is 
impossible.  General ly:  Ja me s  Crawford,  The  Crea t ion of S ta te s  m In ternat ional  Law (Oxford,  
1978), pp.  187-200; Alfred K am a nd a ,  A S tudy  of the Legal S ta tus  of P rotectora tes  in Public 
In ternat ional  Law (Ambil ly-Annemasse,  1961), chapter s  1 and 2; J . H . W.  Verzijl,  Internat ional  
Law in Historical  Perspect ive (A.W.Si j thoff-Leyden,  1969), 2:412-420.
1 7 .1 * Brit ish Colonial  Cons t i tu t ion  1947 (Oxford,  Cla rendon Press,  1952), at  pp. 8-9. See also 
D . P . O ’Connell ,  In ternat ional  Law (London,  Stevens,  1965), 1: a t  p. 384. Com par e  Verzijl,  ibid., at 
p .414, he claims th a t  some colonial protec torate s  owed their  existence “to Treat ies  which could 
when they were concluded perhaps  be still considered as falling within the empire of the law of 
nat ions. ”
8com m ented th a t  the Kingdom of B uganda  and Northern  Nigeria, represented “ the 
colonial p ro tec to ra te  at its nearest approx im ation  to  the protected  s ta te  ... ° Wight did
not e laborate  but his s ta tem en t  raises the  issue as to  w hether B u g an d a ’s “exceptional” 
adm in is tra t ion  could be explained merely in political and economic term s as historians 
claim.
Ross Jo h n s to n ’s study of the theory  of p ro tec to ra tes  and sovereignty in the late 
n ineteenth  century deserves a special m en t io n .19 It was mainly his book which aroused 
my in terest in this area. Johnston  examines the evolution of the concept of pro tec tora tes  
and sovereignty as developed by the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the Law Officers 
of the Crown, and sometimes by the British officers on the spot. He draw s his examples 
from all over Africa and the Pacific. B u t,  as he points out,  he does not deal with the 
“idiosyncrasies” of individual p ro tec to ra tes  which m ight have led to  the development of 
different laws; nor does he deal with the issue as to w hether or not the local staff properly 
implemented London-made views abou t  the  law. J o h n s to n ’s work is invaluable, but a t 
the same time one ought to heed Joseph A nene’s warning to historians not to generalise 
abou t  pro tec tora tes  established by the British in Africa. Anene says th a t  British 
p ro tec to ra tes  reveal no consistent p a t te rn ;  and , evidently, the action taken was d ic tated  
by local socio-political and economic circum stances ra the r  than  by any ascertainable 
th eo ry .^ * 1 *
18Ibid.,  at  p.9.
1 S o v e r e i g n t y  and Pro te c t ion : A S tudy  of British Jur i sdic t iona l  Imperial ism hi the Late
Nineteenth Cen tu ry  (Duke University Press,  1973). See also K a m a nd a ,  A Study of the Legal 
S ta tus  of P ro tectorates  in Public Internat ional  Law.
^9 Ibid.,  at  p.vi.
O  J
1 Southern Nigeria iri T ransi t ion 1885- 1906: Theory and Pract i ce  m a Colonial  P ro tecto ra te
(Cambr idge  Universi ty Press,  1966), at  p. 63.
91.2 T h e  S tr u c tu r e
It is not, of course, possible to cover the evolution of all aspects of B r ita in ’s legal 
au thority  in Buganda during the period investigated. Consequently I have selected 
several areas where the gravest doub t was expressed as to  the n a tu re  and extent of the 
au tho ri ty  claimed. The study is divided chronologically into three parts:  first, the period 
of the  sphere of influence which ranges from 1890 to 1894; second, the period from the 
declaration of the P ro tec to ra te  up to 1902; and finally, the  period from 1902 to 1938. 
T he significance of the year 1902, which separates  par ts  two and three, is th a t  it was 
when the first O rder in Council for U ganda was p rom ulgated . This Order spelt out the 
ex ten t  of the C ro w n ’s powers and au tho ri ty  in the P ro tec to ra te  — it became, so to speak, 
the new constitu tional base and the m easure of the C ro w n ’s legal powers. The cut-off 
d a te  has been selected because in the previous year the High C ourt  of Uganda made the 
im p o rtan t  decision, mentioned above, th a t  under municipal law the Crown was not bound 
by the  Agreement except where incorporated in the laws of the P ro tecto ra te .  Extension 
of the investigation to 1938 enables us to review the im m ediate  reaction of the 
adm in is tra tion  to  this judicial decision.
In the second chapter  I discuss the concept of sphere of influence as it applied to 
B uganda and the  ex ten t of the legal au tho ri ty  it entailed; in chapter  three — the 
p ro tec to ra te  s tage — I investigate the declaration of B uganda as a British protec tora te  
and the incorporation of neighbouring terr ito ry  in the U ganda Pro tec to ra te .  C hap ter  four 
deals with the development of the jurisdictional issue in British protec tora tes  generally 
and how this was interpreted  in Uganda; in chap te r  five I tackle the question of the 
C ro w n ’s power to dispose of land; in chap te r  six I discuss the  1900 B uganda Agreement, 
the issue is w hether or not it was regarded as a merely political or a legally binding 
Agreement. In chap te rs  seven to nine 1 deal with the U ganda Order in Council, and the 
conflict between its provisions and the Agreement; in chap te r  ten the land question is
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reviewed in the light of the 1902 Order in Council; chapter eleven discuss the judicial 
intervention in the interpretation of the legal position; and in the last chapter 1 draw 
some conclusions. The main theme linking all these chapters is whether at the material 
time the power and the authority of the Crown were regarded as legally limited and 
whether this factor affected the Protectorate Government’s policy decisions and 
administration.
1.3 G eneral H istorica l B ack grou n d
Uganda is a land-locked country situated in the heart of Africa astride the equator, 
between latitude four degrees North and one degree South, and between longitudes thirty 
and thirty five degrees East. Its area is 93,981 square miles, with a population, at the 
time of independence from Britain in 1962, of six and half million people (presently its 
population is fifteen million). Among Uganda’s most prominent natural features are Lake 
Victoria and the River Nile. From the Lake the Nile flows northwards, bisecting the 
country, en route to the Mediterranean. Both the Nile and Lake Victoria played an 
important role in determining Uganda’s political future.
Uganda, like most African countries, is a creature of European imperialism. Its 
boundaries were determined in longitudes and latitudes by agreements among European 
nations, and by Britain’s administrative convenience. Consequently the country is a 
conglomeration of over forty different communities, most of which were independent 
sovereign entities prior to the Protectorate. Conventionally these communities are 
divided into four linguistic or ethnic groups: Nilotic; Nilo-Hamitic; Hamitic; and B a n tu .^  
The Nilotes occupied mainly the north of the country; Nilo-Harnites part of the north and 
east; Hamites were found in Ankole; while the Bantu were in the south and part of the
22 Harry Johnston, The Uganda Protectorate, 2 volumes, (London, Huchinson and Co., 1902), 2: 
chapters 15-18. Modern scholars are critical of the terms “Hamitic” and “Nilo-Hamitic” for their 
overly racial overtones, e.g. B.Nveko, review of The Forging of an African Nation, by Grace 
Ibingira, in Makerere Historical Journal, 1 (1975), pp. 85-86.
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west and  east of the country. In most cases the language spoken by the  com m unities , 
even w ith in  the same linguistic family, are not m utually  intelligible. Besides, there were a 
wide diversity of political s tructures .  They ranged from small non-centralised societies 
based on family ties, clans, local m em bership, and so on, to centralised and sometimes 
highly hierarchical ones. Generally, the  former prevailed am ong Nilotic and Nilo-
o o
Ilam itic ,  whereas the la tter  were more common am ong Bantu.
1.3 .1  T he K in gd om  of B u gan d a
T he kingdoms of Bunyoro-K itara  and B uganda were the two m ost powerful and 
im p o rtan t  s ta tes  in the in terlacustr ine region. However, for a  num ber of reasons the 
Baganda, and B uganda related m atte rs ,  dom inated  B ri ta in ’s adm in is tra t ion  of Uganda. 
F irstly , the kingdom of Buganda, located around the north-w est shore of Lake Victoria, 
was the nucleus around which the P ro tec to ra te  of U ganda was built. It was declared a 
British P ro tec to ra te  in 1894, and gradually o ther terr itories  were incorporated in this 
“U ganda P ro tec to ra te” . Secondly, Buganda had a highly organised political s truc tu re  
which (ap ar t  from B unyoro-K itara) was unique in th a t  p a r t  of Africa. Thirdly , 
numerically the B aganda were (and still are) the biggest com m unity  in the region.“ * 
Fourth ly , because of their earlier contac t w ith Europeans, the B aganda  had access to 
learning which the others  acquired relatively much later. Finally, their relationship with 
Britain , unlike the rest of the P ro tec to ra te  (with the exceptions of Toro  and  Ankole), 
were governed by a t rea ty  and the B uganda  Agreement which were followed by both 
parties to the letter.
9  *7
'^Generally Tarsis Kabwegere, The Politics of State Form ation: The Nature and Effects of 
Colonialism in Uganda (Nairobi, East Africa Literature Bureau, 1971), pp.21-54.
Estimates of their population by contemporary writers vary from half a million to three 
millions, see Gerald Portal,  The Mission to Uganda m 1893 (London, Edward Arnold, 1894), pp. 
187-188.
12
1 .3 .2  B u g a n d a ’s A d m in is t r a t iv e  H ie r a r c h y
By the time the first Europeans arrived in Buganda in 1862, Buganda had been 
ruled by thirty kabakas (kings) in unbroken succession. Historical estimates of the
o r
aggregate period of their reign varies from three hundred to six hundred years. Prior to 
the nineteenth century the kabakas were not very strong as they had to rely on the clan 
chiefs (bataka) for support. However, in the nineteenth century, mainly as a result of 
external trade and the acquisition of fire-arms, the kabakas became more independent and 
despotic. They ruled the country through a hierarchy of non-hereditary chiefs known as 
the “bakungu” . The most senior of these chiefs was the Katikiro (Prime Minister) 
followed by territorial chiefs known as Saza (county) chiefs, and other lower ranking 
chiefs. These senior chiefs also constituted the Lukiiko (Kabaka’s Council) which used to 
meet at the Kabaka’s court to deliberate national matters. By the 1890s the bakungu 
chiefs were in control of the country at the expense of the bataka chiefs and, eventually, 
the Kabaka.
1 .3 .3  F o r e ig n  C o n ta c t
Buganda’s earliest foreign contact, outside its immediate neighbourhood, were Arab 
merchants from Zanzibar. Although trade goods from the coast are known to have 
reached Buganda before the nineteenth century, the first Arab caravan arrived in 
Buganda in 1848.26 This pioneered a steady trading relationship between Buganda and 
the east coast of Africa whose commercial centre was Zanzibar. Other Arab traders 
followed via the northern route from Egypt. Trading with the Arabs was not only 
important in terms of the goods which they brought and took, but had other 
consequences. The traders gave publicity to the outside world of Buganda’s rich trade  — 
a factor which later contributed to rivalry among the imperialists to control Buganda.
or
ZJSemakula Kiwanuka,  A History of Buganda: From the Foundation of the Kingdom to 1900 
(London, Longmans,  1971), at p.93; Anthony Low, Buganda in Modern History (London,  
Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1971), at 1.
"^ ’Kenneth Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda (London, George Allen and Unwin,  1958),  
at p. 120.
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Moreover, they introduced the Islamic religion which subsequently played an im portan t 
role in B u g an d a’s politics. Finally, the A rabs brough t guns which enhanced B uganda’s 
s treng th  as aga inst  its already weak neighbours, and which prepared the  ground for the 
bloody internal political strife in the last tw o decades of the n ineteenth  century.
European con tac t  with B uganda  was more than  a  decade later. The First known 
European to visit B uganda was John  H anning Speke, a  Briton , on an exploratory mission 
for the source of the  Nile. Speke reached B uganda in 1862, in the reign of K abaka 
M utesa. Although he was terrified by the  b ru ta li ty  of the K abaka, nevertheless he was 
impressed by B u g an d a’s efficient adm in is tra t ion  and level of development which was 
unique in th a t  p a r t  of Africa.27 Speke was convinced th a t  B uganda  was the ideal spring­
board for evangelism in the interior of Africa. However, more than  twelve years elapsed 
before ano ther British explorer, Henry Stanley, visited Buganda. Following discussions 
between him and M utesa, the la t te r  issued an open inv ita tion  to European missionaries to 
s ta r t  their evangelism in Buganda. By 1876 the first group of British priests, of the 
Church Missionary Society, had arrived. Two years la ter French priests, of the Roman 
Catholic Church, followed suit. Meanwhile, the num ber of A rab trade rs  and preachers of 
Islam also increased in Buganda. Soon the presence of these rival foreign religions was to 
have an im p o rtan t  im pact on political events.
By the t im e M utesa  died, in 1884, dissent was already visible am ong his subjects, 
especially the you th ,  who were converted to one or the o ther of the imported religions. 
M wanga, an eighteen year old juvenile, succeeded his fa ther as the Kabaka. Being 
inexperienced and tak ing  over the th rone a t  the time he did, M w anga was soon in trouble. 
He hated  the m issionaries’ influence over his subjects. M w anga tried to get rid of the
27F.Lugard, The Rise of Our East Africa Einpire, 2 volumes (London, William Blackwood and 
Sons, 1893), 2: at p.2.
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foreign religions by executing his subjects who had become converts. His action back­
fired. The religious groups consolidated into formidable political factions: the P ro tes tan t  
p a r ty ,  which was commonly known as the “B a n g e le za ” (English), the  Catholics or the 
“B a f r a n s a ” (French); and the Moslems. T he names of the parties are significant. They 
represent the imperial forces behind the so-called religious groups.
Because of the b i t te r  rivalry, in ter-factional wars were fought constan tly . During 
the first five years of M w an g a ’s reign, he had mixed political fortunes. He was twice 
dethroned  bu t managed to  re ins ta te  himself by allying himself w ith one or the o ther of 
the political/religious factions. It was in th a t  s ta te  of political tu rm oil,  in 1890, th a t  the 
Imperial British East Africa C om pany, which had been granted  a  royal Charter  to 
adm inis te r  the British east Africa sphere, a t tem p ted  to establish its government in 
Buganda.
1 .3 .4  T h e  R e s t  o f  th e  T e r r i to r y
Bunyoro-K itara  used to  be by far the largest and strongest kingdom  in the Lake 
Victoria region. Established around the fourteenth  cen tury , B unyoro-K itara  dominated 
the entire terr ito ry  of present day southern  and western Uganda; and p a r ts  of northern
O  Q
U ganda and of north-w estern  T a n z a n i a /  However, by the beginning of the last century 
its size and power had been reduced considerably. This was partly  due to internal 
dissensions which had led to the creation  of the splin ter kingdoms of Ankole and Toro; 
and partly  to over-expansion. In the last q u a r te r  of the cen tury , M ukam a (King) 
K abarega a t tem p ted  to restore its prestige. He succeeded in recap tu ring  some of the 
terr ito ry  Bunyoro had lost, b u t  in the end it was all in vain. B unyoro-K itara  crumpled 
under the forces of imperialism.
^ G e n e r a l l y  J . W .  Nyakatura, Anato my  of an African Kingdom ed., Godfrey Uzoigwe, (N.Y.,  
Henry Col t ,  1961).
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Unlike his arch-rival, M utesa , K abarega rejected the missionaries and was generally 
branded as an ti-European . T hro u g h o u t the  last decade of the nineteenth  century  
K abarega was engaged in b a t t le  with British forces which were in alliance with the 
Baganda. T he main reason for B r i ta in ’s m ilitary  th ru s t  against Bunyoro was to  prevent 
o ther Europeans, especially the Belgians and (later) the French, from establishing a 
foothold on the Nile. As for the Baganda, fighting K abarega was an opportun ity  to settle 
old scores and to  weaken him. K abarega was eventually  defeated by the combined forces, 
deposed, and in 1899 exiled to the Seychelles with his former enemy, then ally, 
M w a n g a .^
Bunyoro was the only kingdom in the U ganda P ro tec to ra te  which the British 
m ain ta ined  was theirs by conquest. Consequently , unlike the kingdoms of Buganda, 
Ankole, and Toro, they entered  into no agreem ent with it until 1933. For B uganda 's  role 
in the conquest Britain ceded to it extensive p a r ts  of B unyoro’s te rr ito ry ,  thus  creating a 
b i t te r  controversy between B uganda and Bunyoro over w ha t came to be known as the 
“lost counties” . The m a t te r  was not resolved until after U ganda became independent 
when the G overnm ent re tu rned  the counties to Bunyoro.
Toro and Ankole, the o ther main kingdoms in Uganda, as already said, had seceded 
from Bunyoro. In fact, Toro  only m anaged to do so with the assistance of Britain  in the 
last decade of the century . T he two were much smaller and weaker than  B uganda or 
Bunyoro. Indeed B uganda  continued to claim both of them  as its t r ibu ta ry  s ta te s  until 
1900 when, under British pressure, it renounced its rights.
Toro, Ankole, Bunyoro, and Busoga ( which was not a kingdom but consisted of 
independent chieftaincies) were incorporated in the U ganda P ro tec to ra te  in Ju ly , 1896.
^ G en era lly  A.H. Dunbar, A History of Bunyoro- Kitara (Nairobi, OUP, 1965), at pp. 31-43.
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There was no prior treaty with any of them  accepting  B ri ta in ’s protection. However, in 
1900 and  1901, identical ag reem ents were entered  into with Toro  and Ankole, 
respectively, which laid ou t the  d is tr ibu tion  of power between the P ro tec to ra te  
G overnm ent and the rulers of the two nations.
T he  rest of the terr itory  in the north  and eas t,  s tre tch ing  between the Nile and Lake 
Rudolf, was officially declared incorporated  in th e  U ganda P ro tec to ra te  in 1902, under 
the U ganda O rder in Council of th a t  year. P r io r  to th a t ,  between 1894 and 1898, the 
British G overnm ent had despatched m ilitary  expeditions, especially in the no rth ,  to 
forestall a t te m p ts  by the Belgians and the F rench  to acquire terr ito ry  in or near the  Nile 
valley which Britain claimed was par t  of her sphere under the 1890 Anglo-German 
Agreement. Several trea ties  were m ade with local rulers whereby they undertook not to 
cede their terr ito ry  to o ther Europeans or to en te r  into agreem ents with them  except with 
the consent of the British G overnm ent.  U ltim ate ly  the region was secured to Britain 
when France, under the 1899 Anglo-French Agreem ent, acknowledged B rita in ’s claim
o n
over the Nile basin.0
1.3.5 A n g lo -G erm an  R iva lry  for E ast A frica
T he coastal terr itory  s tre tch ing  from Aden in the north  and  as far south as Cape 
Delgado formed par t  of the em pire of the Sultan  of Om an whose headquarters  were a t  the 
time on Zanzibar Island. T he hin terland  of th is  empire was not deep, but, according to 
legend, the  Sultan was so influential th a t  uwhen they pipe [cl j in Zanzibar people dancedjd] 
on the shores of the G rea t Lakes” . Z a n z i b a r  was the commercial centre of the region. 
As the seat of the Sultan it w'as also its political nucleus.
o n  #
° Generally James Barber, Imperial Frontier: A Study of Relations Between the British and 
Pastoral Tribes of North- East Uganda (Nairobi, EAP1I, 1908), at pp. 5-14.
''^Godfrey Uzoigwe, Brit ain and t he Conquest of  Africa: The Age of Salisbury (Ann Arbor,
University of Michigan, 1974), at p. 145, and generally pp. 145-171.
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Although Zanzibar was an independent s t a t e 0 with diplomatic relations with a 
num ber of European countries and the United  S ta tes  of America, the British enjoyed a 
special s ta tu s  a t  the S u ltan ’s court. They were allies of the Sultan from as far back as the 
first decade of the nineteenth  century. M oreover, since their victory over Napoleon in 
1815, the British had undisputedly the m ost powerful force in the Indian Ocean. The 
com bination of power and friendship allowed th em  to dom inate  the Sultan  and the region. 
By supporting  the S u ltan ’s sovereignty over the east coast and the h in terland  the British 
were able for decades to pro tec t  their political and commercial in terests  in the region 
w ithou t  any direct engagem ent in its ad m in is tra t io n .
Anglo-German rivalry for the east Africa in terior sprang from Zanzibar. Until 1884 
B ri ta in ’s monopoly of the coast had never been challenged by any o ther European state .  
In November of th a t  year a group of G erm an  adven turers  (members of the G erm an 
Colonisation Society) led by Carl Peters, w i th o u t  sanction of their G overnm ent,  entered 
into twelve treaties  w ith chiefs in Zanzibar m ain land  wherein the la t te r  purported  to 
surrender their sovereignty to the Society. In spite of s trong  pro tests  from the Sultan 
th a t  the chiefs were his subjects and had no independent sovereignty, the G erm an 
G overnm ent on 2 March 1885 (a few weeks af te r  the notification of the General Act of 
the Conference of Berlin of 1884-85) declared the terr itories  covered by the trea ties  as 
G erm an pro tectorates; and P e te rs ’ Society was gran ted  a  cha rte r  to adm inis te r them  on
o o
its behalf.00 “The Scramble” had reached the  east coast of Africa. Because of the 
complexity in European politics a t  the m ate r ia l  t ime Britain valued G e rm an ’s friendship 
more than  Z anz ibar’s. T hus  Salisbury, in his capacity  as Foreign Secretary, fearful to do
90
9 O
' i t s  independence was guaranteed by the Anglo-French Agreement of 1862, llertslet, Map of  
Africa by T reaty , 3 volumes (London, Frank Case, 1967), 1: 300.
°°R .C oupland, The Exploitation of East Africa 1856- 1 890 (London, Faber and Faber, 1939), at 
pp. 400-405. For discussion of Bismark’s m otive for entering the race for colonies, W.C. 
Henderson, “Germany East Africa 1884-1918,” in Vincent Harlow et al, ed., History of East Africa 
(Oxford, 1965), p p .125-126.
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anything that might alienate the Germans, did not wish to intervene to protect the
o  i  ,  m
Sultan’s dominions. Eventually, as between Britain and Germany, the matter was 
resolved by a Treaty which was signed tow'ards the end of 1886.^°
The gist of the 1886 Anglo-German Agreement was th a t  both countries undertook 
to recognise the sovereignty of the Sultan over the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba and other 
smaller islands. On the mainland they limited it to a narrow coastal strip between five 
and ten miles deep, stretching from Kipini in the north to Rovuma in the south. To 
avoid any future conflicts between the two powers in their quest for territories, the rest of 
the east coast was divided into British and German spheres of influence. The agreed 
demarcation was a line running westwards from the north of the River Wanga or Umba 
“direct to the point on the eastern side of Lake Victoria Nvanza which is intersected by 
the first degree of south latitude” . All the territory north of the line was a British sphere 
and tha t  to the south was German.
The Sultan of Zanzibar, who was neither a party nor consulted during the 
negotiations of the agreement, was forced to accept its terms. His position was so 
weakened by the events tha t ,  on 24 May 1887, he granted a concession (which he had 
earlier refused) to the newly formed British East Africa Association, led by Mackinnon, a 
British businessman. The concession authorised the Association to administer on behalf
o  n
of the Sultan, for a period of fifty years, what was left of the Zanzibar mainland.
Since the 1886 Agreement did not fix the western limits of the sphere, the
‘> 4  f  ^ , ,  . . .  .
Ronald Robinson,  John  Gallagher,  wi th  Alice Denny,  Africa and the Victo r i ans : T he  Official 
Mind of Imperial ism (London,  Macmi l lan,  1961), at  p.192.
'' ’Ilcrtslet ,  Map  of Africa by Trea ty ,  1: 304.
^ A r t i c l e  1 and 3. See i l lustrat ion Map  1.
’’^General ly John G a lb ra i th ,  Mackinnon and East  Africa 1878- 1895 (Cambr idge,  1972), a t  pp. 
127-136.
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hinter land immedia tely became the  focus of Ang lo-German rivalry.  It was believed that  
the  interior,  especially Buganda,  was a rich commercia l  region. In the words of 
M cD erm ot t ,  an official of the Brit ish East  Africa Association:
[The] peculiari ty of the terr itory of East  Africa acquired by Great  Britain and 
Germany,  which explains the movement  t ow ards  the interior adopted by both  
nat ions , ... lay in the  fact t h a t  (he value of the  coas t depended,  ... in large 
measure on the  commerce of the  d is tan t  interior.  Withou t  control of the la t ter ,  
the former could be little no more th an  a barren  acquisit ion; and it was a  s t rong 
conviction of this fact which suggested and gave force to the “hinter land 
doct r ine” ....08
Pet er s ’ German Colonisation Society and M ac k in n o n ’s Association,  organised rival 
expedit ions to explore the interior.  Each accused the  o ther  of plot ting to annex the 
h inter land with a view to cut t ing  off the  o ther  from a lucrat ive t r ad e .0
Salisbury initially resisted calls by Brit ish merchan ts  and some of his official 
advisers to take posit ive steps to protec t  B r i t a in ’s interests  in the hinterland.  Whe the r  he 
did not believe t h a t  the  Germans  posed any serious threat ;  or whether  he still treasured 
thei r friendship more th an  the  allegedly lucra tive h inter land t rade;  or whether he simply 
wanted to avoid com m it t ing  the  Governmen t  to  ven tures  wi thou t  commensura te  returns,  
is a m a t t e r  for debate .  In any case, by the end of 1887, he had s t ar ted  to change his 
a t t i tude .  Early in 1888 a C har t e r  was granted to M ack in non’s Association (thereaf ter  
known as the Imperial  Brit ish East  Africa Com pan y  or “ IB E A C ” ) author is ing it to 
opera te  in the Brit ish Eas t  Africa sphere.
According to Percy Anderson,  Head of the  Africa desk in the  Foreign Office, the 
main reason for g ran t ing  the C h ar te r  was t h a t  the  company would push towards
° ° British East Africa or 1BEA: A I list ory of the Formation and Work of the Imperial British
East Africa Company (London, 1893), at p. 103.
° Uzoigwe, Britain and the Conquest of Africa, at p. 153; and Robinson and Gallagher, Africa 
and the Victorians, at p. 193.
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Buganda.  On the  o ther  hand,  historians  Robinson and Gallagher doubt  whether th a t  was 
indeed Sal isbury’s objective. In their opinion Salisbury was not then concerned about  
Buganda and the rest of the interior; ra the r  his interest  was to use the  Company to 
s t rengthen the  Su l t an ’s position a t  the  coast  agains t  any fur ther  German  intrusion.  
However,  they adm it  th a t  soon thereaf ter  Sal isbury,  for s trategic reasons,  was commit ted  
to bring Buganda under B r i ta in ’s control.  Having decided th a t  Bri tain would stay in 
Egypt  to guard Suez, his Government  was determined to block other  European countries 
from controll ing Buganda,  the  source of the  Nile, and the rest of the terr itory in the 
Upper N i l e . ^
It was Peters  who reached Buganda first. At  the  t ime of his arrival  there was a 
brief lull in the political turmoi l.  In a tense s i tua t ion Peters  quickly entered into a 
provisional t rea ty  wi th  Mwanga.  The essence of this t rea ty  was t h a t  Buganda would 
remain neutral  and open to t rade  and se t t lem ent  for all Europeans . No sooner had he left 
than Jackson,  an agent  of the Imperial Brit ish East  Africa Company ,  arrived at  
M w an g a ’s court.  Jackson failed in his endeavour  to persuade Mwanga (then in alliance 
with the Cathol ic faction) to abandon his t rea ty  with  Peters ,  or to enter  into one with his 
Company.  However,  on his depar ture  from Buganda he left behind a European employee 
of the  Company,  and he took with him two of M w a n g a ’s envoys to confirm at  Zanzibar 
whether Buganda was in the  Brit ish,  Ge rm an ,  or French sphere of influence.
With  the agents of the British and Germ an  companies locked in a stiff compet it ion 
for the interior,  their Governm ent s  decided to resolve diplomatical ly the two countries’ 
rivalry for terr i tory in Africa. The discussions s tar t ed  in Berlin on 5 May 1890 and lasted 
for a lmost  two months .  Th e outcome was the  1890 Anglo-German Agreement ,  whereby
^ J . V .  Wild, The History of t ho Uganda Agreement (London, Macmillan, 1955), at pp.24-25, 
and 33.
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the British and German spheres of influence in Africa were determ ined .^  By virtue of 
this Agreement the future Uganda Protectorate was secured in the British east Africa 
sphere of influence.
In this thesis I examine the development of Brita in’s legal power in Buganda from 
the signing of the 1890 Anglo-German Agreement. W hat was the legal significance of a 
sphere of influence? What rights accrued to the British Government in the sphere? 
W hat powers did IBEAC have in Buganda? These are some of the questions which I 
investigate in the following chapter.
41 For discussion of the negotiations, W.M. Roger Louis, “The Anglo-German Hinterland 
Settlement of 189Ü, Uganda Journal 27 (1963), at pp. 71-83.
22
C H A P T E R  2
THE BRITISH SPH E R E  OF INFLUENCE
The Anglo-German Agreem ent re la ting  to  Africa and Heligoland was signed on 1 
July 1890. Its object was to acknowledge and  dem arcate  certain  territories in Africa as 
falling within the British and  G erm an spheres of interest respectively. The sphere 
reserved for Britain  was defined as bounded to the south  by the “line running from the 
m outh  of the River Umba to the  point w'here the 1st parallel of south  la ti tude reaches the 
Congo Free S ta te  ....” To the north  it was bounded by the Italian sphere and Egypt, and 
to the west by the Congo Free S ta te  and th e  watershed of the basin of the Upper Nile.1 
W ithin this terr ito ry  was the Kingdom of B uganda and other com m unities which w'ere 
subsequently am algam ated  to  form the U g an d a  P ro tec to ra te .
Under Article (vii) of the  A greem ent,  Britain and G erm any undertook not to 
“interfere with the sphere of influence assigned to the o ther ... or make acquisitions, 
conclude treaties ,  accept sovereign rights or pro tec tora tes ,  nor hinder the extension of 
influence of the o ther.’1 Moreover, they agreed to preclude their respective subjects, or 
companies subject to their au th o r i ty ,  from exercising any sovereignty within each o th er 's  
sphere except with the consent of the Power concerned.
Agreem ents of th is  n a tu re  had precedents  a t least as early as the  fifteenth cen tu ry ,  
when in 1179 and 1194 Papal Bulls were issued to divide the new world into zones or
Mlertslet, M ap of Africa by T rea t  y , .‘5: 399. See i l lustration ,  M ap  1.
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spheres of exploration between Spain and  Portugal.  But the concept of sphere of 
influence gained its prominence in the la te  nineteenth  century , during the European  
scramble for Africa and the  Pacific islands. According to Westlake, it was invented 
during this period to hasten the colonisation process, as annexation  and estab lishm ent of 
p ro tec to ra tes  were not fast enough in the acquisition of terr ito ry . The main reason for 
resorting to sphere agreem ents was to avoid conflicts am ongst European nations in their
O
rivalry for terr ito r ies .0 The first such agreem ent was the Anglo-German Treaty  of 1885 
relating to certain terr itory  in Africa.* 4
In this chapter  I examine the legal significance which was attached  to these 
a rrangem ents  during the period under investigation  in both in terna tional and English 
municipal law, especially with regard to the  rights and obligations which accrued to  the 
British G overnm ent vis-a-vis th ird  s ta tes  and within the sphere. I shall also s tudy  the 
power and the au thority  of the Imperial British E ast  Africa C om pany, and the foundation 
the company laid in the developm ent of B r i ta in ’s legal au thority  in Buganda.
2.1 S p h er e  a n d  T h ird  S ta te s
Agreements recognising spheres of influence, like all trea ties , were binding upon all 
those party  to them. On th a t  score B ri ta in ’s east Africa sphere was safe against possible 
challenge from G erm any. W ith  reference to third s ta tes  the position was less certain . 
This was partly  due to  the fact that the concept of a  sphere of influence was relatively 
new and was invented a t  a time of b i t te r  rivalry for terr ito ry  am ong European nations. 
Legal principles were still in their early s tages of development. It is noteworthy th a t  up 
to 1891 none of the leading English au tho rs  on in terna tional law had w ritten  a n y th in g  on
'^Clair Bailey, The Constitutional History and Law of Southern R hodcsia, 1888- 1965 (Oxford,
1966), at p.8. Also Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory, at p .208.
'^ Collected Papers of John West lake on Public 1 nternational Law (Cambridge,  1914), at p. 130.
4 hindley, The Acquisition and Government of  Backward Territory, at p.210.
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the su b jec t .5 Even then Hall, in his 1894 edition of The Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction
of the British C row n, observed th a t  the te rm  sphere of influence “is one to which no very
definite m eaning is as yet a t t a c h e d . N o  wonder th a t  when a British par liam en ta r ian  in
1889 asked the  Under Secretary of S ta te  w he ther he could give the House any au tho ri ty
from which information m ight be gathered  as to w ha t  a British sphere of influence m eant
7the la t te r  insisted th a t  the member had to  give notice of the question.
Various official s ta tem en ts  during the period also point to either a lack of clear 
comprehension of the concept or an a t t e m p t  to m anipu la te  it for national designs. An 
in teresting  example is the Anglo-Portuguese dispute over terr ito ry  in central Africa. 
P o rtugal based her claim on centuries-long occupation and agreem ents with F rance and 
G erm any  by which she was entitled to extend her sovereignty. While adm itt ing  th a t  the 
recognition of her rights by France and G erm any was not binding upon th ird  sta tes ,  
P ortugal nonetheless m aintained tha t:
... their political im portance , the very great  in terest which both  these powers 
are already taking a t  the present day in the ... African continent,  give to  these 
deliberations so im p o rtan t  a meaning and establish our title  in such a m anner 
th a t ,  in the opinion of the Portuguese G overnm ent.. .  the ti tle  in question can, 
on grounds of the greatest justice, even were others  lacking, be invoked before 
o ther nations as legalising our dominions and sovereignty over the regions in
Q
question.
How could agreem ents which Portugal ad m it ted  were not binding upon third s ta tes  a t  the 
sam e tim e be pleaded against them  as “legalising" her title? Britain  in any case rejected 
the  claim on the grounds of P o r tu g a l’s failure to establish effective occupation in the 
region. In a parliam entary  debate , in late 1888, Salisbury explained B ri ta in ’s position:
... Her M ajes ty ’s G overnm ent d istinctly  do not recognise unlimited claims on 
the part  of P ortugal in the interior of Africa. The conditions by which the 
spheres of influence of European Powers in South Africa are bounded are
5Palley,  Th e  Const  it ut ional  History and Law of Sout hern Rhodes ia , at  p.9n.
^ (Oxford ,  1894), at  p.228.
^2 Apri l  1889, House of Co m m on s  Debates ,  3rd Series, vol. 334, col. 1386.
^Quo ted  Herber t  .A.Smith,  ed.,  Great  Bri tain and t he haw of Nat ions (London,  P .S .King  and 
Son, 1932) a t  p. 10.
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perfectly well known. Those influences are not recognised, except where 
se t t lem en ts  take place, and where a  Power possesses the  means of m ain ta in ing  
order, protecting  foreigners, and controlling the natives .9
The d ispute was eventually resolved by a trea ty  between the two countries thereby
avoiding a  possible military confron ta t ion .19
Ironically alm ost ten years later, Salisbury was apparen tly  not ashamed to ad o p t  an 
argum en t similar to one advanced by Portugal to justify B ri ta in ’s claim over te rr i to ry  in 
the Upper Nile which France was threa ten ing .  In a note to  the French A m bassador, he 
protested th a t :
F rance had received warnings th a t  a  seizure of land in th a t  locality could not 
be accepted by G rea t  Britain. T he first warning was the Anglo-German 
Agreement, and the  provisions of which as regards the Nile wrere never formally 
contested. The next warning was given by the Agreem ent with the King of the 
Belgians, the Sovereign of the Congo Free S ta te
Were the “warnings” supposed to convey any legal significance? On the surface th a t
seems to be the Foreign Secretary’s a rgum ent.  Perhaps it was a political ploy to  put
pressure on France to acknowledge the position. Salisbury m ust have been aw are  of the
weakness of B r i ta in ’s legal claim to the terr ito ry . A part  from the fact th a t  B ritain  had
no any form of se t t lem en t in the region in question, in 1895 Salisbury’s predecessor,
Rosebery, had received a  confidential legal opinion from the Lord Chancellor, Herschell,
tha t :
O ur sphere in t h a t  par t  of Africa [Nile Valley] rests on an agreement which 
am o u n ts  to no m ore than this th a t  the Powers who are part ies to it [his 
emphasis] will no t interfere with the recognised sphere of influence of the other. 
B ut it is difficult to  see wdiat effect such agreem ent can have as regards a Power 
not a par tv  to it and  who has not recognised it or w ha t  right it can give aga inst
1 9
such a Power.
On the o ther hand , Salisbury’s theory might have been th a t  since third s ta tes  failed
9Ibid., at p. 16.
1 ^Treaty of 3 July 1891, Her Islet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 3:1061.
'^Quoted Westlake, International haw Part 1: Peace (Cambridge, 1910), at p .133. 
1 ^Lord Chancellor to Rosebery, 28 April 1895, Confidential Rosebery MSS 71.
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to  object after a considerable period of t im e they were legally estopped from challenging 
B r i ta in ’s sphere. Such an argum ent,  according to Westlake, could not be sustained 
because silence only damaged if there was a duty  to speak. W estlake subm its  th a t  there 
was no obligation upon th ird  s ta tes  to object aga inst agreem ents, such as the  Anglo-
G erm an  Agreement, since they did not interfere with their  rights. Besides, he says th a t  a
1
sphere of influence was unknown in in terna tional law.
W hatever the case it is evident th a t  a claim of sphere of influence by itself was not 
legally sufficient to preclude o ther s ta tes  which had not expressly or tacitly  recognised it. 
Besides, it appears th a t  th ird  s ta tes  were not bound by a claim of a  sphere except where 
the  country  asserting it had established some form of control over the  region . * 4 Since, 
m ainly for financial reasons, the British G overnm ent was unwilling to  assume any 
adm in is tra t ive  responsibility in the east Africa sphere, it gran ted  a  C h ar te r  to the 
Imperial British E ast  Africa Com pany to operate  within the sphere. T he object was for 
the  company to set up a government, a t  its own expense, to control the region in re turn  
for the  expected economic gains. Its presence would s treng then  B ri ta in ’s claim over the 
sphere against all potential c la im ants ,  a t  no cost to the G r o w n . * W e  revert to this 
below.
^ International Law, at p.131. See also Baty, “Protectorates and Mandate” , 1921-22 B.Y.B.I.L  
109, at p. 115. But see Taylor, International Public Law (Chicago, Callingham, 1910), at p .271, 
predicted that the sphere of influence would develop into a positive canon of international.
*4 Perhaps not so surprisingly ( in view of the intense rivalry and mutual suspicion at the time) 
there was fear in some British official circles that the Anglo-German Agreement might not be 
legally sufficient to exclude the Germans from the British sphere unless Britain established an 
effective administration, even though settlement was never mentioned in the Agreement as a 
prerequisite, see Memo by Major Wingate on the effect on Egypt of the withdrawal from Uganda,  
21 August 1892, FOCP/G341.
*°For a general discussion of the reasons for the Charter companies, see Lugard, The Dual 
Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London, Frank Cass, 1965), at pp. 18-31.
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2.2 A u th or ity  and O bligation in the Sphere
The nature and extent of authority and obligation of a nation claiming a sphere 
were never very clear. In the House of Commons debate in 1891, a member inquired from 
the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether a British sphere of influence 
entailed any authority or sovereignty over the native people. The Minister responded 
tha t  Her Majesty’s Government had “repeatedly” stated tha t  within a sphere no 
sovereignty was assumed except with the consent of the local rulers.16 When a similar 
question was put to him a month later he replied, with apparent irritation, that he had 
answered it “a good many times” . The persistence of the parliamentary questions is 
not surprising. There was no writing on the subject; and the Government’s position in 
the sphere was sometimes inexplicable: it granted a Charter to the 1BEAC; there were 
talks of constructing a railway from the coast right across the British East Africa sphere 
to the shores of Lake Victoria; Britain undertook to stam p out slave trade in the sphere; 
she purported to lease to the Congo Free State part of her sphere in the Upper Nile, and
I Q
so on. W hat could the Crown not do in the sphere?
Probably the clearest exposition of the legal position by a contemporary statesman 
was tha t  made during the House of Commons debate on the east Africa sphere in 1892, 
by Sir William Harcourt, formerly Professor of International law at Cambridge University 
then a Liberal Party member of parliament.:
A sphere of influence confers no rights, no authority over the people, ... or 
authority over the land of any kind .... Every act of force you commit against a 
native within a sphere is an unlawful assault; every acre of land you take is 
robbery; every native you kill is murder, because you have no right and 
authority over these men, ... except such as in any particular spot may have 
been given you by Treaty with any particular Chief.
1 6 15 June 1891, Hansards Parliamentary Debates 1890-91, 3rd Series, vol.351, col.404-405.
1 71 bicl., 20 July 1891, col. 1761.
The French Government questioned the legal basis of the lease since the British had no 
sovereignty over the region, Lindley, The Acquisit ion of Government, at p.215.
191 March 1892, House of Commons Debate, 1th Series 55 Victoria, 1892, vol. 2, col.71.
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H a rco u r t ’s views were similar to those expressed by Hall in the 1894 edition of his
Foreign Jurisdict ion of the British C ro w n . He wrote t h a t  in a sphere of influence “No
jurisdict ion is assumed,  no internal  or external  sovereign power is taken out of the  hands
o n
of the tribal  chiefs; no definite responsibility consequent ly is incurred.” This  
in terpre ta t ion was convenient  to the Brit ish Government .  There  was no need for 
par l iament  or the British public to worry abou t  the endless expansion of the  Brit ish 
empire — the  Crown had no responsibility over the  sphere except  where it chose to  by 
express agreement  with the local ruler. Nevertheless,  it was believed to be the t ru e  legal 
position. Indeed this is reflected in the Africa Order  in Council,  1889.
The Orde r  was the  basic law' for the exercise of the C ro w n ’s jurisdict ion in any par t  
of Africa where it was applied.  For purposes of this Order  the  whole east Africa sphere
o  1
was declared a local jurisdict ion.  We discuss this Order  in subsequent  chapters.  
Presently it is enough to point out  t h a t  it was primari ly intended for adminis ter ing 
justice (by consular cour ts  establ ished thereunder) to Brit ish subjects.  Under English 
municipal law, subjects of the  Crown,  wherever they might  lx*, re ta in their allegiance to 
it, and therefore for certain purposes  are liable if they act  contrary  to tha t  allegiance or 
the municipal law.“'* With  reference to non-Bri ti sh subjects,  the  Order  made provision 
for the exercise of consular  jurisdict ion over foreigners (who included the  local 
inhabi tants)  w ho either subm it t ed  to British jurisdict ion or whose sovereigns by t rea ty  or 
otherwise manifested thei r  consent.  In the case of Imperat rix v .1 lima bin Fakir and Urzee 
bin Sul leman, the High Cour t  of Bombay was emphat ic  t h a t  the British consular cour ts  
had no jurisdict ion over the  nat ives  of the sphere for offences commit ted  wdthin the 
sphere. Th e fact tha t  the  Brit ish Go vernmen t  had under taken an international  obl igat ion
20(Stevens), al p.228.
o i
Article 5. For text see Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, 18:1. Also at p.63, the Secretary of 
State’s instructions of 22 February 1890, applying the Order to the sphere.
22Henry Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction Beyond (die Seas (Oxford, 1902), pp. 136-137.
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to  eliminate slavery and a rm s  trafficking in all territories under its control, including
0 ‘)
spheres of influence, was held to be irre levant to  t he jurisdictional issue. It is su b m itted  
th a t  this ruling was consistent with the then  prevailing in te rp re ta t ion  th a t  the C row n 
could not exercise any power or au thority  w ith in  the sphere, except w ith the consen t of 
the local rulers.
2.3 I B E A C ’s A u thority  in the  Sphere
If the Crown had no power in B r i ta in ’s sphere of influence, on w ha t  legal basis did 
it au thorise the Imperial British E ast Africa C om pany to exercise sovereignty there in?  
This  issue was not raised when the Com pany petitioned for the C h ar te r ,  but tw o  years 
earlier it had caused some concern over the  N ational Africa C o m p an y ’s (later the  Royal 
Niger C om pany) application for a C h ar te r  to  operate  in the Niger region. B oth  the 
Colonial and Foreign Offices had expressed serious doubt abou t the competency of the 
Crown under international law to gran t a C h a r te r  in territories over which it exercised no 
jurisdiction or p ro tec to ra te / 1 However, by the  time the IBEAC m ade its peti t ion  the 
legal difficulty had been explained away. T he a rgum ent then was th a t ,  by g ran ting  the 
C h ar te r ,  the Crown was not purporting  to  give the petitioners any sovereign powers in 
the terr ito ry , ra ther it was merely au thoris ing  them  to exercise such powers as were
o r
delegated to them  by the local sovereign / 0  F rom  the English municipal law poin t of 
view the C h ar te r  was the formal consent to  the  petitioners to accept and exercise those 
sovereign powers. Otherwise it was illegal, according to the Law Officers, for a  British 
subject to accept or assume sovereignty over a foreign country.
^’'(1898) I.L.R (Bombay) 54, 75-76. At page 82, Justice Renade summed up the position that, 
for purposes of internal jurisdiction, a sphere was an “independent territory where the Consular 
Court has no direct authority and cannot control the actions of its native rulers ... .”
O  A
Robinson cl al, Africa and the Victorians, at pp. 181-182.
^°C.O. and Dr Dean to Salisbury, 8 August 1885, F O C P/2275.
O / »
z Opinion of 9 January, 1854, Arnold Macnair, International Law Opinions, Selected and 
Annotated (Cambridge, 1956) 1:5. See also memo by Wright and Davidson, August, 1885, 
F04 12/28.
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T he  IB E A C  C ha rte r, A r t ic le  2, c lea rly  ind ica tes th a t the a u th o r ity  w h ich  was 
g ran ted  to  the C om pany was to  acquire any pow er by tre a ty  or agreem ent w ith  the  local 
ru le rs  “ and to  ho ld , use, en joy, and exercise the  same, fo r the purposes o f the C om pany ... 
sub jec t to  the ch a rte r.” I t  is thus  no t s t r ic t ly  co rrec t to  say, as some w rite rs  have done, 
th a t the  C row n  gave the C om pany sovereign powers in the s p h e r e . T h e  p re v a ilin g  view 
was th a t  the C row n had no sovereign power in  the  sphere and could no t give w h a t i t  d id
o o
n o t have. As we shall see p resen tly , the C om pany, p r io r  to  es tab lish ing  its  
a d m in is tra tio n  in the sphere, entered in to  trea ties  w ith  the K abaka  and o the r ru le rs . One 
reason fo r th is  was th a t lega lly , and under its  C h a rte r, i t  could  no t exercise any a u th o r ity  
in the  te r r ito ry  except w ith  the  consent o f the  local ch ief.
I t  is in s tru c tiv e  th a t w ha teve r r ig h ts  o r a u th o r ity  the C om pany acquired were fo r 
its  ow n purposes. T h is  no d o u b t was in tended  to  m ake i t  c lear th a t i t  was a c tin g  on its  
own and no t on behalf o f the G ove rnm en t. H ow ever, the C row n  reserved in the  C h a rte r 
s u b s ta n tia l powers w hich  i t  could  use to  m a n ip u la te  and steer the C om pany in  a desired 
d ire c tio n . F or exam ple, the C om pany was precluded from  exercis ing any tre a ty  r ig h ts  or 
g ra n ts  u n t i l  the  Secretary o f S ta te  had s ign ified  his app rova l o f the tre a ty . M oreove r, the 
C om pany could n o t assign o r lease any r ig h ts  w ith o u t the consent o f the G o ve rnm e n t.
O Q
A nd i f  a ll else fa iled the C h a rte r could be re v o k e d /
T hus  as fa r as the B r it is h  were concerned, the  C om pany was no t on ly a p r iv a te  
fin a n c ia l ven tu re  in the sphere b u t lega lly  i t  was independent o f the G ove rnm en t though  
sub jec t to  its  co n tro l. The measure o f its  legal a u th o r ity  in the sphere was a m a tte r  fo r 
n e g o tia tio n  w ith  the local sovereigns. I t  is w ith in  th a t legal and p o lit ic a l fram ew ork  th a t 
the  C om pany proceeded to  Buganda.
27 For example, Karugire, A Po litica l H istory of Uganda, at p.73.
28 iLord Chancellor Herschell (confidential) opinion to F.O., memorandum of 5 November 1892, 
FO CP/6535.
^ A r t ic le s  2, 3, 5,6 and 7.
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2.4  I B E A C  in B u g a n d a
C ap ta in  Lugard was the first Com pan y  official specifically accredited to Buganda.  
He received his orders to proceed to Buganda  two months  af ter  the signing of the  1890 
Anglo-German Agreement .  His ins t ruct ions ,  in his own words,  were brief and somewhat  
vague.  He summarised them  as follows: firstly,  to offer M wanga a “guarantee  of peace in 
his k ingdom and to impress him wi th a sense of the power of the  C ompany” ; secondly,  to 
exercise ua s teady pressure upon h im ” with  the object of securing control of all affairs 
concerning Europeans  in his country;  finally to show impar t ia l i ty  in dealing with  the 
religious/polit ical  factions,  except th a t ,  if the  others  proved “in t rac tab le” , he was to join 
hands  with  the  P ro tes tan ts .  Al though Lugard was not  expressly told to make a t rea ty  
wi th Mwanga,  he gathered from previous Company inst ructions t h a t  it was a priority 
which should give him “an acknowledged and legal s t a t us  in the  country to deal wi th its 
t roubles.” W i thout  a  t rea ty ,  Lugard wrote ,  “any action I took would be mere 
filibustering. It would be open to Mwanga,  when I had rendered him any assistance in 
my power,  to profit by my work and repud ia te  ... any obl igat ion.” 0
T re a ty  making wi th the Baganda proved to be much more difficult than  Lugard 
ant ic ipated .  It took a  week of tense and close to violent negot iat ions  before the  Ka baka 
and his chiefs re luctantly agreed to sign the  t rea ty .  This  was par tly due to the prevail ing 
factional animosi ty am ong  the chiefly oligarchy.  Whi le the P rotes tan ts  led by the 
Katiki ro  (Pr ime Minister) Apolo Kagwa welcomed the Brit ish Company and,  according 
to Lugard,  were anxious  to discuss the te rm s  of the t rea ty ,  the  Catholics and M wanga 
(then a Cathol ic) were not.  They were a d a m a n t  th a t  no t rea ty  would be signed until  the 
K a b a k a ’s envoys sent to Zanzibar wi th Jackson re turned wi th a confirmat ion th a t  
B uganda was indeed in the British sphere.  Moreover,  the  negotiations were lengthy 
because the  Baganda were bargaining with Lugard abou t  the  terms of the t rea ty.  Lugard
o()The Rise, vol.2, at pp.16, and 19-20.
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was surprised by the num ber of questions ( “all most, intelligent for these people are very
clever” ) which the Baganda asked him  during  the negotiations. He noted that:
Every clause is discussed in all its bearing som etimes for days, words are 
altered , and the foresight and determ ina tion  which the natives show of 
forecasting the bearing on the fu ture  of every regulation is as keen almost as
o  1
would be th a t  of Europeans .... 1
L u g ard ’s observation is significant. It con trad ic ts  the common generalisation th a t  
the African signatories to treaties w ith  Europeans did not comprehend the transactions. 
In the  circumstances described by Lugard, there m ust have been reasonable 
comprehension by the B aganda — hence the tension and the vigorous bargain.
In spite of the clam our, on Boxing Day of 1890, a t rea ty  was signed by the Kabaka,
o o
and Lugard signed on behalf of the C om pany. The pith  of the trea ty  was th a t  the
C om pany  offered to p ro tec t  Buganda and to  introduce an adm in is tra tive  system to secure
peace, prosperity and commerce, and to prom ote  civilisation. The Kabaka, accepted the
C o m p a n y ’s protection and undertook not to enter into any agreem ent with any European
of w hatever nationality ,  or allow E uropeans to settle in his country  except through and
«> «>
with the  consent of the C om p an y ’s resident officer.0'' Under Article 3(a) all m a tte rs  and 
questions regarding Europeans were to be the sole responsibility of the C o m p an y ’s 
resident officer who would act as an “a rb i t ra to r"  and whose decision, subject to appeal to 
senior officers of the C om pany, was to  be final. No m ention was m ade of jurisdiction over 
the B aganda  and other non-Europeans. However, the C o m p an y ’s resident officer was 
given wide general powers to intervene in the K ab ak a ’s adm in is tra tion .  For example, 
Article 2(ff) provided th a t  the K abaka  had to seek his consent before declaring war and 
“in all serious affairs and m atte rs  connected with the s ta te .” Under the guise of this
° h b id . ,  at pp.33-34; also Lugard, “Treaty Making in Africa,” 1893 J.R.C.S, at pp.54-55.
*} O
oz,For the text see Mergary Perham, ed., Lugard’s Dairies (London, Faber, 1957), 2:42-45. 
Article 1.
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provision a lot of powers could be a s s u m e d / '1 Finally, the  trea ty  was expressly limited to 
a period of two years subject to renewal and revision as circum stances m ight require.
It has been mentioned above th a t  under the C o m p an y ’s Charter ,  no trea ty  made by 
it was effective till a copy thereof had been sent to the Secretary of S ta te  and his approval 
signified. In this case Lugard enforced the  trea ty  immediately w ithout waiting for 
confirmation, which was only given more th an  a  year la te r .35 Ironically by th a t  time 
Lugard and M w anga had already entered in to  a fresh t rea ty  which supposedly superceded 
all earlier ones “whatsoever with whomsoever concluded.” 36 The la tter  trea ty  was 
subm itted  to the Foreign Office in October, 1892, b u t ,  for reasons s ta ted  below, it was 
not ratified. Consequently, on the basis of the  C h ar te r ,  neither under the former nor the 
la t te r  trea ty  did the IBEAC acquire the necessary legal au thority  to adm inister Buganda. 
Arguably, as between B uganda and the C om pany the trea ty  was valid since it was not 
m ade subject to the approval of the Foreign Secretary. It was up to the Crown to 
penalise or condone the Com pany for violation of the C h ar te r .  In the event the issue does 
not appear to have a t t ra c ted  the G o v ern m en t’s a t ten t io n .  Presum ably  it was not, in the 
circumstances, regarded as a serious breach of the C harte r .
The C om pany had scarcely established itself when a war broke out between the 
P ro te s tan ts  and the Catholics (with M w anga on the  side of the la tter) .  Eventually , with 
the assistance of Lugard, the P ro te s tan ts  won. Following the war Lugard, as a condition 
for restoring M w anga (by then a P ro te s tan t)  to his th rone, forced him to sign the 1892 
trea ty  which gave the Com pany wider powers. By th a t  time, however, the Company had 
in tim ated  to the British G overnm ent its in tention to  pull out of B uganda and the whole 
of the Lake region. Heavy tran sp o r t  costs and the C o m p an y ’s involvement in wars in
o l See also Articles 5-7.
350 n  29 April 1892, Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 1:378.
For the text see Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, 38:5-7.
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B uganda and in neighbouring terr ito r ies  had drained all its resources. Because of the 
political turm oil there was no revenue to  balance the b o o k s . N o r  would the British 
G overnm en t agree to give financial assistance.
At the  end of March, 1893, the Imperial British East Africa Company officially 
completed its w ithdraw al from B uganda and all the territories  beyond. Indeed the only 
region in th e  sphere where it remained was U kam ba and Kikuyu (Kenya).
2.5 Legacy o f  the IB E A C  Treaties
As we shall see in the following chap te r  the decision of the Com pany to abandon the 
sphere, especially Buganda, p rom pted  a widespread outcry in Britain urging the 
G overnm ent to  take over the adm in is tra t ion  of Buganda. For the m om ent, however, our 
interest is with another,  albeit re lated, debate ,  namely the fate of the C om pany’s t rea ty  
rights and obligations in the sphere. W as the British G overnm ent bound by the trea ties  
or en titled  to the rights acquired under them ? This issue was raised as soon as the 
Com pany indicated to the Foreign Office its plans to  w ithdraw . Because of the 
uncerta in ty  of the si tuation , especially as the British G overnm ent was not anxious to 
assume the C om pany 's  responsibility in the sphere, the Secretary of S ta te  declined to 
approve the  second trea ty  between Lugard and M w anga and those m ade with the rulers 
of Ankole, Toro, and o ther chiefs in the region.*^
The issue of the legacy of the C om pany 's  t rea ties  was raised with the Lord 
Chancellor, Herschell, who, as we have seen, had on a num ber of occasions expressed 
views on the C row n’s legal au th o r i ty  and obligation in the  sphere. Herschell advised the 
Foreign Office th a t ,  if the C om pany ceased to adm in is te r  and afford protection to any
37 McDermott, British East Africa, pp. 195-203; also Galbraith, Mackinnon and East Africa, at 
p.192.
9 0
' Rosebery’s memo of October, 1892. IBEAC’s other treaties are enclosed in Portal to Rosebery, 
29 August 1892, F O C P/6341.
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terr ito ry  as promised under its trea ties  “ th a t  would of itself absolve the native chiefs from 
all obligations under the trea ty ,  arid the trea ty  would be practically a t  an end.” The 
Lord Chancellor stressed th a t  neither rights nor obligations under the treaties would be 
incurred by the British Governm ent. W hether the Crown had a moral duty with respect 
to the trea ties  which were approved by tfie Secretary of S ta te ,  in his view, was a  different 
proposit ion .* ^
The Lord Chancellor’s opinion was consisten t with his previous legal advice to the 
Foreign Office. But Rosebery most likely would have preferred a different opinion. He 
was strongly behind the move for the  Crown to take  over the adm inis tra tion  of Buganda. 
Indeed he threa tened  to resign from his C ab inet post if his colleagues decided against it.'*1* 
If the G overnm ent were held legally responsible for the C om p an y ’s treaties, it would have 
added am m unition  to his campaign. In terestingly, in his instructions to Gerald Porta l ,  
Commissioner in Zanzibar and the British east  Africa sphere ,'*1 he somewhat down played 
the Lord C hancellor’s opinion. While emphasising the “considerable difficulty” 
concerning the C o m p an y ’s treaties, he rem arked  th a t  “W hether an approval [of the 
Secretary of State] can be held in any way, directly or indirectly, to bind Her M ajes ty ’s 
G overnm ent is a m oot po in t.” He told Porta l  to  investigate and report on the practical
i  n
effect to B ri ta in ’s repu ta tion  in these regions were she not to adop t  the treaties.
P redictably  P orta l ,  who also strongly favoured re taining Buganda, reported th a t ,  
w hatever the legal d istinctions were between the Com pany and the Crown:
... the impression conveyed to the different native chiefs and peoples in this
of 23 November 1892, FO C P /6362 . In 1897, the Law Officers expressed doubt as to 
whether legally the Royal Niger Company could cede to the Crown its rights under treaties made 
with chiefs, L.O. to F.O., 28 December 1897, F O 881/7058 .
^R obin son  al, Africa and the Victorians, at p.318.
*1 Portal was instructed by the Cabinet to make a fact finding mission to Uganda and write a 
report which was to be used as a basis for its decision over the territory.
^2 Rosebery to Port al, 10 December 1892, F O C P /6362 .
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region [British east Africa sphere] when they signed trea ties  and received in 
re turn  the C om pany’s flag and promise of protection was th a t  they were thereby 
placing themselves under the protection of the G overnm ent of G reat Britain.
Even among the more intelligent people of [B]Uganda the same belief obtained
P orta l  urged a practical solution to the problem of the treaties. He cautioned the 
G overnm ent th a t  failure to assume the C o m p an y ’s t rea ty  obligations was bound to 
tarn ish  the English reputa tion  (which he claimed was held in higher esteem than th a t  of 
o ther Europeans), and ruin B ri ta in ’s commercial prospects in the region.4'’
Eventually the G overnm ent decided to make fresh treaties  with the chiefs 
th roughout the British sphere. M ost likely the legal uncertain ties  indicated by the Lord 
Chancellor contributed to the  decision. Besides, the Com pany had assumed substan tia l  
powers and duties under its trea ties  which the Crown was not, as yet, prepared to accept. 
W ith  the exception of the trea ty  between M w anga and Porta l ,  to be discussed in the 
following chapter,  in none of the G overnm ent trea ties  with the chiefs was protection 
promised or any obligation assumed. Essentially the treaties  were of “friendship” and 
trade ,  with a provision th a t  the chiefs would not cede their terr ito ry  or enter into any 
trea ty  or agreem ent with any European except with the consent of the British 
G overnm ent.  The content of these trea ties  was com patible with B rita in ’s policy of 
re ta in ing control over the sphere, by excluding other Powers, but w ithou t taking over the 
adm in is tra tion  of the terr itory .
2 .6  S u m m a r y  an d  C o n c lu s io n
The main political objective for dem arca t ing  spheres of influence was to elim inate 
relentless rivalry for territories. But, as the evidence in this chap te r  indicates, there  was 
a  general confusion and uncerta in ty  as to the na tu re  and scope of a sphere. Since spheres
4,,Portal to Rosebery, 1 November 1893, F O C P /6497 .  But see Fugard (report of 11 April 1894, 
encl. IBEAC to F.O., 11 April 1894, FOCP/C557), lie claimed that the Baganda were aware of the 
difference between the Company and the Crown.
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were based on bi-lateral trea ties ,  legally they were only significant as against those states 
which were parties  or which had recognised them , though this did not prevent countries 
claiming spheres from asserting vague legal rights even against those which had not 
expressly done so. Secondly, to secure a  terr ito ry  against rival s tates  there had to be 
some form of adm in is tra tive  control over it. It would seem th a t  international law did not 
reach the stage where a  sphere, like a p ro tec to ra te ,  was recognised as giving an exclusive 
claim which was good as aga inst all o ther countries.
T he popular in te rp re ta tion  was th a t  a sphere gave neither rights nor obligations 
except th a t  acquired from the local sovereign. This in terp re ta tion  was convenient to the 
British G overnm ent.  It could afford to  make claims of sphere of influence without 
undertak ing  any responsibility over the te rr i to ry ,  though a t  the risk of losing to rival 
countries. However, it would be wrong to conclude th a t  this construction was m aintained 
simply because it was advantageous to  Britain . The law was uncertain, and this 
construc tion , according to  the prevailing legal theory, was presumed to be the legal 
position. This is reflected in the IBEA C C harte r ,  the Africa Order in Council, the 
opinions (some of which were confidential) expressed by contem porary  lawyers, and the 
trea ties  w ith the chiefs.
During the period investigated the only power and au tho ri ty  acquired in Buganda 
was by the Imperial British East Africa C om pany under the 1890 and 1892 trea ties  with 
M w anga. These powers were extensive bu t  they were its own. Consequently the 
C om pany did not lay any legal foundation for the C row n’s au tho ri ty  in B uganda, or, for 
th a t  m a t te r ,  anywhere else in the sphere. In political term s, of course, the role of the 
com pany in opening up the  country and re ta in ing it for the eventual adm in is tra tion  of the 
British G overnm ent canno t be overemphasised. Indeed, as Portal reported, the chiefs in 
the sphere assumed th a t  the  com pany’s trea t ie s  were those of the Crown.
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In the following chapte r  I examine the  transi tion from a sphere to the Uganda
Protectora te .
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C H A P T E R  3
FROM A SPHERE TO A BRITISH PR O T E C T O R A T E
Once the Com pany decided to  qu it  Buganda, the  British G overnm ent had to  make 
up its mind w hether to  step in and , if so, in which way. The G overnm ent was still 
unwilling to assume responsibility for B uganda  and the rest of the sphere. However, there 
was a  public outcry urging it to take  over the adm in is tra tion  of Buganda. Pressure groups 
m ounted campaigns using all available mass media. They reminded the G overnm ent of 
B r i ta in ’s duty  to s tam p  out slavery and to spread C hris tian ity  and European civilization. 
Businessmen pointed to the loss of po ten tia l m arkets  and a source of raw materials. 
O thers felt th a t  for s trategic reasons Britain  had to stay in Buganda and protect the Nile 
for the sake of E gypt and the Suez C a n a l .1 *3 T he C ab ine t itself was divided. Some 
members were against B rita in’s involvement in B uganda while o thers , particularly 
Rosebery, were in favour. Eventually , by way of compromise, the C ab ine t agreed to 
commission Gerald Porta l  to go to  B uganda to investigate and write a report which it
o
would use in making its final d e c is io n /  As part  of the a rrangem ent the IBEAC was 
requested to m ain ta in  its position in B uganda for a period of three m onths  (ending on 31 
M arch 1893) under G overnm ent sponsorship.'1
In this chapter  I investigate the development of B r i ta in ’s legal au tho ri ty  from the 
da te  of the C o m p an y ’s departu re  up to the declaration of the pro tectorate .
1 Generally Low, Buganda hi Modern History, at pp.55-83.
'^Rosebery to Portal, 10 December 1892, F O C P /6341 .
3F.O. to IBEAC, 30 September 1892, F O C P /6341 .
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3.1 P o r t a l ’s M is s io n
Porta l  was instructed by Rosebery to cu ltivate  friendly relations with M wanga (by 
giving him presents and, if necessary, a small subsidy) and to  impress upon him B ri ta in ’s 
in terest  in his country. However, he was precluded from making any arrangem ents  of a 
perm anen t n a tu re  without fur ther consulting the Secretary of S tate. Otherwise within 
those limits he was given lee-way to exercise his discretion according to the 
circumstances. No specific instruction  was given abou t  the rest of the territories in the 
sphere.'*
Porta l  arrived in Buganda barely a  fortn ight before the C o m p an y ’s final departure. 
Reportedly his arrival was greeted by the B aganda with glamour and splendour; he was 
the  visible symbol of the British G overnm ent.  Indeed one of his first major ceremonies 
was to lower the C om pany’s flag, a t  mid-day on 1 April 1892, and to hoist in its place the 
Union Jack. According to an eyewitness account, Anglican Bishop Tucker, for those 
present “the adm inis tra tion  of Her B rit tan ic  M ajes ty ’s G overnm ent became an 
accomplished fact .... The British G overnm ent had come to s tay .” 0 As a prediction this 
proved to have been right, bu t a t  the t im e Portal had no power to declare Buganda a 
British p ro tec tora te ,  nor for th a t  m a t te r  did he have any legal basis for asserting any 
au tho ri ty  in the country.
The lowering of the C o m p an y ’s flag was the final sign of its evacuation from 
Buganda. Technically, it m eant th a t  B uganda was once again an independent s ta te .  
However, B u g an d a’s freedom was short-lived because barely two m onths  later a fresh 
trea ty  was entered into between M w anga and  Porta l ,  acting on behalf of the British 
Crown. This t rea ty ,  according to P o r ta l ’s despatch  to the Secretary of S ta te ,  was made:
* Rosebery issued (behind the  back of his colleagues) secret instruc tions to P o rta l  to take all 
necessary steps, including negotiat ing  trea ties  w ith the local rulers, to protect B r i ta in ’s interests  in 
the  Upper Nile Valley, Robinson et al, Africa and the  V ictorians, at p .3 ‘26.
°A .R .T u rk e r ,  E ighteen Years iri U ganda  and E as t  Africa (London, Edw ard Arnold, 1911), at 
p.326.
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[Wjith the object of insuring and defining the position and au thority  of Her 
M ajes ty ’s Representative in the country until the final decision and further 
instructions of Her M ajes ty ’s G overnm ent on the whole question can be 
conveyed to him.®
In o ther words, it was intended as a provisional a rrangem ent which immediately provided 
the  British representa tive with a legal basis for asserting au tho ri ty  in Buganda. Porta l  
claimed th a t  the trea ty  was entered in to  by M w anga “of his own free will and a t  his 
request” , and th a t  all possible care was taken to  ensure th a t  he and his principal chiefs 
comprehended its te rm s and willingly gave their consent. The provisions of the trea ty  
were explained to them  “sentence by sentence” by Bishop Tucker, and before it was
7
signed it was left w ith  M wanga for a  fortn ight for his consideration . '  Evidently the 
circumstances were much more relaxed than  three years earlier when Lugard made his 
first trea ty  with M wanga. P a r t  of the credit for this m ust be given to Lugard, whose 
activities had a softening influence upon the B uganda oligarchy. M w anga himself, having 
had serious political problems since he took over the throne, assumed th a t  with the 
British presence he had a be tte r  chance of safeguarding his position. He lived to regret 
this assum ption.
3.2 O utline o f  the T r e a ty * 78
P o r ta l ’s t rea ty  was very carefully drafted. Its term s were described as “conditions” 
which M w anga promised to fulfill with the object of securing British “protection, 
assistance and guidance” in governing his c o u n try .9 The trea ty  was immediately binding 
upon both parties except th a t ,  whereas M w anga was bound to renew it or to enter into 
ano ther  with similar term s if so requested by the British G overnm ent,  the l a t t e r ’s 
obligations were only to  remain until such t im e as the Secretary of S ta te  instructed 
otherwise. M w anga could not escape the t rea ty ,  but the Crown had a discretion to
®Portal to Rosebery, 29 May 1893, F O C P /6 4 9 0 .
7 •'Ib id .  See also T ucker,  Eighteen Y ears , a t  p.265.
8 Appendix 1.
9 Article 3.
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continue with it or to cancel. From  P o r ta l ’s po in t of view, this provision was explicable 
on two main grounds. In the first place, lie had no au thority  to m ake any arrangem ents  
of a  perm anen t nature w ithou t reference to  the  Secretary of S ta te. When the opportun ity  
for a t rea ty  with M w anga presented itself he felt obliged to accept it w ithou t 
transgressing his orders. Secondly, Po rta l  had m ade adverse com m ents  on the C o m p an y ’s 
breach of its trea ties  and the legal obligations it had assumed. He carefully drafted  his 
provisional trea ty  w'ith this in m ind, ensuring th a t  if the G overnm ent did not ratify the 
responsibilities he undertook on its behalf it would be free to  pull ou t in accordance with 
the term s of the agreement. Porta l  had also to ensure th a t  M w anga exactly understood 
the position. In this regard the trea ty  differed from most of the  others made by the 
agents  of European countries w ith  African rulers in th a t  it showed purpose and 
genuineness which the others generally lacked.
Under the trea ty  the British G overnm ent acquired extensive powers and au tho ri ty  
in Buganda. One of the powers was the ad m in is tra t io n  of justice. Article 5 of the treaty  
provided th a t  all cases and m a t te rs  concerning Europeans and persons not born within 
B uganda or in which such persons were involved “so far as ... [the Kabaka] was 
concerned” were to be dealt  with solely bv the British G o v e rn m en t’s representative. 
F rom  this Article it is clear th a t  M w anga had deprived himself of w hatever jurisdiction 
he had over foreigners or cases in which they were involved. Could the British 
representa tive , on the basis of this t rea ty ,  exercise jurisdiction over non-British subjects 
in Buganda? This issue was raised wi th Porta l  by M acdonald , the acting British 
representa tive  he appointed on his d ep a r tu re  from Buganda. M acdonald  a t the time was 
an tic ipa t ing  th a t  M wanga m ight in s t i tu te  legal proceedings in the British representa tive’s 
court aga inst a French Catholic  priest for “fraud” and “breach of con trac t” . T he  case 
related to M w anga 's  children whom the priest had refused to re tu rn  to their father. 
Although Macdonald was confident th a t  it was within his ju risdiction  to deal wit h the
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case, tie feared th a t  the French m ight m ake a “ fuss” if he tried their sub jec t .10
A pparently  Portal did not respond and in the event the case did not materialise as 
the priest re turned the children. Nonetheless, the issue raised by M acdonald is 
interesting. As we have seen, the English law which was applicable in the east Africa 
sphere was the  Africa O rder in Council, 1889.** Article 16 thereof provided th a t  any 
trea ty  or agreem ent made by the Crown with any chief, king, or s ta te ,  with respect to 
any p ar ticu la r  terr itory , w'as to  be enforced as part  of the law under the Order. The 
Article continued th a t ,  in the event of conflict between the provision of the trea ty  and 
any law applicable in England or any th ing  s ta ted  in the O rder itself, the former should 
prevail. Therefore, on the basis of this Article, it is subm itted  th a t  the provisional trea ty  
was law in Buganda under which the British representa tive could exercise jurisdiction 
over non-British subjects. On the o ther hand , as may be recalled, the O rder was 
in terpre ted  to mean th a t  it only applied to British subjects and to foreigners who either
i  o
su b m itted  to  British jurisdiction  or whose sovereigns consented to its exercise. Since 
the foreigners in Buganda were not the K abaka 's  subjects nor under his protection, he
i  o
could not authorise the British representa tive to  adm inister justice over th e m .10 It is 
su b m itted  th a t  the trea ty  with M wanga, in so far as its legal effect was founded on the 
Africa O rder in Council, did not apply to non-British subjects.
10Macdonald to Portal, 13 July 1893, FO C P /6538 .
^ T h e  Order was amended twice in 1892 and 1893, see below.
^ A b o v e  at p.28.
13°Probably Portal did not make this distinction because in his instructions to Macdonald (vide 
29 May 1891, FOCP/6-190), he told him that his (Macdonald’s) powers were spelled out in the 
Africa Order in Council. Portal himself, in his capacity as British Commissioner of the East Africa 
Sphere, was instructed by the Foreign Office that “the administration of justice, as regards 
Europeans and others, not natives of the country, will be exercised under the Africa Order in 
Council,” quoted in 1BEAC to F.O., 12 October 1894, F 0 2 /7 5 .  However, other F.O. 
correspondence indicate that, according to the interpretation of the Foreign Office, application of 
the Order was limited to British subjects, see e.g., F.O. to IBEAC, 24 September 1894; and the 
Foreign Office Committee on the administ ration of east Africa, 17 April 1894, FOCP/6489.
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Besides, in 1891, the Law Officers reported  th a t  it was necessary “in order to give 
valid ity  to  [an] Order in Council so far as it ... [might] affect the subjects of o ther Powers, 
th a t  the  terr itories  comprised therein should be declared to be under the protection of Her 
M ajesty  the Queen.” The Law Officers were com m enting upon a draft Order in Council 
which purported  to confer upon the High Commissioner of British Bechuanaland 
ju risd ic tion  over foreigners in southern  M atabele land  on the basis of a trea ty  with its 
ruler, Lobengula. They argued th a t ,  in in terna tional law, jurisdiction was either 
te rr ito r ia l  or based on consent. Where a  pro tec to ra te  had been declared, consent of the 
signatory  Powers to the Berlin and Brussels Acts was inferred.** Since Buganda had not 
been declared a British p ro tec to ra te ,  it followed from the  Law Officers’ report th a t  the 
Crown could not exercise the jurisdiction which was acquired under the trea ty  over non- 
British subjects.
Could the jurisdiction ceded by the K abaka  be exercised w ithou t the Africa Order 
in Council? There is some evidence which indicates th a t  such a view was enter ta ined  in 
some official British circles.* 1'’ A pparently  the a rgum ent was th a t  since under 
in te rna tiona l  law there was nothing to prevent an independent chief from exercising “full 
civil and  criminal jurisdiction over any person, European or otherwise, within his 
te r r i to ry  ... ,” he could by trea ty  delegate his powers to the Crown which would exercise 
them  in his n am e.1^ A problem which was rarely, if ever, discussed was: whose law was 
applicable in the circumstances? W as it tha t  of the local ruler or of the delegate?
1 *L.O. to C.O., 30 April 1894, FO 881/6207 . Their opinion was probably based on Doctor 
Lushington’s Privy Council judgment in Papayani and others y The Russian Steam Navigation  
and Trading Company (The Laconia), 15 E.R. 862, at p.870. Lushington expressed the view that 
the Ottoman Porte could not give to one Christian Power jurisdiction over subjects of another 
Christian state. But see F.T .Piggott,  Exterritoriality, at p.19. He claims that the Crown was 
competent, under English law, to accept and exercise jurisdiction ceded by local sovereigns without  
need of consent of the European state concerned.
1 '’For example, the report of the Foreign Office Committee on the administration of east Africa, 
see below.
1(’L.O. to C.O., 21 April 1886, h 0 8 4 /2 2 7 5 .  See also the report of the Foreign Office Committee  
on the administration of east Africa.
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Logically, subject to  the agreement, it should be the former. However, there were some 
conflicting views abou t this. In some docum en ts  there is a vague reference to application 
of the local law; while in others  it is the English law. W hatever it was, in practice the 
British G overnm ent,  for political reasons, was loath to  exercise delegated powers over 
subjects  of o ther European sta tes  w ithou t  th e ir  consent. Most likely th a t  was the “fuss'1 
which M acdonald feared were he to exercise his powers over the French priest.
The legal position for the adm in is tra t ion  of justice in cases where oidy the B aganda 
were involved was more s tra igh t forward. Article 6 of the trea ty  empowered the British 
G o v e rn m en t’s representa tive “a t  his abso lu te  d iscretion” to  act as “a Supreme C ourt  of 
A ppeal” in all civil cases. In criminal cases he was given the power to intervene “in 
public in terest and for the sake of ju s t ice” as he saw fit. Porta l  instructed Macdonald to 
exercise these powers sparingly and to  intervene in criminal cases only in instances of 
cruelty  or injustice brought to his notice. The main reason for this was probably to 
conserve m anpow er, and to avoid s tra in in g  relations with the chiefs by frequently 
interfering in their adm in is tra tion  of justice.
Although both the Foreign Office and the local adm inis tra tion  were under the 
impression th a t  the Africa Order in Council was not applicable to the Baganda, it will be 
argued below th a t  in fact, by virtue of the t rea ty ,  the B aganda were justiciable under its 
provisions. T he au tho ri ty  of the Crown to exercise jurisdiction  in B uganda was based on 
both the  O rder and the treaty .
1 7
A<For example: Wright, in a memorandum on foreign jurisdiction written for the Attorney- 
General (dated August 1885, F 0 4 1 2 /2 8 ) ,  argued that, “A sovereign may arrange with the Queen 
that the courts in his territory shall be held by British judges administering either the native, or 
the British, or any other law (as he may direct) in the case of all persons within his territory, 
whether native, or the subject of any other foreign power. Such courts would not be British courts 
at all, but courts of the sovereign of the territory.” Wright was emphatic that Orders in Council 
would not be applicable to these courts. See also the Law Officers’ report to the C.O., 15 
November 1884, no.28 L.O.R., vol.4, at p .l .  Also Piggott, Exterritoriality, at pp.95-96, asserts that 
if a treaty ceded open powers the inference was that the grantee had the right to introduce a whole 
body of procedural and substantive laws. For opposing views, see IBEAC to F.O., 26 June 1894, 
and the minutes of 27 and 28 June 1894, F 0 2 /7 4  and F O C P/6557.
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A p art  from judicial powers, P o r ta l ’s trea ty  w ith  M w anga allowed the British
G overnm ent wide powers to intervene in B uganda’s affairs. Under Article 10, the British
representa tive  had to concur in all serious m a tte rs  affecting Buganda, such as declaration
of war, ap p o in tm en t of chiefs, revenue collection and expenditure, and any division of
terr ito ry  based on religion and politics. In addition  B uganda’s foreign affairs were
unreservedly surrendered to the Crown. Moreover, the K abaka  acknowledged th a t  all
in terna tional agreem ents to which Britain was a party  (then or in future) were to bind
B uganda and all its dependences to the ex ten t determ ined by the British G overnm ent.
As p a r t  of the bargain, Porta l  undertook to  appo in t  and leave behind a British
G overnm ent representa tive in B uganda with sufficient s taff  to  implement the term s of the
• 18t rea ty  until such time as the Secretary of S ta te  ordered otherwise.
The overall effect of the trea ty  was to make B uganda a “provisional” British 
P ro tec to ra te  until the G overnm ent confirmed or renounced its s ta tus .  In a s tric t legal 
sense, since Porta l had no m an d a te  to  declare B uganda a British P ro tec to ra te  (and in fact 
he did no t) ,  B uganda was still a mere sphere of influence in which, by virtue of the trea ty , 
the Crown had acquired extensive powers.19 However, the a rrangem ent was convenient 
to the British G overnm ent.  If it were in its interest it could deny th a t  Buganda was a 
British P ro tec to ra te  as it had not been declared; on the o ther hand the Crown could 
assert the powers conferred upon it under the provisional t r e a ty .“9 Perhaps it was for 
this reason th a t  Porta l  took special steps to  ensure th a t  the trea ty  was properly made 
with the Buganda ruler.
In practice B r i ta in ’s ambiguous s ta tu s  in B uganda  does not appear to have raised
^ A rtic les  9, 14, and 16.
19ln 1mperatrix v Jurna and others, supra, at pp.81-82, it was held that a British protectorate 
had to be expressly declared and not just inferred from the Crown’s activities in the territory.
^ R atif ica t ion  of a treaty, unless otherwise provided, has a retrospective effect, Hannis 1 aylor, A_ 
Treatise on International Public haw (Chicago, Callingharn, 1901), at pp.387-389.
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m any legal issues. Ironically the only serious legal problem was pointed out by the 
Imperial B ritish East Africa Com pany. In December, 1893, the Com pany, whose official 
ad m in is tra t io n  was then restricted to the coast and a few inland posts, reminded the 
G o vernm en t th a t  Buganda did not qualify for the advan tage  relating to im portation  of 
a rm s  under Article 9 of the General Act of Brussels, 1890, because it was neither a 
p ro tec to ra te  of a  signatory Power nor, as an independent terr ito ry , had it adhered to the 
provisions of the  Act. Since, however, the country  was “occupied” by Britain the 
C om pany  promised not to raise any technical issues, a t  any ra te  for the time b e i n g / 1
T he period between the m aking of P o r ta l ’s t rea ty  with M w anga and the declaration 
of B r i ta in ’s protection over B uganda, was marked by the  continuity of the 
religious/politica l struggle am ong the rulers of Buganda. No wonder th a t  one of the 
trea ty  powers which the British representa tive commonly used was th a t  of settling 
d isputes re la ting  to the division of chieftainships and terr itory  am ong the warring 
factions. Interestingly, in dealing with these m a t te rs  M acdonald represents himself as 
merely advising the K abaka in accordance with the trea ty ;  while in others he makes it 
clear th a t  he was the one giving orders. In reality, ap a r t  from the treaty  powers, the 
British rep resen ta tive’s position was reinforced by these factional fights which had 
weakened the s ta tu s  of the K abaka. Moreover, he had a t  his com m and a large contingent 
of soldiers in B uganda and the surrounding countries. All these factors helped to make 
the British adm in is tra tion ,  during this transitional period, the focus of political au tho ri ty  
in the country .
21 IBEAC to F.O., 6 December 1893, F O C P/6477.
22 For example, Macdonald to Portal, 13 July 1893; and Macdonald to Portal, 18 July 1893, 
F O C P /6538 .  Also some of the proclamations which were issued by Colvile (Macdonald’s successor) 
were jointly signed with Mwanga while the others were signed by him alone, Colvile to Cracknall, 
13 December 1893, FO C P/6557.
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3.3  D e c la r a t io n  o f  the U g a n d a  P r o t e c t o r a t e
Meanwhile, Portal,  predictably, reported  in favour of declaring Buganda as a
n o
British p r o t e c t o r a t e / 0 P o r ta l ’s argum ents  were basically a sum m ary  of the different 
views expressed in the public campaign m entioned above. The main problem he felt was 
to determ ine the best way of administering Buganda. For this purpose he came up w ith  a 
num ber of possibilities which the G overnm ent could adopt.  For instance Britain could let 
the Sultan of Zanzibar adm inister it with the  rest of the east Africa sphere under the 
guidance of the British Consul-General a t  Zanzibar. The advan tage  of such a scheme was 
th a t  Britain would retain an indirect control over the whole region w ithou t shouldering 
any Financial or o ther burdens — more or less the a rrangem ent which obtained previously 
with the IBEAC. However, it had many d isadvantages  which, P orta l  thought,  rendered 
it less a t t rac t ive .  F irst,  since Zanzibar was a Moslem country it could mean introducing 
an Islamic governm ent in B uganda which was bound to inflame the Christians and lead to 
more religious wars. Second, Porta l  pointed out th a t  in Zanzibar there were already 
many in terna tional legal issues arising from the  special trea ty  rights which were accorded 
to o ther Powers in the S u ltan ’s dominion. He feared th a t ,  if the au tho ri ty  of the Sultan 
were extended to the rest of the British sphere, there was a chance th a t  these countries 
would claim th a t  their rights extended to these terr itories  as well. In any case Portal felt 
t h a t  the Zanzibar G overnm ent was not s trong  enough to be trusted  with the 
adm in is tra tion  of such an extensive terr itory . P orta l  also considered annexation of 
Buganda. This he quickly dismissed as likely to be too costly, entailing many British 
officers to adm inis te r ,  and w ithou t,  a t  least for the time being, com m ensurate re turns. 
Besides, Porta l  noted th a t  the B aganda had their own adm in is tra t ion  (however defective) 
which could be utilised under European supervision.
Between these propositions (which Porta l  called “extrem es” ) Portal thought t h a t  a 
^ P o r ta l  to Rosebery, 24 May 1893, and 1 November 1893, FOCP/6490 and 6497.
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com prom ise could be struck by appointing Commissioners for the whole sphere with 
sufficient staff and force to protect Europeans and generally to  control tlie region. 
W h e th e r  Britain  declared the whole region as under her protection or left it as a  British 
sphere was, in his opinion, no longer im p o rtan t  since the sphere had already been 
recognised by all the Powers interested in the  region. As for Buganda, Po rta l  asserted 
th a t  M w anga would settle for nothing less th an  a trea ty  of protection; indeed Portal 
reported  th a t  Mwanga had already asked for one under the provisional arrangem ent.  In 
the circum stances he recommended th a t  Britain ought to declare B uganda  her 
p ro tec to ra te .  Such a step, he reasoned, could have a further advan tage  of resolving the 
issue raised by the Company of im port taxa t ion  on goods to Buganda.
T he  proposal immediately to declare B uganda a British P ro tec to ra te  was endorsed 
by Rosebery. He argued th a t  since the C o m p an y ’s w ithdraw al from B uganda  the 
G overnm en t had spent on the average 40,000 pounds per annum  “in an anom alous and 
undefined m anner” . This figure he said was much more than  Portal es tim ated  it  would 
cost the  G overnm ent to adm inis te r B uganda as a P ro tec to ra te .  Moreover, Rosebery 
claimed th a t ,  according to  some authorit ies ,  B r i ta in ’s liability in a sphere was not any 
less th a n  in a pro tectorate .  “ Under these c ircum stances,” he concluded, “it would appear 
th a t  our position is th a t  of carrying on the G overnm ent with the same liability and
9  1responsibility as a P ro tec to ra te ,  only at a g reater  cost.”
A t th a t  stage the C ab inet decision was a foregone conclusion. On 18 Ju n e  1894, it 
was announced in the London G azette  tha t :
Under and by virtue of the agreem ent concluded on the 29 May, 1893, 
between the late Sir G .P or ta l  and M w anga, King of jB]Uganda, the country  of 
t h a t  ruler is placed under the P ro tec to ra te  of Her M ajesty the Queen.
^ M em oran d u m  Rosebery, 21 February 1891, FO C P/6538. Rosebery was referring to the 
French Government claim against Britain, mentioned above.
25Gazette dated 19 June 1891.
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The notification specifically limited the  P ro tec to ra te  to Buganda “proper” which was 
described as the territory “bounded by Busoga, Bunyoro, Ankole, and Koki” . The 
announcem ent was followed by instructions to British officials to inform M w anga 
accordingly and to advise th a t  the provisional trea ty  made with Porta l  had been ratified. 
Two m onths  later Colvile, Acting Commissioner, entered into a fresh trea ty  with 
M w anga, dated  27 August 1894, which was merely a replica of the one it re p la ced .^
It is noteworthy th a t  the P ro tec to ra te  over Buganda was expressly established 
“under and by virtue of the trea ty  m ade with M w anga” . In o ther words the trea ty  was 
the basis of the P ro tectora te .  This factor, as this study will show, gave legitimacy to the 
trea ty  which dominated the relationship between Buganda and the British G overnm ent.
3.4 N e ig h b o u r in g  C o u n t r ie s
W ith the issue of B u g an d a’s s ta tu s  finally resolved, w ha t was to be done with the 
rest of B r i ta in ’s east Africa sphere? A Foreign Office com m ittee, chaired by Percy 
Anderson, was given the task of reporting on this m a t t e r . O n  a num ber of grounds the 
com m ittee  recommended th a t  the P ro te c to ra te ’s im m ediate  neighbours (or “ the 
neighbouring countries” ): Toro, Ankole, Busoga, Kavirondo, Koki, Bunyoro, and the 
tribes around Lake Albert,  because of their political and geographical connection to 
B uganda, should be placed under close supervision of the British Government. Busoga 
and Kavirondo, for instance, were caravan routes to and from the coast. The com m ittee 
felt th a t ,  if these terr itories  were not controlled, the com m unication between the 
P ro tec to ra te  and the coast m ight be jeopardised. Ankole, Toro, and Bunyoro were within 
the Nile s trategic zone hence the need for a close watch over them . Control of these 
countries  was also justified on the ground th a t  Britain  had a du ty  to help s tam p  ou t slave 
and a rm s  trade  in the sphere.
^ H e r ts le t ,  The Map of Africa by Treaty, 1: 396. Below, Appendix 2.
^ R e p o r t  of 17 April 1891, supra.
51
Anderson’s committee proposed that the neighbouring countries should be placed 
under the control of the Uganda Protectorate Commissioner who would, “after obtaining, 
if necessary, further treaties” , exercise a general superintendence as Her Majesty’s 
Commissioner, administering justice over British subjects under the Africa Order in 
Council. However, the committee anticipated a legal problem with regard to the exercise 
of jurisdiction over foreigners within the region. It assumed tha t  jurisdiction could be 
exercised under delegation of the local sovereign although it realised that it might put the 
Commissioner in an “anomalous position” since:
In ,BjUganda, an African Protectorate, he could exercise judicial powers over 
foreigners under the Order; outside it he could not do so. Thus, a recalcitrant 
French missionary or German trader, with whom he could cope in [B]Uganda, 
could only be dealt with in Ankolje] or jB]Usoga under authority delegated by 
the native Chiefs. This might place the Commissioner in a position of no 
inconsiderable difficulty.
The legal and political problems contemplated by the committee have already been 
touched upon in this study. In the event it would seem that  no specific decision was 
made on the proposals.
In the meantime a large scale military campaign was waged by British troops in 
alliance with the Baganda, against Kabarega, the King of Bunyoro. Kabarega resisted all 
foreign intrusion in his country. The main object of the war was strategic: to force a 
“safe-corridor” through Bunyoro for purposes of watching the Nile. By the end of 1891, 
reports from the Uganda officials to the Foreign Office were that the whole of southern 
Bunyoro was under British military occupation and that a line of forts had been
O  Q
constructed stretching froin the Protectorate border to the shores of Lake A lb e r t / 0 The 
speed the local officials were expanding the British empire was a cause for concern in 
London. Kimberley, then Foreign Secretary, cautioned the administration to limit 
Brita in’s activities in Bunyoro to purely defensive measures.
2 8 L o w , “Uganda, the Establishment of the Protectorate,” at pp.68-69. Also Ingham, The 
Making of Modern Uganda, at p.58.
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Likewise the P ro tec to ra te  officials were instructed  not to assume any responsibilities 
in the surrounding  territories. For this purpose fresh trea ty  forms were despatched which 
as many rulers as possible in the sphere were made to  sign. Unlike the IBEAC treaties  
they had  no provisions offering protection  nor Britain undertak ing  any obligations in the
O Q
te r r i to ry .  The treaties  secured for British subjects freedom to trade  and to acquire 
p rope rty  in the region. However, their im m edia te  objective was to com m it the rulers so 
t h a t  they would not cede their countries to  o ther Europeans or enter into any agreements 
w ith  th em  except with the consent of the Crown.
T h e  British G overnm ent was so par ticu la r  ab o u t  limiting its obligations in the 
su rround ing  countries th a t  it disallowed an addendum  to a trea ty  m ade on its behalf with 
K asagam a, the M ukam a (King) of Toro, which suggested th a t  a p ro tec to ra te  had been 
declared over his Kingdom. While approving  the t rea ty ,  the Foreign Office made it clear 
th a t  it had to be understood th a t  “the mention of protection  ... in the addendum] in no
•y r \
way implies a p ro tec to ra te  __T he agen t who m ade the  trea ty  no doub t assumed th a t
by signing the trea ty  form which excluded K asagam a from all external contact,  Toro had 
au to m atica l ly  become p a r t  of the British P ro tec to ra te .  Certainly th a t  was not the view 
of the  Foreign Office; Toro  was still a mere sphere of influence. In ano ther instance, a 
proposal by T hrus ton ,  a British official in Uganda, to  offer K abarega a peace trea ty  on 
condition  th a t  he had to become “an obedient British sub jec t” , received a similar rebuff:
[BjUnyoro is outside the limits of the British P ro tec to ra te  and neither the 
Chief himself nor any of his subjects can be considered as under the protection,
») i
still less as the subjects of Her M ajes ty . 0 1
O Q
The only jurisdiction which the Crown acquired was to settle disputes between the local ruler 
and British subjects with respect to matters relating to trade, for example, custom payable to the 
chief (Article 2). The treaty forms were signed by the rulers of Toro (.‘5 March 1891); Ankole (29 
August 1894); Kavallis (18 April 189-1); and so on, Ilertslet, Commercial Treat ies, 20: 33-39.
30F.O. to Jackson, 10 April 1895, FO C P /6717 .
31 Ibid.
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Ross J o h n s to n ,^  claims th a t  ad m in is tra to rs  in London neither knew the theoretical 
d istinction  between a sphere and a  p ro tec to ra te  nor considered it essential. The foregoing 
evidence con trad ic ts  his assessment. It also negates assertions by both Portal and 
Rosebery th a t  it did not make a difference w hether the whole British east Africa sphere 
was declared a  p ro tec to ra te  or adm inistered  as a sphere; otherwise the Foreign Office 
would not have been so particu lar.  Of course, as we have seen, there were advantages for 
Britain  in persisting with the legal distinction between a sphere and a  protectorate. Most 
im p o rtan t  of these was th a t ,  provided she precluded other Powers from the sphere, the 
G overnm ent did not have to do any th ing  abou t its adm inis tra tion . A t the material t ime 
there was also a  s trong  political m otive not to declare the neighbouring territories under 
British protection . The Foreign Office was locked in delicate negotiations with the 
French over terr ito ry  in West Africa and the Nile region. It was feared tha t  extension of 
the U ganda P ro tec to ra te  m ight th w a r t  the discussions and provoke a  race for the Nile 
Valley which the  British preferred to avoid, if possible.00 Leaving the neighbouring 
countries as mere spheres a t  least gave the appearance of m ain ta in ing  the sta tus  quo — of 
course, to B ri ta in ’s advantage.
In practice, however, British officers in the field were much more active than was 
w arran ted  by B r i ta in ’s legal s ta tu s .  Bunyoro had a garrison of British troops scattered  
all over the southern  par t  of the Kingdom. In Busoga Portal left a  s tanding army of a 
hundred  men under the com m and of a British officer with the title  “officer in charge of 
the d is t r ic t” . A British official was sta tioned  in Toro, and  also in Kavirondo. These men 
carried on adm in is tra t ive  duties in the respective territories. They appointed and  
dismissed chiefs; exercised jurisdiction; punished slave and arm s traders; collected
' ^ Sovereignty  and P ro tectorates , at page 319.
,Q>°R o b in so n  et al,  Africa and the V ic to r ia n s , at pp. 333-334.
>
customs du ty  from m erchants  going th rough  the terr ito ry , and so o n / ' 1 None of these 
powers had been formally acquired from the  local rulers under the treaties . Consequently, 
according to the  prevailing in te rp re ta t io n  of the concept of sphere of influence, and on the 
au thority  of Im peratrix  y .lum a (supra),  s tr ic t ly ,  there was no legal basis for the exercise 
of these powers.
3.5 E x te n s io n  of  the  P r o tec to ra te  
3.5.1 B u so g a
It lias been seen th a t  British  officials in U ganda were anxious to expand their 
au thority  ou ts ide  Buganda. Form al extension of the P ro tec to ra te  adm inis tra tion  was 
first m ade w ith  regard to Busoga. The m ain  reason for this was th a t  Busoga was an 
im p o rtan t  com m unication  link with the coast; secondly, the  B aganda  claimed some 
“sovereign" rights  over it which they were no t  prepared to forego.00 Prior to P o r ta l ’s 
departu re  an agreem ent was reached between the B aganda and the  Basoga chiefs which 
allowed the  P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent to p ar tic ip a te  in the adm in is tra tion  of justice of 
Busoga. Under this agreem ent all minor cases were to be dea lt  with by the chiefs of 
Busoga in conjunction  with the British officer in charge of Busoga, while im portan t cases 
were to be decided by the K abaka  and the  Commissioner jo in tly . In addition it was 
agreed th a t  a  regular paym ent of t r ibu te  would be payable to B uganda  by Busoga, half of 
which was to  go to the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm en t as some form of tax a t io n  from Busoga.
However, the  a rrangem en t proved to be impracticable. By the end of 1895, the 
British officer in charge of Busoga was complaining bitterly of the “ inconvenience” caused 
by M w anga and  his chiefs coming up with decisions which con trad ic ted  his own thereby 
m aking the m ain tenance  of law and order very difficult. To resolve the problem Berkeley,
°^Memorandum by Colvile, 25 July 1891, FOCP/66G1; Berkeley to Salisbury, 18 December 1895 
and 23 March 1896, FO C P/6827;  19 January 1895, FO C P /6693 .
r
Portal’s report, supra.
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the  C om m iss ione r, persuaded M w anga  to  su rrende r his share o f the  ju r is d ic t io n  to  the 
B r it is h  G o ve rnm e n t w h ich  w ou ld  then become so le ly responsible fo r the a d m in is tra tio n  o f 
the te r r i to ry .  A  p rov is iona l agreem ent, sub jec t to  the  app rova l o f the Secretary o f S tate , 
was entered in to  between M w anga  and B e rke ley , a c tin g  on b eh a lf o f the C row n. U n like  
the  p rev ious  agreem ent the  Basoga chiefs were n o t a p a rty . P resum ab ly  th is  was because 
Berkeley was convinced th a t Busoga was B u ga n da ’s dependent s ta te , and he d id  no t 
consider i t  necessary to  seek the ch ie fs 1 consen t.0^ U nder the new agreement M w anga 
and his chiefs were to  su rrender henceforth  to  the  P ro te c to ra te  G ove rnm en t a ll c la im s to  
any voice in  the  a d m in is tra tio n  o f Busoga o r to  any ju r is d ic t io n  in  Busoga. Second, in 
re tu rn  the  B r it is h  G ove rnm en t was to  g ive up its  share o f the  Busoga tr ib u te  w hich  was 
to  be pa id  to  the  Kabaka. F in a lly , i t  was expressly declared th a t Busoga w ould  rem ain  a
o n
t r ib u ta ry  s ta te  o f Buganda.
In te re s tin g ly , unknow n to  Berke ley, by the  tim e  the agreem ent was made the 
B r it is h  G o ve rnm e n t had, a lm os t five  m on ths  e a rlie r, declared th e  te rr ito r ie s  in  th a t p a rt 
o f the B r it is h  sphere ly in g  between U ganda P ro te c to ra te  and the  coast (w h ich  embraced 
Busoga), and between the  R ive r Juba  in the  n o rth  and the southern  fro n tie r  o f the
*y q
G erm an sphere, were under the p ro te c tio n  o f the  C ro w n . 0  The n o tif ic a tio n  was 
p ro m p te d  by a C ab ine t decision to  co n s tru c t a ra ilw a y  (the  so-called Uganda R a ilw ay ) 
from  the  coast to  the shores o f Lake V ic to r ia .* ' The  announcem ent o f the P ro tec to ra te  
was made w ith o u t any reference to  trea ties  o r agreem ents w ith  the local ru lers. Q u ite  
c lea rly  W h ite h a ll,  a t th is  p o in t in tim e , d id  n o t regard the consent o f the local ru le rs  as 
necessary p r io r  to  dec la ring  th e ir  te r r ito ry  a B r it is h  p ro te c to ra te . T hus Busoga, un like
' '^ B e rk e le y  to  F .O . ,  8 Decem ber 1895, F O C P /C 8 2 7 .
37 Ib id .
’' ^ L o n d o n  G aze tte ,  18 June  1895.
" '^R obe r ts ,  “ E v o lu t io n  o f  the Uganda P ro te c to ra te ” , a t  p.99. K a ru g i re ,  A P o l i t ic a l  H is to ry  o f  
U g a n d a , a t  p.99, says th a t ,  apart  f rom  B uganda ,  the process o f  a cq u i r in g  U ganda  d id  not proceed 
acco rd ing  to  a lo g ica l ly  w o rked  o u t  plan.
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Buganda, came under British protection  by a unilateral action. Throughout the colonial 
period this factor was frequently emphasised by British officials, and the Baganda.
Low40 com m ents th a t  Berkeley’s a r rangem en t for the  adm inis tra tion  of Busoga 
shows th a t  the extension of the P ro tec to ra te  did not always aw ait  legal enactm ents. 
While th a t  m ight have been so, it is questionable w hether in fact th a t  was how Berkeley 
himself construed the effect of the  agreem ent.  Most likely Berkeley thought th a t  the 
agreem ent gave the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent the necessary au thority  to exercise 
jurisdiction and other adm in is tra t ive  powers in the terr ito ry  which hitherto belonged to 
the K abaka and the chiefs of Busoga. Technically, as we have suggested above, th a t  did 
not mean th a t  the British P ro tec to ra te  had been extended to  Busoga. As we have seen, it 
was considered legally feasible to  adm in is te r  a  terr ito ry  as a sphere w ithout it necessarily 
being a pro tec tora te .  B uganda  itself was under British adm in is tra tion  for over a year 
before the P ro tec to ra te  was declared over it.
3 .5 .2  A n k o l e ,  T o r o  a n d  K o k i
Next Berkeley (still unaw are  of the abovementioned announcem ent) sought to 
formalise B ri ta in ’s re la tionships w ith  the kingdoms of Ankole, Toro, and Koki by 
incorporating  them  within Buganda. Berkeley told the Foreign Office th a t  one of the 
main advan tages  of this was th a t  it would regularise B ri ta in ’s authority  in these 
territories. He confessed th a t  although for some time British officials had been engaged in 
m ain ta in ing  law and order in these kingdoms and the in h ab i tan ts  usually referred their 
problems to them , he did not know upon w ha t  technical legal basis such interference was 
justified. He instanced a case su b m itted  to him by C ap ta in  A shburnham  (British officer 
com m anding Toro) of a p rom inen t  chief of Toro  accused of slave trading:
Although 1 a t  once took up the  case 1 was not, nor am , very clear as to my 
technical jurisdiction over a  Tor|o] Chief, and by w ha t  precise au thority  I should 
have punished him had he been found guilty. Our T rea ty  with Tor[o], for 
instance, does not refer in any way to slave-dealing.
4^“Uganda: the establishment of the Protectorate” , at p.68.
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Berkeley was happy to report th a t  in the par ticu la r  case the Chief proved his innocence, 
though he detained him “as a kind of political p risoner . ' 1 * 1
Berkeley claimed th a t  the K abaka  and his chiefs enjoyed considerable influence in 
the three kingdoms which he could in o ther circum stances take advantage of, b u t  he 
tho u g h t  th a t  in this case it was inept for him to do so a t  an official level. He subm itted  
th a t  all adm inis tra tive  problems would d isappear once these territories  were absorbed 
into Buganda: “ [Ojur T rea ty  with [B]Uganda would a t  once give us all desirable powers, 
and the central Native governm ent which is under our im m ediate  superintendence and 
guidance could work w ith  us in a common a im .” All th a t  he w anted  was permission to 
bring abou t agreem ents between the K ab ak a  and chiefs of Buganda, and those of Ankole, 
Toro, and Koki, to become par t  of Buganda. He promised to ensure th a t  the agreem ents 
were m ade voluntarily by all concerned.
Q uite  clearly Berkeley’s im m edia te  concern was to establish a legal basis for 
exercising au thority  in these terr itories. Being aw are of the reluctance of the Foreign 
Office directly to extend the P ro tec to ra te ,  presumably he though t  th a t  his proposal to 
expand Buganda had a be tte r  chance of acceptance than  if he asked for the three 
kingdoms to be declared British p ro tec to ra tes .  However, it is arguable th a t ,  even if the 
three kingdoms were incorporated  w ith in  B uganda, they would still have been outside the 
U ganda P ro tec to ra te  since the proc lam ation  which declared the P ro tec to ra te  expressly 
limited it to B uganda “proper” .
W hatever the legal im plications m ight have been, Berkeley was instructed  to
^Curiously three mont hs earlier Berkeley had despatched to the F.O. a copy of his judgement, 
Imperatrix v Jam a, in which he had convicted slave and arms traders in the sphere, Berkeley to 
F.O., 1 September 1895, FOCP/6913. His decision was subsequently overturned by the High Court 
of Bombay, supra.
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proceed with tlie negot iat ions and conclusion of the  necessary agreements,  as lie had 
proposed,  in order to bring Ankole, Toro,  and Koki “wi thin the scope of the Treaty  now 
exist ing between [B]Uganda and ... [Britain],  by incorporat ion with [BjUganda or 
o therwise .” 42 Curiously,  w i thou t  wai t ing for the outcome,  on 3 July 1896, a 
proclamat ion was published in the London Gaze t t e  that :
[BjUnyoro, together  with t h a t  par t  of the  Brit ish sphere of influence lying to
the  west of [BjUganda and [BjUnyoro which has h i ther to  not been included in
Uganda  Prot ec to ra te ,  is placed wi thin the  limits of t h a t  Protec tora te ,  which
includes, also, [B]Usoga and the o ther  terr i tories to the east  under the
adminis t ra t ion  of Her M ajes ty ’s Commissioner and Consul-General  for the 
4 9Protec tora te .
Again there was no reference to any agreements  or treat ies with the local rulers. 
Indeed,  on the  basis of the minutes  of the  Foreign Office after the notification,  it would 
seem t ha t  the only issue which appeared to bother  the  Depar tmen t  was whether in the 
covering letter to Berkeley informing him of the decision it should be noted t h a t  the
A  A
P ro tecto ra te  had been extended as he had requested.  The despatch which was sent
abo ut  a for tnight  later simply s ta ted  t h a t  a decision had been made by the Secretary of 
S ta t e  to incorporate wi thin the Uganda P ro tec to ra te  the  terr itories ment ioned in the 
proclamat ion:
[After; considerat ion to the ques tions  which have been raised on the subject of 
the  difficulties as regards jurisdict ion,  arising from the fact t h a t  [BjUnyoro, 
Torjo] and Ankol[ej, though wi thin the British sphere were not included in the 
Protec tora te . . .  [and]... i n order to regularise the  s i tua t ion,  and to give Her 
M ajes ty ’s Commiss ioner  the  powers which are requisite for adminis tra t ion. . . .45
Th e let ter cont inued th a t ,  by vi rtue of the  notification,  the  countries in question were
bro ug h t  wi thin the jurisdict ion conferred by the Africa Order  in Council.  Nothing was
said of t he earlier ins t ruct ions  to conclude agreements  with  the three kingdoms.
42F.O. to Berkeley, 13 April 189C, FO C P/6819.  
43F.O. to Berkeley, 17 July 1896, F O C P /6861 .  
44Minute Anderson arid Bill, 3 July 1896, F 0 2 /1  1 1. 
4 ,F.O. to Berkeley, 17 July 1896, supra.
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At th a t  s tage the situation  could be sum m arised as follows. In the first place, it is 
evident th a t  the main object for the  formal extension of the P ro tec to ra te  to incorporate 
the neighbouring countries was to resolve the jurisdictional problems mentioned by the 
Commissioner. T he assum ption was th a t  the  change of s ta tu s  of the territory from a 
sphere to a P ro tec to ra te  would au tom atica lly  enable the Commissioner to exercise in the 
region the powers conferred upon him under the Africa O rder in Council. Secondly, it 
appears  th a t  the consent of the local rulers was not considered necessary before their 
terr ito r ies  were incorporated w ith in  the  P ro tec to ra te ,  or the African Order in Council 
applied to them . However, w ith  reference to the Africa O rder in Council, it m ust be 
remembered th a t  these countries, as p a r t  of the British sphere of influence, were subject 
(o this Order well before the P ro tec to ra te  was declared over them  except th a t  its 
application  was limited, as we have already indicated. '1^  Moreover, as we shall see below, 
d oub t  remained even after the dec lara tion  of the P ro tec to ra te  as to the scope of the Order 
with regard to the  inhab itan ts  of the P ro tec to ra te  and foreigners who were not subjects of 
s ignatory Powers to the Berlin and the  Brussels Acts.
A H
Kenneth Ingham, ' com m ents  th a t  with the notification of the P ro tectora te  over 
Ankole, Toro, and  the others, the trea ties  their rulers made with Britain  in 1894 were 
“ legalised” . It is subm itted  here, however, th a t  the declaration did not add anyth ing  to 
the legal s ta tu s  of these treaties  which, in fact, were approved by the Secretary of S ta te  
more than a year before the P ro tec to ra te  was announced. T he notification of the 
P ro tec to ra te  over these terr itories, unlike th a t  over Buganda, was not based upon any 
agreem ent with the rulers concerned. Besides, the 1894 treaties , as indicated, did not 
confer any adm in is tra tive  powers or jurisdiction  upon the British Governm ent.
4^A statement by Morris and Read, Uganda tlie Development of its haws, at p.13, that Uganda  
became subject to the Africa Order in Council on the establishment of the Protectorate, is 
questionable.
^ The Making of  Modern Uganda, at page 64.
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Consequently, w hatever powers Britain  had in these territories was by virtue of her s ta tu s  
as the pro tec ting  country.
3 .5 .3  F u r th e r  E x te n s io n  o f  th e  P r o t e c t o r a t e
There still remained terr itories  in the no rth  and north-east  corner of the Uganda 
P ro tec to ra te  which Britain claimed lay within her sphere. Some of these were within the 
Nile Valley and therefore were critical to  B r i ta in ’s Nile s trategy bu t ,  as we have seen, the 
s ituation  w as politically delicate. A num ber of British spying missions had been 
despatched there  to  check on the activities of the Belgians and the French. Although the 
Belgians had by the 1894 T rea ty  recognised B ri ta in ’s claims to the sphere, Britain 
remained suspicious of their movem ents in the area. However, it was the French who 
posed the m ost serious th rea t  to B ri ta in ’s in terest in the region. In 1896 B ri ta in ’s 
military intelligence reported a plan by France to  acquire a s tr ip  of terr itory  connecting 
her west Africa possessions to the Nile a t  F ashoda, separating  Uganda and the East
A O
Africa P ro tec to ra te  from E g y p t .10 To forestall the French manoeuvre Salisbury, once 
again in charge of the Foreign Office, secretly instructed  M ajor M acdonald to survey the 
terr itory  lying on the northern and north-eastern  frontiers of U ganda and the East Africa 
P ro tec to ra tes .  His orders were “to endeavour and make T reaties  with Chiefs in the ... 
[form provided]” and  to explain to them  B ri ta in ’s position in the two Protectora tes.  The 
trea ty  forms were identical with those signed by Toro  and Ankole rulers. A second set of 
t rea ty  forms was also given to M acdonald which provided for a limited protection of the 
region; bu t his instructions were th a t  he was only to use the la t te r  if compelled by 
c ircum stances . '^
Because of political turmoil and war in Uganda, M acdonald did not s ta r t  on his 
mission until April,  1898. A year later lie reported the success of his assignment, lie had
^ M acd on a ld  to Salisbury, 31 July 1899, F O C P /7  102. Also Barber, The Imperial Frontier, at 
p. 13
'^Salisbury to Macdonald, 31 July 1897, FOCP/696'1.
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twenty eight treaty-form s signed by the chiefs in the  region. Macdonald obviously 
trusted  the legal efficacy of the treaties, proudly informing the Secretary of S ta te  th a t :
A to ta l  of 50,000 square miles ... [have] been secured to the Empire by 
treaties , and ... th is continuous block of t rea ty  country  has been carried 
no rthw ard  conterm inous with the southern  frontier of Abyssinia.
M acdonald claimed th a t ,  with these treaties, he had thw arted  French plans to establish  a
continuous belt of terr itory  from the A tlan tic  to the Red S e a . ^
W hatever M acdonald’s achievements, they had earlier been overshadowed by an 
Anglo-Franco Agreement of 21 M arch 1899, partly  inspired by B r i ta in ’s military success 
in E gypt and Sudan. Under the Agreement France recognised the remainder of B r i ta in ’s 
east Africa sphere as dem arcated  under the Anglo-Germ an Agreem ent of 1890.'^ W ith 
the sphere secured from all conceivable th rea t  by o ther European s ta tes ,  Britain took her 
time in formally incorporating the rest of the terr ito ry  within the existing P ro tec to ra te .  
A scheme devised by M acdonald for the G overnm ent to assume im m edia te  control of the 
so-called “ trea ty  countries” was rebuffed by Salisbury. So were Berkeley’s proposals to 
convert the military posts in the “Nile D is tr ic t” into adm in is tra t ive  centres as initial 
steps tow ards establishing B ri ta in ’s au thority  over the whole Nile region. Salisbury was 
em phatic  th a t  the only expenditure  he w'ould au thorise  was for m ain ta in ing  the forts for 
m ilitary purposes and not for civil adm in is tra tion . '  “ Quite  clearly, as far as the Secretary 
of S ta te  w'as concerned, the mission had been accomplished. T here  was no justif ica tion  
for incurring further responsibilities and financial burdens in these regions. M oreover, 
adm inistering the Uganda P ro tec to ra te  w'as proving to be very expensive, especially in 
military expenditure to  suppress both internal conflicts and resistance against British  
imperialism. The cost of construction  of the Uganda Railway had also raised the 
P ro tec to ra te  adm in is tra tion  bill beyond all original estim ates.
' ^ M a c d o n a ld  to Salisbury,  31 July 1899, supra.
,r> *  l ler tslct ,  Map  of Africa by T r e a t y , 2: 796.
' ^ B a r b e r .  Imperial  F ro n t i e r , at  pp. 17-18.
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D uring the period there were a few jurisdictional problems. These were par tly  a 
consequence of the am biguity  of the border between the U ganda and the E as t  Africa 
P ro tec to ra te ;  and partly due to the lack of clarity concerning the ex ten t of the terr ito r ies  
which were actually  under British protection. For instance, the Commissioner of the  East 
Africa P ro tec to ra te  a t one time reported a European hun ter  who challenged P ro tec to ra te  
legislation restr ic ting  the num ber of elephants which could be killed in the Lake Rudolf 
area. T he  hun te r  claimed th a t  since the area  in question was neither within the  East 
Africa P ro tec to ra te  nor th a t  of Uganda, none of the P ro tec to ra tes  had the au th o r i ty  to 
impose any restriction over the terr itory . Salisbury, in response, adm itted  the am biguity  
in the  description of the P ro tec to ra te ’s boundary . He au thorised  the Commissioner to 
assum e th a t  the areas in question was within his ju risdiction , though he cautioned him
r o
aga ins t  en tering  into unnecessary deta ils . 0 0
Similar jurisdictional problems were reported  by Harry Johnston ,  B rita in ’s Special 
Com m issioner, during his mission to  Uganda. He complained th a t  a number of foreigners 
were violating U ganda P ro tec to ra te  regulations in the Baringo and Rudolf districts  on the 
p re tex t  th a t  they were not aw are of the ex tent of the P ro tec to ra te .  Johnston subm itted  
to  the Foreign Secretary a draft  proclamation which he proposed to issue, subject to  his 
approval,  declaring all terr itories  covered by M acdonald 's  and  o ther British ag e n ts ’ 
t rea ties  (effectively the rem ainder of the British east Africa sphere) to be incorporated  
w ith in  the U ganda  P ro tec to ra te .  The proclam ation decreed th a t ,  whether a  British 
ad m in is tra t io n  was established in these regions or not, the  laws and regulations 
prom ulgated  for the U ganda P ro tec to ra te  would be enforceable, unless otherwise 
provided. Jo h n s to n  justif ied  his endeavour in the  in terest of p ro tec ting  the natives.
U nfortunate ly  for Johnston  the Foreign Office was not impressed by his am bitious
Salisbury to Hardinge, 31 May 1898, FO C P/7077.
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proposal. Time was not ripe to extend th e  P ro tec to ra te .  There were o ther more pressing 
issues than  the jurisdictional problems incurred  by the U ganda authorities . B ritain  was 
then engaged in a war in south Africa; there were still unsettled boundary problems 
regarding Bahr-Ghazal d istrict and the southern  frontiers of Abyssinia, pa r t  of which 
would probably fall within Jo h n s to n ’s proposed proclam ation, thus creating poten tial 
problems; and of course there was also the financial cost of adm inistering the 
P ro tec to ra te .  Johnston was told to consult w’ith the Commissioner of the E as t  Africa 
P ro tec to ra te ,  Hardinge, to work out a so lution to the jurisdictional p ro b le m .^
Meanwhile a new O rder in Council for Uganda was in prepara tion  by the Foreign 
Office. T he Order was finally p rom ulgated  on 11 A ugust 1902.55 For the present 
purposes the most im p o rtan t  provision is Article 1 which had the effect of extending the 
U ganda P ro tec to ra te  to cover all terr ito r ies  which Johnston  had earlier proposed to 
include therein. The regions which co n s t i tu ted  the U ganda P ro tec to ra te ,  and to  w'hich 
the O rder was made applicable, were divided into five Provinces: C entral,  comprising the 
d is tric ts  of Bukedi, Elgon, K aram oja, Busoga, and Labar; Rudolf, made up of the districts  
of Turkw el,  T urkana ,  and Dabassa; Nile, m ade  up of Dodinga, Beri, and Acholi; W estern , 
comprising the kingdoms of Bunyoro, T oro , and Ankole; and finally, the Kingdom of 
Buganda. Power was reserved to the Secretary of S ta te  to remove from or add  any 
terr ito ry  to  the P ro tectora te .  Working o u t  the exact boundaries of the P ro tec to ra te  took 
several years to complete. In some cases it involved negotiating  with G erm any and  the 
Congo Free S ta te  where their respective terr ito r ies  shared a common border with Uganda. 
As between Uganda and the East Africa P ro tec to ra te ,  ad ju s tm en ts  were made by local 
British officials guided by adm in is tra tive  convenience and political considerations. In the 
end, the U ganda P ro tec to ra te  of 1902, was by 1927 reduced to abou t  half of its original
'’^Johnston to Salisbury, 1 February 1900 and Salisbury to Johnston, 19 April 1900, 
F O C P /7404 .
'’’’London Gazette 15 August 1902, see below for details.
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size, the beneficiary being the East Africa P ro tec to ra te ,  or Kenya Colony as it was later 
k n o w n .^
Assum ption of the actual British adm in is tra t ion  did not au tom atica lly  follow the 
legal extension of the P ro tec to ra te .  It proceeded very slowly, mainly guided by the 
ava ilab ility  of resources, adm in is tra tive  convenience, and the commercial viability of the 
p ar ticu la r  region. In some cases it took a lm ost twenty  years before British au th o r i ty  was 
effectively established.
3 .6  S u m m a r y  an d  C o n c lu s io n
P o r ta l ’s provisional t rea ty  conferred upon the  British G overnm ent legal power to 
adm in is te r  Buganda w ithout a formal declaration  of a  p ro tec to ra te  over the terr ito ry . 
W ith o u t  cession of power by the local ruler Britain could not exercise any sovereign 
a u th o r i ty  in the country. The decision to regularise B u g an d a’s re la tionship with Britain  
was m ade partly  because Britain was already so involved in B uganda th a t  it did no t  make 
much difference whether to continue adm inis te ring  it under the in terim  a r ran g em en t or as 
a p ro tec to ra te .  Moreover, in spite of the substan tia l  powers which the Crown enjoyed 
under the  trea ty ,  there was still some d oub t  in official circles as to w hether it was proper, 
on political or legal grounds, or both, to exercise those powers, in par ticu la r  jurisdiction  
over subjects  of o ther countries within the sphere. It has been subm itted  th a t ,  on a 
careful reading of the  Africa Order in Council, the Commissioner could not adm in is te r  
jus tice  over foreigners in Buganda on the basis of the trea ty .
W ith  reference to the rest of the terr itories ,  B rita in  chose not to  acquire  any 
ad m in is tra t iv e  au thority  under the  trea t ie s  made with the local rulers. In practice 
zealous British officers assumed adm in is tra t ive  powers in the sphere even though they had
"^Generally A .C .McEwen, International Poundary of East Africa (Oxford, 1971), chapters  
17-2Ü; also Kabwcgere, The Politics of State Formation, at pp. 5(5-07.
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no legal basis for doing so. It was mainly to rectify this situation th a t  the U ganda 
P ro tec to ra te  was gradually extended over these o ther territories. For the im m ediate  
purposes the assumption was th a t  the extension of the P ro tec to ra te  to the rest of the 
sphere would thereby give the Commissioner the jurisdiction over foreigners and the 
in h ab itan ts  of the region.
An im portan t point to note abou t  the trans it ional period — from a sphere to a 
P ro tec to ra te  — is the different way the P ro tec to ra te  was established over Buganda as 
com pared with the rest of the country . Whereas the British expressly based their 
protection of Buganda on the trea ty  made with the K abaka, they had no agreem ent with 
the rulers of the other regions accepting B rita in ’s protection . The fact th a t  the Foreign 
Office did not await for the results of its instructions to the Uganda officials to enter into 
p ro tec to ra te  agreements with the rulers of the neighbouring territories, is indicative th a t  
it did not consider their consent necessary. Andrew Roberts observes th a t  with the 
notification of the P ro tec to ra te  over the other regions the U ganda P ro tec to ra te  thus 
ceased to be based on a  trea ty  with the native s ta te .0 ' His com m ent, it is subm itted , is 
right provided it does not include Buganda.
In the following chapter 1 examine the legal consequences of declaring the U ganda 
P ro tec to ra te .  In particular I will investigate  the au tho ri ty  which Britain claimed accrued 
by virtue of the P ro tectora te .  Did the s ta tu s  entitle  the Crown to exercise all the powers 
it needed to adm inister the country?  W hat legal difference did it make th a t  the 
P ro tec to ra te  was declared over B uganda on the basis of a trea ty  while over the o ther 
terr itories  the decision was unila tera l?  These are some of the issues to be examined 
below.
“T he  Evolution  of the Uganda P ro te c to ra te ” , at p.100
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C H A P T E R  4
THE BASIS A N D  E X T E N T  OF BRITISH  
JU R ISD IC T IO N
As indicated in the previous chapter ,  the main official reason for formally ex tend ing  
the British P ro tec to ra te  to the rest of the terr ito r ies  was to  enable the Commissioner to 
exercise jurisdiction and other powers conferred upon him under the Africa O rd e r  in 
Council. The Order, from the viewpoint of British municipal law, was the fu ndam en ta l  
law for the exercise of British jurisdiction  in the terr itories  to which it applied. It has 
been suggested above, and will be touched upon below, th a t  the application of the  O rde r  
was limited to British subjects; o ther persons were only justic iable under its provisions 
where they voluntarily subm itted  to British jurisdiction  or where their sovereign had 
agreed to “ the exercise of power and au tho ri ty  Jby- Her M ajesty .” 1 In B uganda  the 
K abaka had consented to the P ro tec to ra te .  Rulers of the o ther territories had no t  — 
indeed many were not even aw are th a t  they were under British protection. In th is  
chapter  I examine the legal basis for and the ex ten t of the ju risd iction  the British asse r ted  
in U ganda in the period from the t im e the P ro tec to ra te  was announced up to 1902 w hen a 
new Order in Council was made for Uganda.
4.1 G eneral B ackground to  the Jurisd iction  Issue
U ganda P ro tec to ra te  was one of the last British p ro tec to ra tes  to be established in 
Africa. For more than  a decade prior to the declaration of the P ro tec to ra te  there was a 
lively deba te  am ong British officials in London as to  the na tu re  and ex ten t  of a p ro tec t in g
^Article 10 (4), em phasis  added.
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P ow er’s jurisdiction over persons o ther than  its subjects, in territories under its 
protection . Although by the time U ganda became a P ro tec to ra te  much of the steam  had 
evaporated , except in those aspects s ta ted  below, an outline of this debate  is necessary in 
order to pu t the picture of w h a t  followed in U ganda in perspective.
For the present purposes we need not trace the issue back before 1886. In August of 
th a t  year, B ri ta in ’s Foreign Secretary inquired from his G erm an coun te rpart  as to the 
legal s ta tu s  of G erm any’s p ro tec to ra tes  in south-w est Africa and the South Seas and 
elsewhere. The question was prom pted  by an Imperial G erm an decree promulgated  
earlier in the same year which provided for legislation and adm in is tra t ion  of justice over 
all persons in Germ an pro tec to ra tes ,  irrespective of nationality . The British Minister 
w anted  to know w hether the terr itories  to which the legislation applied had been annexed 
by G erm any or were still regarded as pro tec to ra tes .  If they were still pro tec tora tes  he 
w anted  to know the basis upon which the G erm an G overnm ent asserted its jurisdiction 
over subjects of o ther Powers. T he G erm an M inister in response explained th a t  the 
terr itories  in question had not been annexed bu t  were foreign territories under his 
G o v e rn m en t’s control. He added th a t ,  according to the G erm an  G overnm ent, if a 
country  subm itted  to G erm an protection , or was uncivilised and a pro tec tora te  was 
declared over it, such a s i tuation  entitled the G overnm ent to assum e jurisdiction over all 
persons residing or sojourning therein irrespective of the consent of their governments. 
Jurisdiction  in th a t  case, he said, was not regarded as dependent on annexation nor 
derived from the native chiefs, but existed by vir tue  of the p ro tec to ra te .  The G erm an 
M inister emphasised th a t  jurisdiction  over the  natives was by trea ty  left with their chiefs;
o
but only as a m a t te r  of expediency ra ther  than  l a w /
If the British P arliam ent could enact s imilar laws for B r i ta in ’s p ro tec torates,  it 
2L.O. (Webster and Clerk) to Salisbury, 29 June 1887, F084/2275.
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would solve complex legal problems. However, the question was whether it was within 
parliam enta ry  competency to  enact such laws. A reference to the Law Officers of the 
Crown returned a negative response. A lthough the Law Officers sounded som ew hat 
uncerta in , since the form of p ro tec to ra tes  in question was new in in terna tional law and 
had never been discussed in any of the leading writings, nonetheless they confidently 
asserted  th a t  the relevant general principles were well settled:
... the right of ju risdiction  over the persons found in any terr ito ry  belongs only 
to  a power which is entitled  to  rights of terr itoria l sovereignty. Those r igh ts  
may be acquired by conquest, by cession, or by se tt lem ent,  and where they exist,  
the  Power which possesses them  is clearly entitled  to exercise jurisdiction over 
all persons coming w ith in  the limits of the  te rr ito ry ,  w hether they be natives of 
the  terr itory  or the subjects of a ... foreign P o w er .3
Since a  p ro tec tora te  was a  foreign terr ito ry , the  Law Officers opined th a t  no Pow er had a
right to  exercise jurisdiction over subjects of o ther countries within th a t  p ro tec to ra te
w ithou t  first obtaining the consent of the governm ents  concerned. A lternatively  they
suggested, as did their predecessors, th a t  ju risd iction  could be acquired by trea ty  from  the
local rulers; though on d iplom atic  grounds they cautioned against its exercise w i th o u t  the
consent of the Power concerned. In the opinion of these Law Officers, the G e rm an  law
m entioned above was misconceived since no country  had the power to alter in te rna tional
law merely by enacting its own laws. They advised th a t  the G erm ans ough t  to  be
reminded accordingly.^
T he Law Officers’ report ,  which the Foreign Office accepted, was severely criticised 
by Jenkyns, Parliam entary  Counsel, who indeed th ough t  th a t  the German G o v ern m en t
3Ibid.
Albert, Assistant to Parliamentary Counsel, attributed the Germans’ action to lack of “practical 
colonial experience” . He claimed that their statesmen and jurists were still in an experimenting  
stage unable to distinguish between a “dominion” and a “protectorate” , consequently they referred 
to all their overseas territories as Schutzgebiet  (protected territories), memorandum on Indian and 
African Protectorates, 24 January 1889, F 0 8 4 /2 2 7 5 .
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had taken a step in the right direction.'^ Jenkyns urged the  British G overnm ent to follow 
suit by enacting a law conferring upon the Crown legislative and judicial powers over all 
persons in any “uncivilised” terr itories  under B rita in ’s protection . He argued th a t ,  
according to English municipal law, the legislation could not be challenged in British 
courts. Though in ternationally  it could be subject to d ip lom atic  pro test ,  he th o u g h t  th a t  
if the exercise Qf the jurisdiction  did not entail gross violation of in terna tional legal 
principles or wras fairly enforced, objection was unlikely.
Moreover, Jenkyns argued th a t ,  if there were no in terna tional law principles directly 
applicable to the subject, as the Law Officers reported, it was an opportune t im e for 
Britain  to  lead the way by m aking them.
[In te rna t ional  law like o ther law [ he asserted], has a ltered  and grown, and 
m ust alter and grow with changing circumstances, and  the writers on it have 
invented principles of in terna tional law to  suit accomplished facts .... We may 
therefore consider in which direction we can direct the grow th of in terna tional 
law by municipal law ....
Besides, Jenkyns s ta ted  th a t ,  according to  a general belief, in terna tional law only 
applied to  civilised s ta tes  of Europe and America, and, if it applied a t  all to uncivilised 
terr itories ,  it did so only with considerable modification to  su it  the special c ircum stances 
of these territories. One of the factors he mentioned was th a t ,  since by virtue of the 
p ro tec to ra te  a terr ito ry  was legally cut off from all con tac t  with o ther European s ta tes  
except through or with the consent of the protecting  Power, the  la t te r  had a double duty: 
to safeguard foreigners against native a t ta c k s  and to provide them  with a redress which 
they could not get from the local rulers. A t the same tim e it was incum bent upon it to 
ensure th a t  the natives were not injured by the Europeans. As a  corollary of th is  du ty ,
^Memorandum on the application of principles of international law to foreign subjects in British 
Protectorates, 26 July 1888, F 0 8 4 /2 2 7 5 .  A draft response to the German Government was  
prepared on the lines suggested by the Law Officers, Salisbury to Count Hatzteldt, August, 1887, 
FO G P /5736 . It is not clear whether the letter was actually despatched.
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Jenkyns subm itted  th a t the  P ro te c tin g  s ta te  had to  assume a u th o r ity  over a ll persons in 
the  p ro tec to ra te  irrespective  o f th e ir  n a t io n a lity .
Jenkyns re in forced his a rgum en t by re fe rring  to  A r t ic le  34 o f the  G enera l A c t o f 
B e r lin , 1885,^ w hich  p rov ided  th a t any Pow er w h ich  acqu ired a p ro te c to ra te  on the  coast 
o f A fr ic a  had to  n o tify  o the r S ignatories to  the A c t to  g ive  them  a chance to  ob jec t i f  they 
so w ished. T h is  A r t ic le  (w h ich  Jenkyns said co ns titu te d  in te rn a tio n a l law  fo r the 
u nc iv ilised  states on the  coast o f A fr ic a ) in  his in te rp re ta tio n  m eant th a t ,  by n o tify in g  the 
o the rs , a ll th e ir  a c tiv it ie s  in  the  te r r ito ry  were im m e d ia te ly  excluded o r lim ite d  and any 
Pow er w h ich  d id  no t o b jec t was deemed to  have acquiesced. F u rth e rm o re , he suggested 
th a t  the A r t ic le  had to  be in te rp re ted  as enab ling  the p ro te c tin g  co u n try  to  assume power 
in  o rder to  discharge o b lig a tio n s  imposed upon i t  under A rtic le s  30 and 35 o f the  A c t: to  
p ro te c t fore ign subjects and to  m a in ta in  su ffic ie n t a u th o r ity  to  safeguard e x is tin g  r ig h ts
n
and trade.
S tr ic t ly ,  Jenkyns ’ in te rp re ta tio n  o f the B e rlin  A c t w ent beyond what, was agreed 
upon a t the conference. F irs t,  the A c t was on ly in tended to  app ly  to  p ro tec to ra tes  and 
new occupations on the  coast o f A fr ic a ; a lthough  Jenkyns m entioned th is  p o in t, he argued 
as i f  i t  were app licab le  to  the whole c o n tin e n t o f A fr ic a . Second, the o b lig a tio n s  under 
A r t ic le  35 were imposed on ly in  the case o f “ new occupations”  (annexa tions) and not 
s im p ly  where a p ro te c to ra te  had been declared. In fac t th is  d is t in c tio n  was m a in ta in e d  a t 
B r i ta in ’s insistence.^
^H e r ts le t ,  M a p  o f  A f r ic a  by T r e a t y , 2: 4G8.
n  % . . . .
' Jenkyns  c la im ed th a t  t h a t  was how the  G erm ans  in te rp re te d  the p rov is ion  as ev idenced by th e i r  
response to  the B r i t is h  G o v e rn m e n t  in the  despatch referred to  above.
Q
°F ra n c e  rejected B r i t a i n ’s suggestion to  ap p ly  the A c t  to  the who le  c o n t in e n t .  T h e  Russian 
rep resen ta t ive  also emphasised t h a t  his un de rs ta nd ing  was t h a t  the A c t ’s l im i t s  was the A f r ic a  
coast. See F ind ley ,  B ac k w a rd  T e r r i t o r y  m In te rn a l io n a l  L a w , pp. 144-148.
^ I b i d ., at p.445. See also Tw iss  to  Paucefote, J a n u a ry  1885; and notes by Lo rd  C h a n c e l lo r  
Se lbourne da ted  3 J a n u a ry  1985, and 11 J a n u a ry  1985; F 0 8 4 /2 2 7 5 .
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Jenkyns  also a t tacked the max im of “terr itor ia l  sovereignty” upon which the  Law 
Officers based their challenge to the G e rm an s ’ legislation. He claimed th a t  the m ax im 
was a product  of Austinian jur isprudence — t h a t  sovereignty was indivisible — which had 
since been proved false in in ternational  law by Henry M a i n e . ^  If sovereignty was 
divisible, Jenkyns  theorised t h a t  the solution to the terr itor ial  sovereignty maxim was to 
conceive of “ter r i tory” as the defined area  wi thin which any portions of the external  and 
internal  sovereignty were exercisable.  By declaring a terr itory its protec to ra te  the  
protec t ing Power acquired external  sovereignty to the  exclusion of others  over t h a t  area.  
Jurisdict ion,  he submit ted:
... will depend on the existence in fact of the assumpt ion of the Protec tora te ,  
and not on the question whether  some naked chief living in the country  is or is 
not sufficiently civilised to cede jurisdict ion,  or has or has not by some informal 
agreement  in fact ceded it. It really seems absurd  t h a t  the question of the  
jurisdiction of one of the Queen ’s cour ts  should depend upon such points.
Jenkyns  conceded t h a t  his proposals could in pract ice cause some inconvenience to 
the Crown.  For example,  other  Powers could also decide to assert  their jurisdict ion over 
Brit ish subjects which might  well be to thei r de t r iment .  It could, .also entail  the  
Gove rnmen t  assuming more responsibilities than  it was prepared to take on a t  the  t ime. 
How'ever, in his opinion,  these were all ma t t e rs  of policy for the Cabinet  and not  for the  
lawyers to consider. From a legal point  of view Jenkyns  was convinced th a t  there were no 
l imi tat ions upon the power and jurisdict ion which the Crown could claim and exercise in 
its protec torates .  Consequent ly he strongly felt t h a t  it was impolitic for the  Bri tish 
Gov ernmen t  to make a protes t  to the German Gove rnment ,  as suggested by the  Law 
Officers, which would not  only impede the development  of international  law, bu t  would 
expressly commit  the Government  to a position from which it would find difficult to 
wi thdraw in the future.
^ H e n r y  Maine,  In ternat ional  Law (London,  1888), at  p. 58.
72
4 .2  T h e  F o r e ig n  J u r isd ic t io n  B i l l
In the meantime Jenkyns and llbert on one side and Wright on the other, were 
locked in another (but related) debate over the drafting of the Foreign Jurisdiction Bill. 
The Bill had been commissioned by the Foreign Secretary to remove doubts regarding 
foreign jurisdiction which had cropped up since the last consolidation of the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act in 1878. Jenkyns and llbert could not agree with Wright on the extent 
to which Parliament could go in legislating over natives and foreigners in British 
protectorates irrespective of their governments’ consent or that of the local sovereign. 
The former, relying mainly on the points raised by Jenkyns in the foregoing 
memorandum, urged an express provision in the Foreign Jurisdiction Bill conferring upon 
the Crown power to exercise jurisdiction over all persons in British protectorates 
irrespective of the consent of their governments or that of the native sovereign.
Wright, on the other hand, staunchly argued tha t  the existence of jurisdiction in 
protectorates depended on questions of international law as yet unresolved and could not 
be predetermined by an Act of Parliament. Although Wright admitted that llbert’s and 
Jenkyns’ proposal was a convenient solution to the jurisdictional problem, especially in 
uncivilised countries and tha t  he was aware that, if the jurisdiction were asserted as an 
Act of State its exercise would require legislation under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 
nonetheless he submitted tha t  “it cannot properly be made an universal incident of 
Protectorate” . Wright also envisaged that such assertion of jurisdiction would, for 
instance, extend Britain’s responsibilities in the protectorates. Yet one of the main 
reasons for not annexing them was precisely to avoid additional duties. Another problem 
was tha t  of choice of law for the consular courts to apply to foreigners. In his opinion the 
courts could not administer English law because th a t  law did not apply to persons who 
did not owe any allegiance to the British Crown. Nor was it, in his view, conceivable that 
the British consular courts could apply Italian or American law, as the case might be, in a
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foreign terr itory . W right subm itted  th a t  the Bill should not go fur ther than to declare 
th a t ,  where the Crown had acquired jurisd ic tion , by trea ty ,  cap itu la tion , grant, usage, 
sufferance, and o ther lawful means, it could be exercised as prescribed under the Act.**
It should be emphasised th a t  the deba te  was mainly with in  an in ternational law 
framework. Both parties t rea ted  the issue as one involving international law, with 
Jenkyns arguing th a t  in ternational law recognised the exercise of the jurisdiction (or a t  
any ra te  was not against it), while W right was sceptical whether indeed in ternational law 
had developed to th a t  extent. Nor did W right think th a t  the problem could be solved by 
resorting to  the municipal law. He preferred the m a t te r  to  be left open to  let 
in terna tional law take its usual course of developm ent. Another point of difference to  be 
observed is th a t  Jenkyns and llbert felt th a t  even on practical grounds it was to B ri ta in ’s 
advan tage  to assume the jurisdiction. W right tho u g h t  otherwise.
Salisbury was in a dilem ma as to  which opinion should be accepted. Assistance was 
sought from the Lord Chancellor, Halsbury. The la t te r  w ithout hesitation dismissed 
Jen k y n s’ a rgum ent (which he said was “trying to  push the law in a direction which it had 
not h i therto  taken” ) on two basic principles. F irstly , no s ta te  had a right to alter  
in terna tional law. Secondly, the main ad v an tag e  of the concept of a protec tora te  was 
th a t  it enabled the protecting country  to control a terr ito ry  with little obligation there in , 
uidess it chose otherwise. In the  Lord C hancellor’s opinion this function would be
destroyed if a principle was adopted which virtually  removed the distinction between a
1 9pro tec to ra te  and complete sovereignty .* 1
The fate of Jenkyns’ a rgum ent was thereby sealed. Davidson, legal adviser to  the
* *See exchange of notes relating to the Bill: 15th, 16th and 20th November, 1888. FÜ 84/2275 .
1 9F.O. to Lord Chancellor, 15 December 1888, and memorandum by the Lord Chancellor, 28 
March 1890, F 0 9 7 /5 6 2 .
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Foreign Office, commented th a t  he was not surprised by tlie Lord Chancellor’s opinion as 
it was in accordance with those of successive Law Officers and other eminent lawyers, lie 
suggested th a t  Jenkyns be informed of the Lord C hancellor’s “veto” to his proposals, bu t 
to  avoid fu r ther  discussion and counter-m em oranda, the reasons were not to be disclosed 
to  h im .13
T he Foreign Jurisdiction  Bill was eventually presented to Parliam ent and passed 
with li ttle  discussion. It became law on 4 August 1890. A part  from a few minor verbal 
changes the  new Act reta ined the substance of the original 1843 Act and the am endm ents  
the reo f .1"1 This in effect m ean t  th a t ,  from the point of view of the Foreign Office — the 
D e p a r tm en t  responsible for the Bill — the Act did not and could not empower the Crown 
to exercise jurisdiction over non-British subjects in B ri ta in ’s protec tora tes  as th a t  was a 
question to  be determined by in ternational law. W ha t the Act authorised was for the 
Crown to exercise any jurisd iction  which it already had or it subsequently acquired “by 
t re a ty ,  cap itu la tion ,  g ran t,  usage, sufferance and other lawful means ... in the same and 
as am ple  a m anner as if [Her] Majesty had acquired th a t  jurisdiction  by the cession and 
conquest of te rr ito ry .” 13 In o ther words the Act cleared away the doub t surrounding the 
exercise of the jurisdiction in foreign territories from a municipal law point of view, but 
the ju risd ic tion  had to be obta ined  first by any of the above means which were acceptable 
in in te rn a tio n a l  law.
1 9
°M inute Davidson (undated), ibid. Instructions were given to print the Lord Chancellor’s 
memorandum for the Foreign Office purposes but it was not to be included in the annual collection  
of the L.O.R.
^ T h e  text of the Act is printed in Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, 18:286. For a detailed 
discussion of the making of the Foreign Jurisdiction Bill, see: Johnston, Sovereignty and 
Protection, pp. 218-225; Colin Newbury “Treaty, Grant, Usage and Sufferance: The Origins of 
Britain’s Colonial Protectorates” in Wood and O ’Connor, ed., W.P. Morrell: A Tribute Essays m 
Modern and Early History (Dunedin University of Otago, 1973) pp.69-80; Palley, The  
Constitutional History and haw of Southern Rhodesia, pp. 57-60.
15 Preamble and Article 1
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4 .3  D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  I n te r n a t io n a l  L a w
Barely a year after the enactm ent of the Foreign Jurisdiction  Bill, Brarnston, legal 
adviser to the Colonial Office, raised with the Law Officers the issue of jurisdiction over 
non-B rit ish  Europeans in terr itories  under B ri ta in ’s control. The reference was p rom pted  
by reports  of British officials in southern Africa th a t  they were encountering difficulties in 
m ain ta in in g  law and order am ong Europeans of diverse nationali ty ,  over whom they had 
no contro l,  who were arriving in large num bers into Bechuanaland and M atabeleland 
P ro tec to ra te s .  Brarnston urged the Law Officers to accept th a t ,  according to the 
prevailing principles of in terna tional law, the Crown had the power to legislate and to 
ad m in is te r  justice over all foreigners in the P ro tecto ra tes .  Interestingly Brarnston 
supported  his case with an argum ent which was identical to th a t  of Jenkyns, reinforced 
by reference to  the recently signed Brussels Act, and the fact th a t  both G erm an and 
French practices assumed jurisdiction by virtue of the p ro tec to ra te  — thus proving th a t  
the principle already had in ternational recognition. He also drew the Law Officers’ 
a t te n t io n  to the  latest edition of Hall’s International Law (1890) where a similar point 
was m a d e . ^
Unlike Jenkyns, Brarnston had some success. The Law Officers partially accepted 
his a rg u m en t  to  the effect th a t  consent for the exercise of jurisdiction  could be inferred 
from the  Berlin and the Brussels Acts. This, they claimed, was consistent with the view 
they had always en ter ta ined  th a t  jurisdiction was either terr itoria l or consensual. 
However, they were only prepared to accept the rule as regards subjects of the Signatories 
to the two Acts when in p ro tec to ra tes  declared by the o ther over territories within the 
con tem pla t ion  of the said Acts. The Law Officers denied the existence of a general 
principle of in terna tional law which entitled the Crown to assert coercive jurisdiction
^ M e m o r a n d u m  Brarnston, 12 March 1891, e n d .  C.O. to L.O., 23 April 1891, FO881/6207 .
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merely by declaring a  p ro tec to ra te .17
By restricting the principle to Signatories to the two Acts it m eant th a t  some 
Europeans and persons of o ther nationalities  (including Africans) whose governm ents  
were no t parties there to , were still not jus tic iable in British courts. Moreover, even for 
the former, no inference of consent could be made regarding their subjects w ith in  
p ro tec tora tes  outside the coast of Africa, for example the Pacific where similar
I  o
jurisdictional issues were being encounte red .10 However, the partial b reak th rough  
enabled the Colonial Office to prom ulgate the South Africa Order in Council whereby the 
High Commissioner was authorised to make regulations for the adm in is tra tion  of justice 
and generally for governm ent of all persons in Bechuanaland and M atabeleland protected  
te rr i to r ie s .1'^  The Foreign Office also capitalised on the Law Officers’ report by am ending  
the Africa Order in Council to apply to all subjects of Signatories to the Berlin Act within
9 0British p ro tec tora tes  to  which the O rder applied.
Encouraged by his success, in August 1892, B ram ston  yet again made ano ther  
proposition to the Law Officers. This time he requested them  to consider as a “special 
case” a d raft  Order in Council for the Western Pacific which provided for the exercise of 
jurisdiction  over natives and foreigners in the protected Islands “inhabited by native 
tribes under no civilised governm ent.” B ram ston claimed th a t ,  to  make the P ro tec to ra te  
effective in these Islands, the protecting s ta te  had to assume extensive powers including
17L.O. to C.O., 17 April 1891, no. 209, vol.4, L.O.R; also no. 210, 30 April 1891.
1 ft
AOFor example the case of the Protectorate of British New Guinea. In 1884 the Law Officers 
reported that, if there were no chiefs in the Protectorate to cede to the Crown jurisdiction over 
non-British subjects, it could not assume it as long as the territory was not annexed, L.O. to 
Derby, 11 December 1884, FÜ 881/512. New Guinea was annexed in 1888.
^ A rt ic le  4. Note that “all persons” is qualified by the fact that the Commissioner could only 
exercise powers acquired by the Crown in the territory (see Article 2). For the text of the Order, 
see Hertslet, 19:30.
^ F o r  the text of the Order see Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, 19:2. The order recited that  
subjects of the Signatories had been included in accordance with the obligations undertaken under 
the Berlin Act.
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the adm inistration  of justice and pun ishm ent of all persons of w hatever nationality  who 
were oppressive tow ards the natives as well as natives who a ttacked  foreigners.
A similar argum ent had been presented to the Law Officers alm ost ten years earlier, 
regarding New Guinea. Then it found no favour with the Law Officers (Henry Jam es and 
Herschell) who suggested annexation as the only solution. 1 This t im e the Law Officers 
(Russell and Rigby), by extending the principle of implied consent under the Berlin Act 
enuncia ted  by their predecessors, were a t  pains to give a partial acceptance of B ram ston’s 
proposal:
[T]he precedent set by th a t  Act, and the general argum ents  in support  of the 
jurisdiction of a P ro tecting  Power in similar cases, make it right ... to assume 
th a t  the Signatories of the Berlin Act will not object to the exercise of 
jurisdiction over their respective nationals  and we think th a t  such jurisdiction 
may be assumed by the Order, if it be though t  advisable as a m a t te r  of policy.
T he scope of the  C row n’s jurisdiction was thereby extended within a  space of only 
two years since the consolidation of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. It should be 
emphasised th a t  the basis of the jurisdiction was still regarded as consensual, however 
flimsy the line of its inference had become. In fact the two Law Officers in the same 
m onth  criticised the French for assum ing th a t  an in terna tional rule had been developed 
which entitled the protecting  s ta te  to exercise jurisdiction  over all persons, including
0 9
subjects  of countries which were not parties to  the Berlin Act.*"'' Therefore, according to 
the  prevailing British legal opinion, there were still persons who were not justiciable in 
the  p ro tec to ra te  courts.
21L.O. to C.O., 11 December 1881, supra.
22L.O. to C.O, 17 November 1892. The draft Order had been queried by the Foreign Office, see 
minutes Davidson, 23 August 1982, on Rosebery to Ripon, 26 August 1892, F 0 5 8 /2 7 3 .
o  o
L Johnston, Sovereignty and Protectorates, at pp. 245- 246.
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4 .4  I s su e  o f  J u r is d ic t io n  O v er  N a t i v e s  o f  th e  P r o t e c t o r a t e
W hat abou t  the natives of the p ro tec to ra te?  Were they subject to the British 
jurisdiction  by virtue of the p ro tec to ra te?  The Law Officers’ report of 1892, on the d ra f t  
W estern  Pacific Order in Council, advised th a t  jurisdiction  over the local in h ab itan ts  of 
the  p ro tec to ra te  depended in each case on the trea ty  w ith  the local sovereign, where there  
was such a ruler. In con tra s t ,  the South Africa O rder in Council, 1891, which the Law 
Officers approved, empowered the High Commissioner to  legislate for government of all 
persons within its limits. Nonetheless the Colonial Office instructed him not to include 
the  natives of the p ro tec to ra te  in his p roclam ations since the law affecting them  was still 
unse t t led .^0
It was not till 1895, th a t  the Colonial Office was specifically asked to give a ruling 
as to w hether the Crown had jurisdiction over the natives of the p ro tec tora te .  T he  
request came from Hudson, the  Governor of the Gold Coast Colony and P ro tec to ra te .  
A pparently  there had been an ongoing deba te  over this m a t te r  between him and the Chief 
Jus t ice  of the Colony, Griffith. According to  the Governor, the natives of the 
P ro tec to ra te  of the Gold Coast were by “sufferance" subject to the jurisdiction  of the 
cour ts  of the Colony. The Chief Justice on the o ther hand denied th a t  sufferance could be 
deemed to be established by the fact th a t  “one ignorant native” had appeared before one 
of the British courts. Griffith was convinced th a t ,  where jurisdiction had not been 
acquired  under the trea ty  with the local sovereign, the subjects of th a t  sovereign were not 
jus tic iab le  in the British c o u r t s . ^  In o ther words the Crown had no jurisdiction over the 
in h ab i tan ts  by v irtue of the p ro tec tora te .
 ^1 L.O. to C.O., 17 November 1892, supra. The Law Officers had previously been informed that  
(here were no chiefs in British New Guinea, L.O. to Derby, 11 November 1884, supra.
o r
^ J o h n sto n ,  Sovereignty and Protectorates, at p.245.
26 Hudson to C.O., 14 February 1894, C 0 9 6 /2 4 3 .
79
Bram ston w ith  his usual flamboyance drafted a response in which he claimed th a t  a 
principle had been established th a t  existence of a p ro tec to ra te  in an uncivilised country  
entailed a right on the part  of the protecting  Power uto exercise within th a t  country such 
au tho ri ty  and jurisdiction, in short  such of the a t t r ib u te s  of sovereignty as are required 
for the due discharge of the duties  of the P r o t e c t o r . T h e s e  duties, he contended, 
involved protecting foreigners and natives from hurting  each other as well as natives from 
the excesses of their  own sovereign. In the circum stances, Brarnston subm itted th a t  the 
question of the ex ten t of powers assumed in this type of p ro tec to ra te  was a m a t te r  of 
policy irrespective of express g ran t  in the t r e a t i e s / '
Had the principle in fact been established? T h a t  apparen tly  was the question which 
the Colonial Secretary asked because, before the letter was despatched to the Governor of 
the Gold Coast, it was referred to the Law Officers for their com m ent. The latter (Reid 
and Lockwood) pointed out th a t  the doctrine propounded by Brarnston contradicted the 
position h itherto  assumed by the British G overnm ent (which they adm itted  was contrary  
to th a t  of France and Germ any) th a t  jurisdiction over the natives of the protectorate  was 
dependent on express consent of their sovereign. Nevertheless, the Law Officers reported 
th a t  over the previous ten years Britain had gradually assimilated her position with th a t  
of France and G erm any; and in their opinion the principle had been established in
O  Q
accordance with in ternational law.
The report was hailed by the Colonial Office as an im p o rtan t  breakthrough. 
Wingfield, Assistant Secretary, proposed th a t ,  since the principle laid down was generally 
applicable to all p ro tectorates,  a copy of the report and B ra ins ton ’s draft  to the G overnor 
should be sent to  the Foreign Office, although it was not the usual practice for the two
27C.O. to Ag. Governor Griffith, draft of January 1895, F 0 8 3 /1 3 7 5 .  
^ L .O . to C.O., 14 February 1895, no.78, L.O.R., vol.5.
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D ep artm en ts  to keep each o ther informed of instructions despatched to the protec tora tes  
under their control. To coun terac t  possible opposition of the Foreign Office, Wingfield 
suggested th a t  the report had to be sent “for their inform ation” only, so th a t  no 
impression was given th a t  the Colonial Office was seeking cuncurrence over the issue. 
Irrespective of the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office was prepared to accept the report as 
it s t o o d .^
Subsequently a copy of the draft and the report were sent to the Foreign Office with 
an in tim ation  th a t ,  if no response was received from th a t  D epartm en t within a fortnight, 
the draft  as it was would be despatched to the Governor of the  Gold Coast. From the 
tone of the  letter and the fact th a t  the Colonial Office sent the draft after seeking the 
Law Officers’ opinion — and not before, Davidson was able to  guess th a t  the Colonial 
Office was not concerned abou t  the views of the Foreign Office on the m atter .  Although 
Davidson thought th a t  it was probably a good policy for the British Governm ent to 
modify its earlier views and to bring them  into line with French and G erm an 
jurisprudence, nevertheless he felt th a t ,  since the principle reversed the views of the 
previous Law Officers, who included the curren t Lord Chancellor (Ilalsbury), and the 
Chief Justice  (Henry Jam es) ,  the report ought to be subm itted  to  Ilalsbury before a final 
decision was tak en .'’0 But his proposal was rejected by the Foreign Secretary, Kimberley, 
who saw no reason for involving the Lord Chancellor. In the M in is te r’s view there was no 
justif ica tion  for not accepting the Law Officers’ report “which seems to be in accordance
9 1
with com m on sense.”
'“^ M in u te  of 22 February 1895, on L.O. to C.O, ibid., C 0 9 6 /2 4 3 .  Most likely Wingfield’s rider 
was prompted by the Foreign Office’s earlier objection to the provisions of the draft Western 
Pacific Order relating to the exercise of jurisdiction over the natives of the protectorate, Rosebery 
to Ripon, 26 August 1892. The objection was raised by Davidson, minute 23 August 1892.
'’^Minute Davidson 27 February 1895, on C.O. to F.O., 26 February 1895, ibid.
’^ M in u te  of 27 February 1895, ibid.
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Kim berley’s veto on D avidson’s suggestion con tra s ts  remarkably with th a t  of 
Salisbury over the Foreign Jurisdiction Bill. It is quite evident in this case th a t  
Kimberley was in favour of the Law Officers’ report and perhaps feared th a t  the  Lord 
Chancellor might reject it as he had Jen k y n s’ argum en t.  On the o ther hand, Davidson
9  O
was not excited and probably hoped th a t  Halsbury would intervene. z One wonders w hat 
m ight have happened had the papers been sent to Halsbury. Three years la ter  he 
expressed his bitterness over the report and accused the Law Officers who w rote  it of
9 9
ignorance of international law .00 By then it was too late to  change the decision.
T he foregoing account indicates how the British reasoned from a denial of a  righ t to 
exercise jurisdiction over persons who were not subjects of the protecting Power, to  its 
acceptance. Throughout the period the a rgum en t was within the framework of 
in terna tional law. The conclusion to be drawn a t  this s tage is th a t  it was not the Foreign 
Jurisd ic tion  Act which was regarded a t  the t im e as the basis for assuming this 
jurisdiction . R ather it was in terna tional law which, as developed, allowed the assum ption  
of coercive jurisdiction over all persons in the pro tec to ra te ;  the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 
merely provided for the exercise of the jurisdiction  by the Crown. One could easily 
contend th a t  the British s tatesm en and lawyers conveniently m anipulated the  legal 
a rg u m en t to suit their desired policy. However, it is evident th a t  the m atte r  was much 
more complicated than  such a conclusion w arran ts .  It is obvious th a t  the law was not 
clear b u t  a t  the same tim e expediency for its own sake was not allowed to prevail over 
w ha t  were conceived to be the relevant principles of in terna tional law, otherwise all the 
legal m em oranda  and argum en ts  would have been unnecessary. Perhaps it hardly needs 
em phasis th a t  these were confidential docum ents and yet there was no direct suggestion 
of the law being flouted in favour of expediency. T he m anipula tion  involved was, so to
o o
' As w e shall see, D av id son  maintained the argum ent th at  the Crown had no jurisdiction over  
natives o f  the protectorate.
**° J o h n sto n ,  Sovereignty  and P rotectorates , at p. 260.
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speak, calculation within the law and it involved developing the legal principles (usually) 
to ca tch  up with practical developments. To a legal mind th a t  is not necessarily unusual,  
indeed th a t  is how the law is developed: reasoning by analogy and distinguishing
situations. The question of whether the  official legal framework was adhered to in 
practice, is a different story.
4.5 T he Ju risd ict iona l Issue  in the U g a n d a  P ro tec tora te
The Africa O rder in Council was the  fundam ental law of the U ganda P ro tec to ra te .  
W ith  regard to the adm in is tra tion  of justice, the Order provided for the  se tting  up of 
consular courts in the P ro tec to ra te  exercising civil and criminal jurisdiction, so far as 
circum stances ad m itted ,  “upon the principles of and in conformity with the substance of
9 i
the law for the t im e being in force in ... E ng land” .0 * T he O rder created certain specific 
offences which were unique to the African continent, and in addition  the Commissioner 
was given power, subject to the approval of the Secretary of S ta te ,  to make legislation 
(designated Q ueen’s Regulations) for the m aintenance of “peace, order and good 
governm en t” of British subjects in relation to any m a t te r  which was not expressly
9 C
provided for by the O rde r .0
Jurisdiction under the Africa O rder in Council of 1889 was limited to  British 
subjects  (and their p roperty) who were defined for the purpose as including all persons 
enjoying Her M ajes ty ’s protection , and subjects of the British P ro tec ted  Sta tes of India. 
“Foreigners” , th a t  is all o ther persons not falling in the above category (whether Africans 
or not) could be justic iable under the O rder provided th a t  they either voluntarily  
su b m itted  to British jurisdiction or their local sovereign consented to the exercise of
'’ ^Article 13. Colvile was the first Protectorate officer to obtain a judicial warrant to hold a 
Consular Court in Uganda. Thereafter several other officers received similar powers. The first 
Consular Judge, Collinson, was appointed in 1896. He was the first person with legal qualifications 
to be recruited. H.B. Thom as and Robert Scott, Uganda (London, OUP, 1935) p.247.
0,r>Articles 48-56, and 99.
"'^Articles 3 and 10.
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British power or au th o r i ty .  This provision was consistent with the prevailing legal 
opinion th a t  jurisdiction in p ro tec to ra tes  was based on consent. As may be recalled, the 
O rder was amended in 1892 to render subjects  of Signatories to the General Acts of Berlin 
and Brussels justic iable in a  similar m anner  as British subjects. A year later inhab itan ts  
of any British p ro tec to ra te  when outside their local jurisdiction  were also included in the
9 n
O rd e r . °  The extension of the British jurisdiction  over the la t te r  was justified on the 
ground th a t ,  since the Crown was responsible for the foreign relations of their territory 
the du ty  of protecting  and controlling the  natives while abroad devolved on it. As a 
corollary it had the right to  assume jurisd ic tion  over them  when in territories subject to 
B ri ta in ’s control. It is significant th a t ,  even though the Foreign Office did not object to 
the Colonial Office’s instructions to the Governor of the Gold Coast, supra, it did not, as 
on the o ther occasions, follow-up the legal b reakthrough by am ending the Africa Order in 
Council accordingly. Probably this was partly  due to the fact th a t  the D epartm ental 
legal advisers were not fully convinced by the legal a rgum ent for assuming the 
jurisdiction* and partly  th a t  the Foreign Office was not anxious to exercise it.
Since under the  189-4 trea ty  the K abaka  had consented to the declaration of the 
P ro tec to ra te  and to the exercise of jurisdiction  over his subjects, it is subm itted  th a t  the 
B aganda  w'ere “foreigners” to whom the O rder was applicable. As already explained, the
9 Q
applica tion  of the O rder to them  was subject to the provisions of the t re a ty .00 On the 
o ther  hand, the rest of the inhab itan ts  of Uganda P ro tec to ra te ,  and the foreigners not 
falling into any of the above groups, were not justic iable under (he Order except with 
their consent or th a t  of their rulers.
9 *7
° 1 For the tex ts  o f the Orders see Hertslet, C om m ercia l T rea t ie s , 18:2-4. 
°^ A b o v e  at p.43.
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4 .6  O fficial I n te r p r e ta t io n  o f  th e  J u r is d ic t io n a l  P o s i t io n
Predictably there was confusion as to where British authority lay and on what legal 
basis jurisdiction was exercised. Although the official reason given by the Foreign Office 
for extending the Protectorate was to enable the administration to exercise jurisdiction 
under the Africa Order in Council, no one seemed to be sure whether the Order applied to 
the natives of Uganda. This is illustrated by two judgments delivered by Colvile “in the 
Court for the district of Port Alice, Entebbe ... under the Africa Order in Council, 1889.” 
In one of the judgments he convicted and sentenced to death one “Badzangeri” (possibly a 
Muganda “Bazongere” ) for murdering his wife; and in the second judgment he sentenced a 
Sudanese soldier to life imprisonment for manslaughter. Colvile reported to the Foreign 
Office that, in accordance with Articles 71 and 75 of the Africa Order in Council, he had
*> Q
despatched copies of the judgments to the High Court of Bombay.
Apparently the procedure which he followed bemused the Foreign Office. 
Immediately Colvile was instructed to explain the legal basis upon which he exercised 
jurisdiction over the two men. If it was under the,Africa Order in Council, the foreign 
Office wanted to know why he had not sent the men to be tried in the courts in one of 
Brita in’s possessions as required under Article 61 of the Order. Colvile in response cited 
the 1891 treaty whereby “Her Majesty’s representative was authorised to try such 
criminal cases as he considered desirable.” He justified his decision of not sending the 
accused to Natal, which was the nearest British possession, on the ground that he was 
merely following the practice of the Zanzibar Court.
The Foreign Office was not any wiser after the second explanation. One official 
dismissed it as “displaying strange confusion” . The contradiction, it would seem from the
•'^The Articles prescribed that where a sentence in excess of twelve months was given, the 
judgment had to be sent to the High Court of Bombay (which was the appellate court for Uganda) 
for review. See Colvile to 1 . 0 ,  «> April 1895, f O ‘2/72.
*
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point of view of the Foreign Office, was that if the men were tried p u rsuan t  to the powers 
gran ted  by the Kabaka their cases were supposed to be dealt  with under the trea ty  
presumably according to B u g an d a’s laws; but not under the Africa Order in Council.'*® 
The Foreign Office allowed the m a t te r  to drop since (regrettably) the judgm en ts  had 
already been sent to B om bay.*1
Colvile most likely assumed th a t  the  trea ty  enabled him to apply the provisions of 
the Africa Order in Council over the  Baganda — which, as we have suggested above, was 
not necessarily wrong. Nor was Colvile’s in te rp re ta t ion ,  in this regard, unique. Harry 
Johnston , then Commissioner of the  British Centra l  Africa P ro tec to ra te ,  had earlier given 
a similar in terpre ta tion  to the trea ties  m ade with the chiefs in th a t  P ro tec to ra te .  On 
several occasions Johnston was reminded by the Foreign Office th a t  the natives were not 
justic iable under the Africa O rder in Council or any regulations made thereunder. The 
I1 oreign Office m aintained th a t  ju risd iction  over the natives of the P ro tec to ra te  was based 
on delegation of au thority  to  the Commissioner who exercised it in the name of the Chief 
concerned. A parallel view was expressed by N unan, Consular Judge of the British 
C en tra l  Africa P ro tecto ra te ,  in the case of Cox v The Africa Lakes C orpora tion : “To try 
a  native case, this Consular C ourt  would have to change its charac ter ,  and resolve itself 
into a Native C ourt  exercising jurisd iction , not in pursuance of the King’s commission, 
nor of a judicial w arran t  signed by His M ajes ty ’s Secretary of S ta te  for Foreign Affairs, 
but,  by the au tho ri ty  of his M ajes ty ’s Commissioner, in the name of the Chief.”*3
*( Minute 4 April 1895, ibid., (initials blurred). He also suggested that Colvile probably meant 
that he did not mean to try them under the Africa Order in Council but under the “[B]Uganda law 
in the fashion of the High Court” .
11 Ibid. No further correspondence relating to these cases could be traced.
*^F.O. to Johnston, no. 135, 22 November 1895, F 0 2 /9 7 .  Also discussions at the Foreign Office 
of a letter from the Acting Commissioner (Sharpe), British Central Africa Protectorate, dated 17 
March 1897, minutes Bertie and Davidson. See also Harry Johnston, British Central Africa, 
(London, Methuen, 1897) at p . 114.
4 *y'T or copy of the judgment enclosure Sharpe to Lansdowne, 29 July 1901, F 0 2 /4 7 1 .  See also 
Johnston, ibid.
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In con trast  to Colvile, his successor, Berkeley, thought th a t  the Africa O rder in 
Council was not applicable to the natives of the Protectorate.'*'* In his 1897 report which 
informed the Foreign Secretary of the es tab lishm ent in B uganda of regular consular 
cou r ts  under the Africa O rder in Council, Berkeley emphasised th a t  the “provisions [of 
the  Order], of course, do not apply to the Natives of the jurisd ic tion” . Berkeley explained 
th a t  justice in cases where only the B aganda  were involved was administered in a two tier 
cou r t  system — “lower” and “higher” courts  — which had been established with the 
assistance of George Wilson, officer in charge of Buganda. These courts were presided 
over by the chiefs under the “guidance” of Wilson.'*'^ Appeals were sometimes allowed to 
go to  the Commissioner and as a rule no executions ordered by the Buganda courts were 
carried out w ithou t his consent. Berkeley justified the Com missioner’s role by reminding 
the  Foreign Secretary th a t  “your Lordship is, of course, aware th a t  by our T reaty  with 
B jU ganda Her M ajes ty ’s G overnm ent exercises final jurisdiction over all m atters  of local 
ju r isd ic t ion” . However, he also adm itted  th a t  in practice the position was to some ex ten t 
different:
Cases (among natives) would be heard som ew hat indiscriminately either in 
the  C ourts  of the A dm inis tra tion  or of local authorities , and in some cases 
se tt lem ents  in the na tu re  of judgem ents  would be arrived a t  a mission. It is 
clear from all this th a t  am ong the masses there  existed a good deal of doubt as 
to  where real au tho ri ty  lay, and on w hat lines it was exercised.*®
Nor did Berkeley think th a t  the rest of the natives of the P rotectora te  were 
justic iab le  under the Order. Indeed in his opinion “ ... the officers in charge of the ... 
d is tr ic ts  outside [BjUganda [had] no jurisdiction over d isputes and claims to which 
natives  of these districts [were] exclusively concerned.” These lie said were m atte rs  for 
their  local authorit ies  or tr ibunals  as were com peten t to deal w ith them. In Berkeley’s
 ^ This was partly based on his experience in Witu Protectorate, Berkeley to Salisbury, 27 July  
1898, F 0 2 /1 5 7 .
 ^ ’Wilson claimed that he participated at the request of the chiefs, see Wilson to Her M ajesty’s 
Commissioner, re: Mr Collinson’s despatch 24 July 1898, enclosure, ibid.
*®Berkeley to Salisbury, 26 January 1897, F O C P /6694 .
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view, the duty of the officers in charge of these d istricts  was “only to  see th a t  nothing 
barb aro u s  [was] done, and th a t  the judgem ent and pun ishm ent ... [were] in accordance 
w ith  public requirements and with justice according to  the officer’s own knowledge of the 
case.” * 4 ^
If the Africa O rder in Council was not applicable to the natives of the P ro tec to ra te ,  
on w h a t  legal basis did these d is tric t officers intervene in the adm inis tra tion  of justice in 
the ir  districts? W ha t was the legal justif ication for applying the O rder to the indigenes in 
cases involving both natives and non-natives? P robably  these were some of the questions 
which provoked Collinson, the  P ro tec to ra te  Consular Judge, to offer his own theory of the 
jurisdictional position in contrad istinction  to th a t  of the Commissioner. His proposition 
was th a t  the Africa Order in Council was applicable to the natives of the P ro tec to ra te .4®
Collinson supported  his views on two grounds. In the first place, he referred to the 
definition (under the Order) of “British subjects” which included persons “enjoying Her 
M ajes ty ’s pro tec tion” . Since the natives of U ganda “no d o u b t” enjoyed this protection, 
he held th a t  they were British subjects for the purposes of the Order and therefore 
justic iab le  thereunder .4^ Second, in the a l te rna tive ,  Collinson suggested th a t  the Crown 
by “usage and sufferance” could apply the O rder to the natives and th a t  in fact she had 
done so wdth regard to the natives of Uganda, except the B aganda  because of the trea ty . 
F rom  his s tandpo in t,  the basis of the Crow'n’s jurisdiction over the natives was the Order. 
F or this reason he m ain ta ined  th a t  the officers responsible for the districts outside
A 1
'Berkeley to Salisbury, 10 December 1898, supra.
A £
°Collinson’s arguments are paraphrased by Berkeley in his letter to Salisbury, 10 December 
1898, supra; and in Collinson’s memoranda to Berkeley of 24 June 1898 and 27 July 1898, 
enclosure, idem.
4 ^Collinson’s memorandum of 27 July 1898, enclosure Berkeley to Salisbury, 10 December 1898, 
F 0 2 /1 5 7 .  With reference to this particular point Berkeley retorted by noting that while Article 3 
defined “Native” “Foreigner” and “British Subject” , Article 10 (which prescribed persons who were 
justiciable under the Order) only mentioned the last two.
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B uganda, who adm inistered  justice am ong the  natives, were under the obligation to 
comply with the provisions of the Order; for example, they had to t ransm it  to the 
Bombay High Court  all the ir  judgm ents  in which sentences of twelve m onths or over were 
imposed.
Collinson did not e laborate  the la t te r  a rgum ent,  however, it is subm itted th a t  it 
wras quite tenable a t  least with regard to some of the d istricts. It will be recalled th a t  
persons who were subject to the Order included “Foreigners ... with respect to whom any 
... King, Chief ... whose subjects, or under whose protection , they are, has, by any 
T re a ty ,  ... or otherwise agreed with Her M ajesty or consented to, the exercise of power or 
au tho ri ty  by Her M ajesty .” The provision, in o ther words, contem plated  manifestation of 
consent by any means. According to Lush ing ton’s oft quoted judgm en t in the case of 
P apavann i  v The Russian Steam  Navigation Com pany (The Laconia), usage and 
sufferance could const i tu te  consent where the usage is “perm itted  and acquiesced in” by 
the  local ruler; or where there was active or silent “acquiescence” with “full knowledge” 
w ith o u t  any protest from his part."*® W hether or not any particu lar  local ruler fell within 
th is  category was obviously a question of fact.’*^
Because of the 1894 trea ty  with the B aganda, Collinson was prepared to draw a 
d is tinc tion  between them  and the rest of the P ro tec to ra te .  Jurisdiction over the B aganda 
— in Buganda — he felt was regulated by this trea ty . Collinson argued th a t  cases where 
only the B aganda were involved were justic iable in their own courts, but th a t  the
'^15  E.R. (P.C) 862, at p.870. F .T . Piggott, The Law Relating to Consular Jurisdiction and to 
Residence m Oriental countries (London, William Clowes and Sons, 1892) at page 53 emphasises 
that the crucial phrase is “full knowledge” ; without it he submits that there could not be sufferance 
or usage.
' Ankole and Toro chiefs were taking their cases to the Protectorate administration even before 
the Protectorate was formally extended to their territory, see Berkeley to Salisbury, 18 December 
1895, supra. In the circumstances it was arguable that the Crown had acquired jurisdiction over 
the Banyankole and Batoro by usage and sufferance; therefore the Order should have applied to 
th e m .
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Commissioner, either acting personally or through the officer in charge of Buganda, was 
empowered to intervene and to control any decisions made by them (Article 7). The 
Commissioner’s jurisdiction in that case was not dependent on his judicial warrant but 
was by virtue of the treaty, and he exercised it in his administrative capacity. On the 
other hand, Collinson added that, where a Muganda was involved in a dispute with 
“persons enjoying Her Majesty’s Protection” , because of Article 5 of the treaty, he was 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the Consular Court. The distinction which Collinson was 
apparently trying to draw was tha t  in the former the Africa Order in Council did not 
apply, while in the latter it did.
It is submitted tha t  the foregoing argument was also conceivable within the scope of 
the Order. Because of the treaty the Baganda were “foreigners” to whom the Order 
applied. However, a point which most likely Collinson had in mind, application of the 
Order in any country which had a treaty with Britain was qualified by Article 16 thereof 
which provided th a t ,  in the event of conflict between the provisions of the treaty and any 
of the applied law's, including the Order itself, the former would prevail. The treaty with 
Buganda did not expressly prescribe the law' which was to be administered. But since the 
Kabaka retained the jurisdiction over cases where only the Baganda were involved 
(subject to appeal and intervention by the Commissioner ) it was implicit that the 
intention was tha t  Buganda’s laws and procedure were to apply; whereas in mixed cases, 
and those involving non-Baganda, where jurisdiction had been surrendered to the Crown, 
it was the Order.
Collinson was evidently attempting to justify the Crown’s jurisdiction over the 
natives of Uganda within the context of the Protectorate municipal law. If his argument 
were accepted, it meant tha t  all the provisions of the Africa Order in Council had to be 
complied with in administering justice over the natives, except the Baganda as explained.
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For  example,  only officers wi th judicial  warran ts  could hold courts;  sentences in excess of 
twelve months had to be confirmed by the Secretary of Sta te,  and the minutes of the 
ju d g m en t  had to be sent to the High Cour t  in Bombay  for review — which entai led delay 
and a  possibility of the  ju d g m en t  being over turned on technical grounds.  Most  likely 
these considerations influenced Berkeley to take s t rong exception of the Consular Judge’s 
views. Not th a t  Collinson himself favoured the full fledged appl ication of the Order; quite 
the  contrary.  However,  he though t  t h a t  the posit ion as he interpreted it was the law 
unless regulations were made  (as he indeed proposed) providing a simpler system for the
r o
adminis t ra t ion  of jus tice in the d is tr icts outside Buganda.  A point which should be 
noted is th a t  nowhere in Coll inson’s argument  did he express any reservations t h a t  the 
Crown had jurisdict ion,  by vi r tue of the  Protec to ra te ,  over the nat ives of Uganda.  His 
endeavour was to explain this jurisdict ion within the  context  of the Order.  On the other 
hand,  Berkeley was perhaps confused by the wider issue as to whether the  Crown had 
jurisdict ion over non-Bri ti sh subjects wi thin a Brit ish protec torate.
4 .7  I s su e  R e ferred  to  th e  F o r e ig n  OfTice
In view of the d isagreement  between the Commissioner  and the Consular  Judge,  the 
former requested the Foreign Office to intervene.  He wanted an autho r i t a t i ve  opinion as 
to whether  the Africa Order  in Council was or was not applicable to the nat ives of the 
U ganda  Protec tora te .  Berkeley added that ,  until the position was clarified, it was 
pointless to make any proposals regarding the  adm inis t ra t ion  of just ice in the
r  9
Pro tec to ra te  especially in the dist ricts outside Buganda.
At  the Foreign Office the m a t t e r  was referred to the legal adviser,  Davidson,  to 
untangle.  Character is t ical ly Davidson began by expressing his sympathies for the 
difficulties Collinson had (which he said were experienced by other  lawyers) in construing
f f t
,)ZCollinson to Com m issioner ,  27 Ju ly  1898, supra.
'’' 'Berkeley to Salisbury, 10 December 1898, supra.
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Articles 3 and 10 of the Africa Order in Council to determine the jurisdictional position of 
the natives of the Protectorate. Davidson attributed the problem to the ambiguous 
definitions of a “British subject” and a “Native” in the Order. Nonetheless, he had no 
doubt that, according to the rules of s tatutory interpretation, Collinson’s construction of 
the Order was misconceived. Since in Article 3 the definition of “Native” came after that 
of “"British subject” , Davidson argued tha t  it overrode the latter “qua its special subject 
m atter  of ‘British subject5 in so far as it purports to include Natives” . ^  In any case, 
Davidson minuted that, even if Collinson’s interpretation were right tha t  the definition of 
British subject included natives of the Protectorate, it did not, in his opinion, necessarily 
render them justiciable in Her Majesty’s courts if she did not otherwise possess 
jurisdiction over them:
The Order in Council merely provides for the exercise of Her Majesty’s 
jurisdiction which has (in theory at any rate) been obtained by Treaty or 
Agreement with the Sultan, King, Chief or other ruler of the Protected place.
Such Sultan or other ruler did not grant to Her Majesty jurisdiction over his 
own subjects and Her Majesty cannot assume a jurisdiction which does not 
otherwise exist by making phylacteries of a definition clause in the Order in 
Council. ^
From the foregoing it is evident tha t ,  according to Davidson, the declaration of a 
protectorate did not by itself entitle the Crown to assume jurisdiction over the natives of 
the territory. Moreover, it would seem that, in his opinion, jurisdiction could not be 
created merely by legislating: it had first to be acquired from the local sovereign. If this 
is a fair interpretation of Davidson’s minutes, they contradict the Colonial Office’s 
instructions to the Governor of the Gold Coast, mentioned above. Surprisingly, nowhere 
in his minutes w’ere these instructions mentioned; on the oilier hand, it may be recalled 
th a t  Davidson did not show much enthusiasm about the legal position taken by the
'^M inute Davidson, 6 April 1898.
,r) , lbid. W.E. Hall, Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction of the British Crown (Oxford, 189-1) at. page 
213, interpreted Article 10(4) of the Order as amounting to the assumption of jurisdiction over the 
natives of the country and all subjects of European states in the territories where the Order applied.
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Colonial Office. P erhaps  he did not wish the  Foreign Office to follow the l a t te r ’s 
precedent which he felt was not consistent w ith  English and in terna tional law. It is also 
notew orthy  th a t  in his a rg u m en t Davidson only dealt  with s i tua tions  where there were no 
express au thorisation  by the terr ito ria l sovereign to exercise jurisdiction  over his subjects. 
He did not discuss or com m ent on a s i tua tion  like th a t  of B uganda  w'hich had a trea ty  
with the Crown. W as the Africa O rder in Council applicable in th a t  case? Davidson did 
not say.
Davidson passed on Berkeley’s le t te r  to  Albert G ray , the  draftsman, for his 
com m ent and possible action. Significantly, Davidson forewarned him against amending 
the  Africa Order in Council (unless unavoidable) solely to correct the ap pa ren t  
overlapping definitions, as he feared th a t  “d oub t  [might] thereby be thrown on the 
proceedings of the last ten years .” This indicates th a t  Davidson was not only opposed, 
on technical grounds, to  the exercise of jurisd ic tion  over the natives of the P ro tecto ra te ,  
bu t  he was probably also against it as a m a t te r  of policy.
In the event G ray expressed his full agreem ent with D avidson’s in terpretation  of the 
jurisdictional position. G ray a t tacked  Collinson for holding th a t  “since a Native of a 
P ro tec to ra te  enjoyed Her M ajes ty ’s protection  ergo, he was a British subject under the 
Africa O rder in Council.” In his opinion the premise was unsound in law because the 
Crown did not p ro tec t  natives individually in their own country , but only their 
government. He claimed th a t  it w'as only when the natives were abroad  th a t  they became 
British protected persons. This was because the ir  government had no independent foreign 
relations which, by v irtue of the p ro tec to ra te ,  were B ri ta in ’s responsibility. ' Gray 
illustra ted  his argum en t by reference to the  protected s ta tes  of India which he said
'’^M inu te  Davidson to G ray , 11 April 1898.
J ^M cm o Gray, 11 April 1899, F 0 2 /2 5 9 .  C o m p are  G ra y ’s views with those of Bram ston, above 
pp. 77-78.
i
93
provided an excellent example of the concept of a p ro tec tora te .  Although the  native 
governm ents in east and central Africa were not exactly analogous to those of India (for 
example they were not as organised and some could hardly be described as governm ents) ,  
nevertheless Gray subm itted  th a t  there were na tive  laws and custom which the British 
G overnm ent upheld, provided they did not offend against m orality  and justice. These 
laws, he argued, could be adm inistered , where possible, th rough a native agency, 
otherwise by British Officers.
Addressing himself specifically to U ganda, Gray confessed th a t  he was neither 
acquainted  with the B uganda trea ty  nor with the  distinction which Collinson said should 
be “observed between B uganda and the rest of the  P ro tec to ra te .” He casually remarked 
th a t  “ it appears from ... jCollinson’s] s ta te m e n t  th a t  the B aganda are by some trea ty  
provision justic iable to  a certain  ex ten t to  the Consular Courts . Is this so?” He did not 
com m ent any fu r th e r .58
Collinson, by basing p a r t  of his a rgum en t upon the definition of “British su b jec t” in 
the Order, exposed himself to this criticism. However, th a t  was only part  of his a rgum en t 
for holding th a t  the O rder was applicable to  the  natives of the P ro tectora te .  Neither 
G ray nor Davidson com m ented upon his suggestion th a t  the O rder applied by “usage and 
sufferance” . G ray 's  ignorance of the trea ty  provisions, and D avidson’s silence ab o u t  it, 
are indicative th a t  the two legal advisers were discussing the issues raised from a 
theoretical s tandpo in t  w ithou t seriously a t te m p t in g  to relate to  the actual facts of the 
U ganda P ro tec to ra te .  As suggested earlier, Collinson was try ing to justify the C ro w n ’s 
jurisd ic tion  over the natives of U ganda w ith in  the  framework of the municipal law of the
o8Subsequently Hill, Head of the Africa desk, sent, him a note explaining the treaty. Davidson  
expressed his gratitude to him for taking a strong view of the “erroneous nature of C ollinson’s 
construction of the Africa Order in Council” , minutes: Hill to Gray, 15 April 1899; and Davidson  
to Gray, 20 April 1899.
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P ro tec to ra te  which was founded upon the  Africa Order in Council. Both G ray  and 
Davidson denied th a t  the O rder was applicable, yet neither of them  indicated the  legal 
basis for the P ro tec to ra te  G o v ern m en t’s in tervention in tlie adm inistration  of justice 
within th is  fram ework.0^
T here  are no records of the Foreign Office’s response to  Berkeley em ana ting  from 
the above discussion. P robably  it did not w rite  back. This was partly  because Berkeley 
resigned (on health grounds) while the m a t te r  was still under discussion, and  Harry 
Johnston  was appointed  as a Special Com missioner to replace him. Johnston left Britain 
for B uganda  a t  the beginning of Septem ber 1899. Johnston  m ost likely was instructed  to 
resolve the jurisdictional problem in the P ro tec to ra te .
4.8  P r o p o s a l  for a n e w  O rd er  in C o u n c i l
Meanwhile Gray conferred with Hill, Head of the Africa desk, about the need to 
p rom ulgate  a new O rder in Council for Uganda. Gray advised Hill th a t  the Africa Order 
in Council was “ou tda ted  in a P ro tec to ra te  where the general adm inis tra tion  is largely 
assumed by Her M ajesty and we have as you know had g rea t  difficulty in doing w hat is 
required under it .” He predicted th a t  with time these difficulties were bound to increase 
ra the r  than  decrease. In any case, in his opinion, a fresh O rder in Council was required 
“unless we are to go on adm inistering justice  to the natives without any w ritten  
c o n s t i tu t io n .^  Later G ray  subm itted  to th e  Foreign Office a detailed m em orandum  in 
which he re iterated  these views. He urged the D epartm en t to prom ulgate a broad based 
law for the Uganda P ro tec to ra te  which authorised  legislation on general m a t te rs  of 
adm in is tra t ion ,  for example, customs, police, post office, land, and  so on.^*
’’^See in particular C ray’s suggestion that the British officers could administer justice to the 
natives either through “a native agency” or directly. Query: Was the consent of the local ruler
necessary?
60Minute Gray to Hill, 9 May 1899, F 0 2 /2 5 9 .
()1 Memorandum respecting law in Uganda, no.97, 2 September 1899, FOCP/7402.
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T hus  from G ra y ’s analysis the Africa Order in Council was actually the cause of the 
P ro te c to ra te ’s jurisdictional problems. His advice was simply to repeal and replace it 
with an appropriately  worded Order which conferred extensive power and au th o r i ty  over 
a wide spectrum  of topics. Ju risd ic tion , contrary  to D avidson’s views, could af te r  all be 
acquired by legislation even where it did no t exist before!
G ra y ’s solution was of course no t  new. As we have seen, there were already 
precedents of such O rders in Council as he proposed in some of the p ro tec tora tes  
adm inistered  by the Colonial Office. Why did the Foreign Office adopt a legal position 
which its lawyers had previously re jected? It seems th a t  the Foreign Office by th a t  time 
was anxious to extend the powers and adm in is tra t ion  of the Crown in the pro tec tora tes  
under its control. The Colonial Office was far ahead in this regard and it provided 
convenient precedents. Moreover, up to  th a t  t ime no legal problems had apparen tly  been 
experienced with the Colonial Office Orders in Council which authorised  the exercise of 
extensive powers. This  m ight have encouraged the Foreign Office to follow suit. Indeed 
prior to G ra y ’s submission of his m em orandum  for a new Order in Council for Uganda, he 
had referred to the Law Officers a proposed am endm ent to the East Africa P ro tec to ra te  
O rder in Council, 1897. This empowered the Commissioner to issue proclam ations for the 
natives of the p r o t e c t o r a t e . S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  G ray , in the accom panying letter to the  Law 
Officers, enclosed the 1895 Colonial Office instructions to the Governor of the Gold 
C oast,  mentioned earlier. Since th e  Law' Officers approved the  am endm ent w ithout 
dem ur, it confirmed th a t ,  by virtue of the p ro tec to ra te ,  the Crown could assume judicial
( \ 9
^For example, South Africa Order in Council, 1891; West Pacific Order in Council, 1892; supra.
ß  O
°See Articles 51 and 52. Although Queen’s Regulations dealing with these Courts were enacted 
there was serious doubt about their legality, Y.P. Ghai and J.P.W . McAuslan, Public Law and 
Political Change hi Kenya: A_ Study of the Legal Framework of Government From Colonial 'Limes 
to the Present (Nairobi, OUP, 1970) pp. 19-20. The Order is printed in Hertslet,Commercial 
Treat ies, 20:50.
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and legislative powers over the indigenous people. 4
Hence when G ray recommended th a t  a  new O rder in Council should be promulgated 
for Uganda, a  decision had already been taken by the Foreign Office as to the general 
legal question; a t  any ra te , as regards the  E as t  Africa P ro tectora te .  In fact Gray 
suggested th a t  the E as t  Africa P ro tec to ra te  Order, as am ended, should be adopted for 
U ganda  with a  rider th a t  certain m a tte rs  m ight need special consideration for U ganda’s 
purposes. As an example he singled out the  t re a tm e n t  of Buganda the circumstances of 
which he again confessed, he was not too familiar with.
Instructions to  prepare the O rder were issued to Gray in March, 1900. Two years 
later the U ganda O rder in Council, 1902, was enacted. This Order is discussed below. 
One point which should be emphasised here is th a t ,  while the above discussions were 
tak ing  place in London, Johnston , unaw are of the London talks, was negotiating a fresh 
Agreem ent with the Baganda. Johnston  regarded the Agreement he m ade as the legal 
b reak th rough  which authorised  the Crown to legislate and adm inister justice over the 
Baganda.  ^
4 .9  Q u e e n ’s R e g u la t io n s
Before draw ing  a  conclusion from the foregoing account, we shall briefly digress to 
deal with the issue of legislative powers which is closely linked with jurisdiction. If the 
a rg u m en t was m ain ta ined  th a t  the Africa Order in Council was not applicable to the 
natives  of the P ro tec to ra te ,  then it followed th a t  Q ueen’s Regulations could not affect 
them  either. T h a t  indeed was the official in te rp re ta t ion  in the British Central Africa
^ F . O .  to L.O, 24 July 1899; L.O to F.O, 8 August 1899, FO C P/7402. The amendment fell 
short of making all persons justiciable under the Order, see Article 2, Hertslet, Commercial 
Treaties, 21: 118.
See chapter six.
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P ro tec to ra te , w h ich  was also approved  by the  Fore ign  O ffice .
U nder the 1894 B r it is h /B u g a n d a  tre a ty , there  is no p rov is ion  w hich  empowered the 
C om m issioner to  leg is la te  fo r the  Baganda (though , as suggested above, he had the  pow er 
under the O rde r). E ith e r  because o f th is  or fo r p o lit ic a l expediency, or bo th , George 
W ilson  reform ed the L u k iik o  and converted  i t  in to  a leg is la tive  body som ewhat m odelled 
on the  B r it is h  P a rlia m e n t . T hu s  “ B il ls ”  were in tro du ced  in the  L u k iik o , read and 
debated a t three separate s itt in g s  before f in a lly  being voted upon to  become “ s ta tu te s ” . 
One o f the f irs t laws to  be made by the  L u k iik o  was th a t w h ich  required the chiefs to  
a tte n d  to  L u k iik o  m a tte rs  fo r a t least a period o f fo u r m on ths a nn ua lly . A n o th e r law  
p rov ided  th a t no leg is la tion  made by the  L u k iik o  was to  be va lid  u n t i l  i t  had received the 
C om m iss ione r’s co n firm a tio n .* ’ ”  These tw o  laws were obv ious ly  p a rt o f the re fo rm  to  
co nve rt the L u k iik o  in to  a leg is la tive  body under the c o n tro l o f the  C om m issioner.
Berkeley in  h is re p o rt o f the  L u k iik o ’s law  m ak ing  powers, c la im ed th a t the
P ro te c to ra te  a d m in is tra t io n ’s role was in d ire c t: “ I t  may be th a t the a d m in is tra tio n
suggests the need fo r leg is la tion  in a p a r t ic u la r  question , and ind ica tes  the line  on w h ich
i t  m ig h t m ost advantegeously be p ro v id e d , or the local n a tive  a u th o r it ie s  them selves take
/
r*o
the  in it ia t iv e .”  0 By co n tra s t, K a t ik iro  A p o lo  K a gw a ’s account gives the im pression th a t 
the  B r it is h  o ffic ia ls  p layed a m ore d o m in a tin g  role. Kagw a b lu n t ly  w'rote th a t,  “ By the 
9 th  o f Ju ly  1895 M r  Jackson [had] enacted eighteen l a w ' s . I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  these law's, as 
recorded in  K agw a ’s book, bear the  s ignatures o f M w anga , K agw a  and tw o  o the r chiefs. 
Jackson signed: “ A pproved  by F rede rick  Jackson, rep resen ta tive  o f the K in g  o f E ng land
66 J o h n s to n ’s C i r c u la r  to  a l l  j u d ic ia l  and o th e r  o f f ic ia ls  o f  the P ro te c to ra te ,  17 J a n u a ry  1896, 
c i ted  in P ig g o t t  to  H .M .S .  C o m m is s io n e r ,  7 A p r i l  1898; F 0 2 / 1 4 7 .  See also memo by F a rn a l l  on 
the  a d m in is t ra t io n  o f  N o r th e rn  R hodes ia ,  8 O c to b e r  1898, F O C P /7 1 4 3 .
n n
’ ' K a g w a ’s book, c ited below.
68 Berke ley  to  S a l isbury ,  26 J a n u a ry  1897, supra.
^  A po lo  K ag w a ,  Basekabaka be B u g a n d a ( t rans la ted ,  m ic ro f i lm  copy ,  U n iv e rs i ty  o f  C h ic a g o  
L ib r a r y ,  1927) p.167. Since the oriqinal was not available, I  was unable to
usedkbvheKar, thV erm " T L  13 an aCCUratS Nation of the expressionused by Kagwa. However, I have no reason to doubt that this is indeed the case.
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in witness thereof.” Was .Jackson a witness or the  one who made the laws? There are a t 
least tw o possible explanations: either the laws were made by .Jackson and the chiefs ju s t  
signed as a  formality; or the system  of legislation being new, Kagwa did not appreciate  
th a t  the laws were made by the Lukiiko since the  Commissioner had the final word.
W hatever the practical explanation , using the Lukiiko politically to make laws for
B uganda  had the advantage in th a t  the chiefs and their  subjects were more likely to
cooperate  if they partic ipated in the legislative process than  if the laws were ju s t  imposed
by the  British adm inistration . Secondly, Wilson probably saw the exercise as par t  of
B ri ta in ’s “civilising” mission of the B aganda . W hether in addition  the Lukiiko was
consciously developed as a legislative body because the adm in is tra tion  believed th a t  it
was the  only legal mechanism for making law for the Baganda, cannot be said for certain.
However, there are a few pointers which suggest th a t  this might well have been the case.
The m ost obvious example is Berkeley’s insistence th a t  neither the Order nor Q ueen’s
Regulations were applicable to the natives of the  P ro tec to ra te .  One might deduce from
this th a t  the Lukiiko was perhaps developed with the intention of being used to enact
laws which the G overnm ent considered desirable for the adm in is tra tion  of Buganda.
Secondly, Berkeley’s explanation, in his 1897 report earlier referred to, of the
a d m in is tra t io n ’s role in the Lukiiko’s law m aking process m ight partly  have been
intended to portray  the view th a t  the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent had no direct legislative
powers over the Baganda. Another example which supports  this line of argument is found
in the P ro tec to ra te  ad m in is tra t ion ’s discussion of the proposal to apply in U ganda the
Land and Mining Regulations. Both Wilson and Collinson were em phatic th a t  the
Regulations had to be adopted by the B uganda Lukiiko before they could apply in
Buganda. This  indicates th a t ,  in their opinion, the Lukiiko was the only body which had
7nthe power to legislate for Buganda.
^ C oll in son  to Wilson, 11 August 1899, enclosure Wilson to Salisbury, no.83, FO C P/7077, see 
chapter six.
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Nevertheless, there were a few Q ueen’s Regulations which were made applicable to 
all persons within the P ro tec to ra te .  M ost of these were made after 1900, during 
Jo h n s to n ’s adm inis tra tion . 1 Ironically, Johnston ,  while Commissioner of the British 
C entral Africa P ro tec to ra te ,  in 1896 issued a circular to his subord inate  staff reminding 
them  th a t  neither the Africa O rder in Council nor Q ueen’s Regulations were applicable to 
the natives of the P ro tec to ra te .  Why did he in this case make them  applicable to the 
people of U ganda P ro tec to ra te?  Why did the Foreign Office approve them  when a few 
m onths  previously its legal advisers had ridiculed Collinson’s argum en t th a t  the Order 
applied to  the natives of the P ro tec to ra te?  W as the application of the Order regarded as 
different from Q ueen’s Regulations? Perhaps none of these questions can be answered 
satisfactorily, though there are a num ber of possible reasons to account for the 
contradiction.
F irstly , and perhaps most im portan tly  from a legal point of view, towards the end 
of 1899 a reference was m ade to  the Law Officers by the Foreign Office with regard to the 
C row n’s powers over land in the Uganda and the E ast  Africa Protectora tes .  In its letter 
the Foreign Office confessed th a t  Q ueen’s Regulations had in some cases been made and 
applied to  the natives of the two P ro tec to ra tes  even though strictly  there was no power 
under the O rder to do so. In their response the Law Officers agreed th a t  the Regulations 
were ul tra v ires , but,  since they had been au thorised  by the Crown they were Acts of 
S ta te  and therefore not questionable in the courts. Effectively this m eant th a t  any 
legislation could be made and applied to anybody provided it was approved by the 
Secretary of S tate. Secondly, as the Foreign Office had accepted the principle th a t  the 
Crown had the power to exercise judicial and legislative jurisdiction , it might well be th a t
71 .<AFor example But Tax Regulations, 20 September 1900; Native Cun Tax Regulations, 30 
September 1900; Regulations number 29 and 30’ Laws of the Uganda Protectorate 1895-1900.
^ A b o v e  at p.9Gn.
"°The report is discussed in the following chapter.
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it decided not to intervene w ith  Q ueen 's R egulations m ade under the Africa O rder in 
Council even though they were believed to  be irregular. Third ly , a related point, it might 
have been decided as a m a t te r  of policy no t to stifle the local adm in is tra tion  with 
technical issues which after all were meaningless to the persons concerned and probably
n  a
would never be raised by them . q Finally, w ith  regard to  Buganda, Toro (and later) 
Ankole), the agreements which they entered in to  with Johnston ,  expressly accepted the 
app lica tion  to them  of the laws made by the  P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent provided they 
were not inconsistent with the provisions of the  Agreement.
4 .10  Sum m ary and C on clu sion
T he official reason for formally declaring the U ganda P ro tec to ra te  was to regularise
the C ro w n ’s jurisdiction and power therein under the Africa O rder in Council__ In this
ch a p te r  we have seen th a t  the es tab lishm ent of the P ro tec to ra te  did not autom atically  
resolve the jurisdictional problem. On the con tra ry  controversy persisted am ongst British 
officials, both in Uganda and London, as to w he ther the Crown had jurisdiction over the 
local inhab itan ts  and if so w hether they were justiciable under the Africa O rder in 
Council which was the fundam ental  law of the  P ro tec to ra te .  The argum ents  and the 
confusion were predictable. In the first place, the law was still very unclear. Even 
though  by the end of 1895 the Law Officers had reported th a t ,  according to in terna tional 
law, the  Crown was entitled  to assume ju risd ic tion  over the natives of the pro tec tora te ,  
the Foreign Office legal advisers were still in doub t .  Secondly, the ad hoc approach to the 
problem  m ade consistency difficult. T h ird ly ,  the Africa O rder in Council -- itself a 
p ro d u c t  of th a t  ad hoc approach  — was am biguous: it was alm ost impossible to say which 
persons w'ere supposed to be subject to its provisions. F ourth ly ,  the Order was not 
popu lar  with the adm in is tra to rs  because it entailed  a cum bersom e procedure which was
n a
1 For example, in the East Africa Protectorate, Judge ( ’ator reported the illegal application to 
the natives of the 1897 Order and the Regulations. His only comment was that if it were in 
civilised countries it would have led to may jurisdict ional issues. See Gator to Hardinge, 11 April 
1898, enclosure Hardinge to Salisbury, 18 April 1898, FO C P /7077 .
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n e ither  comprehensible to them  nor to  the local people. This factor encouraged 
a rg u m en ts  th a t  the natives were not justic iable under the Order, thereby leading to  other 
ju risd ic tiona l problems.
T he argum ent th a t  the Order was not applicable apparen tly  broke down when it 
cam e to  the adm in is tra tion  of justice in cases involving natives and o ther persons subject 
to  the  Order. Nobody seemed to object th a t  the natives were not justiciable in th a t  
s i tu a t io n ,  even though there was noth ing  in the O rder which justified it. Similarly 
Q u een ’s Regulations applying to the natives of the P ro tec to ra te  were approved w ithout 
dem ur.  Yet the a rgum en t and  concern of the officials cannot be dismissed as w anting  in 
all genuineness. T he fact th a t  the ju risdictional issue was raised and for years discussed 
a t  g rea t  length in confidential m em oranda ,  not only in relation to U ganda but also to 
o th er  territories, is indicative of the im portance a t tach ed  to it.
It has been subm itted  within th a t  the B aganda ,  because of the t rea ty ,  were subject 
to  th e  Order except th a t  its application was limited by the provisions of the same trea ty . 
As for the rest since their sovereigns had not consented to British protection they were 
not justic iab le  under the Order, though it was open to the Crown to bring them  within 
the O rder  by either acquiring the jurisdiction  over them  from their rulers or by “usage 
and sufferance” . During the period investigated  this in te rp re ta t ion  was never officially 
adop ted .
By the end of the period examined the Foreign Office had accepted th a t  the Crown 
was en ti t led  to assume jurisdiction over persons in the P ro tec to ra te .  Instructions had 
been given to make a new Order for U ganda which was to  be comprehensive in line with 
the new legal theory. In the m eantim e, the new Commissioner for Uganda, Jo hns ton ,  
u n aw are  of the discussions in London, was try ing  to resolve the jurisdictional and  o ther
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problems relating to British adm in is tra t ion  of B uganda  in the conventional manner: by 
en tering  into an A greem ent with the rulers of Buganda. The A greem ent was accepted by 
the British G overnm ent before the new O rder was p rom ulgated . As we shall see, it later 
played a  crucial role in the legal and political relation between the British G overnm ent 
and the Kingdom of Buganda. Before I deal with the Agreem ent I will discuss another 
contentious issue: w hether by virtue of the p ro tec to ra te  the Crown had the power to
convey titles or lease unowned or unoccupied land in the p ro tec to ra te .
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C H A P T E R  5
D O E S  A C Q U I S I T I O N  OF T H E  R I G H T S  OF  
P R O T E C T I N G  P O W E R  C A R R Y  A N Y  T IT L E  TO T H E
SOIL?
Wheth e r  it was the commercial  enthusiasm  which primarily mot ivated  the British 
to  declare thei r  Protec tora te  over Uganda is a subject  of much controversy.  Be th a t  as it 
m ay ,  by the  close of the century there was a drive in London and locally to encourage 
expa t r i a t e s  to exploit  U ganda’s reputedly fertile land which was lying “waste” and 
appa re n t ly  unowned.  For the immedia te  purposes  there was a desperate desire to make 
the  P ro t ec to ra t e  self-sustaining ra the r  than  relying on the British Government  for funds 
for i ts adminis t ra t ion .  It was hoped t h a t  the sale and lease of land would raise revenue 
which would go a long way towards  meet ing this objective.  Secondly, and even more 
im por tant ly ;  it was ant ic ipated  th a t  with  the expa t r i a t es ’ capital  inves tment  and 
advanced  farming methods  the P ro tec to ra te  would provide in the long run raw mater ials  
which could be used for product ion in the  Brit ish economy . 1 The construction of the 
rai lway from the  coast  to Uganda increased the  anxiety abou t  land in Uganda and the 
Eas t  Africa Protec tora te .  The railway project  involved an expensive capital  out-lay and 
had to  be made commercially viable.
The plan to make conveyances and leases out  of the  “waste” land ran into a legal 
problem:  whe ther  the acquisit ion of the protec t ing power carried wi th it any t itle to the
H V a d a d a  Nabudere,  Imperialism and Hevolut ion iri U gan da  (London,  Onyx  Press, 1980), pp. 
37-39.
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soil? In o ther words did the Crow n, by virtue of the p ro tec to ra te ,  have the power to 
dispose of land to expatriates? This  issue, like the one of ju risd iction , was debated  in 
London as well as in most British pro tec to ra tes .  In this ch ap te r  I examine its 
developm ent and the a t te m p ts  which were m ade to resolve it. A brief background of the 
legal controversy will be given before focusing on Uganda.
5.1 G eneral background
The involvement of the Foreign Office in the issue of Crown au thority  over the 
disposal of land can be traced back to M arch 1893. In th a t  m on th ,  the Foreign Office 
requested the Colonial Office’s advice regarding its policy for land sales in M ashonaland 
and B echuanaland. This request was p rom pted  by a land se t t lem en t scheme for the 
British C en tra l  Africa P ro tec to ra te  subm itted  by Commissioner Johnston .  Under this 
scheme, Jo hns ton  claimed to have acquired from the native chiefs (through “purchase” 
“g ra n t” and “cession” ) approxim ate ly  one and a half million acres of “Crown land” , 
which he was proposing th a t  the Crown lease to expa tr ia te  farmers. T he Foreign Office, 
being inexperienced in dealing w ith  land, sought assistance from the Colonial Office on 
how best to dispose of this land. If possible, it w an ted  the two d ep a r tm en ts  to pursue a 
uniform land policy in all British terr ito r ies  in southern  Africa.“
In response, the Colonial Office advised th a t  it m ade a distinction  between land in 
M ashonaland and the Bechuanaland P ro tec to ra te  on one hand, and land in the 
Bechuanaland Colony on the other. W ith reference to the former, the Crown did not 
claim ownership. The land was regarded as still vested in the chiefs and the re levant 
tribes “except such lands as had been duly a lienated  by th em ” . The only claim m ade by 
the Crown, as  the protecting Pow er, was the au th o r i ty  to investigate  and confirm or 
disallow any g ran ts  made by the native owners. As for the Bechuanaland Colony,
^Memorandum by Hill, “Land claims in British Central Africa”, 11 August 1893, FQ881/6383.
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because it was an annexed terr ito ry , the Crown, according to  the  Colonial Office, was 
“regarded as having become the supreme owner of the soil and the du ty  of a l lo tting  land 
was en trusted  by law to the G overnor” .3 British C en tra l  Africa being a p ro tec to ra te ,  its 
land was in the former category. Consequently  the Colonial Office advised th a t ,  unless 
the  land was granted  to the Crown by thie local ruler, it could not be sold or leased by the 
Crown. W ith  respect to J o h n s to n ’s claims of having acquired “Crown L ands” , the 
Colonial Office suggested th a t  the Foreign Office legal advisers verify the docum ents  upon 
which he based his claim and ensure they am oun ted  to such transfer  of native rights as 
would enable the Crown to re -grant the land in fee simple or lesser rights. Otherwise, it 
w arned , g ran tees’ rights could in future be jeopardized by native claims.
The legal distinction which the Colonial Office purported  to make was based on the 
English common law' feudal doctrine  th a t  all land in England was owned by the  Crown 
from which all o ther titles ensued.* By v ir tue  of annexation of a  terr ito ry , w he ther as a 
result  of cession, conquest, discovery or w hatever,  this principle was applied to  the 
te rr ito ry ,  and the Crown, if it so chose, assum ed the radical title to the soil .5 T hen  a t  its 
discretion it could convey or g ran t  lesser titles  out of this land though, according to 
in terna tional legal principles, it was under an obligation not to dispose of land which was 
in private  ownership prior to annexation . W here however it did violate these obligations, 
the  municipal courts could not interpose to enforce t h e m / ’ In con tra s t ,  a p ro tec to ra te  
being a foreign territory, the Crown had no radical t i tle  to the soil which was regarded as 
still vested in (whoever was) the  terr ito ria l sovereign. W ithou t it the legal advisers could
°C.O. to F.O., 29 April 1894, annex 1, ibid.
^Also known as “nulle terre sans se igneur” (no land without a Lord or no land is allodial). See 
R.E. Meggary and H.W.R. Wade, The Law of Real Property (London, Stevens, 1966), p.13.
•’Arnodu Tijani y Secretary Sout hern Nigeria, 1921 (2) A.C. 399, 404.
Cook y Sprigg, (1899) A.C. 572, 578. See also: Vajesingii Joravasingji y Secretary of State, 
(1924) L.R. 51 Indian Appeal Cases 357, 361; A mod u I ijani, ibid. For a general review of cases on 
the subject from diverse jurisdictions, see the Australian case of Milirroum and others v Nabalco  
Pty Ltd and Another, 17 F.L.R. 141.
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not envisage how, as a m a t te r  of law, the Crow n could issue titles out of the land unless
the  land was first expressly gran ted  to the Crow n and it su b -g ran ted . ' Even then the
8radical t i tle  still remained vested with the terr ito r ia l  grantor.
One of the main reasons for insisting th a t  there had to be a proper conveyance was 
th a t  investors’ titles to the land m ight in fu ture  be a t  the risk of challenge by the  native 
ow ners .7 *9 Secondly, the legal advisers were concerned abou t  the effect on the 
consti tu tional s ta tu s  of a protected  terr itory  if the Crown announced the land as Crown 
lands or granted titles therefrom. There was a  theory th a t  a declaration of Crown lands 
in a  terr ito ry  could be in terpreted  as t a n ta m o u n t  to  annexation  of th a t  terr ito ry . Since 
the British G overnm ent was a t  the time loath to  annex terr itories  in Africa, legal advisers 
w arned against such declarations. Amongst the lawyers who subscribed to th is  line of 
a rg u m en t ,  perhaps surprisingly, was B ram ston . C om m enting  on the Gold C oast Land 
Bill, B ram ston wrote:
I doubt ... whether the Crown can become the owner, j u r e  co r o n a e ,  of large 
tra c ts  of foreign terr itory: to assert such owmership would I think am o u n t to 
annexation, which if the assertion in any way affects private  owners this would 
be going beyond the exercise of partial sovereignty which H.M. has acquired by
7' M i n u t e  Davidson,  9 June  1897, on J o h n s t o n ’s m e m o r an d u m ,  “Gov ernme nt  rights over  waste 
land and  unoccupied land in Brit ish Cent ra l  Africa P ro t ec to ra t e” , 4 June  1897, F 0 2 / 1 2 8 .  
Dav idson ,  apparent ly  f rust ra ted,  commented th a t  “The  difficulty in practically dealing wi th these 
real p roper ty questions in a savage protec to rate  is th a t  we d o n ’t know wh a t  the lex loci rei s itae  is 
by which they should be governed and we are obliged to try the doctr ine of English law as well as 
we can .”
^Davidson ,  ibid. But  see the case of Crown Prosecutor  y The  British Cent ra l  Africa C o m p a n y , 
r epor t ed  in the British Central  Africa P ro tec to ra te  Gazet t e ,  30 October  1905, where it was held 
t h a t  the radical  tit le to the soil in the P ro tecto ra te  was with the Crown “by vir tue of a more or less 
informal  process of surrender  and re-grant  and t h a t  sovereignty of the count ry is identified [ in 
B.C.A.]  wi th the ownership of the soil .” In S a lm o n d ’s Jur isprudence (London,  10th ed.),  App.  iv, 
it is argued tha t  since under  the common law the Crown was the owner  of all land it followed th a t  
appl i ca t ion  of the common law to a colonial protec tora te  mean t  th a t  the Crown au t omat i ca l ly  
became  the owrner of the land.  Thi s  theory is opposed by Rober t s -Wray ,  Com mon wea l th  and 
Colonial  Law (London,  Stevens and Sons, 19CC), pp. 626-627.
9T h e  fear was not necessarily far fetched considering the fact,  for example ,  tha t  in 1966 in the 
P a p u a  New Guinea High Court  a t r ibe challenged the G o v e r n m e n t ’s t i t le to land in the nat ional  
cap i t a l  claiming tha t  the alleged t ransfer  of the land to the Crown in 1886, was f raudulent .  T h e  
plaintiffs won the case in the lower Cour t  but  lost on appeal ,  see T he  Admini s t r a t ion  of the 
Ter r i to ry  of P N G. and another  y Daera C u b a , 130 Com mon wea l th  Law Reports  353. See also 
below at  pp .233-236.
107
virtue of her being the protecting  pow er . 111
B ram sto n ’s views apparently  were based on the  Privy Council case of 
A tto rn ey -General v Bristowe, where it was held th a t  the m aking of a Crown g ran t  in a 
terr ito ry  previously outside the terr itoria l dominion of the Crown consti tu ted  
an n e x a t io n . 11 It transpired subsequently th a t  these fears were misconceived since no one 
can force the Crown to annex a  terr itory  aga inst  its will. 12 As it happened, Crown lands 
were later declared in protec tora tes  and titles  conveyed by the Crown. And all this had 
no effect a t  all on the constitu tional s ta tu s  of the p ro tec to ra te s . 13 This , however, is 
ra tionalisation  with hindsight. During the period under investigation, as evidenced by 
the views of such prom inent G overnm ent legal advisers as B ram ston , the law was 
believed to be otherwise. Indeed, as regards the British Centra l  Africa P ro tec to ra te ,  the 
Foreign Office, following the advice of the Colonial Office, appointed  a depa rtm en ta l  
com m ittee  to verify Jo h n s to n ’s claims. Pending its findings all leases of the “Crown 
L and” already granted  by Johnston  were suspended and Johnston  was forbidden to  make 
fu r ther g ra n ts .11
^ M in u te  of 12 June 1895 on Maxwell to Ripon, 9 May 1895, C 0 9 6 /2 5 7 .
1 11880 (6) A.C. 143, at p.148. According to Clark, Colonial Law (London, 1834), at p.330, it 
was not even necessary that the grants were freeholds.
] 2
Per Kennedy, L.J., in R y Crewe ex . p>. Sekgome, 1910 K.B. 570, at p.625, citing with approval  
Stapple v The Queen (unreported).
13 Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law, at p. 626 et seq.
^M em orandum  Hill, 11 August 1893, supra. Eventually the com m ittee confirmed Johnston’s 
claims. Davidson, who saw the report for the first time three year after it was made, expressed 
strong reservations whether in fact the documents constituted grants. He thought that they were 
actually “cessions” of territory as opposed to transfer of title to land. Davidson accused Johnston  
of confusing “cession” with purchase as if they were convertible terms. He proposed that the 
matter should be referred to the Law Officers, minute of 9 June 1897, on Johnston’s memorandum, 
supra.
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5 .2  T h e  p o s it io n  in th e  E a s t  A fr ica  P r o t e c t o r a t e  an d  U g a n d a
In the East Africa P ro tec to ra te  and Uganda, the Foreign Office, some two years 
la ter ,  a t tem p ted  to invoke an exception to  the Colonial Office’s in te rp re ta t ion  of the 
C ro w n ’s rights to the land. It alleged th a t  in the regions beyond the Sultan  of Z anz ibar’s 
coastline dominion, the P ro tec to ra te  A dm in is tra tion  claimed the right to deal w ith  
uncultivated  and unoccupied lands w ithou t  the consent of the natives. Therefore, the 
Crown could grant titles and mineral concessions out of th e m . 1"1 On this assum ption , Hill 
drafted  land regulations to be issued in Uganda and the E ast  Africa P ro tec to ra te ,  
au thorising  the Commissioners to g ran t land t i t le s .1*’ Before despatching them  to Africa 
a  copy was sent to the Colonial Office for its com m ent bu t w ithout specifically 
m entioning the issue as to whether the Commissioner was legally com peten t to lease land 
in the two protectorates.
The legal issue, nonetheless, wras raised and it provoked diverse opinions within the 
Colonial Office. It was Lucas (Assistant U nder-Secretary) who, probably unintentionally , 
exposed it. He s ta ted  in his minutes th a t  E ast  Africa (outside the Coast and “possibly” 
Buganda) was behind South Africa as regards tribal ownership and occupation of land. 
He theorised th a t  these territories were no m a n ’s land and therefore belonged to the 
s trongest man. Since Britain as the pro tec ting  Power was the strongest, Lucas saw no 
reason why it could not make grants  of this land which belonged to no one .1' B ram ston  
disagreed with this argum ent.  He re ite ra ted  the concept th a t  legally it wras impossible for 
the Crow'n to make g ran ts  or leases of land in a mere p ro tec torate:
^ F .O .  to C.O., 30 June 1896, FO C P/6849. The Foreign Office’s information was based on a 
report given to it by Ilardinge, Commissioner of the East Africa Protectorate, Hardinge to 
Salisbury, 15 May 1896, FOCP/6849. See also generally, M.P.K. Sorrenson, Origin of European 
Settlement in Kenya (Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1968), pp.46-47.
^ M in u te  Hill, 20 June 1896, on the draft Land Regulations, F 0 2 /1 7 6 .  The Regulations were 
modelled on the 1894 IBEAC Land Regulations, Sorrenson, ibid., at p.47.
^ M in u te  of 30 July 1896, on F.O. to C.O., 30 June 1896, GO417/202. Lucas suspected that the 
Foreign Office did not wish to raise the legal issue and he saw no reason for doing so.
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The acquisition of par tia l  sovereignty in a p ro tec to ra te  does not carry with it 
any title to the soil. The land is foreign soil and does not become vested in 11.M. 
as in a territory which is actually  annexed to the British Dominion.
Consequently, in B ram sto n ’s opinion, it was inadvisable for British au thorit ies  to  purport
m aking  grants  or leases out of this land which did not belong to the Crown.
In anticipation of further requests for advice from the Foreign Office, Bram ston 
suggested th a t  the desired objectives could be achieved by issuing “perm its’’ . He claimed 
th a t  adm inis tra tive  officials, ac ting  on behalf of the  Crown, had the power to  issue 
perm its  authorising any person to occupy a specified piece of land subject to any 
conditions as they deemed fit. This, B ram ston subm itted ,  was an adm in is tra tive  act and 
was no t in any way in conflict with the legal concept since a perm it did not consti tu te  a 
transfer  of title. In effect, he elaborated:
The Crown ... cannot say to an individual this land is mine jand] I give it to 
you; but it can say, this land is vacant [and] if you like to occupy it on certain 
conditions, I will take care th a t  nobody interferes with you . . . . ,S
B ram ston  emphasised th a t  the  distinction he was m aking was, in law, a real one though
in practice the results were bound to be the same. Already there were land regulations
for the  G am bia P ro tec to ra te  based on the sam e principle, lie though t  the same could be
adop ted ,  m u ta t i s  m u t a n d i s , for the East Africa P ro tec to ra te .
B ram sto n ’s views were in tu rn  questioned by Fairfield, A ssis tan t Under-Secretary, 
who was also a lawyer by training. Fairfield accused Bram ston  of perpetuating  the 
concept th a t  distinguished land in a p ro tec to ra te  from that, in a colony: “Of all places on 
ea r th  British East Africa is the last place where we should insist on th a t  d is tinc tion .” ^
^ M i n u t e  of 9 August  1890, and 29 August  1896, ibid.
^ M i n u t e  of 28 August  1896, ibid. Fairfield cited Chief  Just ice Russel ’s summ ing  up to the  ju ry  
in the  case of R v Jameson  and others (1896) T .L . R .  551, at  p.594, which he claimed t h a t  it 
effectively brought  down the dist inct ion between a p rotec torate and a dominion.  To the  la t t er  
co m m en t  Bramston  retor ted tha t  the passage cited had nothing to do with the concept tha t  land in 
a p ro tec to rate  was foreign soil, minu te  of 29 August ,  supra.
On practical grounds he reminded Bram ston th a t  the British G overnm ent was investing 
over three million pounds in the railway project which had to be recovered. Fairfield was 
prepared to assume, on the basis of the Foreign Office information, th a t  the Crown had a 
righ t to make gran ts  of land in E as t  Africa and Uganda.
Which of these conflicting views were to be recommended to  the  Foreign Office? 
T h a t ,  most likely, was the question which Cham berla in , then Secretary of S ta te  for the 
Colonies, asked himself. Vaguely he scribbled on B ram sto n ’s minutes: “Proceed as 
proposed, but w ithout too much insistence on our old doctrines — ap a r t  from legal 
in te rp re ta tion  it looks like the p ro tec to ra te  as our adm in is tra tive  g arm en t is wearing out 
a t  once.” 20 On the basis of the letter which was finally sent to  the Foreign Office, 
C ham berla in ’s note was in terpreted  to mean approval of all B ram s to n ’s views. T he letter 
was a  verbatim  copy of his m inutes.  No a t te m p t  was made to scale down the legal 
concept; nor was there any hint given to the Foreign Office of the sharp  controversy over 
th is  issue w ith in  the departm ent.  In effect, as far as the Colonial Office was concerned, 
the circum stances which prevailed in Uganda and the E ast  Africa P ro tec to ra tes  did not 
const i tu te  an exception to the legal maxim.
There was no immediate reaction to the Colonial Office’s le t ter  w ithin the Foreign 
Office. Davidson had been on leave and conveniently excused himself from com m enting  on 
the le t te r .21 B ut the response provoked an angry reaction from llardinge, the 
Commissioner of the East Africa P ro tec to ra te  — the man who was mainly pushing the 
idea, l lard inge sarcastically dismissed as “pedantic” B ram s to n ’s d istinction between the 
Crown gran ting  title  over waste lands and the Crown authorising  occupation of this land 
as an adm in is tra t ive  act. If there were no practical differences, he wondered, “why not
20Minute of 31 August 1896.
2^Minute (undated) on C.O. to F.O., 14 September 1896, supra.
I l l
say boldly th a t  all unowned land, and all rights  whatever in it, is the property , not
o  o
necessarily of the Crown, b u t  of the P ro tec to ra te  A dm in is tra tion?” "^
In spite of H ardinge’s sharp  reaction, the Foreign Office decided to proceed 
cautiously. Instructions were given to C ray  to  draft “simple” land regulations for the 
E as t  Africa P ro tec to ra te ,  possibly modelled on the G am bia  Land Regulations.'^0 Gray 
prepared a draft which essentially was a  replica of these Regulations. He based the 
Regulations on the au thority  invested with the Commissioner by Article 99 of the Africa
o i
O rder in Council, to make regulations for “peace, order and good governm ent” / 4 Under 
the  Regulations the Commissioner was empowered to issue a certificate of occupancy to 
any person to hold and occupy a specified portion of land for a  m axim um  period of 
tw en ty  one years. There was no fixed limit on the size of the terr ito ry  on which he could 
au thorise  occupation. However, in exercising his powers he was enjoined from granting  
certificates of occupancy over areas which, a t  the da te  of the promulgation of the 
Regulations, were cultivated or regularly used by natives. Nor could he permit
occupation of land which was already held by any person, native or non-native, under a
o r
docum ent of title granted prior to the R e g u la t io n s / '
Supposedly, these Regulations were based on the common law concept of a license. 
A t common law, a license by itself does not create any estate or a legal or equitable 
in terest  in the property to which it relates. In the words of Ghief Justice  V aughan , ^  “ [it]
o  o
^Memorandum of 9 October 1896, F O C P /6913 .  See also Sorrenson, Origin of European  
Settlement in Kenya, pp. 46, 47 et seq.
^°F.O. to Gray, 10 November 1896, FO C P /6913 . Enclosed therewith were the Colonial Office 
letter of 4 September, referred to above, and Hardinge’s comments thereon; and a number of other 
memoranda on the land matters in the East Africa Protectorate written by Hardinge. Davidson  
was skeptical about the legality of the Crown’s claim to the waste lands, but Hill pressed for the 
papers to be passed on to Cray to see what he could work out, minute on F.O. to Gray, 10 
November 1896, F O 107/70.
o i
Z4See the preamble to the Regulations. For the text, see llertslet, Commercial Treaties, 21:82.
^'’Regulations 1, and 5-7.
‘• ’^Thomas y Sorrell, 1673 Vaugh 330, at page 351.
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only makes an action lawful which w ithout it had been unlawful.” Since it crea tes  no 
title  to  the land it is not necessary th a t  the licensor is the owner of the land. It was 
because of these a t t r ib u te s  th a t  B ram ston believed its issue would not violate the  legal 
concept. On the o ther hand  there is au tho ri ty  to the effect th a t  an instrum ent which 
pu rpor ts  to  give the holder an exclusive right of occupation of land, though subject  to 
certain reservations for which the land may be used, is in law a demise of the land 
itself.27 Therefore, if the certificates of occupancy gran ted  under the Land Regulations 
went beyond the scope of a  mere license, they were illegal, since (assuming of course 
B ram s to n ’s principle was sound law) the land did not belong to the Crown.
5.3 T h e  L and  q u e s t io n  in U g a n d a
Although the U ganda P ro tec to ra te  was occasionally mentioned in these discussions, 
it was mainly after the draft ing  of the East Africa P ro tec to ra te  Land Regulations t h a t  it 
featured more prom inently . Until then, none of the Uganda officials had con tr ibu ted  to 
the discussion, nor it would seem, supplied inform ation to the Foreign Office on the land 
system in U ganda .2S All the  information came from British officials in the E ast  Africa 
P ro tec to ra te .  From  this it was assumed th a t  similar circum stances prevailed in U ganda. 
In fact, within Buganda, British officials m ade no presum ptions abou t  the land. All the 
land was regarded as belonging to the K abaka. Until 189G it was he alone who had the 
power to g ran t land.* 2^ In th a t  year a land “s t a tu te ” was passed by the Lukiiko which 
provided th a t  this power was to be exercised by the K abaka and the Lukiiko. Moreover, 
the exercise of this power was subject to the  “approval or consent or direction” of the 
Commissioner. The “s t a tu t e ” also provided for registration of all p rivate  gran ts  w he ther
27GIenwood Lumber Company y Phillips (1901) A.C. 405, at p.408. The Law Officers’ report of  
1899 (below p. 127), described the licence granted under the Land Regulations as constituting a 
conveyance.
^B erk e ley  to Salisbury, 26 January 1897, F O C P/6964.
2 'Vor example, he granted a small tract, of land to Lugard, and later to Colvile on behalf of the 
Crown, for official use. 11.B. Thom as and A.E. Spencer, Uganda Land and Survey (Government  
Printer, Entebbe, 1937), p.45.
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9 n
to  fo re igners or to  the na tives .° These re fo rm s were p a rt and parcel o f an ongoing
p o lit ic a l s trugg le  between the K abaka  and the  chiefs. I t  was a s trugg le  w hich the  fo rm er 
was g ra d u a lly  losing — a deve lopm ent encouraged by B rit is h  a d m in is tra to rs .
M eanw h ile , in London, fo llo w in g  the  p ro m u lg a tio n  o f the  East A frica  P ro te c to ra te  
Land  R egu la tions , H ill inqu ired  fro m  G ray  w he ther s im ila r law s could be enacted fo r 
U ganda. The  la t te r  was unce rta in . He th o u g h t they could “ p rov ided  as I assume th a t 
trea ties  have been made w ith  M w anga  and the o the r chiefs ( i f  any) in the p ro te c to ra te
9 1
g iv in g  the  C om m issioner some pow er to  deal w ith  the lan d .’1' C u rious ly  C ra y  d id  no t 
im pose a s im ila r  q u a lific a tio n  over the  enac tm en t o f the R egu la tions  fo r East A fr ic a  
P ro te c to ra te . The  possible e xp lan a tio n  is th a t ,  accord ing to  the  in fo rm a tio n  supp lied  to  
the Fore ign  O ffice , the  land in East A fr ic a  P ro te c to ra te  was e ith e r unowned, or consent o f
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the  chiefs was no t regarded as necessary. Up to  th a t date  there  was no specific 
in fo rm a tio n  on Uganda. G ray  p ro ba b ly  assumed th a t the c ircum stances in  the East 
A fr ic a  P ro te c to ra te  were unique. He had o bv ious ly  heard a b o u t M w anga and possibly 
o th e r chiefs w hom  he th o u g h t were responsible fo r the land and whose consent had to  be 
g iven before the R egula tions app lied .
H ow ever, subsequently G ray  changed h is m in d . He advised th a t trea ties  were n o t 
necessary p r io r  to  the enactm ent o f the Land R egula tions fo r U ganda. Even then i t  seems 
he re ta ined  some reservations abou t the a p p lic a tio n  o f the R egu la tions to  Buganda. F o r 
hav ing  said th is  he im m e d ia te ly  called H i l l ’s a tte n tio n  to  A r t ic le  10 o f the 1894 tre a ty  
w h ich , he emphasised, con ta ined  the on ly  reference to  land: “ ... and there i t  is on ly
p o lit ic a l or re lig ious d is tr ib u t io n  o f te r r ito ry  — th a t expression means d is tr ib u tio n  as 
between tr ibes  on the one hand and m iss iona ry  societies on the  o th e r.” C ray  proposed
^ B e rk e le y  to  Salisbury, 26 January 1897, FO C P/6G 94. 
'^ G ra y  to  H ill,  3 February 1897, F 0 2 /1 7 6 .
*^ F .O . to  G ray, 10 November 1896, supra.
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th a t  there should be a better  and definite land se tt lem ent with M w anga when the trea ty
O *>
was next revised.0"*
O  A
T he Land Regulations finally became law in U ganda on 10 July 1897. 4 Their 
p rom ulgation  in Uganda did not raise as much excitement am ongst local officials, as did 
their  co u n te rp a r ts  in the East Africa P ro tec to ra te .  This was probably partly  due to the 
absence, as yet, of foreign investors showing interest in land in U ganda as compared to
or
tlie E as t  Africa P ro tec to ra te .  Secondly, it was assumed th a t  the Regulations were not 
supposed to  apply to Buganda, which a t  the time was the most im p o rtan t  pa r t  of the 
P ro tec to ra te .  Wilson thought th a t  since all land in Buganda was regarded as the 
property  of the K abaka  the Colonial Office m axim  “ th a t  the acquisition of the right of a 
p ro tec ting  power does not carry with it any title  to the soil ...” applied to Buganda. He 
told the Foreign Office that:
Such being the case, it would perhaps be expedient in disposing of unoccupied 
lands therein situated  to arrange th a t  the regulations should be adopted, in 
principle a t  least, by the local au thorit ies  in the in terests  of their G overnm ent.
In his opinion the results would practically be the sam e “as all g ran ts  and other
t ransac t ions  affecting public lands are subject to the approval of Her M ajes ty ’s
C om m issioner.” "*^  Similar views were expressed by Collinson. He stressed th a t  the
Crown could not dispose of the land in B uganda except where the land was granted  to it
o  n
by the  native  authority."*'
*’^Gray to Hill, 5 February 1897, F 0 2 /1 7 6 .
‘> 4
°  For the text see Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, 21: ICO.
O  C7
For example, by the end of February, 1898, the Land Regulations had only been used once, 
Wilson to Salisbury, 22 February 1898, F O C P /7077 .  For an account of the position in the East 
Africa Protectorate, see Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement in Kenya, pp.47-51; and 
Mwangi wa-G ithumo, Land and Nationalism (Washington, University Press of America, 1981,> 
p p.169-73.
’’^Wilson to Salisbury, ibid. Presumably lie was referring to the powers given to the 
Commissioner under the Lukiiko land “statutes” , mentioned above.
*) 7
Collinson to Wilson, 11 August 1897, enclosure Wilson to Salisbury, ibid.
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As for tlie rest of the P ro tec to ra te ,  both Wilson (then Acting-Commissioner) and 
Collinson assumed th a t  the  Land Regulations were autom atically  applicable to it. 
Wilson, indeed, complained th a t  the Regulations were unnecessarily restrictive of the 
Com m issioner’s powers since unoccupied lands have been held, so far w ithout
con ten tion , to be entirely a t  the disposal of the Crown in like m anner with those of the
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interior districts  of the  British E as t  Africa P ro te c to ra te .” 0 He asserted th a t  the Crown 
had the  power to  alienate absolute  titles, as opposed to mere certificates of occupancy, 
over all unoccupied land in the rest of the P ro tec to ra te  outside Buganda. The two men 
felt th a t  the Colonial Office m axim  was not applicable to these d istricts because the land 
was not supposed to be owned by anybody.
T he Colonial Office, which received from the Foreign Office copies of the foregoing 
despatches, cautiously conceded W ilson’s a rgum ent as far as Buganda was concerned: uIf 
it has already been settled , as Mr C ham berla in  is inclined to suppose from Mr W ilson’s 
despa tch ,  to regard all the land in the Kingdom as the property of the natives the 
disposal of it would rest with the native authorit ies  and not with the adm in is tra t ion .” It 
m ain ta ined  nonetheless th a t  the Crown had the power to control land transactions in 
B u g an d a .39 Actually , the Foreign Office had never expressly resolved the issue of land 
ownership in Buganda; it was the view of the local officials th a t  land in Buganda was the 
p roperty  of the Kabaka.
W ith  reference to the rest of the P ro tec to ra te ,  the Colonial Office categorically 
denied th a t  the Crown had the power to convey land titles, as opposed to licences of 
occupancy. R re ite ra ted  th a t ,  as far as it was concerned, the principle th a t  the 
acquisition of the rights of pro tec ting  Power did not carry any title  to the soil, was
'^W ilson  to Salisbury, ibid. Wilson borrowed the phrase quoted from llardinge’s memorandum  
of \  September 1896, supra, which he in fact cited.
39C.O. to F.O., 21 June 1899, F O C P/7401.
applicable even to  unoccupied lands in districts  where the land was not regarded as owned 
by anybody. This  was also C r a y ’s view.40
There is no record of the Foreign Office com m unication  with U ganda officials over 
the  issues raised by Wilson. Nor is there any evidence to indicate whether Wilson meide 
any overtures to the B uganda au thorit ies  to persuade them  to adopt tfie Land 
Regulations. It is, however, certain  th a t  there was no change in the belief th a t  these 
Regulations were not applicable in Buganda. T he only change which seems to have 
occurred in this regard concerned the reasoning for their non-application. For example, in 
a  D istric t circular which Wilson issued over a year later it was s ta ted  th a t  the  Land 
Regulations w'ere not applicable because of the t r e a ty .* 4 * Yet in the same circular it was 
claimed th a t  the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent uin the exercise of its powers and 
responsibilities as protector and in accordance with the term s of the t re a ty ” had control 
over all transactions relating to public land. T he circular warned th a t  as a result no 
transfer  or lease of land in B uganda was effective unless approved by the adm inis tra tion . 
How the trea ty  exactly fulfilled these roles the circular did not say.
S trictly , it wras arguable th a t  the Regulations were not applicable in Buganda in so 
far as they were inconsistent w ith the trea ty ,  since, as we have seen, the treaty prevailed 
over any other law in the P ro tec to ra te .  The only power relating to land expressed in the 
t re a ty ,  as G ray pointed out to Hill, was under Article 10. This provided th a t  the 
C om m issioner 's  consent had to be given in all “ religious or political transfer of te r r i to ry ” . 
Beside the question whether “ transfers of te r r i to ry ” was intended to embrace all land 
g ra n ts  as used in this context, two other im p o rtan t  points  emerge from this provision. 
F irs t ,  the C om m issioner’s consent was required only in cases w'here the motive for the
40Gray to F.O., 21 June 1899, F O C P/7101.
4 *Buganda Resident Archives, 15 May 1899. The circular was aimed at the Missions which were 
receiving gifts of land from the chiefs.
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transfer  was religious or political. It was not, for instance, required where it was m ade for 
purely economic reasons. Secondly, it was implied by this provision th a t  the power to 
“transfer” was with the B uganda au thorit ies  and not with the Commissioner. Thus, the 
s ta tem en t  in the circular th a t  the Regulations were not enforceable in Buganda because of 
the  trea ty ,  was right. But the claim th a t  the trea ty  entitled the adm inistration  to exert 
control over all land transactions, was excessive (though it may be recalled this power 
was given to the Commissioner under the Lukiiko land law “s ta tu te ” ).
5.4 The E x cep t io n  to  the R u le  — the U gan d a  R ailw ay
The adage th a t  all rules are subject to exceptions eventually proved to be true  in 
this case when land was appropria ted  for the U ganda Railway. The Uganda Railway 
project was one of the most expensive projects yet undertaken by the British G overnm ent 
in black Africa. Initially its cost was es tim ated  a t  abou t two and a half million pounds, 
bu t eventually it proved to be alm ost three times t h a t .42 It was an ticipated  th a t  all land 
wherever the railway was constructed  inevitably would rise in value. As one of the means 
of recouping the enormous expense incurred in the construction, the  Treasury D epartm ent 
suggested th a t  a one mile zone on both sides of the railway, wherever constructed, 
(including all the minerals therein) be acquired, absolutely, as an asset for the Uganda 
Railway with power to sell or lease a t its discre tion .4,J
As to the m erits  of th is  proposal there was probably no one in doubt, bu t  the 
question was how to reconcile it with the legal maxim. The T re a su ry ’s original idea was 
to include a provision in the U ganda Railway Bill appropria ting  the land and minerals in 
the zone. But the Foreign Office objected on the grounds th a t  dealing with land in a 
p ro tec to ra te  by an Act of Parl iam en t could lead to constitu tional issues. Instead, it
\ '.2M.F. Hill, Permanent W ay: 1 he Story of the Kenya and Uganda railway (London, Hazel
Watson, 1949), pp. 83, 134, 243 el seq.
A O
Treasury to F.O., 2 March 1896, cited in Treasury to Salisbury, 24 March 1897, FQ2/135.
118
suggested th a t  the appropria tion  provision be incorporated in a  subsequent Order in
C ouncil .44 This viewpoint, according to C ray ,  was not satisfactory either:
The constitu tional difficulties involved in dealing with the fee simple of land 
in a p ro tec to ra te  appear ... to be present equally whether the legislation is by 
Act of Parl iam en t or by O rder in Council .'15
As a  partia l solution, he suggested th a t  the Commissioner prom ulgate Q ueen’s 
Regulations providing th a t  all ren ts  and ra tes  paid by occupants or holders of land under 
the  Land Regulations in the terr itory  with in  the Uganda Railway zone be paid to the 
Railway fund.
C r a y ’s proposal would a t  least have ensured th a t  the Uganda Railway project 
received the revenue from th e  zone. However, this was not considered secure enough for 
such an expensive out-lay. In the event the  U ganda Railway C om m ittee  resolved to 
d isregard  the legal technicalities and simply proclaim the zone appropriated  to the 
Railway — a suggestion with which Cray reportedly agreed in a private  conversation with 
Bertie, C hairm an  of the Railway C om m ittee. Certainly, he thoug ras better  than
app ro p ria t in g  the land by an Order in Council “as it would be difficult, to do an illegal 
th ing  in th a t  way.” Bertie himself, in support  of the C om m ittee  minuted: “ If we 
ap p ro p r ia te  the zone who can tu rn  us out? There  is no one with a better t i tle  to the 
w aste  and  unappropria ted  la n d .” 411
W ith  the approval of Salisbury, identical instructions were sent to the Uganda and 
the E as t  Africa P ro tec to ra te  Commissioners to issue proclam ations appropria ting  for the 
U ganda Railway, subject to any proven righ t of ownership, all land within a one mile
j  n
zone of either side of the railway line wherever finally co n s tru c ted .1' A notification to
^Treasury  to Salisbury, 21 March 1897, F Ü 2/135 .
45Cray to F.O., 7 April 1897, FO C P/6964.
41lMinute Bertie, 15 April 1897, on Gray to F.O., ibid.
4 ^F.O. to Ternan, and F.O. to Hardinge, both dated 31 May 1897, FOCP/6964.
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th a t  effect was published by the U ganda Commissioner on 17 November 1 8 9 7 .^  The 
notice om itted  any reference to  legal au tho ri ty  upon which the land had been acquired. 
T h is  m ost likely was deliberate  since the legal advisers were not too sure as to the  legal 
basis of the acquisition of the land.'*^ Subsequently this land, by virtue of the Africa 
(Acquisition of Lands) O rder in Council, 1898, was vested “absolutely” in trustees for the 
U g an d a  R a i lw a y .^  Thereafte r ,  it was presumed ready for sale or lease by the railway 
authorities/'**
For im mediate purposes, especially as regards Uganda, the acquisition of land for 
the  railway was more theoretical than real. T he zone could not be identified until after 
the  railway lines were laid, or a t  any ra te  after when the survey had been completed — a 
very slow process which took years to accomplish. But as a practical result, it proved the 
Colonial Office m axim was not an impregnable fortress; a t  least where the land was 
required for certain public purposes. Later th is  success was used as a precedent to 
su p p o r t  the argum ent th a t  the  Crown could, after all, assume title over land in its 
p ro tec to ra te .  Nevertheless it was some years before th a t  position was generally accepted.
5 .5  T e r n a n ’s R e fo rm  P r o p o s a ls
In the m eantim e T ernan , then Acting-Commissioner following Berkeley’s 
resignation, convinced himself of an urgent need to reform the land in system the U ganda 
P ro tec to ra te .  Ternan  was obsessed with the idea th a t  expa tr ia te  farmers would soon 
flock in to  the country. He was anxious th a t  when they came there should be sufficient 
good land as well as land tenure  laws which were conducive to investm ent in the country . 
T he gist of the problem from T e rn a n ’s point of view were the Land Regulations. T ernan
^H erts le t ,  Commercial Treaties, 21:93.
^ S e e  below at p.125.
‘^ Ib id . ,  20: 231. See also the East Africa (Acquisition of Lands) Order, 1898, idem, 21: 93. 
51 Cray to F.O., 18 November 1897, FO C P/7032.
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grumbled th a t  since the  Regulations were not applicable in Buganda, the whole question 
of land disposal was with the chiefs, with hardly any government c o n t r o l . O u t s i d e  
B uganda, T ernan  though t  their  application was not uniform because “the various customs 
as to land tenure th roughou t the P ro tec to ra te  differ immensely in each dist r ict . ” Even 
where the Regulations were applicable, T ernan  suggested they were unsatisfactory. For 
example, it was difficult to  ascertain w h a t  was “occupied” and “unoccupied” land (the 
la t te r  being available for the governm en t’s disposal) because of shifting cultivation. In 
any case, Ternan  th ough t  the Regulations were too restrictive and not conducive to 
potential planters. In particu lar ,  they did not contem plate  land sales or leases.
Ternan  presented to the Foreign Office reform proposals which he called “Proposed 
Basis of New Land R egulation” . They involved a declaration  th a t  all land in the 
P ro tec to ra te  belonged to both  the G overnm ent and the inhabiting  tribe or sub-tribe, if 
any. Disposal of this land to  any non-m em ber of a tribe was subject to the consent of the 
Commissioner whose decision as regards the term s and the price was (o be final. Proceeds 
from the sale or lease of this land were to be shared equally between the G overnm ent and 
the tribe concerned. In the absence of an inhabiting tribe, the land and the proceeds were 
to belong to the G overnm ent.  The scheme also provided for setting  aside, subject to 
m utual agreem ent with the tribe, land for Governm ent purposes free of rent or any other 
paym ents.
T ernan  was so confident about the suitability  of his project for all the d istricts  
outside Buganda th a t  he did not consider it necessary to  discuss it with the officers in 
charge of the districts , or with the chiefs. However, as for Buganda, “owing to the 
T re a ty ” he felt compelled to know the views of the chiefs before he subm itted  the scheme
J^Ternan to Hill, 27 June 1899, F O 2/202 .  Unlike Wilson and Collinson, Ternan believed that 
the application of the Land Regulations was subject to the local system of land holding.
53Ternan to Salisbury, 22 July 1899, end . 1, FQ C P/7402.
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to the  Foreign Office. He instructed Wilson to discuss the proposal with them  and in 
par ticu la r  to find o u t  their feelings as to  the proposed sharing of the land with the 
P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent.  W ithin th ree days, Wilson reported the outcome of his 
discussion with the regent katikiros (K agw a and M ugwanya). Wilson observed th a t  the 
two during  the conversation were very thoughtful and asked several pertinent questions 
on how the proposed regulations would affect Buganda. Nevertheless, in the end they 
gladly accepted the plan. In Wilson’s opinion, their decision was mainly influenced by the 
assurance th a t  under this scheme their income would be sec u re .^
W ith  this backing, the  self-assured T ernan  subm itted  his proposal to the Foreign 
Office. He credited it w ith several m erits  over the Land Regulations. Firstly, it was 
simple. Secondly, it would give the G overnm ent control over all land transactions. 
T hird ly , it would raise substan tia l  revenue for the G overnm ent and native authorities  
th rough  the sale or lease of land (T ernan  predicted th a t  this would be the only steady 
source of revenue for the foreseeable fu ture). Fourth ly , it would be very easy for the 
G overnm ent to acquire land for its purposes, moreover, for free. Finally, Ternan claimed 
it would lead to a uniform land law system  throughout the P ro tectora te .
No doubt T e rn a n ’s scheme had some merits. But basically, as a resolution of the 
legal problem, it ju s t  begged the question. A declaration per sc, according to the 
prevailing legal opinion, could not make the Grown a jo in t  owner of the land with the 
native  tribes. Nor could it make the Crown the absolute sole owner of the uninhabited 
regions. Indeed, th a t  was the core of the problem. For his scheme to be “legal” , it had to 
be assented to by all the  local au thorit ies  and not ju s t  the B uganda chiefs. Some of the 
d isadvantages  he m entions were also exaggerated. For example, as Bill observed, defining
'* ^Ternan to Wilson, 19 Ju ly  1899; and Wilson to Ternan , 22 July  1899, e n d .  2 and 3 in T ernan  
to Salisbury, supra.
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“ inhab ited” and “uninhab ited” land was not necessarily simpler than “occupied” and 
“unoccupied” land .5;’
In the event the proposal did not cause any excitement in the Foreign Office. Hill 
conceded th a t  the Land Regulations had their problems but he did not think this scheme 
necessarily resolved them. Moreover, Johnston , the Commissioner designate, was already 
on his way to Uganda. A lthough land se tt lem ent was not expressly included in his 
m andate ,  he had specifically requested the Colonial Office to defer any definite decision 
on the land question pending his report.  F urtherm ore , the Foreign Office was a t  the time 
preparing a reference to the Law Officers on the land question in B ri ta in ’s protectorates 
which was bound to affect its land p o l i c y . F o r  these reasons, Ternan was told th a t  a 
decision over his proposal had been deferred. In the m eantim e “for the immediate 
necessities of the case as regards restrictions in the transfer of the native lands” he was 
authorised  to make a regulation similar to the one issued in the East Africa P ro tec to ra te  
on 8 July 1897. T he regulation provided that no docum ent purporting to transfer land 
from a native to a non-native would be recognised unless approved by the officer in
r 7
charge of the d istrict.
As a m a t te r  of fact, T ernan  had already published a circular to th a t  effect — in 
addition  to one com m unicated earlier by Wilson. T he only issue which was still open 
concerned the C ro w n ’s power to dispose of this land under the Land Regulations or 
otherwise. This is the issue which was the subject of a reference to the Law Officers.
’ ’Minute Hill, 29 September 1899, on Ternan to Salisbury, FO 2/203.
Ilill, ibid., proposed that Ternan’s letter should be enclosed with the papers to be sent to the 
Law Officers. The letter does not appear in the list of documents finally sent to the Law Officers.
*’~F.O. to Ternan, 29 September 1899, FO 2/203.
^ T e rn a n  to Salisbury, telegram of 5 August 1899, FO2/205.
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5 .6  R e fere n c e  to  th e  L aw  O fficers
It was G ra y ’s idea th a t  the Law Officers ought to be consulted. The Foreign Office 
itself had decided to give in to the pressure, especially from Hardinge and some potential 
se tt lers  in the East Africa P ro tec to ra te ,  to disregard the colonial Office maxim. They 
m ain ta ined  th a t  nothing short  of freehold or indefinite leases could induce investors to 
come to E as t  A f r ic a .^  As the railway construction  progressed inland, the Foreign Office 
became more concerned abou t  the  effect of this m axim on investm ent. Overtures to the 
Colonial Office for a  compromise were of no avail.®® Eventually the Foreign Office 
decided unilaterally to  disregard the legal maxim. Instructions were issued to Gray to 
d raft  as far as possible, uniform land regulations for U ganda and the East Africa 
P ro tec to ra te .  Gray was authorised  if he thought it necessary or expedient, to declare 
expressly in the Regulations th a t :  “he A dm inistration  has the right to deal with waste
and unoccupied lands as Crown lands, and to create freehold tenure  instead of mere 
leaseholds .” ®1 Gray, however, doubted  the legality of w ha t the Foreign Office wanted to 
do. Before proceeding any further,  he thought the Foreign Office ought to seek the 
opinion of the Law Officers over the whole question of land adm in is tra tion  in East Africa. 
Otherwise, he cautioned, “ if not put on legal lines [it] may give rise to much future 
troub le” . This advice could not be disregarded, especially as it was given by Gray who 
had so far played a very im p o rtan t  role in this m atte r .
Three questions were framed for the Law Officers’ opinion .®0 First, whether, in
S9Sorrenson,Origin of European Settlement in Kenya, at pp. 50-51.
®®Salisbury to Hardinge, 6 August 1898, FOCP/7018; F.O. to C.O., 3 September 1897, 
FOCP/7018; F.O. to C.O., 20 September 1897, FOCP/7018; C.O. to F.O., 10 November 1898 ( 
cited in C.O. to F.O., 7 April 1899, FO C P/7401);  C.O. to F.O., 25 January 1899, F 0 2 /2 5 9 .
®1 F.O. to Gray, 9 March 1899, F O C P /7401 .  It is significant that the instructions were sent 
before the Colonial Office responded to the despatch of 10 November 1898, supra. This indicates 
that whatever the views of the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office was prepared to proceed with its 
own arrangements. In the event the former refused to compromise over the issue, C.O. to F.O., 7 
April 1899, ibid.
62Cray to F.O., 12 June 1899, F O C P/7401.
63F.O. to L.O., 18 November 1899, FOCP/74Ü3.
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regions where Her M ajesty exercised rights of p ro tec tora tes  under trea ties  which did not 
specifically g ran t  to Her M ajesty the right of dealing with waste or unoccupied land, such 
a righ t accrued by virtue of the p ro tec to ra te .  As a supplem ent to this question, w hether 
it m ade any difference if the natives with whom the trea ty  were concluded, were 
practically  savages w ithou t any proper conception of land ownership. Second, if in their 
opinion the answer to the first question were in the negative, how would the difficulties of 
Land Certificates be overcome or w ha t o ther alternatives  were available to Her Majesty 
to deal with land in these regions. Finally, w hether the Crown could by operation of the 
Indian  Land Acquisition Act and the E ast  Africa (Acquisition of Lands) Order in 
C ounc il ,1898, g ran t a ti t le  am oun ting  to a freehold in the regions referred to in the first 
question.
Though this reference specifically related to Uganda and the East Africa 
P ro tec to ra te ,  the Law Officers were requested to consider these issues according to 
general legal principles since the  problem was not unique to these two. They were 
informed th a t  for purposes of the reference, p ro tec to ra tes  were divisible into two groups. 
G roup  one had an organised system of governm ent and possessed land laws which, inter 
alia, provided for the tenure  and transfer of titles to land. Above all, the concept of 
p r iva te  and public ownership of land was well known. Zanzibar and Tunis were identified 
as typical examples in this group. In con tras t,  the Foreign Office asserted th a t  
p ro tec to ra tes  in the second group had not, as yet, developed an organised system of 
governm ent: “ [Territorial] sovereignty, if it can be said to exist a t  all ... is held by
mainly small chiefs or elders, who are practically savages, and who exercise a precarious 
rule over tribes which have not as yet developed either an adm in is tra tive  or a legislative 
sy s tem ” . The s ta tem en t  w ent on to deny th a t  in these communities any idea of tribal 
ownership of land, let alone private  ownership, existed. The nearest to ownership, it was 
claimed, occurred when crops were grown or where the land was used for grazing. Even
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then, the interest was more in the crops and the animals than  the land “ temporarily 
occupied by them ” . All terr ito r ies  in the E as t  Africa P ro tec to ra te  beyond the Sultan of 
Z anz ibar’s coastal dom inion, were identified as belonging to this group. In the Uganda 
P ro tec to ra te ,  the whole P ro tec to ra te  was included, except tlie Kingdom of Buganda, 
which “m ight perhaps in some respects be placed in ihe first class” . But it was 
emphasised th a t  this reference was mainly concerned with p ro tec tora tes  in the la tte r  
group.
T he  Foreign Office outlined legislative measures which had been taken so far in 
respect of land in both p ro tec to ra tes .  Some of these measures involved compulsory 
acquisition of land: for example, under the Indian Land Acquisition Act, land acquired for 
construc tion  of the railway and other public purposes; the proclam ations under which the 
Uganda Railway zone was appropria ted ; the proclam ation in the E ast Africa P ro tec to ra te  
which provided for compulsory purchase of native houses and land, and so on. Reference 
was also m ade to the Land Regulations and the  Com missioner’s powers therein. Some of 
these measures the Foreign Office confessed were som ewhat irregular. For instance, land 
beyond the coastal region was purportedly  acquired under the Indian Land Acquisition 
Act, before the Act was even applied to the  region. A nother example was th a t  of the 
proc lam ations under which land in the East Africa P ro tec to ra te  and Uganda was acquired 
for the Uganda Railway. T he  proclam ations did not s ta te  on w h a t  legal authority  they 
were issued. Moreover, a t  the time when they and the Land Regulations were 
prom ulgated , the Com missioner had no legislative powers over the natives of the 
P ro tec to ra te  or their p roperty  since the Africa Order in Council and the East Africa 
Order in Council, 1897, applied only to persons and property of British subjects and some 
foreigners. Doubt, therefore, still lingered in the D epartm ent as to whether these 
measures were strictly applicable to  the natives and their property.
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In spite of tlie irregularities, the Foreign Office was happy to point out th a t  they 
had  no t  resulted in any ill feelings on the p a r t  of the natives, nor had the inhab itan ts  who 
m ig h t  have been affected under the Indian Land Acquisition Act, ever institu ted  any 
ac tion  for appropria ting  their land under the Act. The la tte r ,  in the Foreign Office’s 
op in ion , supported  the a rgum en t th a t  the concept of land ownership was unknown in 
these  regions. Moreover, the Foreign Office argued th a t  if land could be acquired (with 
com pensa tion) from natives under the Indian Land Acquisition Act, which it believed 
could thereafter  be g ran ted  in freehold; it seemed proper by a  similar Act for the Crown 
to acquire  waste and unclaimed land.
Reinforcements of the argum en t were also found in recent precedents regarding the 
concept of pro tectorates.  The Law Officers were reminded of their predecessors’ approval 
of the  Colonial Office’s instructions to the Governor of the Gold Coast Colony for the 
Suprem e C ourt  to assum e w hatever ju risd ic tion , over all persons in the Pro tectora te ,  th a t  
m ig h t  be needed for the effective adm in is tra t ion  of the P ro tec to ra te .  Similar precedents 
were also found in some Orders in Council, which included the Foreign Office’s own East 
Africa O rder in Council, 1899, recently approved by them . If the Crown could assume 
ju r isd ic tion  over natives of the P ro tec to ra te ,  why, the Foreign Office wondered, for the 
good and  the development of these regions the Crown could not: “ ... assume jurisdiction 
over w aste  and uncultivated  land in places where the native ruler is incompetent, whether 
from ignorance or otherwise to exercise th a t  jurisd ic tion .”
In a brief response which contained no argum ents,  the Law Officers (W ebster and 
Finley) reported th a t  in p ro tec to ra tes  such as these, the Crown by virtue of the 
p ro tec to ra te  had the power to assum e control over all “ lands unappropria ted” . The 
C row n was free to declare them  Crown lands and to g ran t  freeholds or lesser term s from 
them . They emphasised th a t  the nam ing of this land Crown land or public land had no
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legal significance. As regards the legislative measures already taken, the Law Officers 
a d m it te d  th a t  there were some irregularities. For instance, they doubted whether the 
Indian Land Acquisition Act, could have been used as a basis for acquiring unowned 
lands. They also cast d oub t  on w hether the  proclam ations declaring the appropriation  of 
the  U ganda  Railway zone were within the scope of the Com missioner’s powers under the 
Africa Order in Council. On the o ther hand they exposed the so-called licenses of 
occupancy issued under the Land Regulations as am oun ting  to actual conveyances. 
N otw iths tand ing ,  in the ir  opinion, the  irregularities were not of any legal consequence. 
T he  legislation was au thorised  by the  C ro w n ’s Secretary of S ta te ,  therefore they were 
A cts  of the Crown and  could not be questioned in any British courts. Nonetheless the 
Law Officers recommended prom ulgation of a fresh O rder in Council for Uganda which 
would enable the m aking of Land Regulations and any other proposed regulations for 
contro l of unoccupied la n d .^4
Perhaps  any o ther  response from the Law Officers was in the circumstances 
unlikely. In the first place, the reference was not designed as an objective s ta tem en t 
requiring  an objective opinion. It was a cam paign for a favourable response. The Foreign 
Office had made up its mind to take the land. Already, by some “irregular” legislative 
m easures  — which produced no harm  — it had acquired some land for government 
purposes. E ither the  Law Officers had to accept the position or suggest an equally viable 
a l te rna t ive .  Secondly, the  recent developm ents in the concept of pro tectorates strongly 
favoured the Foreign Office’s argum ent.  If the Crown could assume jurisdiction over 
natives  of the p ro tec to ra te ,  w ha t excuse could be used to deny assum ption of jurisdiction 
over unoccupied land? Added to this, the information given to the Law Officers about 
these regions (their lack of government and absence of any concept of land ownership) 
m ade  the s i tuation  look extremely hopeless. It m eant there was no one to authorise
L.O. to Salisbury, 13 December 1899, FO C P /7403 .
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occupation of the  land: the natives neither understood nor cared abou t  its ownership.
C ould  such a s i tuation  be allowed to  continue especially in view of the British economic 
inves tm ent in East Africa?
A num ber of writers have since proved th a t  even a t  th a t  time the idea of land 
ownership was not as alien to  some of the tribes as the Foreign Office asse rted . ^ 0  Some 
go on to claim, possibly with some element of political m otivation , th a t  indeed there was 
no land a t  all which was not owned a t  the material t i i n e . ^  Similarly allegation of lack of 
p roper governm ents th ro u g h o u t these regions is, rightly, strongly contested. It is ironical 
t h a t  whereas ten years earlier the Law Officers had been told th a t  there were native 
sovereigns to cede jurisd ic tion , when it came to land it was a different story. The fact 
th a t  sovereignty was spread over many people, as alleged by the Foreign Office, was of 
course legally irrelevant. Yet it would be perhaps going a bit too far to suggest th a t  the 
inform ation was fabricated to  secure a favourable response from the Law Officers . ^  
According to  the prevailing s tan d a rd s  of investigation it was probably believed to be true. 
T hough a t  the same time it m ust  be emphasised th a t  the Law Officers’ opinion was based 
on facts as given by the Foreign Office. It is a m a t te r  of speculation as to w hether their 
report  would have differed with different information.
Finally, the concept of Act of S ta te ,  which the Law Officers invoked to  uphold the 
irregular legislative measures, strictly  m eant th a t  nothing could be questioned in the 
British courts provided th a t  the Secretary of S ta te  approved or ratified the action. But
6S1 See for example: Sorrenson, Origin of European Settlement in Kenya, at p.51; W.S. Routledge 
and K. Routledge, With a Pre-Historical People: The Akikuyu of the British East Africa (London, 
Edward Arnold, 1910), at p. 12; K.Maini, Land Law m East Africa (Nairobi, Oxford University 
Press, 1967), at p.3.
^ S e e  for example, Mwangi, Land and Nationalism, at pp. 173-176. See also Kimble, A Political 
History of Cliana, chapter 9.
^Sorrenson , Origin of European Settlement m Kenya, at pp. 177-79, argues that the 
misinterpretation of the Kikuyuland system: that land ownership was unknown, was originally 
deliberate to discourage foreigners from attempt ing to buy land.
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as will be shown below, it was only gradually th a t  this concept came to be critically relied 
upon.
5.7 T he O utcom e
N aturally  the report  was a  welcome relief to the Foreign Office. Davidson described 
it as the m ost valuable o p i n i o n . C r a y  recommended th a t  Orders in Council be 
p rom ulgated  for both  U ganda and the E ast  Africa P ro tec to ra te  to pu t  the land system in 
the two P ro tec to ra te s  on a basis consistent with the Law Officers’ opinion. He suggested 
th a t  it ought to be declared expressly in the Order th a t  all unappropria ted  and w aste 
land were vested in the Crown and could be disposed of either in fee or for a term of years 
a t  the Crowns discretion. As for B uganda, G ray th o u g h t  th a t  its “special circumstances” 
would require consideration both in the. O rder and in any subsequent regulations. If the 
P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent ad m it ted  the rights of the chiefs to alienate the land, he 
proposed the prom ulgation  of regulations empowering the Commissioner to control the 
t r a n s a c t io n .®0
G ra y ’s proposals were approved by the Foreign Office. Instructions were duly given 
to  him to draft the necessary O rders in Council for both Uganda and the East Africa 
P ro tec to ra te  vesting all land belonging to Her Majesty either by virtue of the 
P ro tec to ra te  or otherw ise in the Commissioner for the time being as trustee for the 
C ro w n .70 In the first d raft  (E ast  Africa Lands Order in Council) Gray defined Crown 
lands as:
All lands belonging to Her Majesty by virtue of any T rea ty  or Convention, or 
of Her M ajes ty ’s P ro tec to ra te ,  or assigned or transferred to His Highness the 
Sultan  of Zanzibar or the British E ast  Africa C om pany, all waste and 
unoccupied lands ... and all lands which have been or may be otherwise 
howsoever purchased or acquired by Her Majesty within the P ro tec to ra te  ....
®^Minute of G February 1900, on L.O. to Salisbury, supra, F 088 1 /7 6 7 5 .  
®°Gray to F.O., 16 February 1900, FOCP/740-1.
70F.O. to Gray, 12 March 1900, F Ü 8 8 1/7-104.
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These lands were to vest “absolutely” in the Commissioner for the time being in 
t ru s t  for the Queen. G ray intended to incorporate  a similar provision in the U ganda 
O rder in Council which he was drafting. He emphasised to the Foreign Office th a t  the 
im p o rtan t  point was to  ensure th a t  the definition comprised all the different sources of 
Her M ajes ty ’s rights to land in the P ro tec to ra te .71
However, in the end G ra y ’s definition of Crown land was amended by the Law 
Officers to read as follows:
... all public lands in the East  Africa P ro tec to ra te  [ or U ganda as the case may 
be] which are subject to  the control by virtue of His M ajes ty ’s P ro tec to ra te ,  and 
all lands which shall have been acquired by His Majesty for public services or 
o therw ise.7^
A comparison of the two definitions shows th a t  the la t te r  was much more concise than  
the  former proposed by Gray. Moreover, G ra y ’s definition purported  to embrace not only 
lands which belonged to  the Crown “by virtue of the p ro tec to ra te” bu t also “all waste and 
unoccupied lands” which, s tric tly ,  would have included more land than  was justified by 
the  Law Officers’ opinion. It is quite possible th a t  the Law Officers amended the 
definition to limit Crown lands within the scope of their report. F inally , it is also noted 
th a t  the word “con tro l” (which is the actual word used in their report)  was substitu ted  
for “belong” . T he two words are not of course synonymous. Indeed control w ithou t 
claiming ownership was always claimed as the only power which the Crown had over the 
land by virtue of the P ro tec to ra te .  Control as used by the Law Officers in this par ticu la r  
case m ust have been intended to encompass much more than the control as hitherto  used 
since it included the power to convey all the lands th a t  were under the “control” of the 
Crown — which m ade the land more akin to being owned than merely supervised. Why 
then  did they shy away from an out right declaration of ownership as in G ray ’s draft?
71Gray to F.O., 3 September 1900.
7 9 r .
This is the version which was adopted in the Uganda Order in Council, 1902, Article 2. See 
also the East Africa (Lands Order in Council), Article 1. For the texts of the Orders see Hertslet, 
23: 63 and 227.
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W as it because the idea th a t  land in a p ro tec to ra te  did not belong to the Crown still 
h au n ted  them ? Claire Palley^° suggests th a t  this m ight well have been the case.
5.8  S u m m ary  and C on clu sion
W ith in  B uganda the local Officials’ views were consistent. Land th roughout the 
K ingdom  was the property of the  K abaka and it was he with his Lukiiko who had the 
power to  dispose of this land. Even the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent had to acquire land for 
its purposes in Buganda from the  K abaka. Some of the Officials assumed this was due to 
the  t re a ty  (which was quite t rue  though there is no evidence of any reasoned argum ent on 
this basis). The Colonial Office m axim , if any th ing ,  merely confirmed w hat was in any 
case a lready taken for granted . T he only power claimed by the local officials was th a t  of 
contro l over land transactions by the K ab ak a  and the Lukiiko. Even here confusion 
reigned as to the basis of this power. T he t rea ty ,  the “s ta tu te s ” m ade by the Lukiiko and 
the  power of the Crown “by v ir tue  of the p ro tec to ra te” , were all a t  one time or o ther 
cited as the basis of this au th o r i ty .  A literal in te rp re ta tion  of the trea ty  was incapable of 
sus ta in ing  this claim. T he Lukiiko “s t a tu te ” was probably the basis of the 
C om m iss ioner’s power over land in Buganda.
As for the rest of the P ro tec to ra te ,  similar confusion was displayed. Some of the 
local officials assumed th a t  the Crown had unlimited powers over all unoccupied lands in 
these d istr ic ts ,  whilst others were not too sure. T e rn a n ’s scheme in particular highlighted 
tliis confusion.
T h e  Foreign Office was in the m idst of the imbroglio. It was caught between the 
Colonial Office legal m axim  and the inform ation and pressure from its field officers. W ith 
reference to Buganda, it never m ade up its m ind w hether to accept the views of the local
73 'The Const itutional History and Law of Southern R hodesia, at page 82-83 .
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officials or not; the B u g an d a  land question was th roughou t the period referred to in 
hypothetical terms. In cont ras t  with the rest of the P ro tec to ra te ,  a t  least judging by the 
m em orandum  accom panying the reference to the Law Officers, the Foreign Office 
accepted the generalised view th a t  the land was not owned.
F inally , the opinion of the Law Officers th a t  the Crown could after all by virtue of 
its p ro tec to ra te  convey t i t les  ou t of unappropria ted  lands helped to  clear a decade-long 
confusion. In the process it narrowed down the d istinction between the type of 
p ro tec to ra tes  described in the  reference and  annexed territories. B ut there was still a 
problem of in terp re ta t ion .  T he Law Officers’ report was based on certain facts as given 
by the Foreign Office: the  terr ito r ies  were ruled by “savage” chiefs and had no conception 
of tribal or p rivate  ownership of land. W h a t  if the facts in practice or in certain areas 
were found to  be otherwise? Many years la ter ,  as will be shown below, the issue of which 
land the Crown was en ti t led  to  convey by vir tue  of the p ro tec to ra te  was still being raised. 
In B uganda the question was resolved by the 1900 Buganda A greem ent which was entered 
into shortly  after the Law Officers reported.
In the next chap te r  1 examine the 1900 Agreement and its legal significance from its 
m akers’ viewpoint. Subsequently 1 shall revert to the land question in the light of this 
A greem ent and the new O rder in Council.
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C H A P T E R  6
T H E  B U G A N D A  A G R E E M E N T
On 10 March 1900, an Agreement  was made between the chiefs of Buganda acting 
on behalf  of the  Kabaka (then a minor) and the people of Buganda on one side and Harry 
J o hns ton  ac ting on behalf of the Queen,  on the other.  This Agreement  was called the 
U g a n d a  Agreement ,  hereafter the Buganda A g re em en tJ  It has been variously described 
as “ B u g a n d a 's cha r te r  of rights” “the  Magna C a r t a ” “ B uganda ’s const i tu t ion” and so
9
on. The  Agreement  was a landmark in Br i t a i n ’s relat ionship with Buganda.  It survived
O
for fifty odd years.  Anthony Low, Buganda and British Overrule,0 apt ly observes tha t  of 
all t rea t ies  between Britain and nat ive authori t ies  during the colonial era “few ... have 
been of such consequence as ... [this] Agreement ,  few' have been so detailed,  few have 
a t t a in ed  such impor tance  in the relat ionship with the colonial people; few too have so 
enjoyed thei r app ro bat ion or become so embedded in their folklore.” Apar t  from the 
Bug anda  Agreement  there was the Toro Agreement  which Johnston made some three 
m o n t h s  later wi th the  rulers of th a t  Kingdom; and the  Ankole Agreement  which was 
entered into the  following yea r . *  Although these two Agreements  were im por t an t  in their 
own ways they did not. achieve t he prominence of the Buganda Agreement .
^Appendix 3. The Agreement was ratified on 15 June 1900, llertslet,  Map of Africa by Treaty, 
1: 397.
‘2 aFor example,  Kabaka of Buganda, Desecration of My Kingdom (London, Constable,  1967), p. 
63; Low and Bratt,  Buganda and Brit isli Override, p.56.
°At  page 3.
*26 June 1900, and 7 August 1901, respectively. See Appendix 4. The Ankole and Toro 
Agreements are discussed in F.Uzoigwe,  ed., I gaud a: The Dilemma of Na t ion hood (New York, Nok 
Publishers International,  1982), chapter 4.
*.
T h e  B uganda  Agreement was negotiated and m ade by .Johnston unaware of the Law 
Officers’ report on the C ro w n ’s judicial powers and right to dispose of land in the 
p ro tec to ra te .  This  chapter assesses the Agreem ent and t he reasons leading to its making. 
W as the  Agreem ent m eant to  be simply a political se tt lem ent?  W as it regarded as legally 
necessary in order to confer upon the Crown sovereign powers in Buganda? It is not 
in tended a t  this s tage to discuss w hether the Agreem ent was actually  a trea ty  in the legal 
sense: my concern is with the understanding  of its m akers a t  the material time.
6 .1  O r ig in s  o f  th e  A g r e e m e n t
T h e  political background to the A greem ent is well docum ented. Since the 
es tab lishm ent of the P ro tec to ra te  there was never any real peace in the country . Britain  
found herself engaged in one war after another: war against Mwanga; Kabarega; and  a
num ber of o ther tribes in their  quest to fend off imperialism. In addition she had to 
quash a m utiny by her h i ther to  trusted  Sudanese mercenaries. All these wars were 
calculated  in m onetary  term s. It was all expenditure  with very little revenue. Even 
Buganda, where much of the  original hope for prosperity  had been placed, hardly 
produced any th ing  for revenue purposes. T he  construction  of the Uganda Railway, which 
was regarded as par t  of the overall bill for the adm in is tra t ion  of Uganda, aggravated  the 
financial s i tu a t io n .5 By the end of the cen tury , af te r  the cap tu re  of M w anga and 
K abarega and the suppression of the Sudanese m utiny , there was some re lative 
tranqu il i ty ,  which a t  least in Buganda, had not been enjoyed for more than a decade.
Following Berkeley’s resignation, Salisbury instructed  th a t  he had to be replaced by 
a first, class officer who would put the P ro tec to ra te  on a more satisfactory footing. The 
person who was found to possess the necessary qualities was Harry Johnston . He had 
served in various posts in Africa including th a t  of Commissioner in British Central Africa
5Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda, chapter 4 .
135
P ro tec to ra te .  11 is experience in the la t te r  P ro tec to ra te  had influence on his ac tiv it ies  in 
U ganda.
Johnston  was given a  special commission with two main objectives. F irs t,  he was
to:
Organise the adm in is tra tion  of the U ganda P ro tec to ra te  on lines which, with 
due regard to  economy and any minor a ltera tion  which experience m ight 
suggest, will m eet the requirements of the P ro tec to ra te  on completion of the 
railway from M om basa and a creation of a more rapid com m unication with 
Europe ....^
Second, Johnston  was instructed to “pay special a t ten t io n  to the possibilities of 
raising the present revenue, w ithout risk of arousing the susceptibilities of the natives or 
pressing unduly upon their resources.” Because of Jo h n s to n ’s “experience in the public 
service in west and central Africa” and his “general acquain tance with the s ta te  of affairs 
in the  Uganda P ro tec to ra te” it was not considered necessary to set out in detail how he 
was to  achieve these objectives. The assum ption was tha t  he already knew w hat he was 
supposed to do and how to  do it. Johnston  however had discussions with the Foreign 
Office before leaving for Uganda.
T o appreciate  fully Jo h n s to n ’s activities  and the m aking of the B uganda Agreem ent 
out' needs to look a t  them  in the light of prior events  as well as the surround ing  
circum stances. M any writers have, rightly , stressed the  political and the economic
n
aspects  of these events. Nevertheless t here are also legal issues which it is felt have been 
relegated to the background if not to tally  ignored by some historians.^ As we have seen 
in the  previous chap te rs ,  there was confusion as to the ex ten t  of the C row n’s power and 
a u th o r i ty  in U ganda P ro tec to ra te ,  and in o ther British pro tec tora tes .  The critical legal
^Salisbury to Johnston, 1 July 1899, F O C P/7402.
n
1 For details see Low and Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule, chapter 1.
^For example, Low and Pratt, ibid., at p.193.
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issues a t the time of .Johnston’s commission were those of land and jurisdiction. As 
earlier indicated Johnston  left London for Uganda before the legal position had been 
cleared and he did not become aw are of it unti l  after t he Agreement had been negotiated 
and signed. Land, jurisdiction , and taxa tion ,  were some of the main items dealt w ith in 
the Agreement. Since there were ou ts tand ing  legal problems in relation to these m atte rs ,  
it has to be assumed (even though his formal instructions did not expressly say so), t h a t  
Johnston  was required to solve them  by entering into a new trea ty  or securing an 
am endm en t to the curren t one. The s ta tem en ts  m ade by Johnston  and the surrounding 
circum stances support  this a rgum ent.^
6 .2  N e g o t ia t io n s  o f  th e  A g r e e m e n t
W hatever the exact instructions m ight have been, as soon as Johnston  arrived in 
Buganda he initiated negotiations with the chiefs for a new Agreement. Johnston , like 
Lugard ten years earlier, thought th a t  the negotiations would be a very simple process 
tak ing  only a few days. He was mistaken; probably he had not read L ugard’s account of 
his experience of trea t ing  with the Baganda. T he negotiations were carried on for more 
than  two months. Meeting after meeting was held, many of which were stormy and 
tem pers flared. The chiefs asked Johnston  questions ab o u t  all aspects of his proposals. 
As we commented with regard to the o ther B uganda treaties, the anxiety which was 
exhibited by the Baganda over Jo h n s to n ’s plans is indicative of the fact th a t  they were 
aw are of the na tu re  of the transaction.
Johnston  used th rea ts  and persuasion in his endeavour to force the Baganda to 
come to term s with him. lie told tin* chiefs th a t  if they refused to g ran t to the Crown the 
power to dispose of w aste  and uncultivated  land he would, as the representa tive of the 
protecting  S ta te ,  forbid any transfers of land made by the chiefs:
^For example, Johnston to Salisbury, 13 October 1899, FO CP/7403. Jorgensen, Uganda a 
Modern History, at p.49, claims that Johnston arrived in Uganda with instructions to negotiate an
agreement.
This will greatly hinder the es tab lishm ent of t raders  and planters and will 
delay indefinitely the prosperity  of the country; bu t  1 can see no a l te rn a t iv e .10
Buganda, Johnston  stressed, had to pay a price for being p a r t  of the British Em pire and
p a r t  of th a t  price was the surrender to the Crown of the power to dispose of w aste  and
uncu lt iva ted  land. On the basis of his s ta tem en t  it is clear th a t  Johnston believed th a t
only the chiefs had the legal power to make land g ran ts  in Buganda. His task was to
persuade them  to confer their rights upon the P ro tec to ra te  Governm ent.
Johnston  also tried to rationalise the position to the chiefs. He told them  th a t  the 
British tax-payers could not go on indefinitely sponsoring B uganda’s adm in is tra tion .  
B uganda, Johnston  m ain ta ined , had to con tribu te  tow ards the colonial bill by paying 
taxes  and revenue from forests and uncultivated  land. If Buganda refused to accept 
B r i ta in ’s protection, he predicted th a t  o ther European Powers which it was too weak to 
resist would overrun it.
According to  some historians Johnston  was bargaining from a position of s trength  
vis-a-vis the Baganda. The chiefs over the years had witnessed B ri ta in ’s military prowess 
which had destroyed M w anga, Kabarega, and more recently the Sudanese mercenaries. 
W h a t  could the British not do? Moreover, it is pointed ou t th a t  the chiefs with w hom  he 
negotiated  partly owed their ascendancy to the British and did not feel secure w ithou t  
th e m .11 O ther historians however contend th a t  it was in fact the chiefs who had an edge 
over Johnston .  This is supported  by the argum en t th a t  Britain  at the time had many 
problem s in her colonies in Africa, a war was the last thing she could afford. Jo h n s to n  in 
fact sounded a w arning (o his G overnm ent th a t  for the survival of the P ro tec to ra te  it was 
im pera tive  to come to term s with the Baganda:
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10Johnston to Jackson, 15 January 1900, cited in Low and Pratt,  Buganda and British Overrule, 
at p. 44.
1 'how and Pratt,  ibid., pp. 31-32, and 182.
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I f  there  is any part o f the U ganda P ro te c to ra te  w hich  could do us any real 
ha rm  i t  is ... the  K ingdom  o f jB jU ganda . Here we have som eth ing  like  a m illio n  
fa ir ly  in te llig e n t, s lig h tly  c iv ilize d  negroes o f w a rlik e  tendencies, and possessing 
a bo u t 10,000 to  12,000 guns. These are tlie  on ly  people fo r a long tim e  to  come 
w ho can deal a serious b low  to  B r it is h  ru le  in t his d ire c tio n
Perhaps the t ru th  is th a t each side had weaknesses and s treng th . However, fo r the 
present the issue o f re la tive  ba rga in ing  s treng th  is n o t very im p o rta n t. The p o in t is i t  
was a barga in . Johnston  was try in g  to  acquire from  the chiefs m ore powers fo r the 
P ro te c to ra te  G ove rnm en t to  a d m in is te r Buganda and to  raise revenue.
E v e n tu a lly , when the chiefs accepted his proposals Johnston , e v id e n tly  nervous, 
w ro te  to  a friend :
1 am ju s t a bo u t to  conclude a m ost im p o rta n t T re a ty  w ith  the  K in g  and 
Chiefs o f IB ]U ganda  w hich  give us power to  tax  the  natives, the c o n tro l o f land , 
and a ll branches o f governm ent. There  is m any a s lip  b e tw ix t the cup and the 
lip , and a lthough  the Chiefs have appo in ted  next S a tu rday the 10th M arch  fo r 
s ign ing  the T re a ty  1 shall no t chuckle  u n til i t  is signed and posted. W hen th is  is 
done 1 shall consider 1 have achieved a m ost s tr ik in g  success the resu lts  o f nearly 
t hree m on ths ’ negotia t ions }  °
The chiefs kept th e ir  w ord . A t  a special p ub lic  cerem ony, a fte r the Agreem ent was read 
in bo th  English and Luganda, the Regent chiefs and five  Saza chiefs signed i t  on beha lf o f 
the Kabaka and people o f Buganda, and Johnston  signed on behalf o f the  B r it is h  Queen. 
T w e n ty  o the r chiefs and a num ber o f Europeans and local B r it is h  o ffic ia ls  w itnessed the 
signatures. L a te r Johnston  ju s t if ie d  the  long lis t o f s ignatories  to  the Fore ign  Secretary
th a t i t  was on the suggestion o f A p o lo  Kagw a so th a t “ in fu tu re  they d id  not, plead
11 ’*ignorance o f its  te rm s and its  b in d in g  na tu re . 1
1 •)
M ohnston to Salisbury, 17 March 1900, quoted Low and P ra tt, ib id . 
* 'Mohnston to  Sclater, (> March 1900, A 7 /6 .
^ J o h n s to n  to S a lisbury, C A p ril 1900.
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6 .3  T erm s  o f  th e  A g r e e m e n t
The Agreement was so comprehensive th a t  it virtually covered all aspects  of 
government and B uganda’s relationship with the P ro tec to ra te  Governm ent. For 
convenience the Agreement is divisible into three main parts: land; taxation ; and 
adm inis tra tion .
6 .3 .1  Land
Not surprisingly the land question was the most controversial aspect of the 
Agreement. Johnston  was forced to abandon his original dem and for the Crown to  take  
all waste and uncultivated  land. Instead he settled for the K abaka, chiefs and notables to  
be granted  as private  es ta tes  large pieces of land running in square miles according to  
sizes prescribed in Article 15 of the Agreement. The rem ainder of the land, a p a r t  from 
private  estates already granted  to Europeans and missions, and all forests waste became 
Crown land. Johnston  estim ated  the Crow n 's  share to be approxim ately  10,550 square 
miles — which was abou t  half of his estim ated to tal area of B u g an d a .1'* Johnston boasted 
th a t  before the Agreement the Crown had only fifty square miles of land in Buganda. He 
was confident th a t  the land acquired would be a very im p o rtan t  source of revenue to the 
Crown.
Shortly after the Agreement was signed Johnston  sent a cable to the Foreign Office 
informing it of his success in concluding a land sett lem ent.  He requested postponem ent of 
any further steps in the land m atte rs  until the Foreign Office had received his report.  By 
th a t  time the Law Officers’ report on land was already out and C ray  was preparing the  
necessary legislation to give legal effect to their opinion. Hill felt t h a t  it would be a  pity 
to s top  Gray; nonetheless he sent him privately a copy of Jo h n s to n ’s t e le g ra m .^
^ ’Johnston to Salisbury, 12 March 1900, supra.
^ T elegram s dated 17 March and 17 April, 1900. See also minutes Hill, 30 March 1900, and an 
undated one, FO 2/301.
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Meanwhile, in Uganda .Johnston, booming with confidence, issued a circular to warn 
Europeans who persisted to acquire land from natives. T he circular read:
... in virtue of the Treaties  and A greem ents concluded with the Kings and 
Chiefs of ... [Uganda] P ro tec to ra te  and its adjoining territories, Her M ajes ty ’s 
G overnm ent has acquired the sole right of disposal over the w aste and 
uncultivated  lands of the ... P ro tec to ra te  and its adjoining districts ....
T he  circular went on to  prohibit any acquisition of land from the natives by non-natives
w hether by purchase or gift, w ithout the consent of the Commissioner. Johnston
explained to the Foreign Secretary th a t  the notice was “drawn up, of course, on the
assum ption  th a t  your Lordship) will ratify the recent Agreement into which I have entered
into  with the Kingdom of !B]Uganda.” ^
The Foreign Office approved the circular, for w hatever it w'as worth , as “a  timely 
and  useful warning" which brought “certain  facts to  the knowledge of the East Africa 
j)ublic ... .” Johnston  was however reminded of the instructions given to his predecessor to 
p rom ulgate  a Regulation prohibiting transfer of land from native to non-natives. The 
ra th e r  cold response is indicative th a t  the  Foreign Office was not sharing in Jo h n s to n ’s 
enthusiasm . No doub t,  at least for the im m edia te  pmrposes, the Law Officers’ repjort had 
overshadowed most of the credit which should have been given to Johnston  for his 
success.
6 . 3 .2  T a x a t i o n
As indicated above, Johnston  hailed the power to tax the B aganda as one of the 
m ost im p o rtan t  achievem ents of his Agreement. One of the main reasons for this was 
th a t  the taxation  provisions of the 1894 trea ty  were not very clear. Under Article 11 
thereof the Pro tectora t e Government, was emp)owered to control the assessment, collection 
and the expenditure of tax revenue; while under Article 13 it had the au tho ri ty  to  impose
^Joh n ston  to Salisbury, 10 April 1900, F 0 8 8 1 /7405. There is no record of any other 
agreements allegedly entered into by Johnston with the “Kings and Chiefs” of the Protectorate. 
The Toro Agreement was made a month after the circular.
18F.(). to Johnston, 15 June 1900, FO881/7105.
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custom duty  on all goods leaving or enter ing Buganda.  Whereas  the cus tom revenue was 
expressly s t a t ed  to be for the sole use and benefit of the  Protec tora te  Government ,  the 
t rea ty  was not  so explicit abou t  the revenue from the internal  taxation.  According to 
Berkeley’s in terpre ta t ion of the t rea ty ,  the Go vernmen t  was enti t led to all revenue from 
tax a t io n .1^ The  Foreign Office on the o ther  hand doubted whether th a t  was indeed the  
correct  const ruction.  In its let ter to the Treasury  relat ing to the Es t ima tes  of Receipts 
and Expendi ture  of the  Uganda Protec tora te ,  it explained that :
According to the  Treaty  with the  King of [BjUganda,  of which a copy is
enclosed, only the  impor t  and expor t  dut ies  accrue the exchequer of the 
20Protect ing Power  ....
J o h n s to n ’s ins truct ions  were th a t  in Buganda,  because of the  t rea ty ,  all revenue had 
in the  first place to be collected in the name and on the account  of the Kabaka.  And it 
was on his account  t h a t  it was to be expended. However,  for adminis t ra t ive  convenience, 
lie was told to secure the collection of all revenue in the  Protec to ra te  and its expenditure 
in the  name of the Crown.  Under the Agreement ,  Art icle 12, it was st ipulated th a t  the 
Baganda would pay a hut  and gun tax the proceeds of which were to be handed over 
in tact  to the P ro tec tor a te  Go ve rnmen t  as contr ibut ion towards  its maintenance.  
Fur thermore ,  the  Baganda would be subject  to the  same “exterior t axat ion ” as was 
imposed on other  par ts  of the Protec tora te .  The Article however declared th a t  except as 
was provided in the  Agreement  no further “interior ta xa t ion” would be imposed on 
Baganda w i thou t  the  consent of their government .  In o ther  words the  power to tax the 
Baganda was limited.  As we shall see below, controversy developed over the 
in terpre tat ion of this provision.
As security for the payment  and receipt of the  taxat ion  revenue by the Protec tora te
^Berkeley to Salisbury, .‘51 October 1890, supra. 
20F.O. to Treasury, 20 January 1895, FOCP/0097.
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Government the validity and continuation of the Agreement, was partly based on the 
payment of this tax. By Article 20 the Government had the right to terminate it if the 
Buganda authorities failed to raise within the first, two years of the Agreement, at least, 
half of the estimated taxation revenue, or if thereafter without a reasonable excuse that 
minimum was not collected. By linking the Agreement with the payment of tax Johnston 
thereby ensured that the chiefs would become tax collecting agents for the colonial state. 
6 .3 .3  A d m in i s t r a t i o n
For administrative purposes it was agreed that Buganda was to be a province equal 
in rank with any other province into which the Protectorate might be divided into 
(Article 3). This provision was quite significant since Buganda had always been treated 
differently from the rest of the Protectorate. For example in the discussion of the land 
and jurisdiction issues Buganda was always mentioned as a possible exception to the 
general rule. This had partly to do with the 1894 treaty , a fact itself which is 
noteworthy. Johnston’s objective in incorporating this provision in the Agreement was to 
try and prevent the administration of Buganda from being different from that of the other 
parts of the Protectorate or the future combined Uganda and East Africa Protectorate 
which was then under contemplation.
However, the equality under the Agreement itself was more theoretical than real. 
Article 5 stipulated that all laws and regulations made for the Protectorate were to be 
applicable to Buganda “except in so far as they may in any particular conflict with the 
terms of this Agreement, in which case the terms of the Agreement will constitute a 
special exception to the Kingdom of B;Uganda.*’“ 1 Since Buganda was guaranteed 
certain rights which were not available to the others, and which could not be overridden 
by the Protectorate legislation, it could not be equal in rank with them.
^*It may be recalled that that was indeed the position under the Africa Order in Council,  which 
was still current. Above at p 43.
As for the adm inis t ra t ion  of justice,  the Agreement  provided for a Buganda court 
sys tem  (designated K a b ak a ’s courts) wi th the  Kabaka ac ting through the Lukiiko as the 
h ighes t  court.  Jur isdict ion of the Lukiiko over tfie B aganda  was unl imi ted.  A right of 
appeal  to the P ro tec to ra te  cour ts  was granted in all cases of capital  sentence or
o n
impr isonment  in excess of five years or a fine of over one hundred pounds.  In addi tion 
the Commiss ioner was given power of “remons t rance” with the Kabaka where an 
in hum an  punishment  was imposed by any of the K a b a k a ’s cour ts  (Article 8). T h e  lat ter  
cour ts  however had no jurisdict ion to deal wi th cases where any of the persons involved 
was no t  a Muganda.  All such cases were only jus ticiable in the British courts.  Thus  in 
purely Baganda cases the P ro tec to ra te  courts had only appellate jurisdict ion;  while in 
mixed cases they had full jurisdiction.
Generally there was nothing new in the foregoing ar rangement .  The Crown under 
the  1894 t rea ty had unl imi ted jur isdict ion over the  Baganda.  And the Ka baka had 
surrendered to the  Crown his jurisdict ion over the non-Baganda.  Moreover,  the Buganda 
cour t  system was al ready established under the Lukiiko “s ta tu te s” . However,  as it may 
be recalled, there was serious doub t  whether  the Baganda  were subject to the jurisdict ion 
of the  consular courts.  The Agreement  made it clear t h a t  on appeal and in mixed cases 
they were just iciable in these courts.  Even though the  Commissioneer was given the 
power to remonst ra te  with the Kabaka,  it would seem th a t  th a t  was not  intended to 
confer judicial jurisdict ion to him. Rather  it was an adminis t ra t ive  — at  best  quasi- 
judicial  — power to supervise the exercise of jur isdict ion by the K a b ak a ’s cour ts .  This 
was considerably different from the power the  Commiss ioner held under the 1894 t rea ty .
The  position of the Kabaka  in the admin is t ra t ive  s t ructure  was also expressly
o o
.See Article 6. There was no m ention  o f  civil cases in the  Article, most likely the om iss ion  was
inadvertent since in Article 8 reference is m ade to civil cases.
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provided for under  the Agreement.  The Brit ish Go vernmen t  would cont inue to recognise
him as the native  ruler of Buganda (Article 6):
So long as the Kabaka,  chiefs, and people of B]Uganda shall conform to the 
laws and regulations ins t itu ted for thei r governance by Her Majes ty’s 
Gove rnm ent ,  and shall cooperate loyally with [it] in the organisation and 
admin is t ra t ion  of [Buganda].
T h e  Kabaka was to carry the  honorific t i tle of “His Highness the  Kabaka of Buganda” , a 
t i t le which Johns ton strongly urged the  Secretary of Sta te  to approve because, in his 
view, the Kabaka  of Buganda was of no lesser impor tance  than the Sultan of Zanzibar (he 
carried a similar title) who ruled over a much smal ler terr itory and had fewer people.
Subject to this Agreement ,  the Kabaka was to exercise a “direct  rule” over the 
Baganda  with the assistance of t hree Ministers appointed  by him wi th the approval  of the 
Commiss ioner.  In addi tion the Lukiiko (consti tuted  of these Ministers,  the saza chiefs, 
and persons nominated by the  Kabaka wi th the  approval  of the Commissioner) was to 
function as his advisory body. Any adminis t ra t ive  measures desired by the Lukiiko were 
to be passed in form of “resolut ions” and presented to the Kabaka for his consent.  
However,  the Kabaka  had to consult  with the Commissioner  before giving his consent  and
O O
was explicitly bound,  whether  to approve or not ,  by the  l a t t e r ’s advice.
94It has been suggested t h a t  the Kabaka  ended up the worst  loser in the Agreement .
He no longer ruled as of right but  had to be recognised by the British Government .  Most  
of all the  powers reserved for him were either to be exercised subject  to the approval  of 
the  Commissioner or with the  advice of the Lukiiko. In the ci rcumstances  this is not 
surprising.  The political events in Buganda especially in the last decade of the century  
saw the ascendancy of the chiefs over the Kabaka  — a t rend encouraged by the Brit ish.
ZoT h is  was not entirely new; the Lukiiko was already m aking “s ta tu te s” subject to the approval  
of the C om m issioner.
 ^* Luyimbazi-Zake, Reform in L'g<mda (Kampala, Sapoba Bookshop, undated), at pp. 10-17.
Moreover,  the Kabaka was a minor at, the  t ime of the negot iat ions.  Nevertheless this loss 
of power ought  not  to be judged solely in terms of this Agreement ;  regard must  also be 
had to the  1894 t rea ty .  Under its provisions Mwanga surrendered a substant ia l  pa r t  of 
his sovereign powers.  The new Agreement ,  apa r t  from land mat ter s  and possibly 
taxat ion,  mainly clarified the position and consolidated the  powers since granted under 
the  Lukiiko “s t a t u t e s ” .
6 .4  R a t i f ic a t io n  o f  th e  A g r e e m e n t
Unlike the  1893 P o r t a l /M w a n g a  t rea ty ,  it was not expressed that  the Agreement  
was provisional and subject  to ratification by the Crown.  Nor is there any evidence to 
indicate t h a t  Johns ton advised the s ignatories of this point.  In spite of this, according to
o r
Halleck's In ternat ional  Law, ratification is required “even where this requisite is not 
reserved by the  express terms of the t rea ty  i tsel f’ . The t rea ty  though,  except where  it is 
otherwise provided,  takes  effect from the t ime of its s ignature and not the da te  of 
rat ificat ion.
Johnston was aware tha t  the t rea ty  had to be confirmed by the Gove rnment  before 
it became effective. In his despatch forwarding it, he pleaded to the Foreign Secretary  
that :
I sincerely hope your Lordship will ratify this Agreement ,  the  value of which,  I 
believe I do no t  over-es timate by saying t h a t  it solves the  questions of taxat ion  
of the nat ives  and the control of the land in Uganda Protec tora te ,  and as 
regards the  Kingdom of [B] Uganda ..., determines once and for all its exact  
boundar ies,  r ights,  privileges and obligations.
Johns ton pointed ou t  t h a t  in accordance wi th its terms,  if the chiefs “displayed the
sl ightest  disobedience or disloyal ty” then it would be open to the Crown to declare the
Agreement  null and void. Thereaf ter,  Ik* claimed, the Crown could ins ti tute wha tever
25 V olum e 1, at page 27(5.
MG
governm ent it deemed proper for Buganda. 26
As noted earlier, since Johnston  was given his commission there had been im p o rtan t  
changes in the legal thinking a t  the Foreign Office. The Law Officers had reported 
favourably on the land issue; and they had confirmed to the Foreign Office th a t  the 
Crown could assum e jurisdiction over the natives of tfie p ro tec to ra te  even where such 
powers were not expressly gran ted  under the trea ty  with the local ruler. It was then 
generally accepted th a t  the C ro w n ’s powers could be extended by legislation. Indeed by 
the time the Foreign Office heard of the Agreement, C ray  was under instruction to draft 
a new Order in Council for U ganda which, in term s of the C row n’s powers, was expected 
to be more comprehensive than  the Africa Order in Council. Hence the position was 
much more relaxed.
Nonetheless there was some excitem ent abou t  the Agreement. Hill commented th a t  
it was “very ably conceived and of which the first reading im p ressed  him favourably." 
Brodrick, P arl iam en tary  U nder-Secretary, cautioned th a t  it would sooner or later be 
scrutinised in P arliam ent.  By the time the Agreement reached Davidson it was dabbed 
the “ [BjUganda C o n s ti tu t io n ” . Davidson had no qualm s w ith  its provisions. 
Subsequently a D epartm en ta l  com m ittee , composed of Brodrick (C hairm an),  Davidson, 
Hill, and Ternan , was assigned the task of examining the Agreem ent. Generally the 
com m ittee  was in favour of ratifying it though it raised some queries abou t the land 
sett lem ent.  In its opinion this se t t lem en t was bound to lead to the in troduction of the 
complicated English law of real property  for which B uganda was ill-prepared. Salisbury
'^Johnston to Salisbury, 12 March 1900, supra, and Johnston to Salisbury, 28 August 1900, 
1 '02/299 .
o  n
Minutes on Johnston to Salisbury, 12 March 1900, supra.,. Minute Hill, 4 May 1900; Brodrick 
and Davidson’s minutes are undated. In the file there is an undated and uninitialed note “send to 
Cabinet” . Low and Pratt, Buganda a nd Brit ish Ov erru le, at p. 91 n, say that it was written by 
Salisbury.
on the  o ther hand did not share the co m m ittee ’s fears. If English law were not 
in troduced, he asked, which law was suitable? “They are all complicated — even the code 
Napoleon.” His only reservation was the du ra tion  of the Agreem ent. Salisbury thought
9 Q
th a t  it ought to be given a trial period of four years before its final co n f irm a t io n /
Eventually  the Foreign Office decided not to carry ou t  any am endm en ts  to the
Agreement since it was felt th a t  it would thereby invalidate it unless all the signatories
th ere to  endorsed the changes. The Agreem ent, nevertheless, was ratified on condition
th a t  the British G overnm ent reserved to itself a right to a lte r  its term s if c ircum stances
rendered it necessary. Johnston  was specifically instructed  formally to inform the
signatory chiefs accordingly .29 Strictly, of course, the British G o vernm en t’s rider was an
addition  to the Agreement which ought to have invalidated  it unless the o ther party
accepted them. The indication, according to a report ten years later by Governor
G irouard  of the E ast  Africa P ro tec to ra te ,  is th a t  most likely Johnston  did not inform the
B uganda  signatories ab o u t  the G o v ern m en t’s qualification to the Agreement. Girouard
who was trying to find a way around the Agreement lam ented th a t  as a result the
4>f)reservation could not be relied upon to am end its t e r m s /
y\  copy of the Agreem ent was in the m eantim e sent to G ray  who was already under 
instruction  to  draft a new O rder in Council for Uganda. T here  is no evidence available to 
the present writer, of w ha t  exactly his instruction  were regarding the Agreem ent. 
However, when Gray subm itted  the first d ra f t  of the new O rder he reported th a t  “it 
comprises one a t  least of the  principal provisions of ... Jo h n s to n ’s recent convention, 
namely, th a t  which places natives of B]Uganda under the jurisdiction  of native  courts
2^Minutes on Johnston to Salisbury, ibid. See also Salisbury’s minutes of 13 June 1900, on the 
Com m ittee’s report, FO 2/380 .
29Salisbury to Johnston, 15 June 1900, FO 881/7505.
''^Report on the Uganda Protectorate by Girouard, 15 November 1909, C0533/G3. Most likely 
Johnston did not want to risk another round of negotiations with the chiefs.
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with an ul t imate appeal to the P ro tec to ra te  cour t ." ' ' '  The  impact  of the Agreement  on 
the  new Uganda Order in Council is examined in the following chapter.
6.5 S u m m a r y  a n d  C onc lu s ion
Johnston was aware that  the colonial s t a t e  could not succeed wi thout  col laborators.  
By granting extensive estates to the Bakungu oligarchy and st rengthening the inst i tut ion 
of the  Lukiiko as a judicial and admini s t r a t i ve  body,  he ensured its suppor t  of the 
P ro tec to ra te  Government  and the Agreement.  Moreover,  he realised th a t  Buganda — 
because of its populat ion,  mili tary s t rength  and social organisation — posed the  most 
serious threat  to the colonial Government .  In his pragmat ism  he came to terms with its 
rulers. Hence the political goal of the Agreement  was to enlist suppor t  and to find a 
secure base from which the rest of the P ro tec to ra te  was to be ruled.
Apar t  from the  political aims,  it was at the t ime deemed necessary to enter  into this 
Agreement  in order for the Government  to expand its legal powers in Buganda.  If one 
takes  into account  the legal issues and the level of thinking a t  the t ime of J o h n s to n ’s 
commission; and tlie s ta tements  made by Johnston  and his predecessors,  before and after 
t lx1 Agreement ,  all indicate tha t  that, must  have been the assumpt ion in Uganda.  The 
Buganda /Bri t i sh  relations were based on a t rea ty  of protec t ion whose validity or efficacy 
as a legally binding document  had never been questioned.  Indeed under the Africa Order 
in Council,  which was the current  municipal law of the Protec tora te ,  it prevailed over any 
other  law. It was therefore natural  for Johns ton  to enter  into a new Agreement  as the 
Brit ish Government  wanted to extend its legal powers beyond those already possessed. 
W he the r  or not the Foreign Office const rued the Agreement  in a similar manner ,  is more 
difficult to answer because of the changes in the  legal thinking which occured jus t  when it 
was being negot iated.  This issue is dealt  with in the following chapter .  It suffices to note
31 Gray to F.O., 21 July 1900, F0881/7G75.
here that the fact tha t  the Agreement was scrutinised by the senior officials of the 
Department, and actually sent to the draftsman while the Order was still under 
preparation, is significant.
In the next chapter 1 examine the 1902 Uganda Order in Council and how it related 
to the Buganda Agreement. In subsequent chapters the issue of conflict between the 
Order and the Agreement will be tackled.
C H A P T E R  7
A S S U M P T I O N  OF C O M P R E H E N S I V E  L E G A L  P O W E R :  
T H E  U G A N D A  O R D E R  IN  C O U N C I L
We have seen th a t  a t  the close of the last century, G ray urged the Foreign Office to 
have the Africa Order in Council repealed for Uganda and replaced by a more broadly 
based Order. The legal d ra f tsm an  was by then convinced th a t  by legislation the C row n’s 
au tho ri ty  could be extended to cover almost all aspects of governm ent in the 
P ro tec to ra te .  This idea had been confirmed by the Law Officers’ opinion following their 
approval of the East Africa O rder in Council, 1899, and. equally im portan t ,  their report 
on the land question. While these events  were taking place in London Johnston , unaw are 
of them , was busy negotiating  the B uganda Agreement. In fact he su b m itted  the 
Agreement to the Foreign Office shortly after formal instructions had been given to  Gray 
to proceed to draft a new O rder in Council for Uganda.
In this chapter 1 examine the main provisions of the  Uganda Order in Council in 
con tra s t  with the Africa Order in Council, and the basis the power thereunder  was 
assumed. 1 will also investigate  the im pact, if any, tin? Buganda Agreement had on the 
draft ing  of the new O rder in Council. The crucial question is w hether the Agreem ent was 
regarded as the source of the C row n’s legal powers in Buganda.
Originally the Foreign Office intended the new U ganda Order to follow as closely as 
possible the precedent of the East Africa Orders in Council of 1897 and 1899. T h e  object 
was for both p ro tec to ra tes  to have uniform laws as a t  the time it was contem pla ted  tha t
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they m ight be combined into one P ro tec to ra te .  In any event with the im provem ent in 
com m unication , mainly as a  result of the construction of the railw'ay which was steadily 
proceeding inland, there was bound to  be a great deal of m ovem ent of people and goods 
between the two pro tec torates.  Since their borders were ill-defined it was convenient 
adm in is tra tive ly  for the two British p ro tec tora tes  to have similar law s.1 2*
When Gray subm itted  his first d raft  in July 1900, he informed the Foreign Office 
th a t  although it followed the precedent of the East Africa Orders “ in so far as it applies 
the law of India in substitu tion  for th a t  of England5’ he proposed “not to confine the 
O rder to judicial m atte rs ,  bu t following the precedents of ... some of the South African 
O rders to give legal expression to  the fact th a t  the  general adm in is tra tion  of the 
P ro tec to ra te  is in the hands of Ilis M ajesty .” W ith this object in mind he added in the 
d ra f t ,  provisions giving the Commissioner extensive powers for the purposes of 
ad m in is tra t ion ,  raising of revenue and for gran ting  of land titles. These, it may be 
recalled, were the main topics in Jo h n s to n ’s negotiations with the Baganda.
G ra y ’s proposition was agreeable to the Foreign Office. Indeed Gray was given 
fur ther instructions to prepare new Orders for the East Africa P ro tec to ra te  and British 
C en tra l  Africa P ro tec to ra te ,  incorporating  similar provisions. Several consultations were 
held with a num ber of officers w ith  local expertise in the three pro tec tora tes .  These  
included: C ato r ,  judge of the E as t  Africa P ro tec to ra te ;  N unan, judge of the Brit ish
C entra l  Africa Protectora te ;  Sadler, Commissioner designate for Uganda; Hardinge and
9
Hayes.*’ After a num ber of drafts ,  a final Order was eventually produced which received 
the Royal assent on 11 August 1902. This Order laid out the ex ten t of the power and
^Minute Gray of 9 May 1899, on Hill to Gray, 15 April 1899, F02/259. See also G ray’s 
memorandum on Uganda, 2 September 1899, supra.
2Gray to F.O., 21 July 1900, F Ü 8 8 1/7075.
^Hill: A note to the Law Officers, -1 March 1902 F 0 2 /6 6 3 .
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au thority  of the Crown in Uganda P ro tec to ra te .
7.1 A d m in is t r a t iv e  a n d  L e g is la t iv e  P o w e r s
The new Order provided for the es tab lishm ent of a complete system of governm ent 
with executive, legislative, and judicial powers. A dm inistration  of the P ro tec to ra te  was 
entrusted  to a person holding the title  of Commissioner (or such other title as designated 
by the Crown) in the nam e and on behalf of the King of England. Subject to the 
instructions of the Secretary of S ta te  which m ight be given from time to time, and  to the 
laws applicable in Uganda, the Commissioner was to exercise such powers as were granted  
him by virtue of this order and his commission. These powers included: appointing
public officers and prescribing their duties  in the P ro tectora te ;  exercising the C row n’s 
rights in relation to land and minerals; and m aking legislation.0
Undoubtedly the provision empowering the Commissioner to legislate was the most 
im portan t.  Article 12 s t ipu la ted  th a t  he could make Ordinances “for the adm in is tra tion  
of justice, the raising of revenue, and generally for the peace, order, and good governm ent 
of all persons in U ganda.” A comparison between this provision and the corresponding 
Article 99 of the Africa Order in Council, reveals two significant differences. F irs t,  and 
foremost, in the new Order the au thority  given was to legislate for all persons in Uganda 
irrespective of consent of their sovereign. T he notion th a t  the Crown could not legislate 
for the natives of the p ro tec to ra te ,  and foreigners within the p ro tec tora te ,  was thereby 
disregarded. In practice, as we have seen, there were already a num ber of Q ueen’s 
Regulations which were m ade applicable to  foreigners and to  the local inhab itan ts .  We 
have subm itted  above th a t  these regulations were ultra vires  the legislative pow'ers given 
to the Commissioner under the Africa Order in Council. In con tras t  in many 
protec tora tes  administered by the Colonial Office similar powers had long been authorised
*For the text see Hertslet, CommereiaI Trent ies , 23: 227.
r>Articles 4, 10, and 11.
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under the relevant Orders in Council/*
Second, the wording of Article 12 of the new Order was different from that of 
Article 99 of the Africa Order in Council. Whereas the latter specified a long list of 
subjects over which legislation could be made (including the general object of attaining 
“peace, order, and good government6 *11) in the former it was not found necessary to do so. 
The draftsman was content to name only administration of justice, the raising of revenue, 
and generally for “peace, order, and good government” . Probably the difference between 
the two Articles is explicable on the grounds that by the time the Uganda Order was 
made the draftsmen were quite confident tha t  the latter phrase was wide enough to cover 
all matters for which legislation might be required which in fact was the intention. Lven 
then Gray probably considered it safer to mention specifically administration of justice 
and the raising of revenue, to put beyond any shadow of doubt tha t  the Commissioner
Q
had tha t  power.
7.2  L im ita t io n  o f  th e  C o m m is s io n e r ’s L eg is la t iv e  P o w e r s
The Order stipulated tha t  the Commissioner in exercising his legislative power had 
to observe any general and specific instructions given by the Secretary of State in respect 
to any matter. In any case the Secretary of State reserved the power of disallowance of 
any Ordinance made by the Commissioner. Secondly, he was enjoined to respect native
6 For example: Article 8 of the Barotziland-Northern- Western Rhodesia Order in Council, 1899; 
Article 8 of the Northern Nigeria Order in Council, 1899; Hertslet, Commercial fre a t ie s ,21:210 and 
250. Compare the East Africa Order 1899, supra, Articles 2 and 9. The Commissioner was 
empowered to legislate for the natives of the Protectorate but not for foreigners except with the 
consent of their sovereign.
"in the course of the discussions of the draft, Judge Cator expressed the hope that the words 
“peace, order, and good government” were extensive enough to cover all objects of legislation, 
minute of 18 January 1902, on the draft, January 1902, F02/663. In Gray’s earlier proposal he had 
suggested that, to make the point clear, all topics over which legislat ion might be made should be 
expressed in the Order, memorandum on the law in Uganda, supra. There were already judicial
precedents to the effect that the phrase authorised unlimited legislative powers, for example, Reg, 
v. Burah (1878) 3 A.C 889; and Riel y Reg (1885) 10 A.C. 675.
^According to Morris and Read, Indirect Rulc, at p.46n, as late as January, 1901, the foreign
Office was still in doubt whether the words “peace order and good government” included the power
to legislate for foreign marriages.
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law and custom  in so far as it was not opposed to morality or justice.^
The issue is whether the C om m issioner’s powers were limited by the provisions of 
the  Agreement? We have seen th a t  the B uganda  Agreement expressly provided th a t  any 
laws made for the Uganda P ro tec to ra te  were to apply equally to B uganda except to  the 
ex ten t  th a t  they were inconsistent with the Agreement. In th a t  event the provisions of 
the Agreement would const i tu te  a special exception to Buganda. T h a t  in fact had been 
the position under the Africa O rder in Council, Article 16. W hether or not this s i tua tion  
was to continue under the new O rder w'as not expressly s tated . However, the issue was 
touched upon during the discussions of the draft.  In the first d ra f t  G ray had included the 
following provision: :
In making Ordinances the Commissioner shall observe any Treaties  or 
conventions made with the King of [B,Uganda or any native Chiefs . . . . ^
As a result of Judge C a to r ’s criticism the provision was deleted from the general d ra f t .  “ I
th ink ,” Gray minuted, “Mr C a to r ’s criticisms are well founded ... I do not th ink  it
necessary to provide th a t  the Commissioner is to observe treaties  as th a t  goes w ith o u t
„  i Isaying.
Why was compliance w ith  trea ties  so obvious? Was it because the Com missioner 
w'as in any case legally bound to exercise legislative powers subject to trea ties? O r could 
it have been th a t  the Commissioner, as a m a t te r  of British policy, w'as expected to  respect 
the treaties? In the circum stances a rgum en ts  are available either way. A t the t im e of the 
enactm ent of the Africa O rder in Council, in 1889, the  assum ption was th a t  ju risd ic tion  
of the Crown, outside British dominions, was dependent on consent of the local sovereign. 
Hence the Commissioner could not legally exercise pow'ers which were beyond those
^Article 1 2(3).
^ D r a f t  enclosed in Gray to Hill, 11 January 1902, F02 /663 .
* * Gray to Hill, 8 February 1902, ibid.
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g ran ted  under the trea ty . On the o ther hand, by the d o se  of the cen tu ry ,  when the 
instructions were given to draft  a new Order for Uganda, the legal advisers had 
abandoned  this position. Observance of t rea ties  was by then largely regarded as a m a t te r  
of policy. Perhaps the la tter  is w ha t G ray  th o u g h t  was obvious and needed not be 
expressed.
A comparison with Orders in o ther African P ro tec to ra tes ,  prior to the Uganda 
O rder indicates a similar pa t te rn .  O thers,  like the N orthern Nigeria O rder in Council, 
1899, had a slightly different formula though the effect was more or less the same. It 
s t ipu la ted  (Article 12) th a t  subject to its provisions or any proc lam ations made 
thereunder  any power granted  by treaties , prior to the  Order, was to continue in full force 
as before the Order. In con tra s t  the Lagos P ro tec to ra te  Order in Council, 1901, had a 
saving clause of the trea ties  which was identical to th a t  C ray  wanted to incorporate  in 
the Uganda Order. Under Article 2 of this Order the Lagos Legislative Council was 
empowered by O rdinance to  exercise and  provide for giving effect to all such jurisdiction 
as the  Crown a t  any time before or after the passing of the Order had acquired, within 
the protected territories:
provided th a t  nothing in such O rdinance ... contained shall take away or 
affect any rights secured to any natives ... by any treaties  or agreem ents m ade 
on behalf or with the  sanction of 11 is Majesty and  all such treaties shall be and 
remain operative and in force . . . J ^
The Uganda Order in Council provided, Article 28(1), th a t  in absence of Ordinance 
“any practice or procedure” established by or under the Africa Order in Council should
12
For  example,  Baro tzi l and-Nor th -Wes te rn  Rhodesia Order ,  1899, supra,  Article 12. Stokes, 
“Baro tseland:  the Survival  of an African S t a t e ” (in Stokes and Brown ed., The  Zam bian  Bast 
(Manchester  Universi ty Press,  1966), at  p.272,  argues th a t  t his Order  took precedent  over  the  1890 
Agreement  with the Barotsc King.
I *)
°  Article 2, see I lertslet,  Corn mercial Treat  ies, 26:215. T h e  Order  was replaced by the Southern 
Nigeria Order  in Council ,  1906, which reta ined the saving clause,  I lertslet,  Commercial  T re a t i e s , 
21:1 15.
k
remain in force until superseded by other law. Morris and R ead ,14 suggest th a t  since 
under the Africa Order in Council the provisions of the trea ty  with the Crown prevailed 
over it and any other law, there was scope for the argum ent th a t ,  as a result of this 
saving clause, the Buganda Agreement continued to  override the 1902 Order and the 
Ordinances m ade thereunder. This m ight well be true. However, it is subm itted  here 
th a t ,  a t  least in theory, the clause gave much less protection to the trea ties  as com pared 
to  Article 1C of the Africa Order in Council. W hereas under the Africa O rder in Council 
the Commissioner could not legislate con tra ry  to  the treaties, in the new Order there was 
nothing which precluded him from enacting laws which were inconsistent with the 
“practice and procedure” established under the  previous Order. In o ther w'ords the 
practice only remained as long as it had not been overridden by legislative provisions.
The issue of conflict between the A greem ent and t he Uganda Order, and ordinances 
m ade thereunder,  subsequently came to the fore in the High Court  of Uganda. Ironically 
the absence of any express mention of the A greem ent in the Order was used to prove th a t  
it was never incorporated into the laws of the  P ro tec to ra te .  We revert to this m a t te r  
below.
7.3 J u d ic ia l  P o w e r s
In addition  to legislative powers, full jurisdiction  was assumed under the U ganda 
Order. While under the consular courts  system  jurisdiction was limited to British 
subjects and other persons specified in the Africa Order in Council, the new Order 
provided, Article 18, for the es tab lishm ent of “ His M ajes ty ’s High C ourt  of U g an d a” 
which was granted  full jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over all persons and m a t te rs  in 
Uganda. T hus  t he concept of jurisdiction by consent, over non-British subjects w ith in  the 
P ro tec to ra te  and natives of the Protectorate*, was legislated away.
14 Indirect Hyde, a t  p .51. Sec also below p. 220.
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The new Order also m ade provision for setting  up courts  subord inate  to the High 
C o u r t  and special courts. T he  final Article in this regard differed somewhat from the 
corresponding one in the draft.  Originally it had been prescribed th a t  courts subord inate  
to the  High C ourt  could be established to adm inister justice among “natives’1 or “to 
n a t iv es” . It had also been provided for the creation of any courts having special 
ju risd ic tion  and own appella te  rules. Apparently  one of G ra y ’s reasons for inclusion of 
this provision was an endeavour to accom m odate  th a t  p a r t  of the Buganda A greem ent 
re la ting  to the administ ration of justice over the Baganda. Again on C a to r ’s advice the 
specific reference to the natives was deleted as redundan t since the High C ourt  had been 
given jurisdiction w ithou t  any distinction between natives and o t h e r s . ^  However, what 
was taken for granted  was later a  m a t te r  of serious concern. For instance, d o u b t  w'as 
expressed whether the native courts  and the special courts  were subord inate  to the  High 
C o u rt .  W hat of the K a b ak a ’s courts? Were they such special courts as were referred to 
in t he Order? These questions are dealt with in the following chapters , but it would seem 
t h a t ,  a t  the time of drafting , Gray and th e  others who were involved in preparing  the 
O rder were convinced th a t  the C row n’s jurisdiction was complete over all persons within 
the  P ro tectora te .  Having resolved the broad jurisdictional issue they left the details of 
o rganisa tion  of the court system to be worked out subsequently.
7.4  L egal B a s is  o f  th e  U g a n d a  O rder
Looking a t  the provisions of the 1902 Uganda Order in Council, it is clear th a t  the 
Crown had a t  th a t  s tage assumed plenary powers in the P ro tec to ra te .  The Commissioner 
had been given unlimited legislative powers, and the High C ourt  had full jurisd ic tion  over 
all persons and m a tte rs  in Uganda. Although the Buganda Agreement (and the  Ankole 
and Toro  Agreements respectively) imposed certain restrictions on the C row n’s powers in 
B uganda ,  the Order did not expressly incorporate  them.
^ G r a y  to Hill, 8 February 1902, and Gator’s minute of 1 February 1902, on draft of 21 January 
1902, F 0 2 /6 6 3 .
On w hat legal grounds was the  power assum ed? The Order, like all the others, 
recites th a t  the Crown had “by T rea ty ,  g ran t,  usage, sufferance, and other lawful m eans” 
power and jurisdiction in Uganda P ro tec to ra te .  Then it goes on to declare th a t  it was 
m ade by virtue of the C row n’s power under the  Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890.* 1 ^ Allott 
suggests th a t ,  with reference to Buganda, the power which the Crown sought to  exercise 
under the Uganda Order was founded on the 1894 trea ty  and the 1900 A greem en t.17 It is 
subm itted  th a t ,  though this argum en t is conceivable, and in fact, as is discussed below, 
was adopted by the Uganda High C ourt ,  evidently it, was not the construction  of the 
Foreign Office a t  the time the O rder was made.
It has been seen th a t  instructions to draft, a new O rder in council for U ganda were 
issued before the Foreign Office heard of the Agreement. Although an a t tem p t  was made 
to  accom m odate  it in the Order it was not regarded by those involved in the draft ing  as 
the source of the C row n’s powers in Buganda. The t ru th  is th a t  the m aking and 
ra tification  of the  Buganda Agreement, coincided with the acceptance by the Foreign 
Office of the view, much earlier adopted  by the Colonial Office, that  under in terna tional 
law a P ro tec to ra te  over “uncivilised” regions entitled  enjoym ent of as ample power and 
jurisdiction  as was necessary for purposes of establishing an effective governm ent and to 
discharge international obligations . 1 The policy of the Foreign Office could not be 
be t te r  represented than  by the views of C ranbornc, then Foreign Secretary (vide minutes 
of 10 April, 1902), tha t:
the legal difficulties a ttend ing  the s ta tu s  of protect o ra tes are in the process of 
being explained away. It seems the gradual broadening of view in the Law 
Officers’ D epartm en t neither has produced nor is likely to produce any serious 
objection, and we shall soon reach tlie stage when an O rder in Council -
^ ’Preamble and Section 1.
17 A.N. Allott, “The Development of t he Fast Africa Legal System During the Colonial Period” , 
in D.A. Low and Alison Smith, ed., History of Last Africa, 3:348, 355.
I o
JOThis was the view of most of the leading publicists. For example: John Westlake,  The  
Collected Papers, pp .185-186; Jenkyns, Jurisdict ion beyond the Seas, pp.177 and 193-194; W.F.  
Hall,Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction of Urn British Crown, p.220.
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au tho rised ,  if necessary, by a short enabling Act - will make it possible to  sweep 
all cobwebs away without any resistance from foreign p o w e rs .^
Under the  British municipal law the assum ption of this powder was probably 
justified as acquired by “o ther  lawful m eans” referred to in the Foreign Ju risd ic tion  Act, 
since, as W estlake wrote, acquisition of am ple jurisdiction in these type of p ro tec to ra te
on
had become internationally  lawful. If th a t  were true, it followed th a t  it was not legally 
necessary for the Crown to  en ter  into the B uganda Agreement in order to ex tend  its 
power and au tho ri ty  in Buganda.
Nevertheless, a rider may be added to  this conclusion. Up to th a t  t im e there  was 
scarcely any judicial au thority  to confirm or lend support  to these developm ents in legal 
th inking. And in absence of s trong  judicial precedents it could not confidently be s ta ted  
th a t  the m a t te r  had been p u t  to rest. Indeed C ran b o rn e ’s m inute cited above indicates 
th a t  there was still some d o u b t  as to the ex ten t  the Crown could go in assum ing power, 
by O rder in Council, in its p ro tec tora tes .  In Southern Nigeria, for instance, as late as 
1901 it was considered necessary, a t least as a precautionary  measure, to en ter  into 
“judicial ag reem en ts” with the local rulers to  confer jurisdiction  to the P ro tec to ra te  
G overnm ent in those terr itories  where “usage and sufferance” could not be relied upon to
O l
assert it. It is also im portan t  to  rem em ber th a t  the views of the publicists and the  legal 
advisers referred to p ro tec to ra tes  over “uncivilised” regions. W ha t was the tes t  for 
civilisation? It is of course easier to use nebulous term s, such as this one, in general
^ M in u te  on Oakes, and Hill memorandum, 4 March 1902 and 7 April 1902, respecting the 
advantage or otherwise of annexation of the Foreign Office controlled protectorates, F 0881/7716 .
The Collected Papers, at page 186. Roberts-Wray, Colonial Law, at page 187; suggests that 
jurisdiction might have had its origin in an Act of State which he says is one of the “lawful m eans” 
recited in the Act.
^ S ecretary  of State to Governor, 14 October 191”, 0 0 8 7 9 /1 1 ”. O. Adewove, “The Judicial 
Agreements in Yorubaland,” Journal of Africa History, 12, 4 (1971): 607-627, claims that there is 
no doubt that the judicial agreements were regarded by the administration as the basis o f  British 
jurisdiction. Also T.N. Tamuno, The Involution of the Nigeria State: The Southern Phase  
1888- 1914 (Lagos, Longmans 1972), generally pp.64-80.
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theorisation  than to apply them . For example , was B uganda which was reputed to have 
a  social organisation which was unique in the region, supposed to be civilised or 
uncivilised? As we have seen in previous chapters ,  there was always doub t  whether 
B uganda ought to be trea ted  in a similar m anner  as the ot hers.
Finally, w hether or not a t  the  t im e of drafting  the U ganda Order it was considered 
legally necessarily to enter into the A greem ent,  what legal significance was a t tach ed  to it? 
It is noteworthy th a t  in the discussion a t  the  Foreign Office, in 1902, w hether the three 
p ro tec to ra tes  under the D e p a r tm e n t’s control (Uganda, East  Africa, and British Central 
Africa) should be annexed, Hill expressed a view th a t  the newly ratified trea ty  which 
recognised the K abaka  as the ruler of B uganda was one of the  “inconveniences” which 
m ight be m et in a decision to annex U ganda P ro tec to ra te .
In the following three chapters  1 investigate  the in terp re ta t ion  of the legal position 
with reference to  those areas where the provisions of the Agreement conflicted with those 
of the Uganda O rder in Council. The critical issue is w hether after 1902 the C row n’s 
power in B uganda was, as a m a t te r  of law, regarded as plenary or subject to the
Agreement.
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C H A P T E R  8
J U D I C I A L  A N D  L E G I S L A T I V E  P O W E R S :  C O N F L I C T  
B E T W E E N  T H E  O R D E R  A N D  T H E  A G R E E M E N T S
We saw in the previous chapter that ,  by virtue of the Uganda Order in Council, 
1902, the High Court was granted full jurisdiction over all persons and matters  in 
Uganda. Moreover, the Commissioner was invested with virtually unlimited legislative 
powers. On the surface there was nothing which could not legally be done in the 
Protectorate  if necessary by the Commissioner issuing appropriate legislation. In 
contrast,  the Buganda, Ankole, and Toro agreements allowed less than full judicial and 
legislative powers to the Crown in the respective territories. In this and the following 
chapters 1 investigate how this conflict was resolved.
8.1 J u r i s d i c t i o n
From the beginning it would seem that the Protectorate officials, possibly under the 
influence of the newly appointed High Court  judges, Ennis and C a r t e r /  interpreted the 
High Cour t ’s jurisdiction as subject to the agreements. Evidence of this is found in the 
fact that  barely two years after the Uganda Order in Council was promulgated, Sadler, 
then Commissioner, proposed the amendment  of the Buganda Agreement in order to arm 
himself with power to extend jurisdiction of the British courts over the Baganda. As we
* Ennis previously was an assistant judge at Zanzibar. He went to Uganda as Chief Judicial 
Officer, and Vice-Consul in 1902, before he became a judge of the High Court of Uganda, and later 
of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa. Carter was formerly Registrar in the East Africa 
Protectorate, and Magistrate at Zanzibar. He went to Uganda in 1903 as High Court judge and a 
member of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa. Subsequently he became Chief Justice of  
Uganda (1912-1920). Both judges, especially Carter, played a. very influential role in shaping 
Uganda’s land policy during the first two decades of the century. See Morris and Head, Indirect 
R i) le, at p. 334.
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have seen, under the  Agreement the British cour ts  had exclusive jurisdict ion in all cases 
where tlie Baganda were involved with o ther  persons (mixed case) but  no jurisdict ion in 
purely Baganda cases which were reserved to their c o u r t s /  Sadler wan ted the 
Commissioner to be empowered to t ransfer  some of the la t ter  cases for trial in the  British 
cour ts  wherever ci rcumstances  rendered it desirable.  In a despatch to the  Foreign 
Secretary justifying the need for the a m en d m e n t ,  he claimed that  the provisions in Article 
6 of the  Buganda Agreement  (“the K a b ak a  of [B]Uganda shall exercise d i rec t  rule over 
the nat ives of [BjUganda” ) were held to be “a  bar for jurisdict ion by our C o u r t s  in nat ive 
cases even when the K abaka  would be willing th a t  they should be tried by us.” At  the 
t ime he in par ticular had in mind divorce cases among the Baganda which he t h ough t  “for 
obvious  [but unspecified) reasons should not  be left for trial by the nat ive cour ts .
In addi t ion  Sadler wan ted  to amend  the  Agreement  in order to clarify the  position 
relat ing to appeals from the  Buganda cour ts  to the British courts.  Under Article 6 of the 
Agreement  there was a right  of appeal “ to t he principal Cour t  established by Her Majesty 
in U g an d a” in all cases where a sentence of more than five years impr ison ment  was 
imposed or a fine of over a hundred pounds . The use of the  words “fine*' and “sentence” 
which pertain to criminal law led to some doub t  within the adm in is t ra t ion  whether  the 
right  to appeal in civil cases was intended to be included or was restr ic ted to criminal 
cases alone; yet in Article 1 1 reference was made  to both civil and criminal  cases.  Sadler 
argued tha t ,  since in the  recently prom ulgated Appeals O rd inance ,1 appeals  from Native 
cour ts  to the  British cour ts  were ant i c ipated  in both criminal and civil cases,  it was 
pr uden t  for the m at ter  to be made clear in the Buganda Agreement  by expressly 
providing t h a t  appeals could lay to Brit ish cour ts  in both civil and criminal  cases.
 ^Articles 6 and 8.
°Sadler to F.O., 6 .July 1904, F 0 2 /8 5 8 .  The Divorce Ordinance N o.5 of 1904, Uganda  
Protectorate Ordinances, 1904-1905, was translated into buganda presumably because it was to be 
administered by the Kabaka’s courts since at the time the High Court had no jurisdiction over 
cases involving only the Buganda.
^No. 10 of 1904, Ordinances of Uganda Protectorate, 1904-1905.
Sadler presented his proposals together with a draft Agreement which reportedly 
the chiefs were ready and willing to sign subject to the Secretary of S ta te ’s approval.5 
T he  preamble to  this d raft recited in part:
Whereas by the Principal Agreem ent certain provisions were m ade for the 
es tab lishm ent of native Courts  and the  adm in is tra tion  of justice in ... [BjUganda 
and whereas it is expedient to supplem ent,  vary or modify such provisions, the 
Acting Commissioner and Regents do hereby agree....
T he  draft  then went on to  set out the proposed term s of Agreement. Under Article 3 the
Commissioner was to be empowered, with the consent of the Kabaka:
by order under his hand, in any case or class of cases in which it may be 
deemed ju s t  and expedient [to] transfer any case or class of cases for trial or 
decision from any C ourt  established by virtue of this or the [1900] A greem ent to 
any C ourt  established by or under the U ganda O rder in Council, 1902.
Similarly under Article 4 of the draft,  a right to appeal to the British courts  in certain
criminal and civil cases was expressly gran ted .
For quite some time the Foreign Office deferred the decision over this m atter .  No 
reasons for the delay are recorded in e ither the correspondence or the minutes. It might, 
well be th a t  it w an ted  to weigh the financial cost of the proposal. In the end approval 
was signaled w ithou t any am endm en t and ,  it is noted, w ithout any com m ent on the 
C om m issioner’s reasons for the am en d m e n t.6 No sooner was the am endm ent (entitled the 
[B]Uganda (Judicial) Agreem ent, 1905)' signed by the  chiefs, than  an order was signed by 
the Commissioner and the B uganda regents issued under au thority  of this Agreement 
d irecting th a t  with im m edia te  effect the High C ourt  of U ganda was to hear and  decide all 
causes between natives of B uganda  “of a like na tu re  to the causes th a t  would come before 
the said C ourt in the exercise of its jurisdiction under the Divorce O rdinance 19(M and
o
according to the  practice and procedure laid down by or under th a t  O rdinance.’
’’The draft also contained taxation proposals, see chapter 9.
6 F.O. to Commissioner, 24 March 1905, F 0 2 /8 6 5 .
'h aw s of Uganda, 1951, 6: 28.
^Order of 23 January 1905, enclosure Ag. Commissioner to F.O., 16 February 1905, FÖ2/926.
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There is no doubt  t h a t  par t  of the  reason for amending the Agreement  formally was 
political.  However,  on the basis of the  correspondence between Uganda  and London, it is 
evident th a t  the  local officials believed th a t  the  exercise of the power and jurisdict ion of 
the  High Cour t  under  the Uganda  Order  in Council,  was subject to the Agreement .  They 
were convinced th a t  the procedure which was followed to amend the Agreement  was 
legally a condition precedent.  Th e fact t h a t  the  Foreign Office did not  challenge or 
commen t  upon Sadler’s reasons jus tifying the am endm en t  probably confirmed to the 
Uganda  officials t h a t  this was indeed the legal position.
8 .2  G a lt  M u r d e r  C a se
Further  evidence of s imilar in terpre ta t ion is found in the so-called Galt murder  
case.'^ Galt ,  an adminis t ra t ive  Official in charge of t he dist rict  of Ankole, was murdered,  
allegedly by a  Munyankole (man of Ankole t ribe).  His alleged murderer  was himself 
murdered suspectedly by other  Banyankole presumably  to suppress evidence of a 
conspiracy surrounding the case. Tw o  men were ar rested  and charged wi th the second 
murder .
Article 6 of the  Ankole Agreement  provided t h a t  jus tice between nat ives of Ankole 
was to be administered directly by the  recognised chiefs of Ankole. Appeals could then go 
to the  European officer in charge of the dist rict .  But  there was no ment ion of further 
appeal  to the British courts nor did the  Agreement  s t a te  anywhere th a t  the Brit ish cour ts  
had jurisdiction over the  people of Ankole except in cases in where other persons or their 
proper ty  were involved. In the  lat ter  s i tua tion the British cour ts  had exclusive 
jurisdict ion.  Since the accused men were charged with murder ing one of their own 
t r ibesman,  the Uganda author i t ies  classified the  case as one between natives of Ankole, 
and therefore only jus ticiable to  the Ankole chiefs’ t ribunals.
‘V o r  a detail account of Gal t ’s murder, see Henry Morris, “The Murder of St. G.Galt ,” Uganda  
Journal 24 ( i960): 1-15.
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Because of the political implications of this case the Commissioner decided that it 
was so grave it had to be tried in the High Court of Uganda. To give the High Court 
jurisdiction over the case, the Commissioner issued a Proclamation suspending the Ankole 
Agreement as, he said, he had been “advised that the suspension of the Agreement is 
necessary in order to enable [him] to assume jurisdiction to try the murderers of the 
murderer in [British] Courts....” 10 He purportedly justified the suspension of the 
Agreement on the grounds of proof of “sufficient cause” having been shown.
By this time Uganda affairs had been transferred to the Colonial Office 
departm ent.11 Apparently this was the first time this Department had had to deal with 
the Uganda agreements. The immediate impression, even of its lay officers, was tha t  the 
suspension of the Agreement was legally uncalled for. Ellis, then Clerk, minuted:
... I cannot see anything in the Agreement which would oust (in such a case at 
least) the jurisdiction of the H[igh] C[ourt] of Uganda which under S[ection] 15 
of the Ujganda] Order in Council has full jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over all 
persons and over all matters in Uganda.
In his opinion the annulment of the Agreement was just a political decision which was
12probably necessary, as the Commissioner said, to mark the gravity of the offence.
Risley, Legal Assistant, endorsed the argument tha t  the suspension of the 
Agreement was not required. Moreover, he even doubted whether the circumstances 
constituted an infringement within the meaning of Article 3 thereof which entitled the 
Crown to annul the Agreement. Whether it was justified or not within the terms of the 
Agreement, it was, in his opinion, of no legal consequence since it could be defended as
^C om m issioner to F.O., C 0 8 7 9 /8 8 .
* *  The transfer was effective from the end of April, 1005, Thom as and Scott, Uganda, at p. 211.
^ M in u te  of 3 October 1905, C 0 8 7 9 /8 8 .  Read, Principal Clerk, concurred but passed the papers 
on to the lawyers, “as we do not want to have another Max Wehner incident” , minute of 4 October 
1905. For a note on this incident see Morris and Read, Indirect Rule, at p.52n.
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“simply an act of force justified by the political expediencyf’ * 1 **
Following these m inutes the  Commissioner was told th a t  his action in suspending 
the A greem ent was approved a lthough it was not legally necessary as the High C ourt  
a lready had full jurisdiction over all persons and m a t te rs  in Uganda. Moreover, he was 
advised th a t  the suspension was not strictly justified under the term s of the A greem ent 
bu t was nonetheless an act of force justified by the gravity  of the case.1'1
At th a t  s tage one would have assumed an end to this m a t te r ,  but it was not to be 
the case. M ost likely the U ganda C overnm en t was taken aback by the Colonial Office’s 
reaction to  w hat they had all along believed to be the legal position. The Commissioner 
responded:
... it has always been held here th a t  under Article 6 of the Ankole Agreement 
... cases between natives of Ankole were only triable  by the Ankole Native 
C ourts ,  and as the reported  m urderer of the late Mr G alt  was a native of 
Ankole, as are the persons tried in the second cases for m urdering this native, it 
was th o u g h t  th a t  some special steps were necessary to take  this case (not th a t  of 
the  ... [conspirators to  m urder Galt] who would natura lly  be tried by our 
C ourts )  out of the jurisdiction  of the Ankole C o u r ts .1"*
This was probably intended partly  as a polite challenge to  the Colonial Office’s
in te rp re ta t io n  and partly  as a solicitation to reconsider the m atte r .  The issue was then
even more academic since the C ourt  of Appeal for Eastern  Africa had dismissed the case
against  the accused men for w an t  of evidence connecting them  with the m urder. T he
Colonial Office did not bother to respond and the m a t te r  was dropped.
Up to  this t ime none of t hese conflict ing assum ptions had been tested in the Uganda
I o
°Minut.e of 13 October 1905. Risley in any case queried the classification of the murder of a 
native by his tribesman as a “native-to-native” case, although “it is possible the natives of Ankole 
might look upon it in the light. 1 presume that murder and other crimes are prosecuted in the 
name of the Crown in Uganda as in other protectorates.”
^ C .O .  to Commissioner, 10 November 1905, C 0 8 7 9 /8 8 .
1 '’Commissioner to C.O., 5 December 1905, ( ’0 8 7 9 /8 8 .
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cour ts ,  though behind the scene the  judges  were probably playing an influential advisory 
r o l e J ^  Short ly thereafter ,  however,  the High Cour t  found itself face to face with  this 
issue of conflict between the  Order  in Council and the Ankole Agreement .  This occured
. . 1 7 .in the case of Katosi  v Kahiz iJ1 which again involved two Banyankole.
8.3 K a to s i  v  Kahizi
The case originated from the  Cour t  of the  Mugabe of Ankole agains t  whose decision 
Katosi  wa nted  to appeal to the High Cour t .  A preliminary issue was raised by the  two 
presiding judges ,  Ennis and Car ter ,  as to whether  the High Cour t  had jurisdict ion to 
en ter ta in  the appeal.  As al ready seen, under the Ankole Agreement  cour ts  established by 
the P ro tec to ra te  Gove rnment  had no jurisdict ion in cases where only the nat ives  of 
Ankole were involved nor was a right of appeal  granted to these cour ts . JO Al though the 
jurisdict ion of the High Cour t  under the Order  in Council (Article 15) was s t a ted  to be 
complete over all mat ter s  and persons in Uganda,  the learned judges  were not satisfied 
th a t  the  provisions of the Order  could override the Agreement.  Indeed they expressed a 
very s t rong view th a t  the High C o u r t ’s jurisdict ion had to be read subject to the C r o w n ’s 
jur isdict ion under the Ankole Agreement .  Being aware that  their in terpre tat ion was in 
conflict wi th  t h a t  expressed by the  Colonial Secretary in the despatch referred to above 
they though t  it w'as advisable for the m a t te r  to be clarified before they could proceed with 
the appeal .
At  the  judg es ’ request  a formal reference was made by the Governor  to the
^ T h e  two judges had written several formal memoranda expressing their opinions on diverse 
legal issues and policy matters. See for example: memorandum by Ennis and Carter on Succession 
law in Uganda (especially on land), enclosure Ag. Commissioner to F.O., 10 February 1905, 
F 0 2 /9 8 4 ;  memorandum by Ennis on meaning of “exterior” and “interior” taxation under the 
Buganda Agreement, 6 October 1903, (see next chapter); reports on land tenure in Uganda, 
especially by Carter (below chapter ten). In addition, there was bound to have been many informal 
discussions in which the judges were involved; it has to be remembered that the official com m unity  
was very small.
17 ( 1907), 1 U.L.R. 22.
Article 6. A right of appeal was granted in certain cases, but only to the principal European 
officer in charge of the district.
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Secretary of State to determine whether the High Court had jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal. 1^  This reference was purportedly made under section 4 of the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act, 1890 which provided that:
If in any proceeding, civil or criminal, in a court ... under the authority of Her 
Majesty any question arises as to the existence or extent of any jurisdiction of 
Her Majesty in a foreign Country, a Secretary of State shall, on the application 
of the court, send to the court within a reasonable time his decision on the 
question, and his decision shall for the purposes of the proceedings be final.
Strictly this reference was misconceived. In the first place, the above section only 
applied wdiere a question arose as to whether the Crown had jurisdiction at all in a 
territory and as to the territorial limits of tha t  jurisdiction. It did not entit le the court to 
ask the Secretary of State to tell it wdiether it had jurisdiction under an Order in Council 
in m atters  before it. That w'as for the court to determine by interpretation of the Order 
or any other relevant l a w .^  Secondly, ironically, the Ankole Agreement was at the 
material time still under suspension,^ hence it ought not to have been an obstacle to the 
High C ourt’s assumption of jurisdiction in this case. Had the judges and the Uganda 
officials forgotten what took place only a couple of years previously? If they had, they 
were not alone in this m atter  because nowhere in the minutes of the Colonial Office w'as 
this point mentioned.
Be that as it may, Risley, to whom the m atter w'as handed, had no doubt in his 
mind tha t  the learned judges’ interpretation and fears were unfounded. He reiterated the 
view that  the High C ourt’s jurisdiction under the Order was full over all matters and 
persons in Uganda and was not limited in any way by the agreements with the local
^G overnor  to C.O., 8 April 1907, C O 530/13.
^ S e e  Minute Roberts-Wray, 23 September 1937, on Governor to C.O., 12 July 1937, 
C O 36/40199, also below at p.252-253. See also the argument, by counsel, Diplock, in t he case of  
Mukwaba. y Mukubira (1953) High Court Transcript of the Proceedings, below at p. 177
^ T h e  Agreement was not restored until 12 September 1912, Proclamation, Laws of Uganda, 
1923, 3:520.
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rulers. In his opinion where the  Crown had entered into these types of agreements which,  
for example,  allowed chiefs to adminis ter  just ice in nat ive and nat ive cases, it meant  th a t  
the jurisdict ion was concurrent  and not exclusive of the High Court .  Naturally,  he 
though t ,  in pract ice the High C our t  ought to use its jurisdict ion sparingly except in grave 
cases.
On the  o ther  hand,  Cox, the  Legal Adviser Under-Secretary,  was sceptical of his 
as s i s t an t ’s ar gumen t .  He premised t h a t  the Crown acquired its jurisdict ion in Ankole by 
cession from the chiefs, and,  in ceding this jurisdict ion they reserved their rights to try 
nat ive cases: “If t h a t  be so,” he minuted,  ” 1 doubt  whether the Order  in Council is valid 
so far as it takes  away this r ight ... [and] I think tha t  it ought  to be const rued so as not  to 
impair  i t” . Cox emphasised t h a t  he was not denying the fact t h a t  the Crown could by 
force compel the  Ankole chiefs to forgo the reserved jurisdict ion to IIis Majesty:
... but  I think t h a t  some cession of this right by the chiefs or some further 
Order in Cjouncilj wjouljd probably be necessary in order to pu t  the jurisdiction 
of the  Supreme C[our]t [in] Ankole beyond qjuestiojn. The consti tutional 
position seems to me to be t h a t  II.M. cannot  be supposed to override by Order 
in C[ouncil] for a  jurisdict ion which has not been acquired by t rea ty  grant  usage 
or sufferance ... [and] t h a t  we cannot  point  to any one of these things in Ankole 
as regards the  trial of purely native  cases.
Cox’s suggestion th a t  there should be cession of jurisdict ion by the Ankole chiefs, 
was probably based upon Henry Jenkyns ’ British Bule and Jurisdict ion Beyond the Seas . 
Al though Jenkyns  st rongly argued th at ,  according to international  law, the protect ing 
Power  had a right to assume the  entire internal government  of the protected terr itory,  he 
said th a t  until th a t  was done by following the appropr ia te  methods ,  the jurisdiction 
belonged properly to the local sovereign. Jenkyns  was convinced that  this rule of 
international  law was par t  of English municipal law and had to be observed by the courts:  
In considering the Orders  in Council issued under the  Acts  ji.e. The Foreign
^ M in u te s  of 18 and 19 May 1907, on (lovernor to C.O., 8 April 1907, C 0 5 3 6 /1 3 .
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Jurisdiction Acts it must be recollected tha t  in any legal proceedings, civil or 
criminal, the validity of any Order can be challenged on the ground that it is 
ultra vires, as, for instance, tha t  it dealt with jurisdiction which the Crown did 
not possess or purported to confer powers in excess of the jurisdiction ....
Jenkyns claimed that ,  though under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act a court might refer to
the Secretary of State a question respecting jurisdiction (in the international law sense)
acquired by the Crown in a foreign territory, “it would be for the court to draw the
inference from the facts stated by the Secretary of State, and tha t  inference might be
o
adverse to the Order in Council/ '
As we shall presently see, Jenkyns was castigated by subsequent writers and the 
judiciary for misrepresenting the English legal position.
With reference to the rest of Cox’s argument, a number of queries may be raised. If 
the Crown could acquire the reserved jurisdiction from the Ankole chiefs by “act of force' 
(or Act of State) why did Cox not consider Article 15 of the Uganda Order in Council 
which conferred full jurisdiction upon the High Court (moreover subsequent to the Ankole 
Agreement) as constituting such an act of force? Why did he think it was necessary for 
either a cession (which of course would have been consistent with the Agreement) or a 
new Order in Council to put the m atter of the High Court jurisdiction beyond question? 
How would the Order in Council which he had in mind have succeeded where the Uganda 
Order in Council failed? With due respect one cannot easily glean answers to these 
questions from C ox’s minutes. Presumably his hypothesis was based on the assumption 
tha t ,  since the Crown had entered into a treaty with the King of Ankole whereby it 
acquired some jurisdiction in Ankole, the Order in Council of 1902 which was subsequent 
to this Agreement was intended to provide for the exercise of that jurisdiction alone. 
Consequently it had to be construed accordingly. This probably accounts for his rather
23 At p.153. Also W.E.l lal l ,  Foreign Jurisdiction of Hk> Hritisli ( Town, at pp. 220-225.
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obscure suggestion for a fresh O rder in Council to clarify the posit ion .24
W hatever the explanation A ntrobus, the Assistant Under Secretary, was satisfied 
by the a rgum en t of the Legal Adviser. lie did not, however, think th a t  it was necessary 
to s ta te  in the response to the Commissioner anyth ing  abou t  taking steps to get the  
jurisdiction of the High C o u rt  extended since the Commissioner had expressed a desire to
o r
leave the adm in is tra t ion  of justice in native-to-native cases with the Ankole c h ie f s /  A 
draft  on those lines was subsequently prepared. Interestingly, Cox noted in the margin of 
the d raft  th a t  “ ... if the British Gov[ernmen]t by force superseded the Ankole Agreement 
it m ight be argued — if the C o u rt  had actually  tried cases between native and native — 
th a t  by sufferance of the  chiefs the necessary jurisdiction had been acquired .” 
P resum ably  this was in tended to  emphasise the point th a t ,  even w ithou t taking the steps 
he m entioned, there was still room for fu ture a rgum ent th a t  the jurisdiction had been 
acquired by sufferance provided there were precedents of its exercise. Cox nevertheless 
agreed with the view expressed in the draft as the safest, and was reportedly assured by 
the Law Officers in a  private  conversation that it was the one they would have ad o p ted .26
In the final despatch sent to U ganda the Secretary of S ta te  confirmed the judges ' 
view th a t  in ceding jurisd iction  the chiefs reserved jurisdiction in native to native cases 
wthe validity of the Uganda O rder in Council in so far as it nullifies this reservation, is 
consequently open to question no tw iths tand ing  t he view ... [earlier] expressed .” 2
W ithou t  more ado, K otosi’s appeal was dismissed by the High C ourt  for w an t  of 
jurisdiction . T he precedent was reinforced the following year in the case of Nasanairi
24But see our conclusion in the previous chapter. 
2<>Nlinute 22 July, 1909.
26Cox to Hopwood, Minute of 26 July, 1907. 
27C.O. to Commissioner, .‘51 July 1907, 0 0 5 3 6 /1 3 .
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Kibnka v Bertie Smitli to lx* discussed below, which went  up to the Court, of Appeal for 
Eas tern Africa.
8 .4  N a t i v e  C o u r ts  o f  B u g a n d a
Meanwhi le Bell, then Governor,  on 29 Jan ua ry  1909, issued a Proclamat ion enti t led 
“ Native Courts  in Buganda P ro clamat ion""^  which, according to its preamble,  had three 
objectives: firstly, to organise,  recognise and define the  jurisdict ion and powers  of the
B ug anda courts; secondly, to define the  supervisory powers of the Government  over these 
courts;  and finally to provide th a t  certain offences commit ted  by the Baganda  be tried in 
Brit ish courts.
Three  levels of Buganda cour ts were recognised in the Proclamat ion.  A t  the top 
was the Cour t  of the Lukiiko whose jurisdict ion (both original and appellate)  over the 
Baganda  was declared to be full except as was provided in the Proclamat ion.  Appeals lay 
in some cases from this Cour t  to the  High C o u r t  in accordance with the terms of the  1900 
Agreement  and the judicial  Agreement  of 1905. Below the  Lukiiko Court  were the  cour ts  
of the county chiefs and sub-county chiefs respectively. These cour ts were subordina te  to 
the  Lukiiko and had limited jurisdict ion.  Appeals from the lat ter  cour ts  lay to the 
Lukiiko Court .
The second objective of the Proclama t ion was satisfied by set ting out  in detai l  the 
powers of the District  Commiss ioner over the  Buganda cour ts.  These included: power to 
call records of proceedings; power to stay proceedings which appeared to be illegal or in 
excess of jurisdiction of a par ticular  court;  power to annul  judgm en ts  which appeared to 
be illegal and to refer them to the next highes t  court and so on. But  in exercising his
"^(1908-09), 1 U.L.R. 11. Also A dm mi K ikonyogo y The Kivuvn (Ugand a.) R uhhor Company  
Ltd., (1915), 2 U.L.R. .‘>0; (Town y Kinnba, (1908-09),  1 U.L.R. 79; Stanislas Mugwanya y Lui 
Sensuwa, (1915), 2 U.L.R. 207.
^  1909, Uganda Gazette,  2: 23.
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powers the dist rict  Commiss ioner was enjoined not to “unduly interfere” with the  
proceedings of these courts.
The final objective was in effect to extend the  jurisdict ion of the British cour ts  over 
the Baganda in certain cases. Except  where a right of appeal was granted,*"^ Brit ish 
cour ts,  as we have seen, had no jurisdict ion over cases where only the Baganda were 
involved. In clause 2(a) of the Proclamat ion it was provided th a t  certain offences 
commit ted  by the Baganda were to be tried in Brit ish courts.  These included: offences 
commit ted  in the Township  of Entebbe and certain par ts  of Kampala ;  offences (and civil 
cases) in which Baganda employed by the Governmen t  were involved; violations of any 
special laws such as the laws relat ing to arms,  forests,  game and so forth; lastly, any o ther  
cases where the  presiding chief so requested.  All the cases falling in this category were 
removed from the  jurisdiction of the  Baganda cour ts  and t ransferred to tha t  of the Brit ish 
cour ts  established under the Native Cour ts  Ordinance,  1905.
8 .5  L eg a l  B a s i s  o f  t h e  P r o c l a m a t i o n
On what  legal author i ty  was the above Proclamat ion made? This quest ion is 
im po r t an t  because in 1905 judges  Ennis and C ar ter  expressed a view that ,  as the High 
Cour t  of Uganda had under the 1902 Order jur isdict ion over all persons and mat ters ,  no 
cour t  could be established under the  same Order  th a t  was not subordinate  to the High 
C o u r t . T h e  judges  were react ing to the Commiss ioner’s a t t e m p t  to establish Native 
courts in Bunyoro that  were outside the control of the High Cour t .  In doing so the  
Commiss ioner purpor ted  to rely on Article 18(1) of the Uganda Order  in Council which 
authorised es tabl ishment  by ordinance or under an ordinance of “Cour ts  subordinate  to 
the High Cour t  and Courts  of special jur isdict ion.” The Commissioner  thought  “Cour t s  
of special jurisdict ion" included Native courts which were not subordinate  to the  High
' '^Art icle 6 of the 1900 Agreement ,  and  1 of (he 1905 .Judicial Agreement .
^ E n n i s ’s m e m or an du m ,  3 J a nu ar y  1905, supra.
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C o u rt .  This in te rp re ta t ion ,  it would seem, had been endorsed by the Foreign Office 
before the U ganda affairs were transferred  to the Colonial Office.”  ^ B ut the judges 
in terp re ted  the phrase “C ourts  of special ju risd ic tion” to refer to courts  which exercised 
jurisd ic tion  th a t  could neither be classified as criminal nor civil; for example, bankruptcy , 
divorce, p robate , adm ira lty  and so on. They asserted th a t  it did not include Native 
cour ts  exercising ordinary criminal and civil jurisdiction. On the advice of Risley, the 
Colonial Office agreed with the ju d g es ’ in te rp re ta t io n .00
Reverting to the 1909 P roclam ation ,  we find in the preamble a s ta tem en t  to the 
effect th a t  the K abaka, chiefs and the people of B uganda had agreed to its making, and 
the  G overnor “by virtue of the Agreem ent and of exercise of powers conferred” had 
prom ulgated  it. Significantly the Proclam ation  did not purport  to be m ade under any 
par ticu la r  Ordinance. M ost likely the omission was deliberate since the view was th a t
•> i
there was no ordinance which au thorised  its enactment,.”4
Recitals in subsequent proc lam ations relating to these courts, however, mentioned 
w ithou t  specifying, in addition  to the consent of the  K abaka (and the 1900 and 1905
2 2
' Act ing Commiss ioner  to F.O. ,  10 Februa ry  1905, and  minute  Risley of 17 May 1905, 
F 0 2 / 9 8 4 .  See also minu te  Hirst  of 15 October  1904, on C.O.  to F.O.,  1 Sep tember  1904, F 0 2 / 8 6 5 .
° ° M in u t e  of 17 May 1905, ibid.,  and C.O.  to Commissioner ,  20 May 1905, F 0 2 / 9 8 4 .  In the 
sam e  year  the [BjUnyoro Nat ive  Cou r t s  Ordinance,  No.5 of 1905, and (he Nat ive Cour t s  
Ordinance,  No. 10 of 1905, were enacted (see Ordinances  of the Uganda Protecto ra te ,  1904-05). 
T h e  cour ts  es tabl ished under  these Ord inances  were subordina te  to the High Cour t .
In Alipo Kabazi  y Jemusi  K i b u k a . supra,  at  p . l l ,  j udges  Ennis and Ca r t e r  held tha t  “T h e  
Nat ive  Cou r t s  in B uga nd a  were formally organised and their  powers and jur isdic t ion defined by 
Agreement  evidenced (emphasis  added)  by the P roc lamat ion of 29th Ja n u a r y  1909 ....” E.S. 
Haydon ,  Law' and Just ice in B ug a nd a  (London,  Bu t t erwor ths ,  1960) at  p.32,  says th a t  the 
P roc lam at io n  was made  under  the Nat ive  Court s  Ordinance,  1905, ibid. T h e  Proc lamat ion  does 
not  recite th a t  it was made the reunder .  Besides it is doubt fu l  whether  t h a t  ord inance author i sed 
the  issuance of p roclamat ions  to cons t i tu t e  or establ ish Nat ive  courts.  In a supplementary  Nat ive  
Co ur t s  Ordinance,  N o . 15 of 1909 (l ganda  Gazet t e,  1909, 2:300) which was enacted after the 
P ro c lamat ion ,  the  power to establ ish and cons t i tu t e  Nat ive cour ts  was expressly granted to the 
Governor  (see Article 2). Most  likely this provision was added after it was realised tha t  in the 
pr incipal  Ord inance there were no such powers.
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agreem ents), the powers of the Governor under the C ourts  O rdinance, 1911/*'* T he 
nearest  relevant provision in this Ordinance was Section 41 which authorised the 
G overnor to establish and const i tu te  by Proclam ation  Native courts  in any district with 
such jurisdiction as the Governor, subject to  the sam e Ordinance or any other prevailing 
law, cared to a l l o w . W e r e  the B uganda  courts  supposed to  be “established and 
co ns t i tu ted” under this provision? If they were, did th a t  not make them  subordinate to
9 7
the High Court  in accordance with the principle professed by the judges?0 F urtherm ore ,  
how could they be subord inate  to the High C ourt  if, as it was then believed, they 
exercised jurisdiction outside th a t  of the High C ourt?
There is no evidence to indicate w hether these issues were ever discussed or indeed 
considered by the U ganda au thorities .  Nevertheless, it is noted th a t  in none of the 
proclam ations relating to  the B uganda courts  was it. ever m entioned th a t  they were 
estab lished  by the Governor under the C ourts  O rdinance or any other law; the 
proclam ations ju s t  recognised  and declared  these courts  and their jurisdiction. As a 
m a t te r  of fact when it was desired to  establish B uganda courts  in the  counties of Kabula 
and Mawogola, the courts  were established by the B uganda au thorit ies  after which the 
Governor issued a Proclam ation “ to declare and procla im ” th a t  the said courts had been
*) Q
established with his consent. ' This  point is emphasised if one, for example, compares 
this P roclam ation with the Proclam ation  which established N ative courts  in Busoga. The 
la t te r  expressly cited th a t  the courts  had been established by the G overnor exercising
' The Native Courts Ordinances of 1905 and 1909 were repealed by the Courts Ordinance, No. 
12 of 1911 (Uganda Gazette, 1911, 7:461), which in turn was repealed by the Courts Ordinance, 
N o.24 of 1919, (Uganda Gazette, 1919, 12:346). The substance of the provision dealing with 
Native Courts was retained. For a full list of Proclamations relating to Buganda courts, see 
11 ay don, Law and Justice i_n Buganda, p.454.
' This provision was substantially the same as sections 2 of the 1909 Ordinance, and 34 of the 
1919 Ordinance.
•> 7
The High Court exercised extensive powers over the courts established under the Ordinance, 
see sections 46 and 48 of the 191 1 Ordinance.
"^Proclamation of 11 August 1909, Uganda Gazette, 1917, at p.99.
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powers given to him under the Cour ts  Ordinance ,  1909.
Ap ar t  from the problem of subordinat ion to the High Cour t ,  jurisdiction of the 
cour ts  under the Courts  Ordinance  was substant ia l ly l imited.  For instance, they could 
not t ry  cases involving capital  sentence or carrying a life sentence (Section 50), whilst,  as 
we have seen, the Lukiiko had jurisdict ion to t ry such cases. If the  Buganda Cour ts  were 
establ ished under this Ordinance  it meant  the  Lukiiko jurisdict ion was thus  limited. But  
there is no evidence to indicate tha t  it was regarded as such when it came to these cases. 
This  suggests th a t  probably from the point  of view of the  Government  the Buganda 
cour ts  were not considered to be establ ished by the Governor under the Cour ts  
Ordinance.
But  the issue remains  unresolved. Proclamat ions  of a legislative nature  could only 
be made on basis of some law. If the Buganda cour ts  were not established or their 
jur isdict ion recognised under  the Cour ts  Ordinance  or for t h a t  m at ter  under any other 
law made pursuan t  to the Uganda  Order in Council (since t h a t  would make them 
subordinate  to the High Cour t ) ,  on w h a t  author i ty  then did the Governor purpor t  to 
issue the proclamations  relating to them?  Presumably  if this question had been posed at  
the t ime,  the answer would have been “on the basis of the  Agreement  and consent given 
from t ime to t ime by the Kabaka and the  Lukiiko prior to each Proclamat ion.” It was 
probably for this reason t h a t  these proclamat ions  always  cited the Agreement  and 
declared th a t  consent  of the Kabaka and the Lukiiko had been signalled. As a m a t t e r  of 
legal theory,  it may be asked whether  the proclamations  could have been made wi thout  
the Uganda  Order  in Council but on the basis of the C ro w n ’s common law prerogat ive 
rights?
'^Proclamation of 11 August 1909, Uganda Gazette, 1909, 2:303. 
1, Laws of Uganda, 1923.
Also proclamations in chapter
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The foregoing issue was actually indirectly raised some forty years later a t  a time 
when the m a t te r  was alm ost academic, during argum ent in the High C ourt  of U ganda in 
the case of M ukw aha v M u k u b ira .4(4 The facts of the case are not im p ortan t ,  it suffices to 
say th a t  they related to the  Buganda Agreement. During the course of argum en t,  
Dreschfield, Q.C., A ttorney-G eneral of Uganda, asserted th a t  it was axiom atic th a t  
trea ties  am ong sovereign nations did not become part  of the municipal law except by 
legislation of the terr ito ry . Consequently the Buganda Agreement was not by itself law 
in Uganda. In response to a suggestion th a t  it could have been recognised as law w ithou t 
any specific legislative measures, the A ttorney-G eneral subm itted  that:
... since 1890 the Crown had no power to legislate in any way ... [other than  
by O rder in Council). It is not entitled under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act to 
legislate by means of agreeing to an agreement; there is nothing in the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act th a t  allows it so to do.41
Ilis opposing Counsel, Diplock Q.C., conceded to the extent th a t  treaties had to be 
incorporated in municipal law before they could be enforced; but he subm itted  th a t  the 
decision as to w hether a par ticu la r  trea ty  had been incorporated or not was an Act of 
S ta te .  To determ ine w hether the Crown had recognised trea ty  rights the courts had to 
examine the instrum en t itself and subsequent conduct of the Crown expressed or implied 
through its proper officers.* 4*^ Diplock denied th a t  the Crown could not legislate for the 
p ro tec to ra tes  by means o ther than by Order in Council:
My Lord [he subm itted j it has been the practice of the Crown in many cases of 
recent years to legislate by Order in Council but in [the case of] Secretary of
j 9  1 J
Sta te  for India aga inst Sirder Rusto v Khan ... no Orders in Council were 
made.... The Crown exercises its ... prerogative rights by prerogative acts or 
P roclam ations w ithou t any Order in Council a t  all.
4 ^ A 1 so  known as the “Kabaka Deportation Case” , (1953), 7 U.L.R. 74. The arguments are 
quoted from the High Court transcript of t he proceedings (unpublished). The author had access to
Professor Anthony Low’s personal copy.
41 Ibid., at p .261.
4  ^1 bid., at pp.565 and 570. Counsel cited as his authority the case of Secretary of State For 
India y Kamachee Bhoy Sah aba (1 859) 18 Moore’s Appeal Cases 22.
4 3 1941 A.C. 365.
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Chief Justice Griffin, who was presiding, agreed th a t  the Agreement, so far as it was 
incorpora ted  in s ta tu tes ,  did cons t i tu te  enforceable legal rights. However, he did not 
answ er the question as to  w hether it w'as only by legislative measures th a t  these rights 
were incorporated in the municipal law.* *
W hether Diplock’s a rgum en t is accepted or not it was no doubt a subsequent 
ra tiona lisa tion .  A pparently  a t  the critical period there was no serious consideration of 
the  theoretical legal basis of the B uganda courts  proclamations. Irrespective of any legal 
theory  it is clear th a t  the view was firmly held th a t  the jurisdiction of the Crown in 
B u g an d a  was subject to the Agreement with the Buganda G overnm ent.  Indeed as late as 
1928, John  Gray, then Acting Solicitor-General in Uganda, drew a tten tion  to the fact 
th a t  the Courts  Ordinance, 1919, and the Civil Procedure Ordinance, had in the case of 
B u g an d a  to be read subject to the Agreement .
A s ta tem en t  by C ar te r  (Chief Justice  of U ganda sit ting as one of the three appellate 
judges  of t he Court, o Appeal for East Africa), in Oj je Njogo and ot hers v The Attorney 
General and others '**’is significant in this regard, lie and his brethren were unanim ous in 
holding th a t  an agreem ent entered into between the Crown and the Masai tribe of Kenya, 
was not cognisable in the East Africa P ro tec to ra te  courts. This is because they found 
th a t  the agreem ent was a t rea ty  between the Crown and a foreign sovereign state: the 
M asai. From their holding one would have assumed th a t  logically the B uganda 
A greem ent and t hose of Toro and Ankole, fell in t he same category, and consequently the 
decisions of the Uganda High C ourt  ought to have been overruled or a t  least questioned. 
Yet the  Chief Justice of Uganda, in his long ju dgm en t,  merely observed that:
**(1951),  7 U .L .R .7T  Rober t s -Wray,  Co lon ial L aw , a t  p,18G, suggests tha t  the (Town could 
exercise its powers in a p rotec torate by means o the r  than Order  in Council .  See also Lord Denning 
in Nyal i  Ltd v At to rney-G enera l , jlObGi 1 Q.B.  1, at  p i t.
^ ' ’Ci ted by Morris and Read,  Indirect R nie, at  p.55.
1(>( 1913-24) K.L.R.  70 at  page 9.‘L
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During (he course of the a rgum ent with regard to trea ties  or agreements I 
took occasion to refer to the agreem ents with native chiefs in Uganda, another 
pro tec to ra te  under the appella te  jurisdiction of this C ourt  (in which there is an 
Order in Council similar to the E as t  African Order of 1902 ...), and to s ta te  th a t  
the jurisdiction of the High C ourt  in Uganda is regarded as subject to these 
agreements or treaties.
For reasons which are not expressed in C a r te r ’s judgm en t,  it is evident th a t  he still 
believed th a t  the Uganda Order in Council was subject to the “agreem ents with native 
chiefs.” The o ther members of the panel, Justices Bonham C arte r  and King Farlow, did 
not say any th ing  abou t the U ganda cases. Of course, for purposes of disposing of the 
appeal before them , they did not have to comment upon the Uganda decisions, 
nonetheless their silence is surprising especially so as these cases were cited and moreover 
the  same C o u rt  constitu ted  the Appellate C ourt  for Uganda. As we shall see below, the 
Uganda cases were not challenged until more than  two decades later.
8 .6  L e g is la t iv e  P o w e r s
On the question of legislation, as we have already seen, under Article 12 ( l )  of the 
Uganda Order in Council, 1902, the Commissioner had power to  make ordinances for the 
adm in is tra tion  of justice, raising of revenue, and generally for the peace order and good 
government of the P ro tec to ra te  — power which was normally in terpreted  as plenary. In 
the Buganda Agreement, on the o ther hand, Article 5 s tipu la ted  th a t  the laws m ade for 
the P ro tec to ra te  were to apply equally to Buganda except in so for as they were 
inconsistent w ith the provisions of the Agreement in which case the latter would prevail. 
Were the legislative powers of the Commissioner subject to the provisions of the 
Agreement? This  issue was raised (a year af te r  Katosi v K ahizi) in the High C ourt  of 
U ganda in the  case of Nasanairi Kihnka v Bertie S m ith . 1
In this case Kibuka, a  M uganda, entered into an agreem ent to sell his land to
\ 1 supra.
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Smith, an Englishman. A law, the Land Transfer Law, 1901, made by the Kabaka on the 
advice of the Lukiiko and with the consent of the Commissioner, prohibited natives of 
Buganda to sell land to any person without the consent of the Lukiiko.^ Apparently 
both parties were willing to complete the transaction but the Land Officer informed them 
that  the transfer would not be registered without the Lukiiko’s consent. Smith sought to 
challenge this requirement in the High Court. It was contented on his behalf that the 
Kabaka and his Lukiiko had no legislative powers and therefore the so called Land 
Transfer Law had no legal effect. In support of his argument Counsel cited Article 12(1) 
of the Uganda Order in Council, which empowered the Commissioner to make legislation 
for the Uganda Protectorate.
To put the case in perspective, reference may be made to the provisions of the 
Agreement relating to legislation. Article 1 1 vaguely provided that:
The functions of the Council will be to discuss all matters concerning the 
native administration of [BjUganda, and to forward to the Kabaka Resolutions 
which may be voted by a majority regarding measures to be adopted by the said 
administration. The Kabaka shall further consult with ... (the Commissioner) 
before giving effect to any such Resolutions ... and shall in this m atter explicitly 
follow the advice of ... [the Commissioner .
This provision was construed by the Protectorate Government to mean that the Kabaka 
aided by the Lukiiko and in consultation with the Governor, could enact laws concerning 
the Buganda administration and in respect of any other m atter in Buganda which under 
the Agreement were outside the Crown s ju risd ic tion .^  But up to the time of the case 
there was no legislation which authorised or recognised this legislative power.
Judge Carter, after theorising that a right to legislate was an a ttr ibu te  of every 
Sovereign State ( which Buganda was prior to the Agreement), held tha t  this Agreement 
was “not to be regarded as taking away any right or power of the Kabaka except by its
'^ S ec t io n  2.
^ M e m o r a n d u m  Russell, 26 June  1909, enclosure Ag. Governor to  C .O ., 5 Ju ly  1909, 005.56/27.
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express provisions, therefore w hatever powers were his before remain with him, except so 
far as they are expressly taken away or limited .” '*0 In his opinion there was nothing in 
the Agreem ent which could be in terpre ted  as taking away the K ab ak a ’s powers. lie 
dismissed Counsel’s a rgum en t regarding Article 12 of the Order in Council, holding th a t  
the O rder could not take away these powers as it had to be read subject to the 
Agreement.
C a r te r  also dismissed C ounsel’s a l te rna tive  a rgum en t th a t ,  even if the K abaka and 
the Lukiiko had legislative powers, the Land T ransfer Law, 1901, was itself invalid since 
it had not been published in the official G azette  as was required under Article 11 of the 
U ganda  Order in Council. He held th a t  the Order did not deal with native law and there 
was no other law he was aw are of which required laws prom ulgated by the B uganda 
au tho ri t ies  (including those made prior to the Agreement which were still valid) to be 
published or prom ulgated  in any par ticu la r  manner.'*1 As long as the  Governor gave his 
consent to  a law passed by them  it  was valid; the m anner of publication, in the ju d g e ’s 
opinion, was im m ateria l .  Judge C a r te r  found th a t  the Land T ransfer Law, 190-1, was a 
valid law; consequently, the consent of the Lukiiko before any land transfer by a 
M uganda  could be completed was a  legal condition.
Sm ith  appealed to the C ourt  of Appeal for Eastern Africa where a similar argum ent 
was presented; bu t was of no avail. The C ourt  (constitu ted  by Lindsey Smith, J .W . 
M urrison and P e te r  G rain , J .J . )  held:
We think th a t  by the Agreem ent of 1900 the K abaka of B uganda parted with 
his rights of legislation to this ex ten t  th a t  the approval of l l .M .’s Commissioner 
was thereafte r  necessary to com plete the validity of his laws.
It, upheld the findings of the lower C ourt  th a t  the Land Transfer Law, 1901, complied
,r>0( 1908) 1 IJ.L.R. 4 1, at, p. 12. 
51 Ibid.,  at pp .43-44.
182
with the procedural requirements and was a valid law. ’^
This case not only affirmed that the Commissioner’s legislative’s powers were 
limited in Buganda by the Agreement, but also upheld the Government’s interpretation 
tha t  the Kabaka and his Council had legislative powers which were seen as being part of 
the remaining — original — sovereignty of the Kabaka. With advantage of hindsight, it 
would seem tha t  both Courts missed a crucial point which Counsel for the 
plaintiff/appellant was apparently trying to establish. As stated above, there was no 
statutory law at the time which sanctioned or recognised the right of the Kabaka and the 
Lukiiko to legislate. The plaintiffs counsel’s point was probably that the Agreement, 
until incorporated in the municipal law of the Protectorate, could not be regarded as 
authority for the rights it purported to confer or to preserve. Hence his submission that 
the Land Transfer Law, 1904, had no legislative effect. But bot h the lower and appellate 
courts, judging by their holdings, assumed tha t  he was attacking t he power of the Kabaka 
and the Lukiiko to legislate per se. Consequently they did not address their mind to this 
particular issue.
Following this case the irregularity of the K abaka’s legislative powers under the 
laws of the Uganda Protectorate was realised by the Colonial Office’s legal advisers. On 
the basis of their recommendation the Secretary of State, without actually questioning the 
C ourt’s decision, reminded the Governor:
... tha t  the rights of the chiefs to make regulations binding upon natives 
appears solely to rest on interpretation of the [B]Uganda Agreement, 1900 
Article 11, as approved in the High Court ... and the Court of Appeal ... in a 
recent case.
1 consider it advisable that this report should be duly regularised and 1 should 
be glad if you would have an Ordinance drafted providing explicitly for the right 
of the Kabaka aided by his ... Lukiiko and in consultation with ILL the
52 Ibid., at p.45.
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Governor to enact  laws binding upon the nat ive adminis t ra t ion  of [BjUgandaj.  
Th e same procedure lo be followed in the case of both nat ive laws and 
Ordinances , as regards submission in the first, ins tance together  with  a legal 
report  to the  Secretary of State.
Interestingly,  however,  Russell,  the  legal adviser to the Uganda Protec tora te  
Go ve rnmen t ,  demur red  a t  the  proposal to clarify the position of the K a b a k a ’s legislative 
powers  by an Ordinance.  He submit t ed  t h a t  the proper course to take was by a short  
a m en d m e n t  to the  Buganda Agreement because:
The jBjUganda Agreement 1900, is an Agreement  outside and not  governed 
by the Ug anda Order  in Council,  1902. If, therefore,  an Ordinance  is made 
under t h a t  Order  purpor t ing to make clear a doubtful  point  in the [B]Uganda 
Agreement,  it might  be held t h a t  such an Ordinance  was ultra v ires  on the 
ground t h a t  it was made in var ia t ion of the Agreement .
W i th  deep regret  he suggested t h a t  an o the r  amendment  was, unfor tunate ly,  inevitable.
He put  forward to the  Colonial Office a draft  am endm en t  Agreement  ( the B Uganda
Agreement  (Nat ive Laws) 1910) which it was proposed to offer to the Buganda
author i t ies .  In this draf t  the right of the  Kabaka and the Lukiiko to make  laws binding
on the  Baganda  was expressly recognised and the procedure to be followed in making
these laws was s t ipula ted  following the lines as suggested by the Secretary of Sta te  in the
above despatch.  Since the am en dm en t  was mainly in favour of the Baganda,  the  Uganda
officials assured the Colonial Office th a t  no problems in securing thei r  consent  were
an t icipated.
Within the context  of the prevail ing legal thinking,  no doubt  Russell was right,  but  
it would seem he was a t  cross-purposes with the Colonial Office’s intent ion.  He assumed 
t h a t  the problem was merely the vagueness of the provisions of the 1900 Agreement ,  
whereas  actual ly the Colonial Office, as suggested above,  was thinking of those legal
53C.O. to Governor, 13 August 1909, 0 0 5 3 6 / 2 7 .
Legal report on the draft Agreement Nat ive Laws, 1901, enclosure Ag. Governor to G.O., 17 
June 1910, C 0 5 3 6 /2 7 .
181
irregularities which it, w anted  to be corrected. Nevertheless Russell’s in te rp re ta tion  and 
proposed A greem ent were accepted by the Colonial Office w ithou t  any further 
co m m en t.55 This prom oted  and cemented the  view, especially, one would imagine, 
am ong the U ganda G overnm ent officials, that, the  Agreement by itself was a legal 
docum ent w ith  enforceable rights and ob liga tions5^ superior to  any other law in the 
P ro tec to ra te .  Thus for instance, when in 1919 an Ordinance (the Native Law Ordinance) 
was enacted to empower the Governor to au thorise  Native councils constitu ted  or 
recognised under the O rdinance to exercise some limited legislative powers, it was 
expressly s ta ted  th a t  nothing in the O rdinance was to be construed as affecting the power 
of the K abaka and the Lukiiko to legislate for the  B aganda in accordance with the term s 
of the A g r e e m e n t . '  As we shall see in subsequent chapters, it was not until 1938 th a t  
legislation was prom ulgated  which recognised these powers. In th a t  year the Buganda 
N ative Laws (D eclaratory) O rdinance, was hastly  enacted by the Legislative Council to 
confirm th a t  the K abaka  and the Lukiiko had and  always had those legislative powers 
m entioned in the 1900 Agreem ent and the B u g an d a  Agreement (Native Laws) 1910. All 
laws purportedly made since the da te  of the execution of the 1900 Agreement which were
r o
still operative were retrospectively validated . '
8 .7  S u m m a r y  a n d  C o n c lu s io n
' fhe  conclusion to be drawn is th a t ,  the U ganda  P ro tec to ra te  officials from a very 
early stage were convinced th a t  the Buganda A greem ent (and for th a t  m a t te r  the Toro 
and Ankole agreements) was legally binding upon the Crown and prevailed over the 
U ganda Order in Council. This  in effect meant, th a t ,  no tw ithstand ing  the apparently  
plenary provisions of the U ganda O rder in Council,  the C row n’s judicial and legislative
55C.(). to Ag. Governor, 29 July 1910, C 0 5 3 6 /2 7 .
l)^For example, in the case of Crown y Kiimba, supra, I lie accused, a Chief, was convicted under 
Article 9 for failing to furnish to the Protectorate officials information relating to the collection of 
poll t ax.
'’^Sections 3 and 4, Laws of Uganda, 1923, 1: chapter 02.
°^Seechapter I 1.
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powers were limited in Buganda. Any extension of these powers had to be by agreem ent 
with the B uganda au thorities .  The evidence indicates th a t  the legal advisers played a 
very influential role in im planting this idea. Indeed it was so firm th a t  when the Colonial 
Office which had ju s t  taken over U ganda’s affairs confidently asserted otherwise, the 
U ganda officials did not readily accept its view. The reference in the Katosi v Kahizi case 
is clear proof of this. In t he end the Colonial Office itself under the influence of its most 
senior legal adviser, Cox, was converted. The judicial precedents thereby legitimated the 
legal position assumed by the adm in is tra to rs .
In the following chap te r  1 examine the conflict between the provisions of the 
Agreement and the Order with reference to the C ro w n ’s power to raise revenue in
Buganda.
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C H A P T E R  9
L E G I S L A T I O N  F O R  T H E  R A I S I N G  OF R E V E N U E
The power to make legislation for the raising of revenue was another  area of conflict 
between the provision of the Buganda Agreement  and of the Uganda Order  in Council.  
Article 12 of the Agreement provided t h a t  a hut  tax  and gun tax of four shillings 
respectively, were to be levied on every hut  and gun in Buganda.  The Article prescribed 
fur ther tha t :
The Kingdom of [BjUganda shall be subject  to the  same cus toms Regulations, 
Por ter  Regulat ions,  and so forth,  which may, wi th the  approval  of Her Majesty,  
be ins t ituted  for the Uganda P ro tec to ra te  generally,  which may be described in a 
sense as exterior taxat ion;  but  no fur ther  interior taxat ion,  other  than  the hut 
and gun tax shall be imposed on the nat ives of the Province of BjUganda 
wi thout  the agreement  of the Kabaka,  who in this m a t t e r  shall be guided by a 
majori ty of votes in his nat ive Council.
On the o ther  hand under the Order  in Council ,  Article 12(1), the Commissioner was 
invested with power to make legislation for the raising of revenue in the Protectora te .  As 
with his o ther  legislative powers,  there was nothing in the  Order to indicate tha t  his 
powers were limited except,  of course, where the Secretary of S ta te  disallowed the 
legislation.
In this chapter ,  1 invest igate the in terpre ta t ion of the  foregoing provisions of the 
Agreement  by the Protec tora te  adminis t ra t ion  and its effect upon the Commiss ioner’s
powers to make legislation for the raising of revenue.
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9 .1  I n te r io r  a n d  E x ter io r  T a x a t io n
As we shall see below, there was seldom any doub t within the ad m in is tra t ion  th a t  
the consent of the K abaka and  the Lukiiko were necessary before the imposition of any 
direct tax  (such as the poll tax ,  land tax and gun tax) or its increase where it had already  
been imposed. The problem was with indirect tax ,  for example licensing fees and charges 
for various adm in is tra tive  duties. The question was: were these licensing du ties  and 
charges classified as taxes? W as the consent of the B uganda au thority  necessary before 
they were imposed?
A pparently  the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent as early as 1903 felt uneasy ab o u t  the 
legality of imposing any licensing fees and charges in Buganda. Judge Ennis in th a t  year 
advised the adm in is tra tion  th a t  the issue of tax a t io n  in Buganda had to be resolved by 
in terp re ta t ion  of the words “exterior tax a t io n ” and  “interior taxation"  in Article 12 of the 
Agreement. Ennis held th a t  the former referred to revenue and charges collected under 
laws which applied generally to the whole P ro tec to ra te ,  whereas the la tter  referred to  
revenue resulting from laws of local application to Buganda. 1 hus, according to  the 
Judge, if any tax were imposed by the G overnm ent th roughout the P ro tec to ra te ,  it would 
be “exterior tax a t io n ” within the meaning of the Agreement and therefore would not 
require the consent of the Baganda; but if any tax  were to be imposed only on the 
B aganda the consent of the K ab ak a  and Lukiiko were necessary.
After the holding in the case of Kat.osi v Kahizi, t h a t  the provisions of the 
agreem ents prevailed over the  Order, Russell, the P ro tec to ra te  legal adviser ( then 
officially known as the “Crown A dvocate” ) told the Governor th a t  since ordinances 
imposing charges and fees had already been m ade and more were likely to be made in the  
fu ture , it was of “im m edia te  im portance ... to consider w hether the agreem ent of the
* Memorandum Ennis, G October 1903, quoted in Governor to C.O., 16 July 1908, 0 0 5 3 6 / 2 0 .
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K ab ak a  was and will be necessary for the validity of such charges or fees.11 Russell cast 
d o u b t  on judge E nnis’ in te rp re ta tion  of Article 12 of the Agreement. He argued th a t  if 
such in terp re ta tion  were ad m itted ,  it m ean t  the G overnm ent had a lm ost unlimited  
powers of taxation ; yet under Article 12 of the Agreement it was expressly provided th a t  
“no further interior taxa tion  o ther than  hu t  and gun tax  was to be imposed w ithou t  the 
consent of the K ab ak a .” According to his own in terp re ta tion  “exterior ta x a t io n ” referred 
to revenue collected under laws of a  general application to the P ro tec to ra te  which had an 
exterior element in them , for instance, custom s involved im port  and expor t,  and porter 
regulations applied to engagem ent of porters  for work involving a journey  outside 
Buganda. “Interior tax a t io n ” on the o ther hand referred to revenue collected under laws 
of a general application w ithout any such “exterior" element, as well as laws of a local 
application .
The Governor, Hesketh Bell, who had only recently assumed office, im mediately 
echoed Russell's fears to the Colonial Secretary. He warned th a t  legal questions m ight be 
raised if any legislation were enacted in the P ro tec to ra te  involving “du ties  and  fees or 
tax a t io n  of any other kind.” Moreover, “ the validity of the existing sources of revenue 
may a t  any m om ent be called in question; in either civil or criminal proceedings, ... [on 
the grounds] ... th a t  they are ultra vires  as being imposed in a m anner not in accord with 
the provisions of the [BjUganda Agreement, 1900.” Bell said th a t ,  a l though the  issue had 
not actually  been raised in practice, he nevertheless felt th a t  it was p ruden t to refer it to 
the Secretary of S ta te  well in advance so th a t  in the event th a t  legal difficulties arose (as 
he was advised they were bound to) they m ight be dea lt  with accordingly
T he legal adviser to the Colonial Office, Cox, ad m it ted  th a t  it was very difficult to
o
^Memorandum Upon Taxation under the Uganda Agreement, 1900, dated August 1907. See 
enclosure Governor to C.O., 16 July 1908, ibid.
'^Governor to C.O., ibid.
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determ ine w hat was m eant by “exterior” and “ in terior” taxa tion .  Although Cox was 
inclined to  agree with Russell’s in te rp re ta tion  in preference to th a t  of Judge Ennis, 
nevertheless, in his opinion, the safest solution to  the problem was to enter into a new 
Agreement with the B aganda .4 This  view was accepted by the Secretary of State. The 
Governor was told th a t  Russell’s construction  of the A greem ent was the correct one. 
Consequently, he was instructed  to negotiate with the  Buganda adm in is tra tion  to am end 
Article 12 so as to read th a t ,  “no tax , beyond those already in force shall be imposed 
w ithout the consent of the K abaka, unless it applies to all in h ab itan ts  of the Province, 
whether natives or o thers .” It was hoped th a t  this am endm ent would not only have the 
effect of legalising ex post fac to  the existing tax a tio n  but th a t  it would give the 
G overnm ent all the powers for the future which were necessary.l)
In effect the position was th a t ,  legally, no licensing fees or charges could be imposed 
upon the B aganda  in B uganda w ithout the consent of the K abaka and the Lukiiko or a t  
any ra te  until the  Agreement was amended as suggested by the Colonial Office. The local 
officials, however, were not too anxious to propose to the B aganda to  amend the 
Agreement. For a lm ost a year they kept quiet ab o u t  the m a t te r  until Boyle, who was 
then the Acting Governor, officially requested the Colonial Office to postpone the 
im plem entation  of its decision. Boyle expressed a fear th a t  since the Agreement had in 
the previous nine years been amended seven times, any attempt, made to push in ano ther 
am endm ent was bound to lead to suspicion and probably rejection. Regretfully, desirable 
as it was to settle the issue once and for all, Boyle felt th a t  the timing was not
^Minute of 19 August, 1908. Bopwood expressed a similar view, alternatively he suggested to go 
for an authoritative judicial interpretation of Article 12, minute of 1 September, 1908. Johnston,  
who was by coincidence in London, at the request of the Colonial Office interpreted “interior'’ and 
“exterior” taxation to refer to “direct” and “indirect” taxation respectively, Johnston to C.O., 6 
September 1908, C O 356/20. His interpretation was summarily dismissed as based on afterthought 
and therefore unhelpful.
5C.O. to Governor, 2 October 1908, 0 0 5 2 6 /1 0 0 /2 0 5 2 5 .
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opportune. 6
Ironically, even Russell strongly supported  the postponem ent.  T h e  issue was still 
theoretical in so far as the Baganda had not challenged any of the existing legislation nor 
had it been as yet raised in the courts. Russell warned of serious consequences if the 
proposal was m ade and the B uganda authorit ies  refused to accept it (as he was sure they 
would) since there was no way the G overnm ent could legally force th em  to  comply.^ In 
the circum stances the Colonial Office acceded to the G o v e rn m en t’s request and the
o
problem was shelved indefinitely. We shall revert to this m a t te r  below.
9 .2  D ir e c t  T a x e s
As to direct taxa t ion ,  consent of the B uganda authorit ies  was always sought before 
its imposition. The first such tax the Baganda were called upon to  pay (in addition to 
the h u t  and gun taxa tion  which were expressly prescribed in the A greem ent) was a poll 
tax. This was a three shillings tax  imposed on every “m arriageable” male M uganda who 
was not liable to pay the hu t tax. The tax was actually proposed by the B uganda 
au thorit ies  with the object of catching males in this age group who were evading the hut 
tax by abstain ing from owning a hut preferring instead to cram in to  one hut with friends 
or rela tives.0 An Agreement was entered into, the [BjUganda Agreem ent (Poll T ax) ,  
1904, authorising the t a x . 10 A year later the Commissioner prom ulgated  the Poll Tax 
Ordinance, 1905, which imposed a three shillings tax on every male over eighteen years of
°Ag. Governor to C.O., 9 September 1909, 0 0 5 3 6 /2 8 .
7 ^
Ag. Governor to C.O., 9 September 1909; and Russell’s memorandum of 7 July 1909, enclosure, 
C 0 5 3 6 /2 8 .  Russell cited the Colonial Office’s letter to the Governor, supra, which approved the 
interpretation of Article 12.
^C.O. to Governor, 28 October 1909. Cited by Governor to C.O., 29 January 1930, supra.
Commissioner to F.O., 6 July 1901, F 038 1 /8 5 8 .  As it may be recalled collection of sufficient 
taxation revenue was one of the conditions for the continuation of the Agreement. Hence it was in 
the chiefs’ interest to see to it that it was done. Besides it was claimed that the hut tax was forcing 
young men not to marry since, according to Baganda custom, they would then have to live in their 
own houses. It was feared that as a result many young men were tempted to lead “immoral ’ lives, 
and there was a possibility of a decline in (he population.
^Enclosure Ag. Commissioner to F.O., 6 October 1904, FO2/8G0.
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age w ho was not liable to pay a hu t tax under the Hut Tax Regulations, 1900, in all those 
d is tr ic ts  to which the O rdinance was applied. The Ordinance was declared applicable to 
B u g an d a  (Section 6 ) .11
In 1909, the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent decided to introduce a new taxa tion  scheme 
and also to increase the tax . It abolished the separate  collection of hut and poll tax  which 
it replaced with a general tax  of ten shillings payable by all males over the age of eighteen 
years unless exem pted. T o  implement this new policy three Poll Tax Ordinances were 
enacted  in the same y ea r .1 W ith regard to B uganda before any changes were introduced 
an o th e r  Agreement was entered into, the [B]Uganda A greem ent (Poll T ax) ,  1909, 
consenting to the changes and the increase in the poll t a x .10 Instead of applying the Poll 
la x  O rdinances to B uganda, the new scheme was incorporated in a Buganda Lukiiko law 
(strangely known as the Law for the People who do not pay their tax before the end of 
the year in which it is due, 1909” ) which reproduced the substance of these ordinances. 
This  procedure, according to  Russell, was intended for the convenience of the B aganda to 
avoid confusing them  as some of the provisions of the Poll T ax  Ordinances w'ere not 
applicable in B u g an d a .11
After the first World W ar, when the G overnm ent wanted yet again to raise the poll 
tax  payable by the B aganda  to fifteen shillings ano ther  Agreement, the Uganda 
Agreem ent (Poll l a x ) ,  1920, was entered into au thorising  the increase. Unlike the 
previous Poll Tax A greem ent, it specifically provided th a t  the Poll Tax Ordinance, 1914,
Uganda Protectorate Ordinance, 1904-1905. I lie Ordinance was also applied to Ankole, Toro, 
and Bunyoro.
12 r ^
The Poll Tax Ordinances numbers 2, 3 and 5, of 1909, Uganda Gazette, 1909, 2:22, 72 and
320.
l o 5 June 1909, Notice Uganda Gazette, 1909, 2:180.
' Legal opinion, 5 January 1910, enclosure, Ag. Governor to C.O., 17 January 1910, C 0 5 3 6 /3 2 .  
Russell did not specify the provisions which were not applicable to Buganda.
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or any am endm en t  thereof,  was to apply to Buganda  subject  to certain e x c e p t i o n s J O n e  
of these  exceptions was that  the  persons who were exempted from payment  of the lmt tax 
unde r  the 1900 Agreement  for any of their hut s  or buildings were to receive in lieu in each 
t ax a t io n  year a transferable poll tax t icket  which would ent it le their transferees tax 
exempt ion  for the par t icular  year.
Curiously,  the Agreement provided t h a t  there was to be no fur ther  increase in 
inter ior taxat ion in Buganda for the next  seven years wi thout  the consent of the Kabaka 
and the  Lukiiko. In view of the prevail ing legal theory it is difficult to see the 
jus t if ica tion for this,  since in any case the assumpt ion had always been t h a t  th a t  was 
indeed the  requirement  for validity of any legislation imposing direct  taxat ion in 
Buganda .  In the absence of any evidence to indicate a shift from that  line of thinking at  
this stage,  it can be presumed t h a t  the clause was added as a reassurance to the Kabaka 
and his Lukiiko agains t  any request  for fur ther increase in taxation.  Another  possible 
in t erpre ta t ion is t h a t  within the  succeeding seven years the Government  would not 
increase the taxat ion wi thout  the  consent  of the Kabaka and his Lukiiko, but  tha t  
thereaf ter  the tax  could be increased w i tho u t  their consent.  The lat ter  in terpre ta t ion,  
however,  is unlikely to have been intended as it would be inconsistent wi th the  1900 
Agreement ,  whereas in the Poll Tax  Agreement  it was expressly s tated th a t  nothing 
contained therein was to affect the  provisions of the main Agreem en t .1
9 .3  Land T ax
In the same year as the poll tax  was increased, the  Government  approached the 
Bug anda  author i t ies  to persuade them  to find addi tional  means  of raising revenue in 
B u ganda  to contr ibute  towards  development  projects in the country.  After  what  was 
described as a “prot rac ted  discussion” in the Lukiiko, a resolution was passed authorising
1,>Article 2, Laws of Uganda, 1923, 3:176. 
^ A rt i c l e  5.
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the in troduction  of a  land tax  of tw enty  shillings per annum  payable by all land owners, 
and tw o  shillings levied upon non-land owners. T he  resolution specifically prescribed th a t  
the du ra tion  of the taxation  be limited to a m axim um  period of five years after which it 
would be reviewed by the Lukiiko.17 Subject to  some am endm ents  (accepted by the 
Lukiiko and the K a b a k a ) ^ th e  resolution was given legislative effect by an Ordinance, the 
B u g an d a  T axa tion  Ordinance, 1921, enacted by the newly consti tu ted  Uganda Legislative 
Council.
As if to emphasise the point the Ordinance recited the au tho ri ty  of the Lukiiko 
resolution agreeing to this special taxa tion  over the Baganda. It was also expressly s ta ted  
th a t  the O rdinance would remain in force till 31 December 1925.* 1 *^  Presumably to 
comply with w ha t was conceived to be the proper procedure, a formal Agreement, the 
[B iU ganda A greem ent (T axation  of Natives), 1921, was signed. This Agreement
OA
reproduced the substance of the O rd in a n c e /
T he consistent procedure which proceeded imposition and increase of direct taxation  
in Buganda, strongly support the view th a t  the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent acted on the 
belief th a t  consent of the B uganda  authorities  was necessary for the validity of the 
relevant legislation. It is significant th a t  a t  no time during the period under 
consideration was any argum en t ever raised based on the power of the Commissioner
7^Coryndon to C.O., 8 November 1920, CO536/104. Coryndon personally attended some of the 
Lukiiko meetings to hear the discussion, and (perhaps) indirectly to assert pressure upon the chiefs. 
Coryndon was anxious to start development projects after many years of almost total stagnation. 
Moreover, there were complaints of injustice over the poll tax whereby the rich chiefs paid the same 
amount as the peasants. See Mahmood Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation iri Uganda,at
p. 122.
1 8 Attorney-General’s report on the Bill. Enclosure Deputy Governor to C.O., 17 October 1922,
C 0 5 3 6 /1 2 1 .
^S ect ion  1, Laws of Uganda, 1923, vo l . l ,  chapter 63. In the Attorney-General’s report, ibid., it
was stressed that the procedure in making the Ordinance was in accordance with the requirements
of Article 12 of the Buganda Agreement.
2ÜThe Agreement was signed on 24 August 1922, see Laws of Uganda, 1923, 3:482.
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under  Article 12 of the 1902 O rder in Council to make legislation for raising of revenue. 
This  point is emphasised if one con trasts  the procedure which was followed in Buganda 
w ith  th a t  in the  o ther regions of the P ro tec to ra te .  A p a r t  from the district of Toro, tax in 
these regions was imposed, increased or decreased a t  the discretion of the G overnm ent by 
merely enacting relevant laws or applying the existing taxa tion  legislation to t h e m / 1
As for Toro , the provisions of its A greem ent relating to taxa t ion  differed som ewhat 
from the corresponding Articles of the B uganda Agreement. Under Article 5 of the Toro 
A greem ent it was s t ipu la ted  th a t  “There shall be imposed henceforth on the natives of the 
T oru  [Sic] d is tric t the sam e tax a tio n  as is in force by Proclam ation in the o ther provinces 
or d is tr ic ts  of the U ganda P ro tec to ra te ,  to  wit the hu t  tax and the gun tax .” In 
co n tra s t  to the B uganda Agreem ent, the Toro A greem ent did not s ta te  th a t  o ther taxes 
were not to be imposed in the  d istrict w ithou t  the consent of the King of Toro. When in 
1905 the poll tax  was in troduced under the Poll T ax  Ordinance, 1905, the O rdinance was 
applied to Toro  w ithou t any prior consent. P resum ably  the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent 
assum ed on in terp re ta t ion  of the Toro Agreement th a t  consent was not necessary. When 
a fur ther increase of the poll tax  was contem pla ted  in 1909, the Secretary of S ta te  
instruc ted  the U ganda G overnm ent th a t  any future increases of tax in Toro or imposition 
of new tax had to be with the prior consent of the king of T o r o /  Consequently before 
the Poll Tax Ordinance of 1909 (supra) were applied to Toro, a formal Agreement, the 
T oro  Agreement (Poll T ax ) ,  1910, was entered into with the King and chiefs of Toro
^  For example: Proclamation of 27 January 1909 (Uganda Gazette, 1909, 21:22), applied the 
Poll Tax Ordinance, 1909, supra, to Busoga. Proclamation of 16 March 1911 (Uganda Gazette, 
1910, 3:122), applied the same Ordinance to Bunyoro and Lango. The Poll Tax Ordinance, 1914, 
and 1920, were made applicable to the whole Protectorate, the rates of taxes payable were fixed by 
the Governor.
o  *)
z Appendix 4. The Hut Tax Regulations,. 1899; and the Gun Tax Regulations, 1899, supra, 
applied to Toro. As stated above, Johnston claimed that the chiefs had consented to the taxation  
though there is no written testimony to back his assertion.
^’’Notice, 18 April 1905 (Uganda Gazette, 1905). The Ordinance was also applied to Ankole and 
B u nyoro.
^ C .O .  to Ag. Governor, 7 January 1910 cited by Ag. Governor to C.O. 536/53.
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which expressly authorised  the application of the  Ordinances to th a t  d istrict (Article 5). 
A nother  A greem ent was again entered in to  some five years later, the Toro Agreem ent 
(Foil T ax) ,  1914, before the poll tax was fu r ther increased under the Poll Tax Ordinance,
o r
1 9 1 4 /°  In the  la t te r  A greem ent it was s t ipu la ted  th a t  the new Ordinance or any o ther 
ordinances replacing it m ight be applied to the  district w ithou t  any further need for 
consent of the  King of Toro . This provision was clearly intended to give the 
P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent a  free hand in m aking fu ture legislation for raising of revenue in 
the Kingdom.
As for the  d istrict of Ankole whose Agreement with Britain was similar to  th a t  of 
Toro, there is no evidence of any formal consent having been sought and given before the 
poll tax  was imposed or increased. This can be explained on the grounds th a t  the 
A greem ent was still under suspension by the t im e the Poll Tax Ordinances of 1909 were 
applied to it. And when the A greem ent was restored in 1912, one of the conditions was 
th a t  i ts  res to ra tion  would not invalidate the poll tax  introduced during the suspension of 
the A g reem en t . ^  This however does not account for the subsequent taxation  which was 
imposed in Ankole.
9.4 F u rth er  “Interior” T a x a t io n  -- the B ic y c le s  F ee  D eb a te
Reverting to the issue of license fees and charges in B uganda, we have seen th a t  by 
1909 the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent was concerned that it had no power under the 
A greem ent to levy charges and fees w ithou t the consent of the Kabaka. However, it 
postponed proposing the am endm en t of the A greem ent to the Baganda to give the Crown
■^’Laws of Uganda, 1923, Vol.3, p .515, 519. The preamble of the former Agreement recited that 
under the Buganda Agreement, 1900, a hut and gun tax of six shillings each had been imposed, and 
that it was agreed under the Toro Agreement of the same year that a uniform tax was to be 
imposed in Toro as in the other districts of the Protectorate.
^ A rt ic le s  1 and 2.
^'Proclamations of 12 September 1912. See H.F. Morris, A History of Ankole (Kampala, 
E.A.L.B., 1962), at pp. 44-45.
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the necessary au tho ri ty  for fear of the consequences in the event they declined. For ten 
years  the  issue remained in limbo as far as the  P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent was concerned. 
M eanwhile, a num ber of Ordinances were m ade w ithou t any objection by the Buganda 
au thorit ies ,  nor was the legislation apparen tly  ever challenged in the courts on ground 
th a t  it was “ul tra v i r e s '’ the 1900 Agreem ent as had been feared by the local legal 
advisers.  ^
In 1919, following an increase in the fees for the compulsory registration of bicycles 
under the Bicycles O rd inance , ^  the B uganda au thorit ies  for the first t ime raised an 
objection pointing out th a t  the increase w ith o u t  first reference to them  was contrary  to 
Article 12 of the Agreement. The P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent managed to overcome the 
problem  by explaining to the ira te  chiefs the value of the Ordinance and the need of the 
reg istra tion  fees to sustain the adm in is tra tion  of the scheme. Subsequent increases of the 
fee in 1921 and 1926 were m et with similar objections but on both occasions the
O A
G overnm ent was able to talk the chiefs into accep tance .0 It is significant th a t  in none of 
these cases did the G overnm ent try to justify the  fees on ground of its unlimited power 
under the U ganda Order in Council to legislate for raising of revenue in the P ro tecto ra te .  
Evidently  the assum ption was th a t  in B uganda the provisions of the Order were subject 
to the Agreement.
Officially after 1926 the issue of the bicycle registra tion  fees w'as never raised again 
with the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent,  nor for th a t  m a t te r  were the other charges or fees
28 Examples  of legislation enacted include: Fees for fishing permits  (Sleeping Sickness
Ordinance,  1913); Fees for motor  cars and motor  cycles licenses (Motor  Traffic Ordinance,  1910; 
and Highway  Ordinance,  Laws of Uganda ,  1923, 1: cha p te r  84). See also the Fees and Royal t ies 
Ord inance,  chapte r  85, it empowered the Commiss ioner  to impose fees for a range of purposes.  The  
la t te r  Ord inance  was probably just if ied under  Article 12, since it expressly excluded from the 
defini t ion of '‘interior t a x a t i o n ” charges for water ,  marke t ,  lighting,  and so forth,  “which may  be 
t rea ted  apa r t  as ma t t e r s  affecting municipal i t ies  or townsh ips . ”
' ^ L a w s  of Uganda,  1923, 1: chap te r  1.
^G overnor  to C.O. ,  29 January 1930, supra.
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imposed in B uganda w ithout the consent of the  K abaka and the Lukiiko ever challenged 
again. However, in Janua ry ,  1929, one Yusufu Barnuta (member of the Lukiiko and  
lately its Secretary before his sacking by the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent)  purporting to 
speak on behalf of the people of Buganda, revived the m atte r .  In a petition to the 
Colonial Secretary B am u ta  alleged th a t  the G overnor was violating Article 12 of the 1900 
Agreement by imposing direct yearly taxes on bicycles, motor cars and fishing licenses 
w ithou t prior consent of the K abaka  and the  Lukiiko as was prescribed in this Article.
9  1
Consequently, B am u ta  claimed th a t  these taxes  were illegal.
As a m a t te r  of policy the Colonial Office was inclined not to  do anything in 
response to  the allegations as it did not wish to encourage the habit of direct 
corresponding with it. On the o ther hand there  was a fear th a t  the petition could 
culm inate in a  political a t tack  on the Colonial Office in England of the way it was 
adm inistering Uganda. In the end the G overnor was instructed  officially to ignore 
B a m u ta ’s allegations, since he was not a  representa tive of the Buganda Native 
G overnm ent,  unless the K abaka  himself raised the m a t te r  with him. However, he was
9 0
told to write a full confidential report on the substance of the allegations.
In a detailed m em orandum , Gower, then Governor, reviewed the origin and the 
argum ents  of the in terp re ta tion  of the words “ in terio r” and “exterior” taxa tion  as we
99
have indicated above .00 He suggested th a t  Russell 's in te rp re ta tion  which was accepted 
by the then Colonial Secretary in preference to th a t  of Judge Ennis, appeared to be 
misconceived. Since, as he had been advised by his A ttorney-G eneral,  the  opinion then 
expressed was not necessarily binding, he wondered w hether Ennis’ in terpre ta tion  ( th a t
9 1
01Petition, 7 January 1929, C 0 5 3 6 /1 5 1 .  Bam uta was officially marked as the leader of the 
“Anti-British administration party.” Governor to C.O, 28 August 1928, C 0536/150/201G 1.
’’^Minute Bottomley of 13 May 1929, on Governor to C.O., 14 March 1929; and C.O. to 
Governor, 1 June 1929, C O 536/151/20255.
''■'Governor to C.O., 29 January 1930, supra.
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“exter ior ' ’ t axa t ion meant  tax imposed upon the  Baganda in common wi th the rest of the 
Protec tora te)  ought  not to be subst i tu ted  for the  former.
On pract ical  grounds,  the Governor pointed out  the difficulties which might  arise 
were Russell’s opinion to be mainta ined.  For  instance,  all legislation imposing charges 
and fees enacted  in the previous twenty  years  would be held illegal unless the  Kabaka  and 
the Lukiiko agreed to the fees or to the am en d m e n t  of the  Agreement  — for nei ther of 
which he held any prospects.  If they refused, in his opinion it would be very unfair to 
continue  wi th the fees in the  rest of the P ro tec to ra te  and not in Buganda unless a 
propor t ionate  reduct ion was made  to tlie Govern m en t  expendi ture in Buganda;  which was 
practically impossible to implement.  Gower,  however,  re iterated th a t  he would not  force 
the issue wi th the  Ka baka unless he (the Kabaka)  raised it. But  a t  the  same t ime he 
under took for the  future to consul t  the Kabaka before enact ing any law involving
9 4
taxat ion affecting the Baganda.
Again it is significant t h a t  nowhere in this detailed mem ora ndum  did the  Governor 
try to suggest t h a t  the Agreement  was not  legally binding on the  British Gove rnment .  If 
this idea had ever occurred to the  P ro tec to ra te  adminis t ra t ion  dur ing this period (when it 
was anxious  to justify the legal basis of the  taxat ion legislation and in a confidential  
mem ora ndum) one certainly would have expected it to have, a t  least, raised the  point 
t h a t  af ter  all the Commiss ioner  had unl imi ted powers under the Order to legislate for 
raising of revenue. Instead the  Governor di rected all his efforts to the legal in te rpre ta t ion  
of the Agreement .  This strongly suggests t h a t  it was believed to be the only legal option 
(apar t  from proposing am en d m en t  of the Agreement)  available to it.
9 i
0/1T h e  Governor pointed out that the adm inistra tion  w as not encountering any problem s with  
the Ankole or the Toro A greem ent, respectively , because Article 7 thereof prescribed th a t  the  
district would be subject to the  sam e laws as applied in the rest o f the Protectorate. T h is  provision  
was interpreted to include laws im p osin g  taxes  and license fees.
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9 .5  R e - in t e r p r e t a t io n  o f  A r t ic le  12
Following G ow er’s report  the question of in te rp re ta t io n  of Article 12 was re-opened 
in the Colonial Office. Again the critical issue w as w hether judge Ennis’ in te rp re ta tion  
ought to  have been preferred to  th a t  of the C row n Advocate. While the question was 
under d e p a r tm e n ta l  discussion, the Secretary of S ta te  indicated to the Governor th a t  it 
would take  a long time for the  m a t te r  to be thoroughly  considered by his Office:
M eanw hile , [the Secretary of S ta te  wrote] until a final decision is reached 
regard ing  the  way in which this clause should be in terpre ted , it is open to 
question w hether the practice of consulting the  K abaka of Buganda regarding 
the  app lica tion  to the B aganda  of any fu r ther general taxa tion  which it may be 
proposed to  introduce th ro u g h o u t  the P ro tec to ra te  should be put into effect, and 
I shall be glad if, should the occasion arise to  introduce new taxation , you will 
co m m unica te  with me before adopting  the course .,>0
Q uite  clearly the  Minister was concerned th a t  any p rem ature  consultation with the
K ab ak a  could establish a political precedent from which the G overnm ent could not easily
resile if it tu rn ed  out th a t ,  on the strict in te rp re ta t ion  of Article 12, the Governor was
under no legal obligation to  do so.
In the  m ean tim e the consensus of the non legal members of the Colonial Office was 
strongly t i l ted  in favour of E nn is’ in te rp re ta tion .  Acheson, Principal Secretary, argued 
th a t  according to  the knowledge and level of developm ent of the Baganda a t  the time of 
the A greem ent,  E nn is’ in te rp re ta t io n ,  on a balance of probabilities, seemed to be nearer 
to w h a t  the  par ties  m ust have intended than Russell’s. B ut w hatever the in terp re ta tion  
he strongly urged th a t  the  P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent be instructed  to confront the 
K abaka  and  the  Lukiiko with the m a t te r  ra the r  th an  buying time as was done in 1909. 
Acheson reasoned tha t:
T he issue is bound some day to become one of practical importance. It will 
then have to  be settled either by an appeal to  the C ourts  (which may go as far 
as the House of Lords [stc] or by negotiation). An appeal to  the Courts  is to be 
avoided if possible, and  it is clearly b e t te r  to negotiate while there is no 
im m edia te  urgency and  no actual proposals for additional taxation are before 
the people to  com plicate the m atte r .
35 C.O. to Governor, 31 March 1930, C O 536/160 /20525
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Parkinson,  Ass istant  Secretary,  agreed with  this view. In a note to Bushe, Legal 
Assistant ,  he literally asked him whether  he could think of a sufficient a rgument  to defend 
Enni s ’ in terpre tat ion:  “ If so, the P ro tec to ra te  Government  would be free to act  wi thout  
prior reference to the Buganda Native Government  in regard to the imposit ion of taxa t ion  
applied generally in the  P ro tec tor a te  including Buganda ...” Parkinson conceded t h a t  if 
the Baganda persisted there would be no a l ternat ive bu t  an au thor i t a t ive  in terpre ta t ion 
presumably secured by way of judicial  process or conceivably by submission to an agreed 
arbi t r a tor .
Bushe obliged. He argued t h a t  to sustain Russell’s in terpre tat ion one had to make 
three assumptions.  First ly,  th a t  it was proper to apply to a document  of this sort  st rict  
canons of construction and th a t  “exter ior” taxat ion had to be read e ju sd e m  generis  wi th 
Cus toms  Regulat ions and Por ter  Regulations.  Secondly, tha t  Cus toms Regulat ions  and 
Por ter  Regulat ions const i tu ted  a class. Thirdly,  th a t  the class which they const i tuted 
was one having the common factor of m at te rs  taking place par tly wi thin and par tly 
wi thout  Buganda.  Bushe claimed t h a t  none of these assumpt ions  were justified in this 
case. The in terpre ta t ion of the  Agreement  required common sense ra ther  than  the 
technical rules of in terpre ta t ion.  Moreover,  he argued th a t  the Por ter  and the Cus toms 
Regulat ions  nei ther const i tu ted  a class nor was there a common factor between them as 
Russell seemed to have suggested.  Consequently,  the e jusdem  generis  rule could not  in 
any case apply.  Bushe felt t h a t  the only sensible meaning to be pu t  to Art icle 12, was the 
one suggested by judge Ennis: Buganda  was subject to the same t axat ion regulat ions as 
might  be applied to the rest  of the P ro tec tora te  generally,  but  was not  to be subjected to 
any taxat ion applying only to it (other than  the hu t  and gun tax) wi thou t  the consent of 
the  Kabaka.  In a footnote,  Bushe went  even further to assert th a t  if his in terpre ta t ion of 
“exterior t ax a t io n ” was sound,  since both  the hut  and gun taxat ion had been int roduced 
through out  the P ro tec to ra te ,  it followed th a t  they had also become “exterior t ax a t io n ”
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w ith in  the m eaning of Article 12.ofi
On the basis of Bushe’s advice Ennis’ in te rp re ta t io n  was accepted by the Secretary  
of S ta te  as the official in te rp re ta tion  of the problem atic  Article 12. In com m unica ting  it 
to the G overnor of Uganda, he was instructed  to t rea t  it as confidential and only to  use it 
for his own guidance unless and  until there was a serious objection on the p a r t  of the 
B uganda  G overnm ent in some concrete case then he was to confront it w ith  this 
in te rp re ta t io n .  If, however, the  objection persisted he was to secure an a u th o r i ta t iv e  
in te rp re ta t io n  through a judicial process or possibly by an agreed submission to
o 7
a rb itra t io n .
o  o
9 .6  R e x  v  B u g a n d a  C o t to n  C o m p a n y
By a curious coincidence before the Colonial Secretary responded to the G overnor,  
the issue of “in terior” and “ex ter io r” taxa tion  was raised in the High Court of U ganda, in 
the case of Rex v Uganda C otton  C om p an y . In th is  case the B uganda C o tton  C om pany  
was convicted in the M ag is t ra te ’s Court for purchasing raw co tton  without a  license 
con tra ry  to sections 18 and 25 of the C otton  O rdinance, 1926. It appealed to the  High 
C o u rt  aga ins t  the conviction on the grounds th a t  the fee imposed under the C o tton  
O rdinance was “interior tax a t io n ” therefore it was void since the Kabaka had not
O  Q
consented as was required under Article 12 of the Agreem ent.0
Chief Justice Griffin, s i t t ing  with Acting Judge Hearne, after cautioning himself 
t h a t  the critical words “in terior” and “ex ter io r” were not term s of ar t  with a definite
°^See minutes of 30 June 1930; 7 July 1930; and 21 August 1930, on Governor to C .O., 29 
January 1930, supra.
37C.O. to Governor, 24 August 1930, 0 0 5 3 6 /1 6 0 /2 0 5 2 5 .  
o8( 1930), 4 U.L.R. 34.
oq
JFor the purpose of the appeal the Court assumed that the appellant Company was a 
“Muganda” .
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moaning and consequently had to be construed within their contex t,  held th a t  “ex terior” 
tax a t io n  referred to taxation  th a t  was com m on to the whole P ro tec to ra te  whilst 
“in terio r” th a t  which was restricted to B uganda. In o ther words he upheld Ennis’ 
construction  of the Article which, probably, he was aware of prior to the case. T he Chief 
Justice  speculated th a t  this “s tran g e” Article was possibly incorporated in the Agreement 
by the Buganda au thorit ies  to guard the Baganda, who a t  the time of the Agreement 
were far more advanced than  the others  in the P ro tec to ra te ,  against a heavier taxation  
burden than  could be imposed th roughout the P ro tec to ra te .
Since Griffin found th a t  the cotton tax  was levied th roughout the P ro tec to ra te  he 
held th a t  it was “ex terior” taxa tion  and therefore consent of the K abaka was not 
necessary before it was imposed. On this ground the appeal was dismissed. However, the 
Chief Justice took the opportun ity  to com m ent on w hat lie said took considerable time 
during  argum ent in the Court: the effect of a trea ty  on the power to legislate for the 
P ro tec to ra te .  W ith o u t  citing any au thorit ies  (though he indicated th a t  several had been 
referred to) he observed th a t  a t rea ty  except where it was expressly incorporated in a 
s t a tu te  was not pa r t  of the law' of the P ro tec to ra te .  It could not therefore give rights of 
action nor afford grounds for defence of private  individuals.
This judgem ent could not have come a t  a be tte r  time for the P ro tec to ra te  
adm in is tra tion . The Governor, natura lly , was so excited th a t  he immediately despatched 
a copy of the decision to the Colonial Office which, judging by the dates, m ust have 
crossed with the Secretary of S ta te ’s le tter referred to above enclosing his in te rp re ta tion  
of Article 1 2 . At  the Colonial Office a sigh of relief was expressed on hearing of the 
judgem ent especially as it coincided with the D e p a r tm en t’s in te rp re ta tion .  * It is
40Ag. Governor to C.O., 29 August 1930, C O 536/160/20525.
^ M in u te  Ingharns of 25 September 1930; and Parkinson’s minute of 25 September 1930. Pushe 
just initialled (12 November, 1930) without comment.
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notew orthy th a t  none of the officers (including Bushe) com m ented  on the Chief Jus t ice’s 
obiter d ic tum .
9 .7  S u m m a ry  and  C o n c lu s io n
W hatever was the true  in terp re ta t ion  of the problem atic  Article 12 is beside the 
point. W ha t is im portan t  is the overall construction of the Agreement within the 
framework of the P ro tec to ra te  law. T he evidence examined in this chapter indicates th a t  
the view of the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent was th a t  the C ro w n ’s legal power in B uganda 
was subject to the Agreement. In this par ticu lar  case this was so no tw iths tand ing  th a t  
under the Uganda Order in Council the Commissioner had been granted  unlimited power 
to legislate for the raising of revenue in the P ro tecto ra te .  It has been emphasised above 
th a t  it was significant th a t  a t  no t im e was a reference made, even when the G overnm ent—  
was desperately trying to find a way out,  to the said powers under the Order. Evidently, 
the idea was firmly im planted  th a t  this power was limited by the Agreement. Both 
London and Uganda officials concentrated  on the in te rp re ta t ion  of the Agreement to 
justify the legislation for the raising of revenue in Buganda. Thus the case of the 
B uganda C otton  Company was very im p o rtan t  not only for giving a construction which 
assured unlimited legal powers of taxa t ion  to the Crown th roughou t the P ro tec to ra te  but 
also for raising the possibility, albeit obiter d ic tu m , th a t  the Agreement contrary to  prior 
precedents was not after all legally binding. On the later point, however, as we shall see 
below, it was jus t  the beginning and not the end of the issue.
Further  evidence is examined in the following chap te r  with regard to the C row n’s 
legal power to deal with land consequent upon the 1900 Agreement and the U ganda
O rder in Council, 1902.
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C H A P T E R  10
THE C R O W N ’S CONTROL AN D  
P O W E R  OVER THE LAND:THE OUTCOME
It will be recalled from chap ter  five th a t  immediately after the Law Officers had 
delivered their report on the C row n’s power to  deal with land, the Foreign Office 
proceeded to  give it legal effect by incorporating  in the Uganda Order in Council a 
definition of Crown land which included, as suggested in the report, land acquired by the 
Crown through trea ties  or gran ts  from local chiefs, and any public land under the control 
of the  Crown by v irtue  of the P ro tec to ra te .  Article 7(3) of the Order empowered the 
Com missioner to dispose of Crown lands by g ran t  or lease on such terms, subject to any 
O rdinance, as he deemed fit; and the Crown Lands Ordinance, enacted the following year, 
prescribed rules for dealing with this l a n d .1 In this chap te r  1 investigate the official 
in te rp re ta t io n  of the legal position with regard to the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent’s powers 
and  au th o r i ty  over the land in Buganda and the rest of the P ro tec to ra te  following the 
1900 A greem ent and the 1902 U ganda Order in Council.
10.1 B u gan d a  Land S ettlem ent
In Buganda, as we have seen, the land question was settled under the 1900 
A greem ent (Article 15). Working on the assum ption th a t  the to tal area  of Buganda was 
19,600 square miles, the Agreement provided for the division of this land between the 
Crown, B aganda  notables and the Missionary societies as follows: the royal family and 
leading chiefs were to  receive a to tal of 958 square miles, some in their official and others
N o . 2 of 1903, Uganda Protectorate Ordinances, 1901-1905.
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in the ir  private  capacity; 8000 square miles were gran ted  to a “ 1,000 chiefs and private  
land owners” ; Missionary societies received an aggregate of 92 square miles; 50 square 
miles were set aside for existing G overnm ent s ta tions , and 1500 square miles for forest 
reserves. The rest of the land (including the forest reserves) to ta ling  an estim ated  9000 
square  miles which was described as “waste and uncu lt iva ted” was vested in the Crown 
on the  understanding  th a t  the revenue therefrom  was to be used for the general purposes 
of the  P ro tec to ra te .  The A greem ent provided fu r ther th a t  in the event (“after a  careful 
su rvey” ) of the area  of Buganda being found to be less th an  the estim ated 19,600 square 
miles, the C row n’s share would be reduced to the ex ten t  of the deficiency. On the o ther 
hand , if the to ta l  area were found to be more than  this, the excess land was to be shared, 
w ith  the Crown taking one half and the o ther half divided am ong the chiefs.
Once the Agreement was executed, the w'ork of d is tr ibu ting  the land to the chiefs 
and notables commenced. Briefly the procedure was as follows: the Lukiiko (which under 
the A greem ent was invested with the pow'er of determ ining the a llo tm ents  am ong the 
chiefs with a possible appeal to the Kabaka) would draw up a list of allottees and the 
sizes of their shares which would then be subm itted  to the Commissioner for 
confirm ation. After he approved the list, provisional certificates would be gran ted  to the 
a llo ttees which entitled them  to dem arca te  their chosen estates to the ex tent of their 
a l lo tm en t,  or indicate it by description on a map. More often than  not grantees chose to 
d em arca te  small portions from their to tal en ti t lem ent in different counties ra the r  than  
satisfy all of it in one area. Final certificates which recognised “absolute ownership” were 
g ran ted  after the land had been surveyed by the G overnm ent. Not surprisingly, it took
o
more than  three decades before the whole project was acco m p lish ed /
^For a detailed account of the survey and the allocation, see Low and Pratt, Buganda and 
British Overrule, pp. 107-1 17; Thomas and Spencer, Uganda Land and Survey, pp.66-67, 73-84.
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1 0 .2  C row n  L and  in  B u g a n d a
On paper approxim ate ly  half of the whole terr ito ry  of Buganda was supposed to be 
C row n land. Initially, the G overnm ent let the B aganda allottees select their estates 
w i th o u t  any in tervention on its p a r t ,  apparen tly  intending to assert the C ro w n ’s claim to 
its share  afterwards. Over four years after the allocation had s ta r ted ,  the Lukiiko was 
still grappling with the allo tm ent list and many allottees were yet to select their  estates. 
Meanwhile, the G overnm ent was becoming increasingly im patien t with the delay. It was 
then  th a t  Wilson decided to take action by issuing a  directive to the effect th a t  any 
a l lo tm ents  not dem arcated  by the end of M arch, 1905, would be forfeited. To add more 
w eight to his order, Wilson urged the  Commissioner, Sadler, to issue a similar order, but
9
it would seem th a t  the la t te r  declined to do so. Presum ably  Sadler felt himself lacking 
the  power to issue such an order. This view is supported  by the fact th a t ,  shortly 
thereafter ,  Wilson negotiated  with the regent chiefs, and persuaded them  to  make a 
w ri t ten  undertaking which effectively confirmed his order. In addition , the regents agreed 
th a t  if before th a t  da te  the G overnm ent wanted any land in Buganda, provided th a t  they 
were satisfied th a t  the same had not already been granted  to somebody else, they w'ould 
let the  G overnm ent have it with a guaran tee  th a t  no claims over it would ever be made 
forever."*
Later Wilson, by then Acting-Commissioner, explained to  the Colonial Secretary 
t h a t ,  according to the advice he had received from Judge Ennis, the above arrangem ent 
appeared  to be con tra ry  to the Agreement. Nevertheless, Wilson reasoned, the judge  had 
justif ied  it on the ground th a t  “the possibility of complication ... [was] so small th a t  the
''Memorandum on Land Settlement by Allen, 23 August 1907, C 0 5 3 6 /1 8 .
"*Undertaking of 20 February 1902, see memo Allen, ibid. In a telegram of 1 February 1902 
(F02 /930),  Wilson told the Foreign Office that the Lukiiko passed a resolution to regard all 
undemarcated land as (Town land. At the time the Government was negotiating to sell ten 
thousand acres of land to the Uganda Company, minute Ellis of 10 April 1905, on 
Ag.Commissioner to F.O., 23 February 1905, F02/929.
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immense  advan tage  derived from being in a position to deal with Crown lands,  pending 
the final survey of the country  ... [was] so obvious as to override the possible legal flaw” . 
Personally ,  Wilson claimed, he could not see any illegality wi th it since the  under tak ing 
had been endorsed by the  Lukiiko which had the  power under the Agreement  to decide as 
to the  validity of any claims.^ The ar range ment  was approved by the Colonial  Secretary 
w i th o u t  any objection.
T h u s  a t  least the  Government  could deal with the undemarcated  lands  as Crown 
land while the survey proceeded. But  this was not enough to give the  Gove rn m en t  a 
r ight  over the land wdiich was likely to be sought  subsequently by expa t r i a te  investors.  
Al lot tees  had dem arcated  the best lands for their ent i t lement ,  leaving w h a t  was 
considered to be the wors t  land. Moreover,  most  allottees,  par tly due to ignorance of 
proper  dimensions had dem arcated  es tates  well in excess of their actual  ent i t lement ,  
thereby reducing even fur ther  the land available to the Government ,  and of course,  
pending the  survey,  there  was no basis for challenging their measurements.
Par t ly  to counte ract  the  problem of excessive demarcat ions  and par tly to ensure 
t h a t  the  Government  had a share of the best  lands, a practice was developed by the 
G o ve rn m en t  whereby if an es ta te  on survey was found to be bigger than  w'hat w'as 
indicated as the  a l lo t tee’s ent i t lement  in a par ticular  area,  the surplus was immedia te ly  
declared to be Crown land,  and in a number  of cases the land was disposed of by the 
Gov ernmen t .  When,  on the other hand,  there  were shortages,  owners were told to 
pos tpone their claims for making up the difference until after completion of the survey for 
the  whole country.  In spite of st rong protes ts by the chiefs the Go vernmen t  persisted 
wi th the  practice.  Subsequent ly,  it was given legal effect by the Land (Survey) Law, 
1909, which was draf ted by the Government  and,  surprisingly,  enacted by the Lukiiko.
JAg. Commissioner to F.O., 23 February 1905, ibid.
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T his  law also prescribed tha t  the claims of those allottees who, by 31 December 1909, had 
not applied for a provisional certificate, would au tom atically  expire.®
10 .3  C o n tr o v e r s y  o v er  th e  in t e r p r e ta t io n  o f  A r t ic le  15
T he circumstances leading to the enac tm en t of the Land (Survey) Law, are no t very
n
clear. However, less than  a year later , the regents  wrote to the G overnm ent vehemently 
a t tack in g  the  practice which was legalised by the  very law they had enacted. T heir  main 
com pla in t  was th a t  the excess lands were being sold to Europeans, whereas “ In the 
[BjUganda Agreement, it says th a t  the B aganda  will be allowed to keep their original 
e s ta te s” . They alleged th a t  the lands being sold were “already cu ltivated  and full of 
people” ; consequently, they could not be Crown land. The chiefs suggested th a t  a person 
with more than  one esta te ,  if found to have an excess on one of them , should be given an 
option to  surrender less favoured land. F u r th e r  if one had a surplus over one es ta te  and a 
shortage over another, they proposed th a t  he ough t to be allowed to  balance the  two. 
W hatever the case, the regent chiefs were a d a m a n t  th a t  the G overnm ent had no right to 
the surplus lands found in the cultivated or occupied areas until the end of the survey,
o
after all the 8000 square miles granted  had been fully appor tioned .0 In their 
m em orandum , the regents m ade it clear th a t  they were not aga inst  Europeans acquiring 
land in Buganda; on the con tra ry  they were very much in favour of it.
Q uite  clearly the problem  was one of in te rp re ta t ion  of Article 15 of the Agreement. 
According to  the chiefs’ construc tion  of the provision, the B aganda allottees were entitled  
to satisfy their shares from the cultivated lands or occupied lands up to the m axim um  of 
8000 square miles, before the G overnm ent could assert its claim to whatever remained.
^Sections 2 and 3, Uganda Gazette, 1909, 2:279.
n
'Tomkins, Chief Secretary, in a memorandum of 13 May 1911 (enclosure Governor to C.O., 6 
July 1911, CO879/107) asserted that the draft was made on Governor Bell’s instructions and was 
left with the Lukiiko for six months before the latter adopted it.
^Regent Chiefs to the Provincial Commissioner, 30 March 1910, enclosure Governor to C.O., 6 
July 1911, supra.
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This  line of argumen t  was later adopted by a legal pract it ioner ,  Burns,  who was retained 
by tw o  of the regent chiefs and ten other senior ranking chiefs to pursue the mat te r  with 
the Go ve rnmen t  on thei r behalf.
Burns  contended th a t  under Article 15 one thousand chiefs and pr ivate owners were 
gran ted  es tates  of which “ they were al ready in possession” to the tune  of 8000 square 
miles. The words  “ they were al ready in possession” he interpreted to refer to the lands 
which the Baganda as a t ribe occupied a t  the  t ime of the Agreement .  He submit ted t h a t  
the es ta tes  which al lot tees demarcated  were from these lands, and therefore, if there were 
any surplus  on one es tate ,  it was up to the  Lukiiko to determine how best to re-allocate it 
until  the  8000 square miles had been surveyed.  Burns  charged th a t  the Government ,  by 
declaring the surplus  land Crown lands,  was t rying to take more than it had contracted 
for, namely,  9,000 square  miles of “waste and uncul t ivated  land" . On the basis of his 
in terpre ta t ion,  Burns went  on to suggest t h a t  the Land (Survey) Law, 1909, in so far as it 
pu rpor ted  to declare all surplus lands after survey Crown land, was of doubtful  legality as 
it was inconsistent with  the Agreement .  Moreover,  he claimed th a t  the Lukiiko, when it 
enacted this law, was ignorant  of its overall effect, hence the law ought  to be annulled on 
this ground too.^
Russell, then Acting Chief Secretary; Allen, the  Land Officer; and Parker,  Acting 
Crown-Advocate,  in a jo int  mem orandum ,  opposed the argumen t  on both practical and 
legal grounds.  They claimed th a t  if the  proposals were to be accepted they were bound to 
lead to endless problems: delays in the survey while await ing for allottees to make up
their minds; the need for re-surveying many of the  es tates  (for instance to balance 
excesses with shortages);  difficulties in keeping records since there was more than one 
survey group each usually not  knowing wh a t  the  o ther  was doing; and so on. All of these
^Burns to Russell. 9 D ecem ber 1910, enclosure G overnor  to C.O., 6 July  1911, supra.
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problems would inevitably cause the already excessive survey expenses to soar even 
further. They contended th a t  the chiefs had no case either on legal grounds. Since in 
their opinion the object of the land se t t lem en t was to divide the land on a m ore or less 
equal basis between the Crown and the Baganda:
it could not [they subm itted] have been the in tention ... t h a t  the 
G overnm ent should accept as its share of the land, the hill-tops and m arshes and 
such borderland par ts  of Buganda, as rem ote as possible from im p o rtan t  centres, 
as should be left in th a t  dim future when the disputes and surveys caused by the 
a llo tm ent,  re-allo tm ent and fur ther re -allo tm ent of all land of any value am ong 
the native land owners should be composed.
F u r th er ,  in their in te rp re ta t ion  of Article 15, the one thousand chiefs and p rivate  owners 
had to be allocated estates of which each in d iv id u a l  (emphasis added) was “already in 
possession” a t  or prior to the  Agreement. If th a t  were true, t hey concluded th a t  logically 
shortages from one esta te  could not be satisfied by surplus from ano ther  es ta te  since the 
two could not have been possessed by the same persons. On the basis of this 
in te rp re ta tion  they accused the Lukiiko of violating the Agreem ent when making 
allocations because it allowed the allottees to select es tates a t  random.*** For these 
reasons Russell (and others) urged Burns to advise his clients to drop the m atte r ,  
especially as it m ight lead to  a wider inquiry and possibly a red istribution of the land to 
their d e tr im en t .* *
T he chiefs, however, refused to budge. Indeed Burns, on their behalf, proposed to 
the G overnm ent th a t  the m a t te r  be referred to  the Law Officers of the Crown in London 
for an official ruling.
Meanwhile the chiefs’ claims were boosted by Jackson, the newly appointed  
G overnor of Uganda, who arrived in the m idst of this controversy. Jackson had acted as
***Senior chiefs evicted junior chiefs and their followers from favoured lands; even the traditional 
sacred clan lands (Butaka) were allocated. The latter subsequently led to a serious political outcry 
in the early 1920s, Low and Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule, pp.109-110.
* 'Memorandum of 25 January 1911, enclosure Governor to C.O., 6 July 1911.
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a  go-between for Johnston and the  Baganda  dur ing the negot iat ions  of the  Agreement.  
He recalled t ha t ,  a t  the t ime of the Agreement ,  it was recognised t h a t  the  whole of 
Buganda belonged to the people of Buganda “and the main object  of the  Agreement  was 
to divide the land into, approximate ly ,  two equal  par ts,  the Baganda  to have the  first 
choice and the  remainder including the forests to fall to the G o v e rn m en t” . Jackson 
explained t h a t  they,  Johnston and the o ther  Europeans  including himself, were deceived 
by the  little they had seen of Buganda to assume t h a t  it was all very fertile and rich:
The Baganda,  of course, knew their own country; we did not,  and the  former,  
like all o ther  natives,  natura l ly  selected the  best  lands for themselves.  We now 
find th a t  we have, from the  point  of view of the qual ity of the waste  and 
uncult iva ted land, got the  wors t of the  bargain.  But  the bargain was of our own 
making.  ^
Jackson disagreed with  Russell 's (and o th e r s ’) in terpre tat ion t h a t  the  intent ion was 
for the  grantees  to receive the land they individually possessed. In his opinion B urn s ’ 
construction was the one which was intended.  He was also prepared to accept  the 
ar gumen t  t h a t  the  Lukiiko enacted the  Land (Survey) Law, 1909, unaware  t h a t  the 
Baganda were thereby abandon ing  their r ights under the Agreement.  Wha teve r  the 
legality of this legislation, Jackson thought  t h a t  it would not be in accord with the  
Brit ish t radi t ion  for the P ro tec to ra te  G ove rn m en t  to take advan tage  of a  law made in 
c i rcumstances  such as these.
Jac kson ’s intervent ion prompted a sharp  response from Tomkins ,  the Chief 
Secretary,  who was acting as Governor  prior to the  former’s arrival ,  and who had himself 
been working in Uganda for abou t  ten years.  Referring to J o h n s t o n ’s despatch to the  
Foreign Office writ ten  jus t  after the Agreement ,  Tomkins  argued t h a t  there was nothing 
therein to suppor t  his assert ions t h a t  the in tent ion was for the B aganda to satisfy their 
a l lo tments  before the Grown.  In any case in his opinion what mat ter ed  were the contents
1 9 Memorandum of 13 April 1911, enclosure Governor to C.O.,  6 July 1911.
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of the Agreem ent and not the alleged unw rit ten  in ten tions of its framers.
C ounter m em oranda  were exchanged bu t in the end it was resolved to refer the 
m a t te r  to the Colonial Office for an au th o r i ta t iv e  ruling. In a covering note, Jackson 
apologised for disagreeing with the rest of the P ro tec to ra te  staff on this issue, but he said 
th a t  he felt he had an obligation to s ta te  his views openly “even if those views do not tend 
to assist the A dm in is tra tion  in acquiring small acres of land suitable for alienation by sale 
and  lease” . Moreover, he claimed th a t  according to  his information the a t te m p t  by the 
G overnm ent to take advan tage  of the Land (Survey) Law, was already causing great 
d iscon ten t am ongst the  B aganda. For all these reasons he thought th a t  it was 
inadvisable to proceed with the law .1*
Judging by the Agreement alone, especially Article 15, there was really nothing 
upon which one could conclusively determ ine w hether the intention was th a t  the Baganda 
grantees were to select their shares before the Crow n, or th a t  it was to be a simultaneous 
process. B urns’ a rgum ent was probably more convincing on this point than Russell’s, 
though his emphasis th a t  the  G o v e rn m en t’s share of 9,000 square miles was limited to 
“w aste and uncultivated  land” was som ew hat undermined by reference to the C row n’s 
share in the sam e Article as the “aforesaid 9,000 square miles of waste  or cultivated , or 
uncultivated  land, or land occupied w ithout prior gift of the K abaka or Chief by ... 
peasants  or s trange rs” . This suggested th a t  the C row n’s share was not necessarily 
restr icted to w aste and uncultivated  land.
Extrinsic evidence, however, strongly supported  th chiefs’ claim. A part  from the 
fact th a t  Jackson was himself heavily involved in the discussions leading to the
1^M em orandum  of 13 May 191 1, enclosure G overnor to  C.O., 6 Ju ly  1911. 
^ G o v e r n o r  to G.O., ibid.
A greem ent,  it is really difficult to imagine why, if it was not true, he would have chosen 
to  p u t  his weight right behind the chiefs in contrad ic ting  his colleagues. In fact his 
exp lanation  of the assum ption m ade ab o u t  the fertility of the land was very plausible. 
Secondly, the fact th a t  the G overnm ent initially let the B aganda allottees select their  
shares has to be weighed against its case. Indeed it was when expa tr ia tes  s tarted  showing 
in terest  in acquiring land in B uganda  th a t  the G overnm ent became concerned to get them  
some of the best land. Significantly, when it did, as we have seen, it first secured the 
under tak ing  referred to  which was purportedly  legalised by the controversial Lukiiko 
Land (Survey) Law. If the G overnm ent had been confident of its en t i t lem en t to select the 
C ro w n ’s a llo tm ent before the final survey, none of this would have been necessary.
In the event, the Colonial Secretary ruled in favour of the chiefs’ claim. He agreed 
with Jackson th a t  the policy adopted  under the 1909 Land (Survey) Law contradicted  the 
in ten tion  of the 1900 Agreement and thus had to be discarded. He gave Jackson 
instructions to  arrange with the B uganda  adm in is tra tion  for the s i tuation  to  be rectified. 
B ut as par t  of the deal, Jackson was told to insist on an undertak ing  by them  th a t  they 
would not claim any of the “surp lus” lands th a t  had since been leased or sold to innocent 
th ird  p a r tie s .10
A formal Agreement, the Buganda Agreement (Allotm ent and  Survey) 1913, was 
subsequently concluded between the G overnm ent and the Buganda au thorit ies  which, 
am ong other things, prescribed in detail the procedure which was to be followed in the 
event of a  surplus or a shortage after the survey of dem arcated  lands. T he controversial 
Land (Survey) Law, 1909, was also deleted and replaced by the 1913 Land (Survey) 
Law'.1(^
1 °C.O. to Governor, 20 August 1911, CO879/107.  
^ ’Laws of Uganda, 1923, 3:471 and 491.
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T he u lt im ate  effect of all this was th a t  the G overnm ent had to wait until 1936, 
when the survey was completed, before it knew exactly w ha t was left as Crown land in 
B uganda. Unfortunately  for the G overnm ent,  it was not much either in quan ti ty  or in 
quali ty .  The area  of B uganda proved to be only 17,320 square miles as compared to the 
19,600 square miles of the original es tim ate , and this deficiency, as we have seen, had to 
be borne from the C row n’s share. As regards the quality  of this land the best had been 
taken  by the B aganda  allottees leaving the Crown some 7,500 to 8000 square miles which 
included forests, swamps, eroded hill tops and “trac ts  in the outlying counties of the 
Kingdom  which by lack of w ater  or on account of tsetse fly [were] ... un inhabitab le” .17
10 .4  G o v e r n m e n t  c o n tr o l  o v er  “M a i lo ” lan d
Since, for all practical purposes, the land th a t  really m atte red  in B uganda was 
g ran ted  to the B aganda  notables, w hat powers, if any, did the G overnm ent claim to have 
over th is  land? Before investigating this question, we should briefly consider the nature 
of the  interest which the  notables acquired.
Judge Ennis, in 1902, shortly after his arrival in Uganda, noted th a t  in the 
provisional certificates which were given to grantees their titles were described as “fee 
sim ple” . On his recom m endation all references to the English real property law concepts 
were discarded and instead the certificates were confined to a recognition of whatever 
tenure  the grantees were subsequently determ ined to h o ld .18 Presum ably , ap a r t  from his 
wish to avoid introducing the complexities of the English real property law into the 
B aganda  held lands, Ennis m ight have thought th a t  it was a  legal misnomer to refer to 
these lands as held in fee simple, since under the English feudal land system, although a 
fee simple is the most ample es ta te  from the point of view of the right to deal with the
1 7Low and Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule, at pp. 140-491.
1 8 *Ennis’ land report of 7 June 1910, cited by Ennis, Carter, and Russell report ( Ennis report), 
13 March 1907, C 0 8 7 9 /8 5 .
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land, it is nonetheless derived from the Crown. ^  The land alloted to the chiefs was not 
Crown land — it belonged to the Kabaka — and hence could not be described as held in fee 
simple or for tha t  m atter  under any other English common law concept of real 
property.
In 1906, a land Committee constituted by Ennis, Russell and Allen (Ennis 
Committee) which was set up to probe the land m atters  in the Protectorate recommended 
tha t  the Government call upon the Buganda Lukiiko to enact a law which should specify 
the tenure upon which the Baganda held their land. Subsequently, a draft law prepared 
by Russell along the lines suggested by the Committee, was presented to the Lukiiko 
which proceeded to enact it as the Buganda Land Law, 1908. The name “Mailo land'’ 
(derived from the English “mile’1) which hitherto had been used unofficially to refer to the 
estates granted under the Agreement, was adopted to describe this system of land 
holding.
The Land Law did not expressly define the nature of the mailo land, but it was
• • 9 9clearly intended to be an absolute tenure akin to the English fee simple.LL Apart from 
the prohibition to transfer mailo land to non-Ugandans and religious organisations, 
except with the consent of the Governor and the Lukiiko, mailo owners were free to 
dispose of their land whether inter vivos or by will as they wished. Where a mailo owner
^ G e n e r a l ly  G.C. Cheshire, Modern Law of Real P rope r ty  (London, B u tte rw orths ,  19G2), a t  pp. 
31-3G.
on
In the British C en tra l  Africa P ro tec to ra te  case, A ugusto  Paolucci v T he  Com m iss ioner  of 
M ines , the C ourt of Appeal for E astern  Africa overruled the lower C ourt  decision th a t  E u ro p e an s  
who were gran ted  land prior to the  P ro tec to ra te  by na t ive  chiefs were not absolute owners b u t  had 
to  be regarded as holding the ir  t i t le from th e  Crow n, and subject to the English law of real 
property .  The  Upper C o u r t  m a in ta ined  th a t  the  g ran te es ’ had a unique tit le outside the  precepts  
of the English real property  law, enclosure C om m issioner  to C.O., 31 March 1905, C 0 5 2 5 /1 1 .
U ganda  G azette ,  1923, 2: ch ap te r  102.
9 9 . . .
Mn the final certificates g rantees  were described as “absolute owners” ; and in official circles th e  
tenure  was com monly referred to as a “freehold” . See T h o m a s  and Spencer, U ganda  Land  and 
S u rvey ,p.G8. K rishna Maini,  Land Law iy E as t  Africa (Nairobi, O U P, 1967) at p p .73-74, argues 
th a t  the  “m ailo” was an ac tua l  freehold.
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died in tes ta te ,  the land would be inherited by his heirs determinable in accordance wi th 
the  B u ganda  rules of inheri tance.  In the event  of the absence of any heirs, section 4 
provided th a t  the land would be held by the  Lukiiko and the Governor as t rus tees  for the 
people of Buganda.  Practical ly it was a lmost  impossible for such a  s i tuat ion to happen,  
but  the  d ra f t sman  was obviously thinking of the  common law concept  of “escheat” under
0 9
which the  land reverted to the  Crown,  its original owner,  in those c i r c u m s t a n c e s / 0 Since 
the  Crowm was not  the original owner of this land it had to revert  to the people of 
Buganda.  Probably ,  the B aganda  wrnuld also have complained if the  Crown took such 
land as it would reduce thei r  aggregate share under  the  Agreement .
Rever ting to the ques tion of the G o v e r n m e n t ’s power over mailo land,  it is 
notewor thy  t h a t  apa r t  from the  Regis trat ion of Land Ti tles Ordinance,  1908 
(subsequent ly repealed and replaced by the Regist ra t ion of Titles Ordinance,  1923)^* the 
P ro tec to ra te  Government  avoided enact ing laws which directly affected mailo land. 
Wherever  the  Governmen t  wan ted  to  impose any policy decision regarding this land,  it
o r
exerted pressure on the Lukiiko to enact  the re levant  law. There  can be no doub t  t h a t  
there  were very s t rong political reasons for the  Governmen t  not to intervene in mailo land 
mat te rs .  Th e land was a del icate issue and the  Governmen t  was wary of antagonising the 
beneficiaries of the  land se t t lem en t  who also happened to be the  political leaders of 
Buganda.  Nevertheless,  it seems th a t  the Govern m en t  also believed th a t  it had no legal 
powers to intervene by its legislation. The mai lo land,  as we have seen, was not  Crown  
land nor was it regarded as granted to the holders by the Crown.  Moreover,  under  the 
Agreement ,  ap a r t  from the  power to acquire land compulsorily for limited public
23' G enerally , M artin  Leake, T he  Law of P roperty  hi Land  (London, Stevens, 1909), pp. 20,23, 
and 29.
'^ L a w s  of LIganda, 1923, 2: ch a p te r  102.
25 See for exam ple  the  B usuulu  and E nvujjo  Law of 1 J a n u a ry  1928, N ative  Laws of B u g a n d a ,  
1957, p.168. T h e  provisions of the Land T ransfer  O rd inance  of 1906 (U ganda  G azette ,  1906, p.53) 
which p rohib ited  land transac t ions  between nat ive  and non-natives, were re-enacted by the 
Lukiiko, see Land Law, 1908 (LIganda G azette  1:110).
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purposes, there was nothing to indicate th a t  the  G overnm ent could assert any o ther 
power over the land allocated to the chiefs. M ost likely one of the main reasons the Ennis 
C o m m ittee  recommended th a t  the Land Law be enacted by the Lukiiko instead of the 
G overnor was th a t  it felt the la t te r  had no jurisd ic tion . Presumably this also explains the 
en ac tm en t of the Land (Survey) Laws referred to  above. Judges Ennis and  C a r te r  were 
largely responsible for the  precedents th a t  the agreem ents were legally binding and 
prevailed over any other laws of the P ro tec to ra te .  Hence they were likely to  exercise 
cau tion  in this very im p o rtan t  m a t te r  to ensure th a t  it was done in accordance with the 
B uganda  Agreement.
F u r th e r  evidence of the G o v ern m en t’s re luctance to intervene on grounds of w an t  of 
legal powers, is found in the discussions of the G overnm ent policy w ith  reference to 
o u tr ig h t  sales of land to non-natives in Uganda. Till 1915, it was G overnm en t policy to 
sell Crown lands, and the B aganda were also actively encouraged to dispose of p a r t  of 
their  huge esta tes  to expatriates.  In th a t  year, however, the Secretary of S ta te  prohibited  
all ou tr igh t sales of Crown lands to  non-natives. At the same time he ins truc ted  the 
G overnor to refuse, as a m a t te r  of policy, to give his consent to any o u tr ig h t  transfer  of 
mailo land to a non-native. T hereafte r,  ins truc tions  were issued to the G overnor to 
consider m aking the ban perm anen t by legislative measures along the lines of the  E as t  
Africa P ro tec to ra te  Crown Lands Ordinance, 1915. T he  aim was to try to s tream line  the 
land policies in the two p ro tec to ra tes  so th a t  only leaseholds were g ran ted  to 
non-natives.*^
T he move to  impose a  perm anen t freeze on the g ran t of freeholds greatly  angered 
the  P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent.  Allen, the Land Officer, im mediately responded,
^ C .O .  to Governor, 31 August 1906, quoted in Deputy Governor to C.O., 12 February 1917, 
C Q 536/84.
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emphasising the ad v an tag es  of the freehold land tenure system  over the leasehold. Me 
claimed th a t  since U ganda  was less favourable to Europeans than  the E ast  Africa 
P ro tec to ra te ,  the only way to a t t r a c t  E u ro p ean s ’ investm ent in its land, was by offering 
them  freehold as an ex t ra  incentive. Allen also argued th a t  the ban on the B aganda 
selling their land to non-natives  would be in breach of a policy h i therto  followed, and was 
bound to impede developm ent of the land and  the c o u n t r y / '
P ro tes ts  from the U ganda  G overnm ent led to suggestions with in  the Colonial Office 
th a t  the m a t te r  be reconsidered. Coincidentally , judge C arte r ,  who was then regarded as 
the leading expert on U g a n d a ’s land m a t te rs ,  having been a m em ber (in most cases the 
C hairm an) of all land com m ittees  set up since 1906, was in London. In a semi-official 
letter, Butler asked him for his opinion as to  the likely reaction of the Baganda to a total 
ban on selling land to non-natives. Butler m ade it clear in his le tter th a t  he was not 
seeking his legal opinion on the m a tte r ,  since it was conceivable th a t  thereafter in his 
judicial capacity he m igh t “have to give judgem en t in cases in which the principle of 
interference with the rights  of owners of mailo land was im pugned". Rather, he was after 
his personal assessment based on his knowledge of the B aganda. C arte r  replied th a t  he 
was in no doub t a t  all t h a t  the B aganda would consider the ban a breach of faith and 
th a t  they would resent it. He claimed th a t  the B aganda knew their rights and were 
aw are w ha t  a freehold was. C ar te r  also cautioned th a t ,  according to  his information, if 
the plans to  prohibit  abso lu te  transfer of mailo land went th rough, their validity would 
im mediately be tested in the c o u r t s . ^
Later in an official m em orandum , C a r te r  reiterated  his views on this m atte r .  He 
argued th a t ,  according to  the final certificate, the  mailo land was recognised as vested in
97L Allen to Chief Secretary, 18 January 1917, enclosure, ibid.
^ B u tle r  to Carter, 16 July 1917; and Carter to Batler, 2 August 1917, C0536?84.
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the “absolute ownership’" of the respective holders. Consequently, in his opinion, 
“legislation prohibiting the native from selling a portion of his land to a non-native would
be unjust besides being of doubtful legality __” Carter tried to explain away the
restrictions imposed on transfer under the Land Transfer Ordinance, 1906 (which he 
stressed was adopted by the Lukiiko in the Land Law, 1908 supra) on the ground tha t  it 
was not the intention for this power to be used for a total ban on transfer of land “Such a 
prohibition would be a breach of the spirit, if not the letter of the Uganda Agreement 
In another memorandum on the same topic, he warned of “the grave legal question which 
will without doubt some day come for decision before the courts as to the validity’’ of the 
instructions prohibiting the Baganda from selling their land to non-natives, a right which
o q
he asserted was implied under the Agreement.
Other Government Officials, including the newly appointed Governor, Coryndon, 
added their voices in support of the freehold system and the right of the Baganda to
9 A
dispose of their land to whomsoever they wished/' Although the Colonial Secretary still 
refused to change his policy as regards Government freehold, he did agree to lift the ban 
imposed on the Baganda, citing as the “determining factor” which influenced him, the 
views expressed by Carter:
As the matter presents itself to me the question to be decided is not the 
theoretical question whether freehold or leasehold is in the present or future 
interest of the country generally ... but the practical question whether the right 
granted to the native land owner under the [B:Uganda Agreement includes the 
right, subject to proper safeguards in the native interest, to alienate his land to 
non-natives in freehold. Having regard to the opinion expressed by Sir William 
Carter, I feel unable to resist the conclusion th a t  the absolute prohibition of the 
alienation in freehold to non-natives cannot be maintained, so long as the
o  1
position with regard to native owned land remains as at present. 1
^ A g .  G overnor (Carter)  to C.O., 21 April 1920, C 053G /100 .  See also C a r t e r ’s m e m o ran d u m  of 
21 April 1920, cited by B atte rbee in m in u te  of 21 Novem ber 1920, on C oryndon  to C.O., 22 
S ep tem ber  1920, CO536/103.
’’^C oryndon  to  C.O., ibid.
'^ C .O .  to Governor, 18 J a n u a ry  1921, C O 536/103 .
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Actually, C a r te r  was not an independent observer in these discussions. On the basis 
of his land com m ittees ’ recom m endations, he was an  arden t  supporter of the  freehold land
o o
tenu re  system in Uganda. L His defence of the mailo ow ner’s right to dispose of his land 
as he wished was probably an indirect a t te m p t  to  fu r ther the campaign for the freehold 
system  of tenure th roughou t the P ro tec to ra te .  He possibly though t  th a t ,  if the right of 
the  mailo owner was sustained, it would be very difficult to refuse the G overnm ent the 
power to dispose of Crown lands in freehold. Nevertheless it m ust be rem em bered th a t  
C a r te r  by then was very experienced in U ganda’s legal m atte rs ,  having been on the  bench 
for alm ost two decades during which he was involved in all the im p o rtan t  cases dealing 
w ith  the  agreem ents — as yet no t overruled. His persistent warnings of possible legal 
action  and suggestions th a t  the prohibitions on transfer  were in breach of the spirit and 
possibly the letter of the B uganda  Agreement m ight well have been genuine. The 
Colonial Secretary evidently considered them  serious enough to w a rran t  a change of 
policy.
Interestingly, the Colonial S ecre tary ’s decision did not end the m atte r .  W hen, 
tow ards  the end of 1921, the G overnor com m unicated  to the Lukiiko an outline of the 
d ra f t  rules for regulating the alienation of mailo land to non-natives, the Lukiiko 
im mediately passed a resolution preventing the B aganda  from selling their mailo land to 
non-natives. This resolution was politically m otiva ted  to counteract  w h a t  the B aganda  
feared was a scheme to deprive them  of their lands. The s i tuation  was particularly  
volatile because of the stories coming through to U ganda  of Europeans displacing natives
*> 9
from their land in the newly proclaimed Kenya Colony.
However, by then the general a t t i tu d e  of m ost of the local officials was against the
9 O
■^Thomas and Spencer, Uganda Land and Survey, at pp.52-53, 55, and 63. 
0,,Ag. Governor to C.O., 7 November 1922, C 0 5 3 6 /1 2 1 .
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system  of freehold in U ganda, preferring instead g ran ts  of leasehold or righ ts  of 
occupancy. Hence the Lukiiko resolution was no t only welcome, bu t (knowing of course 
th a t  the resolution could be w ithdraw n a t  any time) the G overnm ent w an ted  to go one 
step  further and ensure t h a t  it remained a  p erm an en t  policy in B uganda as in the rest of 
the P ro tec to ra te .  Several proposals were p u t  forward for effecting this policy. For 
instance, the conference of provincial commissioners suggested the conclusion of a 
supplem entary  Agreement w ith  the B uganda adm in is tra t ion  prohibiting  the alienation of 
mailo land to non-natives. On the o ther hand Jarv is ,  the A cting Governor, th o u g h t  th a t  
the purpose could best be achieved by enacting  P ro tec to ra te  legislation possibly after
9 i
seeking the consent of the Lukiiko, which, he was confident, would readily be g ra n te d .01 
T he A ttorney-General of Uganda, Hogg, on the  o ther hand , opposed both  of these 
proposals. He argued th a t  the right of the B aganda  to sell their  land in freehold to non­
natives with certain safeguards, was “solemnly guaran teed  under our law" and  therefore 
could not be removed w hether by supplem entary  A greem ent or by P ro tec to ra te  
legislation. Any further a t t e m p t  to  restr ict th a t  right would, in his opinion, co n s t i tu te  a 
violation of “a well known legal m axim  th a t  you cannot derogate from your own 
g ra n t” .35
At the Colonial Office, in a jo in t  m inute , B atterbee  and Bushe came up with yet 
ano ther  proposal: legislation by the Lukiiko. They argued th a t  since the  n a tu re  of the 
mailo was established by the Lukiiko Land Law, 1908, which also imposed certain 
restrictions on its transfer, “There ... could be no doub t as to the power under the
34Ibid.
o r
Memorandum of 24 October 1922, enclosure, ibid. The maxim which apparently the 
Attorney-General was referring to was unsuccessfully invoked in the case of The North Charterland 
Exploration Company ( 1910) Limited y The King (1931), 1 Ch. 169. The Court dismissed the 
argument by the Plaintiff (based on Campbell y Hall 1 Cowp. 204) that if a grant were made by 
the Crown without reserving the power to revoke, it could not go back on its grant - even by an 
Order in Council because that would still be its act. Luxmoore, J., held, at p.179, that this 
doctrine did not apply to land granted by the Crown. Moreover, in his opinion, the Crown could 
not deprive itself of its paramount right to legislate for the protectorate, pp.186-187.
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[B]Uganda Agreement of the  Lukiiko to pass such a law [i.e. incorporating  the resolution] 
any more than there was of their power to pass the 1908 law” . In the circumstances, they 
th o u g h t  th a t  a  special Agreem ent was unnecessary, and they rejected the idea of a 
P ro tec to ra te  legislation.^^
Batterbee and B ushe’s proposal had the advan tage  th a t  it did not entail direct 
G overnm ent involvement in the mailo land m atters ;  bu t there were still a few problems to 
be solved. The Lukiiko in its resolution m ade it clear th a t  it did not w ant sale of mailo 
land to non-natives in any circumstances. Its prohibition thus included sale of mailo land 
resulting from a court order (e ither for a t ta c h m e n t  to  satisfy judgm en t debts or 
foreclosing m ortgaged land) which all along was the only exceptional circumstance 
wherein the ban to sell to  non-natives did not apply. T he Conference of the provincial 
commissioners strongly supported  prohibition even in these circumstances, and the 
Colonial Office was quite sym pathetic .  But since the Lukiiko under the Agreement, had 
no jurisdiction to legislate for E uropeans, doub t was expressed as to whether it could 
legally prevent them  from partic ipa ting  in a sale ordered by the courts.
Eventually, it was decided th a t  the best course was for the Lukiiko to enact a law 
prohibiting mailo owners from selling their land to  non-natives. But as regards 
preventing non-natives from buying this land w'hen sold under court order, in view of the 
uncerta in ty  as to whether the Lukiiko laws were binding on them , the Governor was 
instructed  to enact a law in the Legislative Council which prohibited non-natives from 
partic ipa ting  in any forced selling of mailo land as long as the B uganda Lukiiko law still 
remained in force.
^M inutes of 3 June and 5 June 1923.
37C.O. to Governor, 1 February 1923, 00536 /1 2 1 .
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There is no record th a t  the Lukiiko ever enacted  the law as proposed. As for the 
P ro tec to ra te  legislation, it was not until 1944 th a t  the relevant law was enacted. 
Evidently both  the Lukiiko and the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent allowed the m a t te r  to drop. 
For purposes of this investigation though, these discussions illustra te  the general belief 
th a t  legally the G overnm ent had no power to intervene in m atte rs  relating to mailo 
land. Of course, as some of the m inutes testify, it was not a question of legal 
consideration per se. Policy also played a crucial role.
10.5 R ig h ts  over M in erals
The issue of rights over minerals in B uganda  also dem onstra tes  the assumed legal 
limits of the G overnm en t’s claims to  land in Buganda. Article 17 of the Agreement 
provided th a t  “rights to all m inerals found on private  estates shall be considered to 
belong only to  the owners of those estates, subject to a 10 per cent ad valorem  duty  which 
will be paid to the Uganda adm in is tra t ion  when the minerals are working” . In con tras t,  
Article 7(4) of the U ganda O rder in Council, 1902, prescribed th a t  “All mines and mineral 
being in, under, or upon any land in occupation of any native tribes or any members 
thereof, or of any person not possessed of the righ t to  work such mines and minerals, shall 
vest in the Commissioner ... in the like m anner as the mines and the minerals being in, or 
under any Crown lands” .
It was not till around 1918, when ex p a tr ia te  Firms s ta rted  showing real interest in 
exploring for minerals in Uganda, th a t  the issue of mineral rights in Buganda came to the 
fore. Since gold and silver were, of course, the  m ost precious minerals and the most likely 
to a t t r a c t  prospectors, the G overnm ent sought to lay claim to them  even where found on
*>8' Land Transfer Ordinance, Laws of Uganda, 1951, 3: chapter 114.
9Q
Even though the Indian Land Acquisition Act, 1894, empowered the Crown to acquire 
compulsorily land for public purposes, as late as 1936 Governor Mitchell was still in doubt whether 
legally those powers could be invoked in Buganda. Mitchell proposed to resolve the issue by a 
entering into an Agreement with the Baganda. See Mitchell to Bottomley, 3 November 1936, 
C 0 5 3 6 /1 90/40171.
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mailo land. Hogg, the P ro tec to ra te  A ttorney-G eneral ,  advised Governor Coryndon th a t  
the  words “all m inerals” in Article 17 of the A greem ent (cited above), did no t include 
gold and silver. Hogg theorised th a t ,  under the  English common law, the Crown had a 
prerogative right over gold and silver, and th a t  a g ran t  of land by the  Crown, except 
where expressly s ta ted ,  was presumed not to have included these precious minerals. In 
his opinion the Crown enjoyed all the prerogative rights of the Sovereign in B uganda 
“except where they have been expressly limited by the [B]Uganda Agreem ent” . Since the 
Article did not expressly m ention gold and silver, he concluded th a t ,  if these minerals 
were ever found, they would be G overnm ent property . Hogg, however, conceded th a t  the 
m a t te r  was quite  complicated and ought to  be referred to the Law Officers of the  Crown 
in London for an au th o r i ta t iv e  ruling.4^ T he G overnor agreed with the suggestion and 
urged the Colonial Secretary to accept it “in view of the im portance the Native 
G overnm ent a t ta c h  to their rights under the ... A greem ent” .
Eventually  the reference to the Law Officers was made, b u t  not before Bushe and 
Risley had exposed w ha t  they considered to be misconceptions in the A tto rney-G enera l’s 
argum ent.  Bushe though t  th a t  the la t te r ’s theory was based on a presupposition th a t  the 
Crown had acquired rights over gold and silver in B uganda prior to the Agreement. Such 
an assum ption could only be sustained, in his view, if it were further presumed th a t  a 
declaration of a p ro tec to ra te ,  per se, conferred upon the Crown all prerogative rights in 
respect of such te rr ito ry ,  as existed in England. “T h is” , he said, “appears to  me to  be an 
impossible task ” ."** Moreover, even if the position were to be considered after the 1900
^O pinion  of 6 December 1918, enclosure Governor to C.O., 3 January 1919, C 0 5 3 6 /9 3 .  The 
Attorney-General had in mind the case of Woolley v Attorney-General of Victoria (1877), L.R. 2 
Appeal Case 163. In the British Central Africa Protectorate case, Crown Prosecutor v The British 
Central Africa Com pany, Official Gazette, 1901, p.30J, the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa held 
that the “royal mines” concept did not apply to land granted to Europeans prior to the declaration 
of the B.C.A. Protectorate because by then the Crown had not claimed the minerals.
But see Lord Denning, thirty seven years later, in Nyali Ltd v Attorney-General, jl956j 1 Q.B  
1, at p. 16, where he held that the prerogatives of tlie Crown applied in its protectorates as part of  
“the substance of the common law”.
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A greem ent, he m aintained th a t  it would still be the same, since neither the  Agreement 
nor the 1902 O rder in Council purported  to give the Crown prerogative righ ts  over gold 
and  silver.4^
Risley agreed with him, and he revealed th a t  the question of the r igh t of the Crown 
over the “royal mines” of gold and silver in p ro tec to ra tes ,  had in fact been reported  upon 
by the  Law Officers in a reference from the  Solomon Islands P ro tec to ra te .43 The 
substance of their report, he explained, was th a t  the Crown had no righ t to the minerals 
under lands in occupation of the natives either by v irtue of the p ro tec to ra te  or on the 
basis of a provision of an Order in Council which applied the general law of England to 
the p ro tec tora te ,  such as Article 20 of the Pacific O rder in Council, 1893, in case of the 
Solomon Island; or the 1911 U ganda Order in Council. Nevertheless, Risley said, 
according to the report, the Crown, if it so wished, could acquire th a t  righ t by an Order 
in Council specifically declaring th a t  the right to  the minerals lay with the Crown. Risley 
presumed th a t  Article 7(4) of the U ganda O rder in Council was specific enough to satisfy 
the requirements of the Law Officers’ report. However, he suggested th a t  in the case of 
Buganda, it was arguable th a t  this provision had to be read subject to Article 17 of the 
Agreement which was prior to it.
Surprisingly, Risley did not try  to support  his a rgum ent by reference to  the Katosi 
v Kahizi precedent th a t  the agreem ents prevailed over the Order in Council. Instead he 
came up with his own theory th a t  under proviso 1 to Article 28 of the 1902 O rder in 
Council, “any law, practice or procedure” which was established by or under the Africa 
O rder in Council, 1889, and had not been superseded by its provisions or by any 
Ordinances made thereunder,  remained in force until o ther legislative measures were
^ M in u te  of 13 February 1919, on Governor to C.O., 3 January 1919, C 0 5 3 6 /9 3 .  
43L.O.R., 29 January 1912, no. 152, vol. , 7.
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m ade. Since there was no doub t  in his view th a t  under Article 16 of tlie Africa O rder in 
Council, the Buganda Agreement had effect as p a r t  of the law to be enforced in B uganda ,  
and th a t ,  according to this Article, where the Agreem ent was inconsistent with the  O rder 
or any law in force in England, the provisions of the  Agreement prevailed, he suggested 
th a t :
It may therefore be argued th a t  Article 17 of the U ganda A greem ent was a 
“law ... established ... under the Africa O rde r” and, as such, saved by proviso 1 
to  Article 28 of the 1902 Order.
Risley reinforced his a rgum ent by referring to the definition of “Crown lands” in Article 2 
of the 1902 Order in Council which he claimed, clearly limited such lands, when s i tua ted  
in B uganda, to lands which were public lands by v irtue  of the B uganda A greem ent, “and  
the corollary would appear to  be th a t  the O rder in Council must also be read subject to 
any provision of the [BiUganda Agreement as to lands, o ther than public lands s i tua ted  in 
the Kingdom of jB]Uganda” . ^
It m ust be emphasised th a t  the theory which Risley was advancing was totally  
different from the Katosi v Kahizi precedent. Risley was in effect saying th a t  the 
Agreem ent was a “law” under the Africa O rder in Council, which was saved by Article 
28(1) of the 1902 Order in Council. Any provisions of the Agreement which had not been 
superseded by the la tter O rder or ordinances m ade thereunder, continued to  be law in 
B u g a n d a .^  Thus, in his a rgum en t,  the mailo owners were not entitled to the mines and  
minerals on their land because the Agreement prevailed over the Order or any o ther 
legislation in the P ro tec to ra te ;  ra ther,  it wras the fact th a t  the provisions of the  
A greem ent which guaranteed their rights had not been superseded by subsequent 
legislation.
^Minute of 21 February 1919. 
^°See also above at pp. 156-157.
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In the reference to the Law Officers which was accompanied by a  background 
a rg u m en t  (based on the substance of Risley’s m inutes)  their opinion was requested on the 
following questions:
1. W hether they agreed w ith  the report of their predecessors regarding the right 
of the Crown to minerals in the Solomon Islands P ro tecto ra te .
2. If so, w hether Article 7(4) of the  Uganda O rder in Council consti tu ted  a 
specific requisition by the Crown of all m inerals in Uganda.
3. If so, w hether Article 17 of the A greem ent was superseded by Article 7(4) of 
the Order in so far as the minerals found on mailo land were concerned and 
consequently was not saved by proviso ( l )  to Article 28 of the Order.
4. As the a l te rna t ive  to questions (2) and (3), w hether Article 7(4) was to be 
construed as a specific acquisition by the Crown of the property in all mines 
and minerals in U ganda excluding those found in Buganda.
In their report the Law Officers expressed to ta l  support  for the opinion of their 
predecessors, and with regard to the rest of the questions, they responded th a t  Article 
7(4) of the O rder had to  be construed with reference to Article 17 of the Agreement, th a t  
is “minerals found on private  esta tes  in the Kingdom of [B]Uganda being excluded as 
being the property of a person possessed of the righ t to work such mines and minerals” . 
Moreover, in their view, the words “all m inerals” included gold and silver. The Law 
Officers disagreed with the theory of “mines royal” postu la ted  by the U ganda Attorney- 
G eneral. It was true, they said, th a t ,  according to the English common law, gold and 
silver presumptively belonged to the Crown and th a t  a g ran t of land by the Crown would 
no t pass such minerals except where expressly s tated :
But it m ust be doubted w hether an agreem ent with native Chiefs with 
reference to the G overnm ent of a P ro tec to ra te  is to be construed as a g ran t  from 
the Crown. The basis of a g ran t from the Crown is th a t  the property gran ted  is 
vested in the Crowm, w'hereas none of the mines in Uganda were so vested at the 
time of the Agreement of 1900.
For these reasons, in their opinion, the property in all mines and minerals in Uganda was 
by virtue of Article 7(4) of the Order vested in the Crowm, with the exception of those 
found on mailo land.'*
^6 Report of 16 April 1919, annex C.O. to L.O., 5 March 1919, CQ 536/98.
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Since the background information to the  reference was based on Risley’s m inutes,  
presumably the Law Officers accepted his general theory for holding th a t  Article 17 was 
law in B uganda  until it was superseded by legislation. B ut it m ust be stressed th a t ,  from 
a reading of their report by itself, one could not be absolutely certain th a t  th a t  was 
indeed their  view. This point is im p o rtan t  because if Risley’s theory were accepted it 
m ean t th a t  the Governor could enact legislation to override the mailo holders’ mineral 
rights. There  is no evidence to suggest th a t  th is  possibility was even considered by the 
Colonial Office. In any case it would most likely have been rejected on policy grounds.
G overnor Coryndon, learning of the Law Officers’ response to  his enquiries, 
a t te m p te d  to negotiate  with the Buganda au tho ri t ies  for a supplem entary  Agreement 
whereby the mailo owners would surrender all their rights to minerals on their land in 
re turn  for the G overnm ent offer of its ten per cent ad valorem  du ty  enti t lem ent.  The 
main reason given for wishing to acquire mineral rights was th a t  the Governm ent w anted 
to enact uniform mining laws applicable to  the whole P ro tec to ra te ,  which was then 
impossible because of the p rivate  rights in Buganda. The B aganda, however, had no 
in terest in the G overnm ent offer, preferring to stick to their rights under the Agreement.
Subsequent negotiations, in 1928, w ith even more “generous offers” from the 
G overnm ent,  were to no avail. By then the G overnm ent was concerned th a t  the mailo 
owners m ight refuse to work the minerals on their land or, even more likely, f rustra te  
efforts of prospective investors wishing to mine in U ganda by denying them  permission to
A H
prospect on their lands.'1 N egotiations having failed, the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent tried 
to handle this problem by claiming th a t  it was entitled  under Article 17 of the 
A greem ent, to call upon mailo owners either to  work their minerals or to let others do it. 
This claim was based on the theory devised by the A ttorney-G eneral of Uganda,
^ A g .  Governor to C.O., 7 September 1929, C 0 6 9 1 /2 9 0 0 8 .
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A bra hams ,  t h a t  since under  t his Article the  Governmen t  was ent it led to a ten per cent ad  
valorem  duty ,  “when the  minerals are worked” , there was an implied obligation on the 
mai lo owners to work the  minerals.  On this assumpt ion a  provision was incorporated  in a 
dra f t  Mining Ordinance  giving the Governor  power to g ra nt  mining leases on mailo land 
wi th the consent of the  mailo owner,  but ,  if such consent  were wi thheld,  and in the 
opinion of the Governor it was in the public interest  t h a t  mining should proceed on the
par t icular  es tate,  he could g rant  the  lease, notwi ths tanding the  refusal of the  mailo
48owner.
Th e provision was however vetoed by the  Colonial Office. Bushe advised th at ,  
a l though the G o v e rn m en t ’s desires were laudable,  they were inconsistent wi th the 
Agreement .  In his opinion,  an obligation to work minerals contradic ted  the “absolute 
ownership” vested in the  mailo land holders,  “a n d ” , he added,  “we must  not  be swayed by 
modern not ions of the r ights of the S ta t e  in regard to undeveloped land or minera ls  which 
20 years ago had hardly been heard of, much less developed” . According to his 
in terpre ta t ion,  the words referred to in Article 17 m eant  t h a t  if and when the mailo 
owners worked the minerals the S ta t e  would be ent it led to a  ten per cent ad valorem  
duty .  But ,  quite significantly,  he pointed out  th a t  a fur ther quest ion could be considered 
as to whether ,  irrespective of the Agreement  the Gove rnment  could impose the proposed 
obl igat ions  in the interest  of the Sta te.  Bushe, however,  quickly added th a t  such 
considerat ions  were m a t te rs  of policy and not  of law.
Th e Governor was told th a t ,  in the opinion of the Colonial  Office’s legal advisers,  
the  provision could not be justified legally. Significantly,  it was indicated to h im too th a t  
the  Colonial Secretary considered whether ,  no twi ths tanding the Agreement ,  it was
i o
‘'"Memorandum Blair, Commissioner of Mining, “Amendments and additions required to bring 
mailo land in Buganda under the Mining Ordinance,” enclosure ibid.
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justif iable  on grounds of public in terest to impose the provision. The le t te r  stated th a t  
the  Minister had decided against it because the probable political outcry  was bound to 
overshadow the as yet unproved b e n e f i t s .^  This obviously m eant t h a t  if there were 
compelling reasons, the  A greem ent could have been disregarded. It m u s t  be said th a t  
such express indication th a t  the Agreem ent could be discarded if it suited the British 
policy makers, was very rare during the period under consideration. Indeed, as we shall 
see later, it was only subsequently, after a  lengthy discussion, th a t  it was finally decided 
th a t  the Agreem ent was not legally binding.
F u r th er  a t te m p ts  to  persuade the B uganda adm in is tra tion  to  surrender the mineral 
rights  received a very demoralising blow from the Kabaka. Politely, bu t firmly, he 
indicated to the G overnor th a t  it was useless to pursue the m a t te r  any more, since, even 
if his G overnm ent was willing to give up these rights, it had no power to do so, the rights 
having been accorded to the individual mailo owners under the Agreement. This response 
led the Colonial Office to in s truc t the  Governor to  consider any discussion of the mineral 
rights issue as closed, a t  least for the time b e i n g . D u r i n g  the period under investigation, 
the G overnm ent did not a t tem p t  to exert any further claim over minerals in Buganda.
1 0 .6  C r o w n  la n d  b y  “v ir tu e  o f  th e  p r o te c to r a te ”
A brief digression is necessary to con tras t  the position in B uganda with the rest of 
the  P ro tec to ra te ,  in which, except in Ankole and Toro, the Crown did not acquire any 
land rights by trea ty  or g ra n t .1)1
49C.O. to Governor, 19 July 1929, C 0691 /2 9 0 0 8 .
,)9Covernor to C.O., 11 June 1931; and C.O. to Governor, 19 August 1931, C O /536 /165 .
'^Article 4 of the Ankole and Toro agreements, respectively, stated that “All waste and 
uncultivated land which is waste and uncultivated at the date of the Agreement, ... shall be 
considered to be the property of the Crown ... .” Under Article 7, the King and a few of the most 
senior chiefs were granted estates ranging between ten to sixteen square miles (the King had fifty) 
“out of the waste lands” . Logically this meant that their grants were from Crown land. It has 
been suggested that for this reason the Ankole and Toro grantees, unlike their Baganda 
counterparts, held their land subject to the Crown Land Ordinance, 1903, Morris and Read, 
Uganda, ( he Development of its Laws and Constit u( ion, p.34 1.
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It will be recalled th a t ,  following the Law Officers’ report of 1899, Crown land was 
defined to  include “all public lands in U ganda which are subject to the control of His 
M ajesty by virtue ... of His M ajes ty ’s P ro te c to ra te ” . W hereas in B uganda  the problem 
was one of determ ining the C row n’s share and  righ ts  under the  A greem ent, in the rest of 
the P ro tec to ra te  it was one of deciding which lands fell w ithin this definition. In practice 
the la t te r  was not easier to resolve than  the  former. According to the Law Officers’ 
report,  all w aste  and uncultivated  lands in the  terr itories  of “uncivilised” tribes came 
within the C ro w n ’s control “by virtue of the  P ro tec to ra te” . B u t which lands were to be 
regarded as “w aste” or “uncu lt iva ted” or “unoccupied” ? W ere grazing lands included? 
W h a t ab o u t  the lands which were deliberately left to  lie fallow? At w h a t  point in time 
was it to be determined w hether any land was w aste  or unoccupied: was it the da te  of 
the O rder in Council, or of the declaration of the  P ro tec to ra te ,  or was it to be done on an 
ad hoc basis? Were the respective custom ary  system s of tenure  relevant in determ ining 
w hat was w aste or uncultivated  lands? Finally , which tribes were to  be regarded as 
“uncivilised” for this purpose? These and m any other questions faced the adm in is tra to rs  
charged w ith  the duty  of disposing of Crown lands in both U ganda and the E ast  Africa 
P ro tec to ra te .
T he Ennis C om m ittee , earlier referred to, recommended enactm en t of a law 
declaring th a t  all land and rights therein (including minerals, w ater,  forests etc) were the 
property  of the Crown until the contrary  was proved, or where the Commissioner 
recognised any individual ti t le  in respect there to .  It supported  its proposal mainly on 
three grounds. Firstly, Johnston  had already declared in a  circular he issued in 1900, 
supra , th a t  by virtue of trea ties  and agreem ents  the G overnm ent had acquired the sole 
right of disposing of all w aste  and uncu ltiva ted  lands. Secondly, it was convenient, 
especially, the C om m ittee  hoped, as it would p u t  an end to  the problems of identifying 
Crown lands by the ill-defined test as to w he ther it was w aste or uncultivated  land, and,
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moreover,  would ensure Go ve rnmen t  control over all the land. Finally,  on legal grounds,  
the  Commi t t ee  premised th a t  no person could pass a  bet ter  ti t le than  he himself held, and 
(citing West lake)'’2 an uncivilised tr ibe could g ra n t  only such rights as it unders tood and 
exercised:
If this be so nat ives  could not pass,  even wi th the sanction of the 
Commiss ioner,  the  full property in the  soil, and some form of grant  from the 
Crown would have to be made to secure a  definite property in the soil.
Probably ,  by this the  Com mi t tee  mean t  t h a t  it was essential for the Crown to acquire
t i t le to the land so as to assure grantees  a full t i t le.  It is noteworthy th a t  the C ommit tee
emphasised the need for saving individual na t ives ’ land rights because “it would appear
doubtful  whether the  Governmen t  could declare occupied lands as Crown lands simply,  a
course which might  be held to extinguish the  r ights  of the occupiers wi thout  their free
consent” . Precedent  for the type of legislation the  C ommit tee  had in mind was found in
Ceylon,  where, under  its Crown lands Ordinances ,00 all lands were declared Crown lands
until  the contrary was proved.  The Commi t t ee  recommended t h a t  similar legislation be
enacted in Uganda.
When these proposals  were presented to the  Colonial Office, Risley immedia tely 
expressed his s t rong dou bt s  about  the legality of declaring all land in the Protec tora te  
Crown lands:
In a p ro tec to ra te  where II.M. claims only jurisdict ion,  I do not think t h a t  
legally he had any right  of dominion in the  soil so as to be able to g ra nt  any 
estates;  it w[oul]d seem tha t  we can only deal wi th it (“by sufferance” ) by way 
of grants  in the  na tu re  of licences to occupy and th a t  only as regards waste  and 
uncul t ivated  lands.
Risley expressed a fear t h a t  dealing with the land as proposed by the Ennis Com mi t tee
r  o
zThe report did not specify the particular work but the relevant passage is in The Collected  
Papers, p p .146-147. W estlake’s views were partly based on the American case of Johnston v 
McIntosh 8 W heaton’s Supreme Court Reports (21 U.S.) p.543. But in Paolucci y The  
Commissioner of Mines, supra, the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa rejected as a generalisation a 
submission, based on the foregoing opinion, that the chiefs in the British Central Africa 
Protectorate were incapable of understanding the concept of land ownership.
^°Ceylon Ordinances, no. 12 of 1840; no.l of 1844; no.l  of 1897; and no.5 of 1900.
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m ight lead to  future legal problems with the  g ran tees 1 titles being challenged by the 
natives claiming ownership of tfie soil.0 * In his opinion, the Ceylon s ituation  which the 
C om m ittee  sought to use as a precedent was easily distinguishable from th a t  prevailing in 
Uganda. In the former, where R om an-D utch  law was the general applicable law, unlike 
the  English Com mon law feudal system  of land tenure, the land was not regarded as held 
from the Crown as Lord p a ram o u n t .  Secondly, unlike Uganda, Ceylon was a colony: “one 
does not feel the same difficulty abou t  vesting lands in the Crown by s ta tu te  until the 
con tra ry  is proved in the case of a colony ... as in case of a p ro tec to ra te” . On these 
grounds he thought th a t  a t  least for the time being, the U ganda G overnm ent ought to 
abs ta in  from dealing w ith  any lands outside the  three agreem ents d is tric ts  (i.e Ankole, 
Toro  and Buganda) where ti t le  was granted  to  the Crown.
However, Cox tho u g h t  otherwise. He m inuted  th a t  he felt “ less hesitation  than  ... 
Risleyj does in legislating to give the  Crown rights over land in a  p ro tec to ra te” . In his 
view “unless the. right to  legislate as regards ownership of land was expressly reserved” 
the cession of jurisdiction  to  the Crown to make laws for peace, order and good 
governm ent,  sufficed to justify  legislation in favour of the Crown in respect to the land. 
Similar views were expressed by A ntrobus, A ssistant-U nder Secretary. He stressed the 
point th a t  the only restr ic tion  on the power of the Crown in U ganda, was where it was 
imposed under the three respective agreements. A final decision as to w hether to accept 
these proposals was, however, postponed pending com m ents thereon from the newly 
appoin ted  Governor, Bell . 0 0
It is surprising th a t  neither of the legal advisers recalled the Law Officers’ report of
He warned that legal proceedings were already under way in the Gambia Protectorate 
involving land claims. Minute of 26 October 1907, on Ag. Commissioner to C.O., 26 August 1907, 
C 0 5 3 6 /1 4 .  Compare above at p. 106 et seq.
°°M inute Cox, 27 October 1907, and minute Antrobus, undated, on C.O. to Governor, ibid. 
Also C.O. to Governor, 8 November 1907, C 0 5 3 6 /1 4 .
1899.<>() As may be remem bered, Ilisley's a rg u m en t  was identical to B ram s to n ’s which 
dom inated  the Colonial Office th roughout the last decade of the nineteenth cen tury  before 
the Law Officers in te rvened . ^
Similar legal problems were being faced in U g a n d a ’s neighbouring P ro tec to ra te ,  the 
East Africa P ro tec to ra te .  Its Governor, Sadler (formerly Commissioner of Uganda), 
called the Colonial S ecretary ’s a tten t ion  to a po tentially  volatile legal and adm in is tra tive  
problem regarding native owned lands which had been disposed of by the  G overnm ent. 
He reported th a t  in previous years g ran ts  and leases had been made to  expatr ia tes  
w ithou t in some cases sufficient investigation to ascerta in  th a t  the land was not claimed 
by the natives, while in o ther cases natives were paid four shillings per acre for their  land, 
which only covered compensation for the crops and  buildings but did not include loss of 
ti tle  to the land. As a result a group of natives were reportedly preparing to  institu te  
legal proceedings aga inst the G overnm ent and the gran tees to recover w ha t  they claimed 
was their land. Sadler w arned th a t  they had a good chance of winning because the High 
C ourt  judges had privately expressed a view th a t  tr ibal  lands were not Crown lands and 
therefore could not be disposed of by the G overnm ent.
According to Sadler, the im mediate problem was not only in the vagueness of the 
definition of w hat were “tr ibal lands’' or “unoccupied” or “w aste” lands, and so on but 
also the growing fear th a t  the assumption all along m ade th a t  the Crown, by v irtue  of the 
P ro tec to ra te ,  was entitled  to dispose of the “w aste and unoccupied lands” could be 
contrad ic ted  by the judiciary  in absence of agreem ents  with the native chiefs making 
these lands over to the Crown. As a precautionary  measure, Sadler proposed th a t  the
56 Yet barely two m on ths  earlier  in a reference to the Law Officers regarding the C ro w n ’s right to 
the land in Swaziland, (lie report  was cited, see C.O. to  L.O., (5 Septem ber 1907; and L.O. to C.O., 
25 Sep tem ber  1907, L .O .R . N o.86 vol. 7.
57 See chap te r  five.
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G overnm ent should en ter  into agreem ents  with the various chiefs of the territories where 
there was dem and for land, to surrender to the Crown whatever rights  their tribes had to 
the land .58
Ironically, all previous adm in is tra to rs ,  it will be remembered, in the E as t  Africa 
P ro tec to ra te  and in U ganda had denied th a t  there  were chiefs in the region with whom  to  
t re a t  to acquire land rights. Indeed in the reference to  the Law Officers in 1899, em phasis  
was laid on this very point. Had the chiefs then been discovered, or was it a mere change 
in tactics to suit the circum stances? W hatever the reason, it was quite clear th a t  the  
confidence inspired by the Law Officers' Report was being shattered  by doubts.
A conference a t  the Colonial Office, a t ten d ed  by Coombe, the Crown Advocate for 
the East Africa P ro tec to ra te ;  Hollis, its Secretary for native affairs; and Ellis, considered 
the m a t te r  raised by the Governor. The three agreed th a t  the question of determ in ing  
which lands were Crown lands “by virtue of the  P ro tec to ra te” was obscure, and  they 
endorsed Sadler's proposal to en ter  into agreem ents with the relevant local chiefs.5^ On 
the o ther hand, A ntrobus  and Cox felt th a t  the opinion of the Law Officers ought first to  
be sought before proceeding w ith  any proposal. It was then th a t  the 1899 Law Officers’ 
report was drawn to C ox’s a t t e n t i o n . ^  In terp re ting  this report to mean th a t  lands 
acquired “by virtue of the P ro tec to ra te” did not include lands which were ac tually  
occupied or cultivated  by the  natives, Cox was convinced th a t  if w hat the G overnor 
reported were true, there was a s trong  cause for concern about the possibility of g ran ts  
m ade by the G overnm ent being nullified. T o  av e r t  the risk, he also agreed with the 
G overnor’s proposition to t o agreem ents with the chiefs.
58Covernor to C.O., 8 May 1908, C 0 8 7 9 /9 9 .
^ M in u te  Ellis, 10 September 1908, ibid.
^ M in u te s  Antrobus of 25 September and Cox of 6 and 30 September 1908, ibid. In C o x ’s 
minute of 9 October 1908, he confessed that lie had forgotten about the Law Officers’ report of  
1899, if he ever saw it.
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Although instructions were sent to the G overnor to proceed as he had proposed, 
a p a r t  from the 1911 Agreem ent with the M asai, there is no evidence of any o ther  formal 
agreem ents  w ith  chiefs of the  o ther t r ibes .^1 Nor is there any evidence to indicate th a t  the  
fears expressed by Sadler inhibited the East  Africa P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent from 
disposing of lands occupied or used by the natives. On the con tra ry ,  according to  some 
researchers, disposals of such lands continued u n a b a te d .^
W ith  reference to U ganda, the Colonial Office in M arch of 1908 approved in 
principle the  recom m endations of the Ennis C om m ittee  to declare all land in U ganda 
Crowm lands unless proved otherw ise.^0 The C om m ittee  members subsequently 
subm itted  a  d raft  O rdinance, the Crown Lands (A scertainm ent) Ordinance, which 
followed the lines of the Ceylon Crown Lands Ordinances as they had suggested. In 
substance, the bill provided for a rebu ttab le  presum ption th a t  all land in U ganda was the 
property of the Crown. W here any specific land was required by the G overnm ent,  it was 
prescribed th a t  the G overnor would invite any person claiming ti t le  thereto to lodge the  
same; if after lapse of three m onths no person satisfactorily proved his title, the land 
would irrevocably become the property of the Crown.
This draft  was approved by the Colonial Office w ithout any demur. Even Risley, 
who had earlier expressed some misgivings abou t  the legality of this type of legislation, 
agreed. He claimed th a t ,  according to the Law Officers’ report of 1899 (which he had
^*C.O. to Governor, 1 November 1908, C 0 8 7 9 /9 9 .  The 1911 Masai Agreement replaced the  
earlier 1906 Agreement. For a general background to these agreements, see Mwangi wa-Githumo,  
Land and Nationalism , pp.223-211; Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement ini K enya, 
pp. 190-209.
^ M w a n g i  wa-Githumo, ibid., p.216; Sorrenson, ibid., p p .184-189. G.A. Mungeam, British Rule 
in Kenya, at p.201, observes that both the Colonial Office and (lie local Government were unable 
to withstand the settlers’ pressure for land.
^ M in u te  Butler, 15 January 1912, on Governor to C.O., 4 August 1911, C 0536 /42 .
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overlooked) “the question had been resolved in favour of the Crow n.” (i* Risley did no t 
elaborate ,  but it is evident th a t  the Law Officers’ report  had since been reconsidered and 
given a  much wider in te rp re ta t ion  th an  th a t  earlier a t t r ib u ted  to  it by Cox.6  ^ T he  Law 
Officers had justified all the  land legislation made by the Commissioner which otherw ise 
were illegal, on the grounds of the Act, of S ta te  doctrine .66 Presum ably  it was on th is  
basis too th a t  Risley concluded th a t  the issue had been resolved “in favour of the 
C row n” .67
The Crown Lands (A scerta inm ent)  Ordinance was enacted in 1912, bu t was never 
actually  brought into force. T he im m ediate  reason for this was a realisation th a t  
according to its provisions, if any native proved continuous occupancy of land for a  period 
of twelve years or more, since the enac tm en t of the Ordinance, he would acquire a 
prescriptive ti tle  against the G overnm en t.00 This  defect could, of course, have been 
rectified by appropria te  am endm en t to the O rdinance, bu t by then there was no urge to  
proceed with the legislation as there was hardly any dem and for land by expa tr ia tes .  T he 
few there were, were directed to B uganda which was regarded as more politically secure 
than  the rest of the P ro tec to ra te .
It was ten years later th a t  ano ther O rdinance, the Crown Lands (D eclaration)
^ C o m m e n ts  in the margin on minute ibid. See also C.O. to Governor, 6 March 1912; also the 
Law Officers’ report of 18 August 1908 (L.O.R. N o .102, vol. 7), in relation to Gambia  
Protectorate. Having been told that “there was no civilised sovereign of the country, but merely a 
number of tribal chiefs none of whom possessed the attributes of sovereignty” the Law Officers held 
that in the circumstances the Crown was entitled to enact a law declaring all vacant land Crown 
land.
°°A b ove p. 235. Cox had by then left the Colonial Office and replaced by Risley.
6 6 Above at p. 127.
67 In the East Africa Protectorate, under the Crown Lands Ordinance, 1915, “Crown land” was 
defined as including land which was under the actual occupation of the natives. Because of this 
definition, and the annexation of that Protectorate, it was held in Wainaina y Murito (1921) 9 
K.L.R.102, at p.104, that the natives’ title to land was thereby extinguished.
68Thomas and Spencer, Uganda Land and Survey, p.54.
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Ordinance, 1922, was enacted to replace the 1912 O rd in a n c e .^  The new O rdinance 
provided th a t  any land (including rights therein) in the P ro tec to ra te  which was not 
claimed within twelve m onths  from the da te  of its com m encem ent, namely, 22 March 
1922, except where it had been recognised or was thereafter recognised by the Governor 
under a docum ent as the property  of any person, was to be presumed the property of the 
Crown. Sections 4 and 5 provided for the appo in tm en t of a Special Commissioner who 
was empowered to carry ou t  inquiries and to  report to the G overnor whether any claim 
preferred to any land as aga inst  the Crown w-as established. Where a claim was proved, 
the Governor wras to  issue an order vesting the land in the c la im ant,  wdio would 
thereupon be placed in possession of the land. The main difference betw'een this and the 
Ordinance it replaced was th a t  in its case, after the twelve m onths, the C row n’s rights 
over all lands not claimed within th a t  period was complete and irrebuttab le ,  unless if
7  1
proved as abovementioned. Indeed, as it tu rned  out, according to Thom as and Spencer, 
no native claims of any sort w-ere ever lodged wdthin the period, and in fact none w'ere 
seriously contem plated  as no a t te m p t  was m ade to advertise the law . '^  Consequently, all 
custom ary claims to land outside Buganda, were relegated to those of tenan ts  a t  will of 
the Crown. Their legal position w'as not any different from th a t  of their bre thren in the 
Kenya Colony even though their C ountry  was till a P ro tec to ra te .  Elders of Busoga who 
in 1930 wanted to in s titu te  legal proceedings to challenge the legislation which declared 
their “trad it ional lands” Crown land, were sadly advised by their lawyer th a t  th a t  avenue
^ L a w s  of Uganda, 1923, lx h a p ter  100.
7 n
/ sections 2 and 3. The Governor reported that the Buganda administration was not consulted  
before the Ordinance was enacted because Crown land had nothing to do with it, see A.G. 
Governor to C.O., 16 September 1922, CO 536/120.
71a t  was held by the East Africa Court of Appeal in the case of R v Jiwabhai (1957/58), 8 
U.L.R. 21, that under section 2 of the Ordinance once it was proved that land was in Uganda  
Protectorate, the presumption arose in favour of the Crown that the land was Crowm land “It 
would then be for the defence to rebut it by proof of one or the other of the matters mentioned  
therein” , (p.26).
72‘ Thom as and Spencer, Uganda Land and Survey, p.55. The Colonial Office, contrary to the 
advice and request of the local officials, insisted that the Ordinance had to be given wide publicity 
throughout the country, see minute Bottomley of 1 1 December 1923, and a telegram to the 
Governor of the same date, 0 0 5 3 0 / 2 0 .  Apparently the instructions were ignored.
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was closed, and their only chance was to seek a political solution. °
10.7 S U M M A R Y  A N D  C O N CLU SIO N
The evidence examined in this chapter indicates that doubt lingered long after the 
1902 Uganda Order in Council as to the extent of the Crown’s power to deal with land in 
the Protectorate. This doubt was not unique to Uganda but occurred also in other
n a
protectorates.' As we saw in chapter five, in the last decade of the nineteenth century, 
one of the main reasons against declaring Crown lands in a protectorate was tha t  it could 
be interpreted as annexation of the territory. In the period discussed in this chapter, 
there is no evidence tha t  such a fear was still sustained, the Law Officers and subsequent 
judicial precedents having held that the Crown could not be forced to annex a territory 
against its will. The problem of conceptualising the English feudal common law of real 
property in the context of a protectorate, which was regarded as a foreign territory and 
thus its land not owned by the Crown, continued to haunt the legal advisers. The 
problem was eventually solved by reading into the 1899 Law Officers’ report (which for 
some time had been overlooked by the Colonial Office legal advisers) power to make 
legislation giving the Crown rights over land in the protectorate. Probably this power 
was justified on the Act of State doctrine which w’as mentioned in the Law Officers’ 
report.
With regard to Buganda, the position was quite clear to the extent that the 
Crown’s rights were spelt out in the Agreement. Partly due to the conceptual doubts
Busoga chiefs petition of 8 August 1931, enclosure 8 August 1931, C 0 5 3 6 /1 8 2 /2 3 6 2 9 .  In 
1957, in the case of 1^  v Jiwabhai, supra, an attempt to rebut the presumption that certain land in 
Busoga was Crown land by proving that it was hereditary customary land was rejected by the 
Court.
^ F o r  example, John Hookey, “Jurisdiction in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate” , argues 
that in the Solomon Islands Protectorate, prior to the first World War, the Colonial Office 
regarded the Crown’s jurisdiction, by virtue of the Protectorate, as limited to people and did not 
extend to the land, pp.102, et seq. Lindley, The Acquisition and Covernment of Backward 
Territory, at p.24, wrote that a mere establishment of a protectorate did not entitle the protecting 
Power to deal with private land rights in the territory except where the land was expressly granted 
to it by the owners, or w here they acquiesced.
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mentioned above,  and partly because the Agreement  was still held to be a legally binding 
docum ent  dur ing this period, the  Crown was restr icted to only those powers and r ights 
which could positively be read in the Agreement .  For  this reason,  it would seem the  
P ro tec to ra te  Government  abs ta ined from enact ing law's dealing wi th  mai lo land: ins tead 
it drafted the  laws and called upon the  Lukiiko to perform the  enactm ent .  
Supplementary  agreements were also negot iated in order to extend the  G o v e rn m en t ’s 
powers over the land. It must  be emphasised,  though,  t h a t  it wras not  merely a ques tion 
of legal consideration which precluded the Governm ent  from asser t ing powers beyond 
those conceded to the  Crown in the Agreement .  Evidence indicates t h a t  politics also 
played an impo r t an t  role. A clear example was the mineral  r ights controversy;  the  
Colonial Secretary made it clear t h a t  he could have authorised the  disregarding of the  
Agreement  had the ci rcumstances  justified it. Nevertheless,  the issue of the  binding legal 
na t u re  of the Buganda Agreement  was resolved only much lat ter  and af ter a lengthy 
discussion.
In the next chapter  I examine the judicial  intervent ion w'hich led to a legal 
breakthrough for the Protec tora te  Government .
C H A P T E R  11
THE JUDICIAL B R E A K T H R O U G H
As lawyers know all too well, the law is hardly ever certain,  especially if the s t a tu te  
law is general or ambiguous ,  as long as it lacks judicial  precedents  from the  higher courts.  
Even then the  precedents,  irrespective of the courts which set them,  would have to 
wi ths tan d  the  various legal techniques in tended to limit ,  weaken or dist inguish them, 
before they could safely be relied upon to establ ish the  law. One of the major  problems 
which the  legal advisers of the  Crown faced was t h a t  there were few judicial  precedents  to 
guide them.  The paucity of legal precedent is qui te unders tandab le  since the people who 
were most  likely to be affected by the exercise of Brit ish power were not  in a  position to 
challenge its exercise through judicial  proceedings. In this chapter ,  1 examine the role of 
the  judiciary  in resolving the issue of the  ex ten t  of the C ro w n ’s legal powers and 
autho r i t y  in its protec tora tes  and how this subsequently affected the position in Buganda.
11 .1  T h e  F o r e ig n  J u r i s d ic t io n  A c t ,  1890
We have seen t h a t  a t  the t ime of the en act m en t  of the  Foreign Jur isdict ion Act  in 
1890, there was doubl as to whether  the Crown could exercise jurisdict ion in foreign 
countr ies over persons o ther  than  British subjects.  Th e unders tanding of the  Foreign 
Office, which sponsored the bill in Pa r l iament ,  was t h a t  the Act  did not,  and indeed could 
not ,  confer jurisdict ion on the  Crown over non-Bri ti sh subjects because t h a t  was an issue 
of in ternational  law which could not be resolved by municipal law.* Notwi ths tand ing 
this,  the  preamble of the subsequent  Orders  in Counci l,  including the 1902 Uganda Order
 ^Above at pp. 72- 74 .
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in Council, as a s tandard  practice specified th a t  the O rders  had been m ade uby virtue, 
and in the exercise of tlie powers on this behalf by the Foreign Jurisdiction  Act, 1890, or 
otherwise in Her Majesty vested ....” A num ber of issues were eventually raised in the 
courts  in this regard. W as the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, applicable to persons o ther 
than  British subjects? If it was, did it enable the exercise of such ample powers as were 
assumed by the Crown in some of the Orders in Council? Irrespective of this Act, did the 
Crown have plenary powers in its p ro tec tora tes?  W h a t was the legal significance of the 
trea ties  between the Crown and the local sovereigns?
In Uganda, as we have already seen, the High C ourt  in a num ber of cases 
m ain ta ined  a view th a t  the C ro w n ’s powers were subject to the agreements. We shall 
re tu rn  to the position in U ganda after a general review of the most per tinent judicial 
decisions from other jurisdictions th a t  led to  a breakthrough.
11 .2  T h e  K in g  v  C r e w e  E x  P a r t e  S e k g o m e “
T he British C ourt  of Appeal case of H v Crewe is generally regarded as the first to 
expose the ex tent of the C row n’s legal powers in its p ro tec to ra tes .  The case related to an 
application for a writ  of habeas corpus  by Sekgome, a Chief in the  Bechuanaland 
P ro tec to ra te ,  who was allegedly detained under a P roc lam ation  which w'as invalid and 
thereby he was unlawfully held. T he application  was unsuccessful bu t in the process 
several legal principles were established. F irs t,  it was held th a t  a p ro tec to ra te ,  according 
to  English consti tu tional law, was not within the C ro w n ’s dominion; it was a foreign 
terr ito ry . It was noted by Lord Justice Kennedy th a t  the  fact the Crown created and 
controlled all the th ree branches of government in Bechuanaland P ro tec to ra te  did not 
affect its s ta tu s  as a foreign terr ito ry  because the Crown said so; and no one can force the
9
Crown to annex a terr itory  if it did not w an t  to . ’’ Consequently , the C ourt  concluded 
th a t  the Foreign Jurisdiction  Act, 1890, was applicable to Bechuanaland Pro tec to ra te .
2(1910 C.A. (2) K.13.576)
3At p.616 .
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Second, it was held t h a t  all persons, including non-Bri ti sh subjects,  within a Bri t ish 
protec tora te  were subject to the  Foreign Jur isdict ion Act.  Interest ingly,  one of the  
judges,  Vaughan Williams L.J.,  ci ted wi th approval  the  views of W.E.  Hall ( Foreign 
Jurisdict ion of the  British C r o w n , a t  pages 220-222),  t h a t  this Act  was probably only 
intended to deal with British subjects.  Yet he held that:
... the in terpre ta t ion which has been ac ted upon for so many years in Orders  
in Council and the Proclama t ion thereunder  applying the  provisions of the  
Foreign Jur isdict ion Act,  1890, to nat ives of such foreign countries  as well as to 
British subjects resident in or resorting to such foreign countries  makes it 
impossible to ado pt  the in terpre ta t ion suggested by Mr Hall.'*
Lord Just ice Vaughan Will iams did not elabora te ,  but  it is obvious  th a t  he w'as mindful
of the re sul tant  legal and admin is t ra t ive  confusion if the  C our t  were to reverse the
interpre ta t ion.  As we have seen, all Orders  in Council recited t h a t  they were made
pursuant  to the  provisions of the Foreign Jur isdict ion Act.  Consequent ly a cont ra ry
judicial decision would have mean t ,  for instance,  th a t  these Orders  and the proclamat ions
made thereunder ,  in so far as they purpor ted to apply to non-Bri t ish subjects were null
and void.
Having found t h a t  the Foreign Jurisdict ion Act was appl icable to protec tora tes  and 
all persons wi thin,  the Cour t  next  considered the issue of the  extent  of the Crown 's  
powers under its provisions. In this regard it agreed wi th the  submission for the Crown 
th a t  the words  in Section 12 of the  Act,  t h a t  Orders made in pursuance of powers 
conferred upon the  Queen under the Act “shall have effect as if enacted in this Ac t” , gave 
to the Orders  the effect of an Act  of Par l iam ent ,  and therefore they could not  be 
questioned in Cour t ,  except on grounds  of repugnancy.^ Moreover,  the Cour t  cont inued 
th a t ,  under Section 1 of the Act,  the powers and jurisdict ion acquired  by the  Crown were 
to be exercised “as in a ceded or conquered ter r i tory .” Since the  powers of the Crown in
4 At p.626.
5 At pp. 594, 597, and (51 1-613.
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conquered territories were absolute, except or until P ar l iam en t  intervened, the  C ourt  of 
Appeal reasoned th a t  by analogy the Act authorised the Crown to exercise unlimited 
powers in the terr itories  to  which the Act was applied. T h e  result, V aughan  Williams, 
L.J., concluded, “is t h a t  the Foreign Jurisd ic tion  Act, 1890, gave to Her M ajesty  absolute 
powers to say what law should be. applied  in those terr ito r ies  outside Her M ajes ty ’s 
dominions .... [T]he Queen may make such laws as she pleases.’’* 89
11.3 Act o f  State
Finally, the C o u rt  held th a t  irrespective of the Foreign Jurisd ic tion  Act, the
exercise of the C row n’s powers in British pro tec tora tes  was unchallengeable in municipal
courts  because it was an Act of S ta te ."  W h a t  is an Act of S ta te? T he C o u rt  in R v
C rew e, did not expand, but earlier, in 1906, Lord Justice F le tcher M oulton, in the. Privy
Council case of Salaman v Secretary of S ta te  for India, defined an Act of S ta te  as:
... essentially an exercise of sovereign power, ... which hence can n o t  be 
challenged, controlled or interfered w ith  by municipal courts. Its sanc tion  is not 
th a t  of law, but th a t  of sovereign power and, w hatever it be, municipal courts  
m ust accept it as it is, w ithou t question. B u t it may, and often m ust be p a r t  of 
their duty  to take  cognizance of i t .8
T hree  pre-requisites were laid down for the application of the  defence of Act of S tate: the 
ac t  can only be com m itted  in a foreign country; if it is against people (or their  property) 
they m ust be foreigners; and it m ust be au thorised  or ratified by the C row n.9
Long before the  judgem ent of R v C rew e, there were a num ber of Indian Privy
6p. (507. But F.T. Piggott,  The Law Relating to Consular .1 urisdiction and Residence in
Oriental Countries, at pp. 20-27, argues that section 1 of the Act only entitled the Crown to
exercise powers “as in a ceded or conquered territory” in so far as the powers had been acquired.
^Pages 606 and 624.
8 [1906] 1 K.B. 613, at pp. 639-40. For an account of the historical origin of the defence of Act 
of State, see generally William Harrison Moore, Act of State in English Law (London, John 
Murray, 1906). Also Kato, L.L., “The Act of State in Protectorates - in Retrospect,” 1969, Public 
Law, 219-235.
9 K. Pollack, “The Defence of the Act of State in relation to Protectorates,” 1963, 26 M.L.R. 138, 
139 et se.q. For a criticism of “the minimum requirements” of Act of State, see a recent case Nissan 
v Attorney-General (1967) 2 All. L.R. 1238, 1248.
Council cases, some going as far back as the  m id-nineteenth  century , wherein it had been 
held th a t  m a t te rs  involving trea ties  between the  various Indian protected  s ta tes  and the 
C row n, were Acts of S ta te  and therefore were not justic iable in the municipal c o u r ts . 10 
In view of these decisions it is surprising th a t  the High C ourt  of U ganda  and indeed the 
Colonial Office did not refer to them  when dealing with the case of Katosi v K ahizi, and 
o ther related cases . 11 Perhaps one of the  reasons for this was the  uncerta in ty  of the 
s ta tu s  of the African type p ro tec to ra tes .  T he case of R v C rew e, affirmed th a t  all 
p ro tec to ra tes ,  irrespective of the powers assumed therein by the Crown, were foreign 
terr ito r ies  thereby facilitating the application  to them  the defence of Act of S ta te  and  the 
Foreign Jurisdiction  Act.
In subsequent cases in which the exercise of the C row n’s powers were in issue, the 
defence of Act of S ta te  was invariably pleaded by the G overnm ent. Reference has been 
m ade to The Masai C ase, which was decided only a year after R V C rew e, where the 
C o u rt  of Appeal for Eastern  Africa held th a t  violation of the Masai t rea ty  by the  Crown 
was not justic iable in the P ro tec to ra te  courts  because it was an Act of S ta te .  However, 
the cause celebre in this regard is the Privy Council case from Swaziland, Sobhuza H v 
Miller and o thers . 12 In this case the Privy Council was em phatic  th a t ,  as far as the 
courts  were concerned, the subsequent exercise of the C row n’s powers in p ro tec to ra tes  
was not subject to l im itations in trea ties  or conventions ( including those by which 
jurisdiction  was originally acquired ) made with the local rulers or o ther powers.
10For example. Secretary of State for India y Kamachee Boye Sahaba (1859) Moo Ind. at p. 
476; The Imperial Japanese Court v Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation C o . (1859) A.C. 
614.
1 ' However, as we have seen above, the Law Officers suggested the Act of State as a possible legal 
defence in the event of challenge of the Crown’s acquisition of land in Uganda and the East Africa 
Protectorate.
^ 1 9 2 6  A.C. 518. Unsuccessful attempts were made in subsequent cases to distinguish Sobhuza, 
e.g. Hoard Te Heu heu Tukino y Aotea District Maori Land Board (1941) A.C. 308; Nya 1 i Ltd y  
Attorney-General (1957) A.C. 253.
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To sum up the position, the overall effect of the foregoing cases is th a t  w hether by 
v irtue of the Foreign Jurisdiction  Act, or the C row n’s Com mon law' prerogatives or by 
simply invoking the defence of the Act of S ta te ,  according to the English municipal law', 
the C ro w n ’s powers outside the realm were plenary.
11.4 The P ara d o x  o f  the  Judic ia l R ole
A uthors  Jennings and Young (C onsti tu tional Law of the British E m pire ) , * 0 explain 
th a t  the judges, especially in the n ineteenth  century , did not construe the C row n’s powers 
so widely because they assumed th a t  the ex ten t of the C row n’s jurisdiction  had to be 
measured by reference to in terna tional law. This approach , they claim, was influenced by 
the theory th a t  in terna tional law' was par t  of the law of England.*'* According to 
Jennings and Young, once this theory was rejected the courts  concerned them selves with 
only English C onsti tu tional law' as the determ ining  factor of the C row n’s ju risd iction  and 
pow'ers outside the British te r r i to ry .*0
The foregoing observation of the learned writers is undoubtedly  correct. In fact, as 
may be recalled from previous chapters ,  the  Law Officers in the late n ineteenth  century  
w'ere a t  pains to justify the  expansion of the C row n’s judicial and other powers in British 
p ro tec to ra tes ,  on the basis of changes in in terna tional law. The cases referred to above 
made a clean break from the previous legal reasoning. It is evident from these cases th a t  
one of the main objectives of the judiciary  in construing t he C row n’s powers so widely 
was to facilitate British colonialism. This was actually openly adm itted  in R v C rew e, by 
Lord Justice Farwell. He s ta ted  tha t :
*°()xford, Clarendon, 1938.
* * Ibid., at pp. 4-8. They attributed a similar approach to both Hall (in his Foreign Jurisdict ion 
of the British Crown; and Jenkyns (in his British Rnie and Jurisdiction Beyond the Seas) : “They  
[Hall and Jenkyns j were concerned in the first instance; with the powers wdiich a state might by 
international law, exercise within the territorial limits of another.”
* ’’They cite as authority \ \  est R and M i n i n g Co. Ll d y R ex (1905) 2 K.B. 391 (CL A.); and 
Commercial  and Estates C o . of Egypt y Board of Trade (1925) K.B. 271.
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The t ru th  is th a t  in countries inhabited by native tribes who largely 
ou tnum ber white population  such acts  [Habeas Corpus, M agna Carta] ,  a lthough 
bulwarks of liberty in the  United Kingdom, might, if applied there, well prove 
the dea th  w a rran t  of the whites. When the S ta te  takes the responsibility of 
P ro tec to ra tes  over such terr itories , its first duty  is to  secure the safety of tfie 
white population  by whom it occupies the land, and such duty  can best be 
performed by a responsible officer on the spot. There are many objections to the 
government of such countries from Downing Street, bu t the G overnor’s position 
would be impossible if he were to be controlled by the C ourts  here, ac ting  on 
principles adm irab le  when applied to ancient well ordered Sta te , b u t  ruinous 
when applied to semi-savage t r i b e s . ^
W hether or not the judicial action was justified is a  m a t te r  for debate . Critics may 
argue, rightly so, th a t  the judiciary  abandoned  its trad it ional role to control the  executive 
in the  British p ro tec to ra tes  in order to further British interests. Moreover, the  judiciary 
could also be accused of m anipu la ting  legal principles to  achieve desired political goals. A 
case in point is the holding th a t  no terr itory  was a British dominion, in spite of the 
powers assumed and exercised therein by the Crown, unless the Crown said so. This 
decision enabled the application  of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act and the defence of Act of 
S ta te  to British p ro tec to ra tes  and spheres of influence.
On the o ther hand, in the prevailing circumstances, -the judicial reluctance to 
intervene in the adm in is tra t ion  of British protec tora tes  is perhaps understandable. 
F irstly , the judges, far removed from reality, were in the worst position to  control the 
adm in is tra to rs  on the spot. In any case judicial control is im p o rtan t  if the  people are 
aw are  of their legal rights and utilise the courts to enforce them . This, of course, was not 
the case during the  period investigated. Secondly, as this study has shown, the law was 
unclear. Lawyers, writers and ad m in is tra to rs  were confused in their endeavor to apply 
English and In ternational law principles to a totally different environm ent.  Their task 
was complicated by the diversity of communities a t  different level of developm ent and 
organisation. They resorted to legal techniques (typical example are the  numerous
16 Pages 615-616. See also t he Masa i ( -ase,, supra, at p. I 10.
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trea ties) in order to satisfy w h a t  they deemed to be the legal requirements. T he  result 
was contrad ic tion  and conflict in the in terp re ta t ion  and application of the law. T h ird ly ,  a 
s tr ic t  application  of British or In ternational law principles was not necessarily in the  best 
in terest  of the colonised people.
In view of the foregoing points  it is subm itted  th a t  the judiciary should not be over­
criticised when in the end it declared th a t  it had no control over the exercise of the 
C ro w n ’s powers in British p ro tec to ra tes .  It was left to the Crown to determ ine, as a 
m a t te r  of policy, the na tu re  and ex ten t of the power it wished to assume and exercise in 
each particu la r  region or P ro tec to ra te .  Theoretically it m eant th a t  the colonised people 
were thereby exposed to a rb i t ra ry  adm in is tra tion . In practice, political expediency in fact 
exerted great control over th e  adm in is tra t ion .  The clearest evidence of this are the steps, 
described below, which the U ganda P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent took following the  High 
C ourt  ruling in Rex y Beswcri K iw annka, over the legal efficacy of the B uganda 
Agreement.
How did the developm ents in the judicial reasoning affect the legal position in 
B uganda? This is next to be considered.
11.5 The Jud ic ia l  D e v e lo p m e n ts  in B u ganda
It has been argued above th a t  since the case of Katosi v Kahizi, the assum ption  
both in London and U ganda was th a t  the agreem ents with B uganda (as well as Ankole 
and Toro) w'ere legally binding. It was not until 19?>0, in the case of Rex v Baganda 
Coffee C om pany th a t  the judiciary  first expressed doubt abou t the legal significance of 
the Buganda Agreement. Some of the facts of this case have already been dea lt  with.
1911 , in the Masai Case, although Chief Justice Carter held that the Masai Agreement was  
not justiciable, he affirmed the precedent of Katosi y Kahizi as regards the Ankole, Buganda and 
Toro agreements.
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Briefly, it was contended by counsel for Ihe accused th a t  the Ordinance which his client
was alleged to have violated was invalid as it did not comply with the 1900 Agreement
(Article 5). Counsel claimed th a t ,  where the Crown acquired a terr itory  by a t rea ty  it
was bound by its provisions; accordingly the Crown, as instanced by the G overnor and
the Legislative Council of the U ganda  P ro tec to ra te ,  could not legislate for the Kingdom
1 ftof B uganda  in contravention  of the Agreement.
Sir Charles Griffin, Chief Justice  of Uganda, in dismissing the appeal remarked
th a t:
It has been contended th a t  in in terpre ting  s ta tu te s ,  they m ust be read and 
applied as subject to existing re levant T reaties  and cases were cited in which 
courts  have so expressed themselves. It will, however, be found on examination 
th a t  the opinions only applied in cases where a s ta tu te  contains an_express 
reference to a T re a ty ,  so as to incorporate  it in the  s ta tu te  and so make it par t  
of the s ta tu te .  Otherwise the term s of a T rea ty  are not par t  of the municipal 
law and give no right of action and afford no grounds of defence to private  
individuals. A T rea ty  is not the creature  of the legislature and is not m ade by
the legislative au tho ri ty  so as to bind the subject or to afford the subject rights
19in a court.
The foregoing rem arks were m ade obiter d i c tu m  as the C ourt  found th a t  the Ordinance 
was not inconsistent with the A greem ent as alleged by counsel. Griffin did not com m ent 
on the case of Katosi v Kahizi and the o ther cases which followed it; neither did he cite 
any au thorit ies  for his s ta tem en t,  though, as he says, many were cited by both sides in 
the proceedings. However, as we have already seen, the judgm en t excited the 
P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent which was then grappling with the issue of whether it had the 
power to enact legislation imposing charges and fees upon the Baganda — in B uganda — 
w ithou t  the consent of the K abaka and the Lukiiko.
T he issue of the legal significance of the B uganda Agreement did not arise again in
1ft°Sec M em orandum  of appeal (updated)  Crim inal  Sessions case No.5 /30  e n d .  Ag. Gov. to C.O. 
29 A ugust 1930, C 0 5 3 6 / 1 GO/21525.
^ A t  p. 37, supra. See ch a p te r  8 for the reasons for not expressly incorporating  the Agreem ent in 
the U g anda  Order in Council.
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the  courts  until a lm ost seven years later in the case of Rex v Besweri K iw anuka . ^  T he  
case originated in the District C o u rt  of K am pala  and went on appeal to the High C ourt .  
T h e  gist of the case was as follows: K iw anuka was alleged to have stolen the sum  of th ree  
hundred  and ninety shillings from the Buganda adm inis tra tion . It was not in d ispute  
t h a t  the accused was a M uganda; and his lawyer claimed th a t  for this purpose the 
com pla inan t was also a “M u g an d a’' . Counsel claimed th a t ,  according to  the B uganda  
Agreem ent, subject to two exceptions, the B uganda courts  had exclusive jurisd iction  in all 
cases in which the parties were Baganda. The two exceptions to this rule occurred, 
firstly, where a  case was transferred  by the Buganda courts to the British courts  under 
the provisions of the Proclam ation  of 1917 or under Article 3 of the 1905 B uganda 
( jud ic ia l)  Agreement; and secondly, where the case came within the purview of clause 2 of 
the aforesaid Proclam ation . He subm itted  th a t  his clien t’s case did not fall in any of 
these exceptions and therefore on the au tho ri ty  of Katosi v Kahizi it ought to be 
dismissed by the Court for w an t  of jurisdiction.
Against th is  argum ent,  the  Solicitor-General of U ganda subm itted  for the Crown 
th a t  the jurisdiction  of the High C ourt ,  under Article 15 of the 1902 O rder in Council, 
was complete over all persons and m a tte rs  in the P ro tec to ra te .  In cases such as the one 
before the C ourt ,  he asserted th a t  its jurisdiction was concurrent w ith th a t  of the 
B uganda courts. The Solicitor-General sought to distinguish the case of Katosi v Kahizi 
on the grounds th a t  it did not concern the B uganda Agreement and th a t  it arose from an 
a t t e m p t  to transfer  to the British courts  a case which had originated from a native court  
whereas in the case before the C ourt ,  the proceedings had, from the first instance, been in 
the  British courts. In addition , he subm itted  th a t ,  since the decision of Katosi v K ahiz i , 
the law had been enriched by a num ber of reported cases especially Sobhuza H v M iller.
^ C iv i l  Appeal no. 38 of 1937, unreported, end. Governor to C.O., 12 July 1937,
C 0 5 3 6 /1 9 5 /4  0199.
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Following the principles enunciated by the la t te r  case, he m aintained th a t  a trea ty  could
o  1
not override any P ro tec to ra te  legislation.
T he High C ourt ,  presided over by Hall C .J.,  and Francis J.,  agreed with the 
a rgum en t of counsel for the accused th a t  his submissions were supported  by the  precedent 
of Katosi v Kahizi which, the C ourt  emphasised, was based on the opinion of the 
Secretary of S ta te  given under Section 4 of the Foreign Jurisdiction  Act. As for the 
Solic ito r-G enerars  endeavour to distinguish th a t  case, the C ourt  observed th a t ,  if 
any th ing ,  the language of the B uganda  A greem ent (Article 5) was stronger th an  th a t  of 
the  Ankole and  Toro agreem ents in so far as it unequivocally s ta ted  th a t  in th e  event of 
conflict between the Agreem ent and any laws made for the P ro tec to ra te  the former would 
(w'ith regard to Buganda) prevail; whereas the predominance of the provision of the
9 9Ankole and Toro agreem ents over the P ro tec to ra te  laws was ju s t  inferred.
Moreover, the C o u rt  noted , though the Order in Council came into force in 1902, it 
was nevertheless deemed necessary to enter into the U ganda (Judicial) Agreem ent, 1905, 
Article 3 of which empowered the Commissioner (with the consent of the K abaka) to 
transfer cases involving only the Baganda to the British courts:
Such words [in the opinion of the Court: would appear to be unnecessary if the 
High C ourt  was then deemed to have full au thority  under Article 15 [of the  1902 
Order], for we can hardly think th a t  a mere question of procedure such as 
transfer between C ourts  would require such an e laborate  foundation as the 
Agreement.
It seemed to the Court, tha t :
... clause 3 of the 1905 Agreement, was, a t  th a t  time, rightly or wrongly, 
considered necessary in order to remove cases from the Native C ourts  which 
were thought to have exclusive jurisdiction despite the Order in Council. T he 
recitals to  the A greem ent of 1905 ... are significant in this connection.
9  i
'Ibid. See also the Solicitor-General’s semi-private letter to Bushe, 26 November 1937, and 
Governor to C.O., 2 July 1937, supra.
9 9  “^Article 7 of the Ankole and Toro agreements (respectively) prescribed that the districts would 
be subject to the same laws and regulations as were generally in force throughout the Protectorate.
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F urth erm o re ,  the Court remarked th a t  it was significant th a t  the recitals to the 
B u g an d a  courts  proc lam ations of 1909 and 1917 expressly declared th a t  they were m ade 
w ith  the consent of the Kabaka, chiefs and people of Buganda. Although the possibility 
th a t  the  consent was obtained as m a t te r  of courtesy could not be ruled out, in the opinion 
of the C ourt  the m ost likely explanation was th a t  as late as 1917, the adm in is tra t ion  still 
deemed th a t  such consent was n e c e s sa ry .^
Addressing itself to the cases cited by the Solicitor-General dealing with the  s ta tu s  
of the treaties  vis-a-vis the C row n’s powers, the C ourt  noted th a t  the cases were of such 
high au tho ri ty  th a t  they could not ju s t  be ignored. Faced with this d ilemma the C ourt  
felt t h a t  the best and safest course of ac tion  was to subm it ano ther reference to the 
Secretary of S ta te  under Section 4 of the Foreign Jurisdiction  Act to resolve the issue: 
w he ther  the K abaka  of B uganda had, under the 1900 Agreement, exclusive jurisdiction  in 
cases between natives of Buganda (except as above mentioned) or w hether the British 
C o u rts  by virtue of the 1902 Order had concurren t jurisdiction in such cases, a p a r t  from 
the provisions of the judicial Agreem ent and the P roclam ation  of 1917. This issue was 
identical to the one raised with the sam e office in the case of Katosi v Kahizi except of 
course the la t te r  related to the Ankole Agreement.
11.6 D isc u ss io n s  a t  th e  C o lon ia l  Office
R oberts-W ray , Assistant Legal Adviser, who was assigned to the task of un tangling  
the legal position, noted th a t  the m a t te r  needed to be discussed. But he felt th a t  the 
reference was misconceived. In his opinion the Secretary of S ta te  could only be called 
upon under section 4 of the Foreign Jurisd ic tion  Act, where a court required to know 
w hether or not the Crown had jurisd ic tion  “under T rea ty ,  g ran t,  usage, sufferance, and 
o ther  lawful m eans” in a particu lar  foreign terr itory . But where the Crown had in fact
23 See discussion above at pp. 172-179.
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exorcised tlie powers by an Order  in Council then,  in his view, it was for the cour t  to 
in terpre t  its effect. Thus ,  strictly speaking,  Rober ts -Wray thought  t h a t  the proper 
response to the High Cour t  was th a t  it ought  itself resolve the  issue it posed by 
det ermining whether  or not  under the 1902 Order  in Council the  High C o u r t  had
O  A
jur isdic t ion over cases in which only the  Bag anda  were in v o lv ed / '1 Nevertheless,  
Rober t s -W ray  argued t h a t  on the author i ty  of Sobhuza H v Miller, where, as under  the 
1902 Ug anda Order  in Council,  the powers to legislate was unl imi ted,  no Ordinance  
would be challenged on account  of its being inconsistent  wi th a t rea ty.  He explained 
away the  opinion of the Secretary of State,  in 1907, in the case of Katosi  v Kahizi on the 
grounds  t h a t  it was given before the law was sett led by the Privy Council in this 
decision.^0
Similar views were expressed by Bushe who had succeeded Risley as Legal Adviser 
to the Colonial Office. Bushe claimed th a t  he had often doubted the opinion given in 
Katosi  v Kahiz i . He commended his predecessor for his dissent ing views in t h a t  case 
” “which everybody ignored'1 but  had since been vindicated by the Privy Counci l in 
Sobhuza H v Miller. On the  basis of the lat ter  case, Bushe said t h a t  there was hardly any 
doub t  left t h a t  the C ro w n ’s jurisdict ion in the Uganda P ro tec to ra te  was manifested by 
the  1902 Orde r  in Council which overrode the agreements  and the  Proclamat ion of 1917. 
Consequent ly ,  in his opinion,  jurisdict ion of the High Court  was concurrent  with t h a t  of 
the  nat ive chiefs.
The other  officers of the depa r t m en t  were mystified by the  exposition of the
0  4
See also above at p. 1G8.
o r
Roberts-Wray thought that in any case it was arguable that the High Court’s jurisdiction was 
either by sufferance or on the interpretation of the agreements, concurrent with that of the 
Buganda courts, minutes of 23 September 1937, on Governor to C.O., 12 July 1937, supra. See 
also Bushe’s semi-official letter to the Solicitor-General of Uganda, 1 November 1937, (supra).
■^Minutes of -1 August, and 28 September 1937; and minute Flood, 5 October 1937.
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lawyers.  Bot tomley,  in his minutes ,  summed  up somewha t  satirically the  legal posit ion as 
meaning that :
... by Order  in Council or by Ordinance  under Order  in Council,  we have 
undone the  reservat ion in the original Agreements  t h a t  native legal m a t t e r s  
should be sett led by the  three Native governments .  T h a t  view is held in spite of 
the  fact in the case of Buganda it was considered necessary to ob ta in ,  by an 
amending Agreement  wi th the nat ive Go vernmen t ,  the  power even to t ransfer a 
case from the native  cour ts  to the P ro tec to ra te  cour t.
However,  Bottomley cautioned agains t  rushing back with this response to the 
U ganda  High Cour t  before discussing wi th the Governor  of Uganda the possible political 
repercussions of the judicial  decision. This point  was also stressed by Bushe.  He 
explained t h a t  in his minutes  he was only t rying to ascer tain wh a t  the legal posit ion was, 
but  he was aware  t h a t  there might  be a need to look into the political aspects  of the 
m a t te r .  Bushe advised th a t ,  if it appeared t h a t  the  legal position conflicted with the 
political requirements,  appropr ia te  procedures could always  be taken to amend  the law
o  n
accordingly/  1
Mitchell,  the Governor  of Uganda,  happened to be in England.  In a meeting with 
Flood,  he confirmed t h a t  if it were publicly announced t h a t  the High C our t  had parallel 
jurisdict ion in Buganda wi th the nat ive courts this might  lead to considerable difficulties 
for his adminis t ra t ion ,  since the Baganda regarded the  Agreement  “with  almost 
superst i t ious  reverence.” Nor did he think t h a t  it was politically feasible for the  Baganda 
to agree to enter into a supplementary  Agreement  as they always suspected the  mot ives  
behind such proposals.  In the ci rcumstances , both  Mitchell  and Flood suggested t h a t  the 
best  solution,  if it were legally possible, was to am end the  Courts  Ordinance to provide 
t h a t  the  High Cour t  had no jurisdict ion in nat ive  cases in Buganda except  as was
o o
provided for in the A g r e e m e n t /  However,  according to Bushe, their proposal  was not
^ M in u te  of 1 October 1937. 
^ M in u te  Flood, 26 October 1937.
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legally possible since, in his view, any a t te m p t  to  limit the powers of the  High Court  
(which was com plete under the O rder in Council) by an Ordinance, would “obviously” be 
ultra vires. In any case in B ushe’s opinion the problem  was not so much with the High 
C o u r t ’s jurisdiction as with the subord inate  courts  established by the C o u rts  Ordinance. 
For this reason he suggested th a t  the High C o u r t ’s jurisdiction ought to be left in tact,  
and instead am endm ents  be m ade to  the C o u rts  O rdinance to  exclude from the 
jurisdiction of the  subord inate  courts  all cases in Buganda which only involved the 
Baganda. Jurisdiction  in these cases would be reserved to the B uganda  courts  in
oq
accordance with the provisions of the Agreement.
In the m eantim e, a short  response limited to  answering the legal question was
despatched to the High C ourt  of Uganda. The C o u r t  was told th a t  by the  1902 Order in
Council, His M ajesty had expressed the ex tent of His jurisdiction in Uganda:
Such m anifesta tion  may be regarded as an Act of s ta te ,  unchallengeable in 
any British Court ,  or may be a t t r ib u ted  to s ta tu to ry  powers given under the 
Foreign Jurisdiction  Act. T he Order is not subject to the A greem ent and 
Proclam ation  referred to.
The despatch avoided d ic ta ting  to the Court  how the  the provisions of the O rder ought to 
be in terpre ted , since th a t  was deemed to be the du ty  of the the C ourt  to work out. But 
“for such assistance as it may afford" the C o u rt  was told th a t ,  in the opinion of the 
Secretary of S ta te ,  it seemed to follow th a t  an O rdinance made under powers conferred by
the O rder in Council could not be subject to the provisions of the A greem ent which had 
30no legislative effect.0
^M inutes  of 28 October and 2 November 1937.
°^C.O. to Governor (for transmission to the High Court), 13 November 1937, 
C 0 5 3 6 /195/40199.
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11 .7  T h e  O u tc o m e
Curiously,  the decision of the High C our t  in Hex v Besweri Kiwanuka was never 
repor ted  in the  Uganda Law Repor ts  series which were, by then,  in their s ixth volume. 
For such an impo r t an t  case one wonders  whe ther  the  omission was not del iberate for fear 
of publicity which might  have engendered political problems for the G o v e r n m en t .^ 1 
However,  there is no doubt  t h a t  the  issue of the legal significance of the Agreemen t  was 
from t h a t  t ime regarded as resolved. Thus ,  in two cases which came before the  High 
C o u r t  the following year,  namely Seduraka Serwanga v Edward Sulaiman K h a y a ; and 
Ziyadi Mukasa  v Musitafa Serwada,0  ^ the High Cour t  was emphat ic  th a t  the  Buganda 
Agreement  had no legal significance unless incorporated in the  municipal law. Jus tice 
F ra nc is ’s remarks in the  la t ter  case, in response to the ar gument  t h a t  a  certain 
P roc lam at ion was in conflict wi th the Agreement ,  was typical:
The Proclamation in quest ion was made by the Governor under the  Cour ts  
Ordinance  which in turn  was enacted  under the author i ty  of the Uganda Order  
in Council,  1902, which is the  fo n s  et origo  of all power — legislative, judicial  
and adminis tra t ive  — in this protec tora te .  If therefore the Proclama t ion
o o
conflicts with the Agreements  the  former must  prevail .00
Interestingly,  a l though the P ro tec to ra te  Government  on behalf of the  Crown was 
legally ent it led to exercise unl imi ted powers in Buganda,  it opted for the s t a tu s  quo. 
Bushe,  in a semi-official let ter to the  Solicitor-General  of Uganda  advised th a t ,  if 
according to the Uganda adm in i s t r a t i o n ’s in terpre ta t ion of the terms of the agreements ,  
the  la t t er  were found to be inconsistent  wi th the laws of the P rotec tora te ,  “the  best  way
91
In an interest ing incident which occurred a lmost  fifteen years la ter  in the case of M u k w a b a  v 
M u k u b i r a . supra,  the Attorney-Genera l  sought  to cite Hex y Besweri Kiwanuka in su pp or t  of his 
submission,  but he apologised to the Cou r t  t h a t  some pages were missing from the copy of the case 
kept  in the High Court  files. On object ion of the  opposing counsel,  which was sus tained by the 
Cour t ,  the Atto rney-Genera l  withdrew the case from his list of authori t ies ,  T ransc r ip t  of  the  Cou r t  
Proceedings,  at  p.262-263.
3 2 ( 1938) 6 U.L.R.  28; (1938) 6 U.L.R.40.
*) * y
° ^ I b i d ., at  pp. 4 1-42. In M u k w a b a  y  M n k u b i r a , supra,  counsel invoking the Agreement  freely 
conceded tha t  it was not b inding unless incorporated  in municipal  law, Transc r ip t  of  the Cour t  
Proceedings of the case at p. 574-575. See also Daudi  N dib a ra ma  e.t al v T he  Engazi  of  Ankole et 
(d  ( I960)  E.A. 47; Kat ikiro y At to rn ey- General  (1959) 10.A. 382, 1960 10.A. 784 P.C.
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to  s tra igh ten  o u t  the tangle would be by comprehensive legislation” to embrace whatever
9  4
policy the G overnm ent desired to p u rsu e / '
The first legislative measure which was taken to  incorporate  the Agreement was the 
en ac tm en t of the  B uganda Native Laws (D eclaratory) Ordinance, 1938.o0 Its object, as 
s ta ted  in the P ream ble , was to “remove doub ts  as to  certain powers of the K abaka under 
the  [BjUganda Agreem ent, 1900” . Section 3 declared th a t  for removing doubts:
... as from the da te  and by vir tue  of the te rm s of the [B]Uganda Agreement 
1900, and by virtue of the term s of the B uganda A greem ent (Native Laws) 1910, 
and the A greem ent set out in the schedule of this Ordinance, the K abaka of 
B uganda has had power to make laws binding upon all natives in Buganda and 
the right of the K abaka  hereafter to exercise such power is hereby expressly 
confirmed for so long as the said A greem ent shall continue to be of full force and 
effect bu t subject always to the term s of the said Agreement and to any 
am endm ents  ....
Moreover, under Section 4 of the O rdinance all laws m ade by the K abaka and the Lukiiko 
since the execution of the Buganda A greem ent were retrospectively validated and 
declared to have been binding upon all the  natives of Buganda.
Ironically, the Ordinance was preceded by a supplem entary  Agreement with the 
B uganda au thorit ies ,  entitled the B uganda  (D eclaratory) Agreement (Native Laws) 1937. 
Its declared object was to remove doub ts  as to the powers of the K abaka and the Lukiiko 
to make legislation affecting the B aganda  in B u g an d a / '^  The Agreement was, of course, 
legally a sham  as the G overnm ent knew fully well th a t  it was not necessary to enter in to  
it in order to give legislative effect to the laws of the  Lukiiko. But it had to be done for
9  H
political reasons.0
°*Bushe to Hone, 1 November 1937, 536 /195 /40037 .
°°Bushe to Hone, 1 November 1937, 536 /195 /40037 .
° Schedule to the Buganda Native Laws (Declaratory) Ordinance, 1938, supra.
«> n
Compare wit h the reasons for entering into the Buganda Agreement (Native laws), above at 
pp. 182-184.
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Another  s tep  which was taken was to give legal effect to the jurisdiction of the 
Bugand a cour ts.  Rober t s -W ray , in one of his minu tes  in the discussions of Rex v Besweri 
Kiwanu ka , alluded to the possibility of arguing t h a t  clause 7 of the Native Cour t s  in 
Buganda  Proclamat ion,  1917, might  be in terpre ted  to have given legislative effect to the 
Agreement  with  regard to the  jurisdict ion of the  Buganda courts.  The clause referred to 
read:
The provisions of the [B]Uganda Agreement ,  1900, relating to the 
adminis t ra t ion  of just ice as amended by the  [B]Uganda Agreement  (judicial)
1905 and this Proclamat ion and in so far as they are not inconsistent therewi th,  
are hereby confirmed ....
He was, however,  doubtful  as to whether the  Proclamat ion itself had any legislative
o  o
effect.0 Apparent ly  this was because the Proclamat ion,  according to its preamble,  
declared th a t  it was made by the Governor under the  author i ty  of the 1900 and the 1905 
agreements ,  the  consent of the  K abaka  and the Lukiiko, and under the Courts  Ordinance.  
It was not immediately clear whether or not in making the Proclamat ion the Governor 
was actually act ing under the  provisions of the la t ter  Ordinance .0 Besides, as Bushe 
added,  the exercise of the Gove rnor’s powers under the Ordinance  (Section 41) was 
expressed to be subject to o ther  provisions of the Ordinance and any other legislation of 
the Protec tora te .  If, therefore,  the intent ion of the  Protec tora te  Government  were to 
allow the Buganda courts exclusive jurisdict ion over the cases which only involved the 
Baganda,  Bushe thought  t h a t  the 1917 Proclama t ion could not be interpre ted to override 
the jurisdict ion of the Brit ish cour ts  established by either the Cour ts  Ordinance or any 
other  Ordinance whether  al ready in force or subsequently enacted.
The legal position was subsequently clarified by the enactmen t  of the Buganda
'^M inute of 23 September 1937, supra.
' Laws of Uganda, 1923, Lchapter 4. Under section 4 1 the Governor had the power to establish 
Native Courts. But it was not stated in the Proclamation that the Buganda courts were 
established under these provisions. See also above at pp. 174-176.
^ B u s h e  to Hone, supra. Bushe possibly had in mind, for example, Section 31 of the Courts 
Ordinance which conferred upon District Courts concurrent jurisdiction with Native Courts.
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C o u rts  Ordinance, 1940. The pream ble to this O rdinance s ta ted  th a t  its object was to 
m ake “better provisions for the consti tu tion  of native C ourts  in Buganda, for the 
A dm in is tra tion  of justice and to im plement the [R]Uganda Agreement, 1900, and the 
jB]Uganda (Judicial) Agreement, 1905, as varied by the native Courts  in B uganda 
Proc lam ation  1917.” The O rdinance recognised in ter  alia  the C ourt  of the Lukiiko as the 
Principal Court  of Buganda with full jurisdiction  over all Africans, except as provided 
there in . '^  For the present purposes it is not necessary to go into the details of this 
Ordinance; it suffices to stress th a t  it gave legislative effect to the provisions of the 
Agreem ent relating to the adm in is tra tion  of Justice  in Buganda.
Another im p o rtan t  legislation in this regard is the Native Administration  
(Incorporation) Ordinance, 1938. It invested the Governor with power to declare any 
African adm inis tra tion  a  body corporate  with its own rights and liabilities; and to 
enum era te  the persons who should comprise it. Legislative effect was given to the 
A greem ent under Section 13 whereby it was provided th a t  nothing contained in the 
O rdinance should be construed “to derogate from any rights or privileges secured to any 
African ruler ... by virtue of the agreem ent subsisting between the Crown ... and any 
African ruler.” W ith regard to B uganda this presumably m eant,  for instance, th a t  the 
G overnor could not appoin t somebody else as the ruler of Buganda except the K abaka 
who, according to the Agreement, had to be a m em ber of the Buganda royal family. The 
provision also preserved the honorific ti tle  of “His Highness” which was conferred upon 
the  K abaka under the Agreement.
In pursuance of his powers, the Governor issued a notice in which he declared th a t  
the  native adm inis tra tion  of Buganda was a body corporate  and th a t  it would be known
^ L a w s  of Uganda, 1951, 2: chapter 77, sections 3, 6, and 9. 
^ I b id . ,  chapter 72.
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by the  title  of “the B uganda G overnm ent" .  The notice s ta ted  th a t  this governm ent “shall 
comprise His Highness the K abaka of B uganda and the Lukiiko virtute o f f i c i i . ”'*'1
T hus as a result of the abovementioned ordinances selected provisions of the 
B uganda  A greem ent were expressly incorporated  in the municipal law. It m ust be 
rem em bered though th a t ,  prior to the 1902 Order, the  Agreement was par t  of the law to 
be applied in B uganda under Article 16 of the Africa Order in Council; indeed it prevailed 
over the O rder itself. Moreover, Article 28(1), as we have seen, saved “any law or 
practice or procedure established by or under the African O rders” as long as it was not 
superseded by this Order or any o ther legislation m ade thereunder.  As suggested above, 
the  effect of this provision was to incorporate  the Agreement into the municipal law until 
it was replaced by legislation. From  the available evidence there was only one occasion 
on which this a rgum ent was used to justify the view th a t  the B uganda A greem ent was 
p a r t  of the law to be applied in Buganda. '14 In all o ther cases the A greem ent was 
assum ed to be binding w ithou t  discussing the theoretical bas is .1"*
11 .8  S u m m a r y  a n d  C o n c lu s io n
In this chapter  we have seen th a t  there were judicial precedents in o ther 
ju risd ic tions  which had established th a t  the C ro w n ’s powers in its p ro tec to ra tes  were 
plenary. However, in B uganda, it was not until 1936, in the case of Rex v Besweri 
K iw an u k a , th a t  this legal position was accepted. The fact th a t  the High C ourt  of Uganda 
considered it im perative to  make ano ther reference to the Colonial Office; and ,  even more 
significant, th a t  legislative measures were taken subsequent to this case (some to operate
4^Laws  of Uganda ,  1951, 7:1147.
44Minu te  Risley, 13 Februa ry  1919, on Governor  to C.O. ,  3 Ja nu ar y  1919, C 0 5 3 6 / 9 3 ,  supra,  
above at  p. 225.
45 In M u k w ab a  v M u k u b i r a , it was argued th a t  the fact th a t  the Crown consistent ly acted in 
accordance with the t erms of the Agreement  was sufficient proof  (wi thou t  need of express 
legislat ive measures)  tha t  the Crown had incorporated it into the municipal  law. T h e  U g an d a  
High Co u r t  was not  per suaded by this view, see chap te r  seven.
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retroactively) to give legal effect to the provisions of tlie Buganda Agreement, are, it is 
submitted, proof tha t  prior thereto Buganda was administered on the assumption that 
the Crown’s powers were legally limited by the Agreement. The irony is that when the 
Protectorate Government realised tha t  its powers in Buganda were absolute, it took legal 
steps to limit them. At tha t  late stage the political reality was such that the 
Protectorate Government did not wish to be seen by the Baganda to wield unlimited
powers in their country.
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C H A P T E R  12 
C O N C L U S I O N S
In the introduction to this study 1 proposed the thesis that, according to the 
prevailing view of the British administrators and their legal advisers, both in London and 
locally, the Crown had limited legal powers and authority in Uganda, in particular 
Buganda, during the period of my investigation, and that these limitations influenced 
Britain’s policy and administration. I believe tha t  the evidence produced in subsequent 
chapters establishes tha t  this was indeed the case. Previous writers (historians and 
lawyers alike) assumed without serious investigation or on the basis of a much later 
development of legal ideas tha t  the law did not restrict or shape the actions of the 
colonial administration in any substantial way. The data  examined in this study show 
that  the m atter  was considerably more complex than such an assumption would allow. 
The evidence demonstrates tha t  the administrators believed that they were under various 
inescapable legal constraints; they did not appreciate that the Crown — in the light of 
later “advances” in legal theory — had always been entitled to exercise unlimited legal 
powers in Buganda; for it was only at the end of the period studied th a t  the courts held 
tha t ,  on the basis of judicial precedents from other jurisdictions, the Crown’s powers in 
the Protectorate were absolute.
Because the British recognised the sovereignty of Buganda as a legal fact when they 
began colonising it the relationship between the two countries was built on treaties. First 
came the 1890 treaty between the Kabaka and the Imperial British East Africa Company. 
This was followed by the 1893 provisional treaty with the Crown which was ratified the
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following year when B uganda was declared a British P ro tec to ra te .  Then there  was the 
1900 Agreement. The evidence shows th a t  these treaties  and the Agreement were m ade on 
the  assum ption th a t ,  under in terna tional law and British municipal law, a  claim of a 
sphere of influence, or even a  p ro tec to ra te ,  did not entitle  the  Crown to exercise sovereign 
powers in the  terr itory . Sovereignty was regarded as vested in whoever was the local 
ruler, who was free to cede his powers to anybody. T hus the treaties  made w ith  B uganda  
(and with o ther chiefs elsewhere in the sphere) were regarded a t  the time as the  basis and 
m easure of the au thority  acquired in Buganda. The legal significance a t ta c h ed  to these 
trea t ie s  becomes even more ap p a ren t  when one compares the term s of the 1893 trea ty  
w ith  those the Crown made with o ther rulers in the east Africa sphere. Since the British 
G overnm ent did not wish to assume any responsibility outside B uganda, the  la t te r  
trea t ie s  were carefully drafted so as to exclude any provision conferring sovereign powers 
(o ther than control over the te rr i to ry 's  foreign relations) upon the Crown. T he  purpose 
of the  la tter  trea ties  was to  prevent the chiefs from ceding their sovereignty to  rival 
European s ta tes  w ithou t B r i ta in ’s consent — thereby preserving the terr ito ry  for B r i ta in ’s 
eventual occupation.
The fact th a t  B uganda was declared a British P ro tec to ra te  on the basis of a  trea ty  
was crucial in the evolution of British au tho ri ty  in the country . It reinforced the 
conviction of the British officials in U ganda and the Foreign Office, th a t  the  trea ty  
defined the ex ten t of the C row n’s powers in th a t  country . They always cited its provisions 
to  justify their legal position not ordy to  the B aganda but also in their  confidential 
correspondence. Where the trea ty  was silent, the assum ption  was th a t  the  m a t te r  was 
outside the C row n’s jurisdiction.
I have suggested th a t  even under the 1889 Africa O rder in Council, which was the 
fundam ental  law of the P ro tec to ra te ,  the official in te rp re ta t ion  of the legal s ta tu s  of the
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t re a ty  as the measure of the C ro w n ’s power in B uganda  could still be seen as correct. A 
poin t which previous writers  have missed is th a t  the Order incorporated in to  the 
municipal law of the terr ito ry  to which it applied, any trea ty  made by the Crown w ith  a 
local ruler. Moreover, it provided th a t  the provisions of these trea ties  prevailed over any 
law applied to the P ro tec to ra te ,  including the Africa O rder in Council.
A lthough U ganda was one of the last British p ro tec to ra tes  to  be declared in Africa, 
there  was still considerable d o u b t  as to the na tu re  and ex ten t of the C ro w n ’s au th o r i ty  by 
v irtue  of being the p ro tec ting  Power. The prevailing British in te rp re ta t ion  of 
in te rna tional  law was th a t  a  s ta te  claiming a p ro tec to ra te  was not entitled to  exercise 
judicial or legislative power over the in hab itan ts  of the  p ro tec to ra te  or foreigners within 
the  te rr ito ry  except w ith their consent or th a t  of their sovereign. Indeed the Africa O rder 
in Council was drafted within this legal framework. A t the tu rn  of the century there  was 
a d ra m a tic  change in legal th ink ing  in London. T he Foreign Office let itself be convinced 
by its legal advisers th a t  the Crown, by virtue of the p ro tec to ra te ,  could enact legislation 
to extend its powers and au th o r i ty  within the p ro tec to ra te  irrespective of t rea ties  with 
the local rulers. Hence a t  the  time the mood a t  the Foreign Office was th a t  the  C ro w n ’s 
powers were virtually unlim ited . In fact a proposal to annex Uganda, and  o ther 
p ro tec to ra tes  under the control of the the Foreign Office, was rejected by the Foreign 
Secretary as unnecessary since most of the im pedim ents  which m ight have called for such 
action had been removed. A new O rder in Council for Uganda which was comprehensive 
of the C ro w n ’s powers was prepared to replace the o u td a ted  Africa O rder in Council. Like 
all ad a p ta t io n s  in legal theory , the changes were influenced by the socio-political climate. 
B ut this s tudy  shows th a t  in tr ica te  legal a rgum ents  were also involved in the changing of 
the law.
T he evolution of British au tho ri ty  in U ganda was complicated by the B uganda
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A greem ent which Johnston  made, unaw are of tlie foregoing changes in the legal thinking. 
Historians Low and  P ra t t ,  and others, have stressed the political and economic goals of 
th is  Agreement.* However, the view expressed by these writers th a t  the British entered 
into this A greem ent knowing th a t  it had no legal effect, is hardly convincing. This thesis 
shows th a t  the A greem ent was deemed legally necessary by all those involved in making 
it, in order to expand the C row n’s legal powers in Buganda. C ontrary  to w ha t Low says, 
the A greem ent was m ade precisely because the British continued to recognise B uganda’s 
sovereignty even after declaring it to be under their protection.
Although the Agreement allowed the Crown to exercise extensive powers in 
B uganda ,  there  were still restrictions. Jurisdiction  of the British courts over the Baganda 
was limited; and any P ro tec to ra te  legislation which was inconsistent with the Agreement 
did not apply to Buganda. Moreover, the Agreem ent s t ipula ted  in some detail various 
aspects  re la ting  to  B u g an d a’s relations w ith  the P ro tec to ra te  Governm ent which included 
a division of land between the Crown and the B uganda oligarchy; the na tu re  and extent 
of the Com m issioner’s control over the K a b ak a ’s government; and taxation. The result 
was th a t  whereas under the 1902 U ganda O rder in Council the Crown had absolute 
powers in the P ro tec to ra te ,  under the A greem ent they were limited.
In view of the changes in the legal theory described above, any conflict between the 
A greem ent and the Order should have been resolved in favour of the la tter .  The 
Agreem ent should have been regarded as a  docum ent which served a political purpose, 
bu t which did not in any way affect the C ro w n ’s legal position in Buganda. Yet th a t  was 
not the  in te rp re ta t ion  adopted by the local officials. They thought th a t  the trea ty  and 
the B uganda  A greem ent were the source of the C row n’s power and authority  in Buganda. 
Consequently  they held th a t  the Crown could not exercise any powers or enact laws
* Above a t  p ......
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beyond those allowed by the Agreement. The Agreement, in their interpretation, was the 
supreme law in Buganda.
A number of factors combined to sustain this interpretation. One was tha t  for over 
five years after the Agreement and the new Order were made the arrangement worked 
smoothly. The Protectorate  Government had such wide powers under the Agreement 
tha t  British officials were not generally hindered by its terms in the administration of the 
country. Besides the Baganda generally cooperated with the Protectorate Government; if 
they had not, arguments to weaken the Agreement might have been precipitated. The 
result was tha t  the Buganda Agreement had a strong political foundation during the 
critical, initial period. Secondly, the transfer of Uganda Protectorate affairs from the 
Foreign Office to the Colonial Office meant a loss of continuity with reference to the 
officers who were directly involved and aware of the circumstances under which the Order 
and the Agreement were made. In the third place Cox, a senior legal adviser to the 
Colonial Office, strongly supported the Uganda officials’ interpretation. Cox managed to 
persuade the Colonial Office to the view that  this interpretation, which it had earlier 
rejected, was correct. On the basis of his reasoning it is evident tha t  he belonged to the 
old school of thought. He was not aware of the legal developments at the turn of the 
century. Cox believed tha t  the Uganda Order in Council was based on the Buganda 
Agreement (and those of Ankole and Toro); consequently, he concluded that any conflict 
between them had to be resolved in favour of the latter.
The fourth factor responsible for sustaining the interpretation that the Agreement 
limited the Crown’s powers in Buganda, involved the judicial decisions. Once the courts 
embodied this interpretation in judicial precedents (moreover with the blessing of the 
Colonial Secretary), it acquired a legitimacy which was hardly ever questioned during the 
period studied. The Agreement was upheld to the letter — even when the Baganda were
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unlikely to  complain — because the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent believed th a t  any act which 
was inconsistent with the Agreem ent, or which could not be justified under its provisions, 
was illegal and , if challenged in the courts, was bound to be declared null and void. T h e  
Agreem ent was regarded as the fundam ental law in the B r i t ish /B u g an d a  re la tionship . 
Hence, on this basis, a unique legal system was developed in the U ganda P ro tec to ra te .
The G overnm ent had to negotiate  supplem entary  agreem ents,  with the increasingly 
re luc tan t  B uganda adm in is tra tion , to increase its powers under the Agreem ent. T h is  
study establishes th a t  the supplem entary  agreem ents were negotiated  not merely for 
political reasons, as Low and others  have c la im e d /  but because they were regarded as 
legally essential whenever the Crown wanted to expand its powers in B uganda. F u r th e r ,  
it was not only the B aganda who believed in the legal efficacy of the Agreement; many
British officials, both in U ganda and London, 
w e re  a l s o  convinced — until Rex v Besweri 
K iw annka — th a t  the Buganda Agreement was a legally binding docum ent and  a 
constra in t  upon the C row n’s legal powers in Buganda. T he legislative measures which 
were taken to incorporate the Agreement into the P ro tec to ra te  law, and to give legal 
effect to all prior actions and decisions which had been m ade on the assum ption  th a t  the  
Agreem ent was a legal docum ent are clear enough proof of the in te rp re ta t ion  before this 
case.
The debate  abou t  the achievem ents and lessons of colonial rule is usually charged 
with emotion. At one extrem e there are those who strongly contend th a t  B rit ish  
colonialism was nothing but economic exploitation of the dependent countries  for 
B r i ta in ’s interest.  At the o ther extrem e are those who sing the praises of B r i ta in ’s success 
and the “sacrifice” she made to “develop” or “civilise” her former colonies. However,
2 A hove at p p  . 3 - 6 .
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whichever viewpoint one takes, two im p o rtan t  lessons certainly emerge from the 
B r i t ish /B u g an d a  relationship.
In the first place, a lthough in the end political and economic forces are the main 
constra in ts  upon any ad m in is tra t ion ,  be it a  colonial or an independent s ta te  governm ent, 
the law, as a sem i-autonom ous factor, can and does play a significant role in limiting the 
power of the government. We have seen th a t  the P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent was restrained 
by the fear th a t  the exercise of power which was beyond the Agreement might be declared 
illegal by the judiciary .
Secondly, the foundation for “consti tu tiona lism ” or rule by a government with 
legally limited powers, was laid during the period investigated. Prior to the tw entie th  
century B uganda was adm inistered  by despotic monarchs. The Buganda Agreement 
introduced a system of power sharing which effectively restricted the au thority  of the 
P ro tec to ra te  G overnm ent.  T he  study provides a scope for further investigation of a this 
model: the im pact of the Agreement and the B ri t ish /B u g an d a  relationship in the 
development of the rule of law in Uganda, both colonial and the independent s tate. 
Morris expresses his surprise th a t  as late as I960 the Ankole, Buganda, and Toro 
agreem ents were still argued in the U ganda  courts even though it had long been
9
established th a t  they were not legally b inding.0 It is subm itted  th a t  parf of the reason 
m ust be th a t  over the years a  constitu tional convention had been established. There was 
an expectation  th a t  the G o v ern m en t’s powers were limited.
It is painful for a U gandan to adm it,  twenty-five years after political independence 
from the British, th a t  the roots of constitu tionalism  have been destroyed by successive 
regimes. Presently the country  is in political turmoil. There  are, of course several reasons
3Above at page 5n.
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for this. One can only hope th a t  the foundation laid by the Brit ish /B u g a n d a  relationship) 
will some day be used to develop an effective legal control of the G overnm ent which, it is 
subm itted ,  is essential for the res tora tion  of peace.^
*On 17 December 1985, an ag reement  was signed between the U ganda  G o v er n m e n t  and the 
Nat iona l  Resistance Movement ,  a guerr i l la organisat ion which controls abou t  hal f  of  the country,  
to share  the powers of the Government .  At the t ime of wri t ing  the detai ls of this ag reement  are not  
avai lable to the author,  however,  it is hoped tha t  those who are involved in its imp lementa t ion  will 
make  use of the experience of the Bug a nd a  Agreement .
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APPENDIX 1
P R O V IS IO N A L  A G R E E M E N T  B E T W E E N  K A B A K A  M W A N G A  A N D  
M W A N G A  A N D  PO R T A L .  29 May 1893.1
AGREEM ENT between Mwanga, King of [B]Uganda, and Sir Gerald Portal, ... 
Her Majesty’s Commissioner and Consul-General for East Africa, &c.
1. Whereas the Imperial British East Africa Company have now definitely 
withdrawn from Uganda.
2. And whereas I, Mwanga, King of [BjUganda am profoundly and sincerely desirous 
of securing British protection for myself, my people and dominions: as also assistance and 
guidance in the government of my country.
3. I, the said Mwanga, do hereby pledge and bind myself of the the following 
conditions, with the object of securing the British protection, assistance, and guidance 
before mentioned:-
4. I undertake to make no Treaties or Agreements whatsoever with any Europeans 
of whatever nationality without the consent and approval of Her Majesty’s 
Representative.
5. I freely recognise tha t  so far as I, the King, am concerned, the sole jurisdiction 
over Europeans and over all persons not born in my dominion, and the settlement of all 
cases in which any such persons may be a party or parties, lie exclusively in the hands of 
Her Majesty’s Representative.
6. In civil cases between my subjects the Court of Her Majesty’s Representative 
shall be a Supreme Court of Appeal, but it shall lie entirely within the discretion of the 
said Representative to refuse hear such appeals.
7. In criminal cases where only natives are concerned, it is left to the discretion of 
Her Majesty’s Representative to interfere, in the public interest and for the sake of 
justice, to the extent and in the manner which he may consider desirable.
8. And I, Mwanga, the King, undertake to see that due effect is given to all and 
every decision of the Court of Her Majesty’s Representative under Article C and 7.
9. I, Mwanga fully recognise that the protection of Great Britain entails the 
complete recognition by myself, my Government, and people throughout my Kingdom of 
[BjUganda and its dependencies, of all and every international act and obligation to
^Hertslet, Map of Africa by T rea ty , 1: 393-396.
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which G rea t  Britain  may be a party ,  as binding upon myself, my successors, and my said 
G overnm en t and people, to such ex ten t  and in such m anner as may be prescribed by Her 
M ajes ty ’s R epresentative.
10. No w ar or warlike operations of any kind shall be undertaken  w ithou t the  
consent of Her M ajes ty ’s Representative, w'hose concurrence shall also be obtained in all 
serious m a t te r s  of S ta te ,  such as the ap p o in tm en t  of Chiefs or officials, the  political or 
religious d is tr ibu tion  of terr ito ry , &x.
11. T h e  assessm ent and collection of taxes, as  also the disposal of revenues of th e  
country , are hereby made subject to  the control and revision of Her M a je s ty ’s 
G overnm ent in such m anner as they may from tim e to  time direct.
12. T he  property  of Her M ajes ty ’s G overnm en t and of their officers, and of all 
servants  of Her M ajes ty ’s G overnm ent,  shall be free from the incidence of taxes.
13. E x port  and im port  duties  on all goods leaving or entering [B]Uganda and its 
dependencies shall be leviable by Her M ajes ty ’s G overnm ent for their sole use and benefit. 
These duties  shall be fixed in accordance with the provisions of the General Acts of Berlin 
and Brussels of 1885 respectively, and of any in terna tional  Agreements arising from the  
same, and to  wrhich G rea t  Britain  is or may become a  party .
14. T h e  foreign relations of [B Uganda and its dependencies are hereby placed 
unreservedly in the hands of Her M ajes ty ’s Representative.
15. Slave trad ing  or slave raiding, or the expor ta tion  or im porta t ion  of people for 
sale or exchange as slaves, is prohibited. 1, M w anga, also undertake, for myself and my 
successors, to  give due effect to such laws and regulations, having for their  object the  
complete u l t im a te  abolition of the s ta tu s  of slavery in ,B Uganda and its dependencies, as 
may be d ic ta ted  by Her M ajes ty ’s G overnm ent.
16. In consideration of the above engagem ents  on the part of M w anga, King of 
[B]Uganda, I, Gerald H erbert Porta l ,  ... on behalf  of Her M ajes ty ’s G overnm en t,  do 
hereby agree to appo in t and leave a British R epresenta tive  with a sufficient s taff to carry 
ou t the provisions of this A greem ent, which is entirely subject to  the  approval and 
ratification of Her M ajes ty ’s G overnm ent,  and is therefore only binding until such a t im e 
as the decision of Her M ajes ty ’s G overnm ent can be conveyed, and reach [BjUganda. In 
the event of Her Majesty G overnm ent being willing to  assent to the above conditions and 
term s, M w anga, the King, undertake hereby, on behalf of himself and his successors, to 
make a T rea ty  in the above or similar sense e ither in perpetuity  or such specified period 
as Her M ajes ty ’s G overnm en t may desire.
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17. T he present A greem ent supersedes all o ther Agreements or T reaties  whatsoever 
m ade by M w anga or his predecessors.
18. This  A greem ent shall come into force from the da te  of its s ignature.
In faith whereof we have respectively signed this Agreement, and have thereunto  
affixed our seals: K abaka  and Portal.
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A P P E N D IX  2
T R E A T Y . G R E A T  B R I T A I N  A N D  [B jU G A N D A . 27 A U G U S T ,
1 8 9 4 .1
T R E A T Y  between Henry Edw ard Colvile, ... Her M ajesty’s Acting Commissioner 
for U ganda, for and on behalf of Her M ajesty the Queen of G rea t  Britain, ... and 
M w anga, King of [BjUganda, for himself, his heirs, and successors.
1. W hereas Her M ajes ty ’s G overnm ent has sanctioned the Agreement between 
M w anga, King of [B]Uganda, and  Sir Gerald H erbert Porta l ,  ... m ade a t  K am pala on the 
29th day of M ay, 1893;
2. And whereas Her B ritannic M ajesty has been graciously pleased to bestow on the 
said M w anga, King of [B] Uganda, the protection which he requested in th a t  Agreement:
3. I, the said M wanga, do hereby pledge and bind myself, my heirs, and successors, 
to  the following condition:- [Here follow word for word, the same Articles, 4 to  15, as 
appear  in the T rea ty  of 29 May 1893, Appendix li
16. The present T rea ty  supersedes all o ther Agreements or T reaties  whatsoever 
m ade by M wanga or his predecessors
17. This T rea ty  shall come into force from the d a te  of its signature.
In faith whereof we have respectively signed this T rea ty ,  and have thereunto  affixed 
our seals: Colvile and K abaka.
^Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 1: 396
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APPENDIX 3
A G R E E M E N T  B E T W E E N  Sir H. H. Johnston, ... A N D  THE  
K A B A K A , CHIEFS, A N D  PEO PLE OF [B jU G A N D A , R E SP E C T IN G  THE  
B O U N D A R IE S  A N D  A D M IN IST R A T IO N  OF THE U G A N D A
P R O T E C T O R A T E .
Signed at M engo March 10, 1900 .1
WE, the undersigned to wit, Sir Henry Hamilton Johnston,  K.C.B., Her Majesty’s 
Special Commissioner, Commander-in-Chief and Consul-General for the Uganda 
Protectorate  and adjoining territories, on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of Great  
Britain and Ireland, ... on the part ,  and the undermentioned Regents and Chiefs of the 
Kingdom of [B]Uganda on behalf of the Kabaka (King) of [BjUganda and the Chiefs and 
people of [BjUganda, on the other part ,  do hereby agree to the following Articles relative 
to the government and administ rat ion of the Kingdom of [BjUganda:-
1. (Description of the boundary of Buganda).
2. The Kabaka and Chiefs of [BjUganda hereby agree henceforth to renounce in 
favour of Her Majesty the Queen any claims to t ribute they may have had on the 
adjoining provinces of the Uganda Protectorate.
3. 'Phe Kingdom of [BjUganda in the Administration of the Uganda Protectorate 
shall rank as a province of equal rank with any other province into which the 
Protectorate  may be divided.
4. The revenue of the Kingdom of [BjUganda, collected by the Uganda 
Administ ration,  will be merged in the general revenue of the Uganda Protectorate as will 
t ha t  of the other provinces of the Protectorate.
5. The laws made for the general governance of the Uganda Protectorate by Her 
Majesty’s Government  will be equally applicable to the Kingdom of [BjUganda except in 
so far as they may in any particular conflict with the terms of this Agreement will 
consti tute a special exception in regard to the Kingdom of [BjUganda.
6. So long as the Kabaka, Chiefs, and people of Uganda shall conform to the Laws 
and Regulations inst ituted for their governance by Her Majesty’s Government,  and shall 
co-operate loyally with Her Majesty’s Government  in the organisation and administration 
of the said Kingdom of [BjUganda, Her Majesty’s Government agrees to recognise the 
Kabaka of [BjUganda as the Native Ruler of the Province of [BjUganda under Her
Mlertslet, Commercial Treaties, 23: 1G7.
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M ajesty’s protection and overrule. The King of [BjUganda shall henceforth he styled His 
Highness the Kabaka of (BjUganda. On the death of a Kabaka, his successor shall be 
elected by a majority of votes in the Lukiko or Native Council. The range of selection, 
however, must be limited to the Royal Family of [BjUganda, tha t  is to say, to the 
descendants of King Mutesa. The name of the person chosen by the Native Council must 
be submitted to Her Majesty’s Government for approval, and no person shall be 
recognised as Kabaka of [BjUganda whose election has not received the approval of Her 
M ajesty’s Government. The Kabaka of [BjUganda shall shall exercise direct rule over the 
natives of [BjUganda, to whom he shall administer justice through the Lukiko or Native 
Council, and through others of his officers in the manner approved bv Her M ajesty’s 
Government. The jurisdiction of the Native Court of the Kabaka of [BjUganda, however, 
shall not extend to any person not a native of the [BjUganda Province. The Kabaka's 
Courts shall be entitled to try natives for capital crimes, but no death sentence may be 
carried out by the Kabaka or his Courts without the sanction of Her M ajesty’s 
Representative in Uganda. Moreover, there will be a right of appeal from the Native 
Courts to the principal Court of Justice established by Her Majesty in the Kingdom of 
[BUganda as regards all sentences which inflict a term of more than five years' 
imprisonment or a fine of over 1001. In the case of any other sentences imposed by the 
K abaka’s Courts, which may seem to Her Majesty’s Government disproportioned or 
inconsistent with humane principles, Her M ajesty’s Representative in Uganda shall have 
the right of remonstrance with the Kabaka, who shall, at, the request of the said 
Representative, subject such sentence to reconsideration.
The Kabaka of [BjUganda shall be guaranteed by Her Majesty’s Government from 
out of the local revenue of the Uganda Protectorate a minimum yearly allowance of 
1,5001. a year. During the present Kabaka’s minority, however, in lieu of the 
abovementioned subvention, there will be paid to the master of his household, to meet his 
household expenditure, 6501. a year, and during his minority the three persons appointed 
to act as Regents will receive an annual salary of 1001. a year. Kabakas of [BjUganda will 
be understood to have attained their majority when they have reached the age of 18 
years. The Kabaka of [BjUganda shall be entitled to a salute of nine guns on ceremonial 
occasions when such salutes are customary.
7. (Deals with allowance to be paid to the Kabaka’s mother).
8. All cases, civil or criminal, of a mixed nature, where natives of the [BjUganda
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Province and non-natives of that province are concerned, shall be subject to British 
Courts of Justice only.
9. (Describes the counties into which Buganda is divided for administrative 
purposes, and the appointment of county chiefs).
10. To assist the Kabaka of [B]Uganda in the government of his people he shall be 
allowed to appoint three native officers of State, with the sanction and approval of Her 
M ajesty’s Representative in Uganda (without whose sanction shall not be valid):- A 
Prime Minister, otherwise known as Katikiro; a Chief Justice; and a Treasurer or 
Controller of the Kabaka’s revenues. These official shall be paid at the rate of 3001. a 
year. Their salaries shall be guaranteed them by Her Majesty’s Government out of the 
funds of the Uganda Protectorate. During the minority of the Kabaka these three officials 
shall be constituted the Regents, and when acting in that capacity shall receive salary at 
the rate of 4001. a year. Her M ajesty’s Chief Representative in Uganda shall at any time 
have direct access to the Kabaka, and shall have the power of discussing m atters affecting 
[B Uganda with the Kabaka alone, or during his minority, with the Regents; but 
ordinarily the three officials above designated will transact most of the Kabaka’s business 
with the Uganda Administration. The Katikiro shall be ex off icio  the President of the 
Lukiko, or Native Council; the Vice-President of the Lukiko shall be the native Minister 
of Justice, for the time being; in the absence of both Prime Minister and Minister of 
Justice, the Treasurer of the Kabaka’s revenues, or third Minister, shall preside over the 
meetings of the Lukiko.
11. The Lukiko, or Native Council, shall be constituted as follows:-
In addition to the three native Ministers, who shall be ex off icio  senior members of 
the Council, each Chief of a county ( 20 in all) shall be ex off icio  a member of the 
Council. Also each Chief of a county shall be permitted to appoint a person to act as his 
lieutenant in this respect to a ttend to the meetings of the Council during his absence, and 
to speak and vote in his name. The Chief of a  county, however, and his lieutenant, may 
not both appear simultaneously a t  the Council. In addition, the Kabaka shall select from 
each county three Notables, whom lie shall appoint during his pleasure, to be members of 
the Lukiko or Native Council. The Kabaka may also, in addition to the foregoing, 
appoint six other persons of importance in the country to be members of the Native 
Council, 'flic Kabaka may at any time deprive any individual of the right to sit, on the 
Native Council, but in such a case shall intimate his intention to Her Majesty’s
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Representa tive  in U ganda, and receive his assent there to  before dismissing the member. 
T he  function of the Lukiko will be to  discuss all m a t te rs  concerning the native 
adm in is tra t ion  of [B]Uganda and to forward to  the K abaka  Resolutions which may be 
voted by a m ajority  regarding m easures to be adopted by the said A dm inistration . The 
K a b ak a  shall fu r ther consult with Her M ajes ty ’s Representative in U ganda before giving 
effect to  any such Resolution voted by the Native Council, and shall, in this m atte r ,  
explicitly follow the advice of Her M ajes ty ’s Representative. The Lukiko, or a C om m ittee 
thereof, shall be a C ourt  of Appeal from the decisions of the Courts  of F irst Instances held 
by the  Chiefs of counties. In all cases affecting property exceeding the value of 51. or 
im prisonm ent,  exceeding one week, an appeal for revision may be addressed to the 
Lukiko. In all cases involving property  or claims exceeding 1001. in value, or a  sentence of 
im prisonm ent exceeding five years, or sentences of dea th ,  the Lukiko shall refer the 
m a t te r  to the consideration of the K abaka, whose decision when countersigned by Her 
M ajes ty ’s Chief Representative in U ganda shall be final. T he Lukiko shall not decide any 
questions affecting the persons or property  of Europeans or others  who are not natives of 
B Uganda. No person shall be elected to the Lukiko who is not a native of the Kingdom 
of B]Uganda. No question of religious opinion shall be taken into consideration in regard 
to the  appo in tm ent by the K abaka of m em bers of the Council. In this m a t te r  he shall use 
his ju d g m en t and abide by the advice of Her M ajesty’s Representative, assuring in this 
m anner a fair p ropor tionate  representa tion  of all recognised expressions of religious belief 
prevailing in Uganda.
12. In order to con tr ibu te  to a reasonable extent tow ards the  general cost of the 
m ain tenance of the U ganda P ro tec to ra te  there shall be established the following taxation  
for Imperial purposes, th a t  is to say, t he proceeds of the collection of these taxes shall be 
handed over in tac t  to Her M ajes ty ’s Representative in U ganda as the contribu tion  of the 
U ganda Province tow ards the general revenue of the P ro tec to ra te .  The taxes agreed upon 
at, present shall be as follows:
* (a) A hut tax of 5 rupees, or Is. per annum , on any house, hut, or hab ita tion ,  
used as a dwelling place, (b) A gun tax of 3 rupees, or Is. per annum , to be 
paid by any person who possesses or uses a gun, rifle, or pistol.
T he Kingdom of BjUganda shall be subject to the same C ustom s Regulations, Porte r
Regulations, and so forth , which may, with the of Her M ajesty, be institu ted  for the
U ganda P ro tec to ra te  generally, which may be described in a sense as exterior taxation ;
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but no further interior taxation, other than the hut tax and gun tax shall be imposed on 
the natives of the Province of [B]Uganda without the agreement of the Kabaka, who in
this m atter shall be guided by the majority of votes in his Native Council. This
arrangement, however, will not affect the question of township rates, lighting rates, water 
rates, market dues, and so forth, which may be treated apart as matters affecting 
municipalities or towmships; nor will it absolve natives from obligations as regards 
military services, or the up-keep of main roads passing through the lands on which they 
dwell. A hut tax shall be levied on any building which is used as a dwelling place. A
collection of not more than four huts, however, which are in a separate and single
inclosure and are inhibited only by a man and his wife, or wives, may be counted as one 
hut. The following buildings will be exempted from the hut tax:...[ the residence of the 
Kabaka and his household, and the official residences of his ministers and of the county 
chiefs]. As regards the gun tax, it will be held to apply to any person who possesses or 
makes use of a gun, rifle, pistol, or any weapon discharging a projectile by the aid of gun­
powder, dynamite, or compressed air.... [Exemptions from the gun tax were granted to 
the Kabaka, his ministers, chiefs, and other notables].
13. (Deals with the right of the Kabaka to conscript his subjects for military service, 
if called upon by the Protectorate Government).
14. (Deals with the duty of the Kabaka’s government to maintain in good repair all 
roads in Buganda).
15. The land of the Kingdom of [BjUganda shall be dealt with in the following 
manner:
Assuming the area of the Kingdom of B Uganda as comprised within the limits 
cited in this Agreement, to amount to 19,(500 square miles, it shall be divided in the 
following proport ions:-
Sq. miles.
Forests to be brought under control of Uganda
Administration .......................................  1,500
Waste and uncultivated land to be vested in Her 
Majesty’s Government, and to be controlled by the
Uganda Administration ................................  9,000
Plantations and other private property of His
Highness the Kabaka ..................................  350
Plantations and other private property of the
Hamasole .............................................  16
Plantations and other private property of the
Hamasole, mother of Mwanga ...........................  10
To the Princes: Joseph, Augustine,Ramazan, and
Yusuf-Suna, 8 square miles each ......................  32
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For the Princesses, sisters, and relations of the
Kabaka ..................................................  90
To the ... chiefs of counties 20 in all, 8 square
miles each (private property) .......................  160
Official estates attached to the posts of [chiefs
of counties] , 8 square miles each ....................  160
The three Regents will receive private property to
the extent of 16 square miles each ...................  48
And official property attached to their office, 16 
square miles each, the said official property to be 
afterwards attached to the post of the three native
Ministers ...............................................  96
Mbogo (the Mohammedan Chief) will receive for
himself and his adherents .............................. 24
Kamuswaga, Chief of Khoki, will receive .................  20
One thousand Chiefs and private land owners will 
receive the estates of which they are already in 
and which are computed at an average area of 8
square miles per individual, making a total of ....... 8,000
There will be allotted to the three Missionary 
Societies in existence in Uganda as private 
property, and in trust for the native churches
as much as ...........................................  92
Land taken up by the Government for Government 
stations prior to the present settlement (at
Kampala, Entebbe, Masaka, &c . , &c . )...................  50
Total .............................................  19,600
After a careful survey of the Kingdom of |B]Uganda lias been made,  if the total  a rea  
should be found to be less than 19.600 square  miles, then th a t  port ion of the country  
which is to be vested in Her M ajes ty ’s Go vernmen t  shall be reduced in extent  by the 
deficiency found to exist in the es t imated area.  Should, however,  the area of BjUganda 
be es tabl ished a t  more than 19,600 square miles, then the surplus shall be dealt  with as 
follows:-
lt  shall be divided into two par ts ,  one-hal f shall be added to t h a t  am oun t  of land 
which is vested in Her M ajes ty ’s Governmen t ,  and the  o ther  half will be divided 
propor t ionate ly  among the propert ies  of the  Kabaka,  the three Regents or Native 
Ministers ,  and the ... Chiefs of count ies.
T h e  aforesaid 9,000 square miles of waste or cul t ivated,  or uncul tivated land, or 
land occupied wi thout  prior gift of the Kabaka or Chiefs by Bakopi [peasants) or 
s t rangers ,  are hereby vested in Her Majes ty the Queen of G re a t  Bri tain ... and Protec tress  
of Uganda,  on the  unders tanding th a t  the revenue derived from such lands shall form par t  
of the general  revenue of the Uganda Protec tora te .
T h e  forests, which will be reserved for Government  control ,  will be, as a rule, t hose 
forests over which no private claim can be raised justif iably,  and will be forests of some
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con tinu ity ,  which should he m ain ta ined  as woodland in the general interests of the  
country .
As regards the allo tm ent of the  8,000 square miles am ong the 1,000 private  
landowners, this will be a m a t te r  to  be left to the decision of the Lukiko, with an appeal 
to the  K abaka. T he  Lukiko will be empowered to decide as to the validity of claims, the 
num ber of cla im ants ,  and extent, of land gran ted , premising th a t  the to ta l  am oun t of land 
thus  allo tted  am ongst the Chiefs and accorded to native  landowners of the country is not 
to exceed 8,000 square miles.
Europeans and non-natives, who have acquired estates,  and whose claims there to  
have been ad m it ted  by the U ganda A dm in is tra tion , will receive title-deeds for such 
esta tes  in such a  m anner and with such l im itations, as may be formulated by Her 
M ajes ty ’s R epresentative. The official es ta te  granted  to the Regents, Native Ministers, or 
Chiefs of counties, are to pass with the office, and their use is only to be enjoyed by the 
holders of the office.
Her M ajes ty ’s G overnm ent,  however, reserves to itself the right to carry through or 
construc t roads, railways, canals, telegraphs, or o ther useful public works, or to build 
m ilitary forts, or works, or defence on any property , public or private , with the condition 
th a t  not more th a n  10 per cent, of the property in question shall be taken up for these 
purposes w ithou t com pensation, and th a t  com pensation shall be given for the d is turbance 
of growing crops or of buildings.
lb. Until Her M ajes ty ’s G overnm ent has seen fit to devise and prom ulgate Forestry 
Regulations, it is not possible in this Agreement to define such forest rights as amy be 
given to the natives of Uganda; bu t it is agreed on behalf of Her M ajes ty ’s G overnm ent,  
th a t  in a rranging  these Forestry Regulations, the claims of the Baganda people to obtain 
t im ber for building purposes, firewood, and other p roduc ts  of the forest or uncultivated 
lands, shall be taken  into account, and  arrangem ents  m ade by which under due safeguards 
aga inst  abuse these righ ts  may be exercised gratis.
17. As regards mineral rights: T he rights to all m inerals found on p rivate  es tates 
shall be considered to belong only to the owners of those estates,  subject to a 10 per cent, 
ad valorem  du ty ,  which will be paid to the Uganda A dm in is tra tion  when the minerals are 
worked. On the  land outside private  estates,  the mineral rights shall belong to the 
U ganda A dm in is tra tion ,  which, however, in return for using or disposing of the same 
m ust com pensa te  the occupier of the soil for the d is tu rbance  of growing crops or
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buildings, and will bo hold liable to allot to him from out, of the spare lands in the 
Protectorate  an equal area of soil to tha t  from which he has been removed. On these 
waste and uncultivated lands of the Protectorate, the mineral rights shall be vested in 
Her M ajesty’s Government as represented by the Uganda Administration. In like manner 
the ownership of the forests, which are not included within the limits of private 
properties, shall be henceforth vested in Her Majesty’s Government.
18. In return for the cession to Her Majesty’s Government of the right to control 
over 10,550 square miles of waste, cultivated, uncultivated, or forest lands, there shall be 
paid by Her M ajesty’s Government in trust for the Kabaka (upon his attaining his 
majority) a sum of 5001., and to the two Regents collectively 6001., namely, to the 
Katikiro 3001., and the other two Regents 1501. each.
19. Her M ajesty’s Government agrees to pay to the Mohammedan Uganda Chief, 
Mbogo, a pension for life of 2501. a year, on the understanding th a t  all rights which he 
may claim (except such as are guaranteed in the foregoing clauses) are ceded to Her 
M ajesty’s Government.
20. Should the Kingdom of 113]Uganda fail to pay to the Uganda Administration 
during the first two years after the signing of this Agreement, an amount of native 
taxation, equal to half tha t  which is due in proportion to the number of inhabitants; or 
should it at any time fail to pay without any just cause or excuse, the aforesaid minimum 
of taxation due in proportion to the population; or should the Kabaka, Chiefs, or people 
of [H;Uganda pursue, at any time, a policy which is distinctly disloyal to the British 
Protectorate; Her Majesty’s Government will no longer consider themselves bound by the 
terms of t his Agreement.
On the other hand, should the revenue derived from t he hut and gun tax exceed two 
years running a total value of -15,0001. a year, the Kabaka and Chiefs of counties shall 
have the to appeal to Her M ajesty’s for an increase in the subsidy given to the Kabaka 
and the stipends given to the Native Ministers and Chiefs, such increase to be in the same 
proportional relation as the increase' in the revenue derived from the taxation of natives.
21. Throughout this Agreement the phrase “Uganda Administration” shall be 
taken to mean tha t  general government of the Uganda Protectorate which is instituted 
and maintained by Her M ajesty’s Government; “Her Majesty’s Representative” shall 
mean the Commissioner, Governor, or principal official of any designation who is 
appointed by Her Majesty’s Government to direct the affairs of Uganda.
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22. In the interpretation of this Agreement, the English text shall be the version 
which is binding on both parties.
Done in English and Luganda at Mengo, in the Kingdom of B]Uganda, on the 10th 
March, 1900.
Signed by Johnston, Her Majesty’s Special Commissioner, Commander-in-Chief, 
and Consul-General, on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, and by the 
three Regent Chiefs, and four Chiefs of the counties, on behalf of the Kabaka, chiefs, and 
people of Buganda.
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APPENDIX 4
A G R E E M E N T  B E T W E E N  THE B R IT ISH  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  
THE [M UKAM A] (KING)] ... A N D  CHIEFS OF T 0 R [ 0 ] ,  
R E SP E C T IN G  THE B O U N D A R IE S , A D M IN IST R A T IO N , &c, OF THE  
D IST R IC T . Signed at Fort Portal, June 26,
1900.1
1. [Description of the boundary of Toro.]
2. [Description of the territory to which the Agreement was applicable.)
3. By this Agreement the Chief Kasagama is recognised by Her Majesty’s 
Government as the [Mukama] or supreme Chief over all that part of the Tor[o] district 
which is included within the limits of the above-mentioned administrative sub­
divisions;.... So long as the [Mukama] and Chiefs abide by the conditions of this 
Agreement they shall be continued to be recognised by Her Majesty’s Government as the 
responsible Chiefs of the Tor[o] district. They shall be allowed to nominate their 
successors in the event of their demise, and the successors thus nominated shall in the like 
manner be recognised by Her Majesty’s Government as their successors to the dignity of 
Chieftainship, on the understanding that they equally abide by the terms of this 
Agreement. But should the [Mukama] or the Chiefs herein named fail at any time to 
abide by any portion of the terms of this Agreement, they may be deposed by Her 
Majesty’s Principal Representative in the Uganda Protectorate, and their title and 
privileges will pass to any such other Chiefs as Her Majesty’s Principal Representative 
may select in their place.
Should the [Mukama] of Tor[o] — Kasagama or his successor — be responsible for the 
infringement of any part of the terms of this Agreement, it shall be open to Her Majesty’s 
Government to annul the said Agreement, and to substitute for it any other methods of 
administering the Toro] district which may seem suitable.
4. All the waste and uncultivated land which is waste and uncultivated at the date  
of this Agreement, all forests, mines, minerals, and salt deposits in the Tor[oj district 
shall be considered the property of Her Majesty’s Government, the revenue derived 
therefrom being included within the general revenue of the Uganda Protectorate; but the 
natives of Torfoj district shall have the same privileges with regard to the forests as have
Hcrtsle t,  C om m ercia l T  re a l ies , 23:194-199. The  1901 Ankole A greem ent is identical w ith th is
Agreement.
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been laid down and formulated in the aforesaid Regulations in force in the Uganda 
P ro tec to ra te  as are applicable to  the natives of each province or their adm in is tra tive  
division of the P ro tec to ra te  within such province or adm in is tra t ive  division. Her 
M ajes ty ’s G overnm ent shall have the righ t of enforcing on the natives of the Tor[o] 
d is tr ic t ,  as elsewhere in the U ganda P ro tec to ra te ,  the pro tec tion  of game; and in this 
pa r ticu la r  it is agreed th a t  within the Torjo] district the elephants  shall be strictly 
pro tected , and th a t  the  killing or cap tu re  of elephants on the p a r t  of the natives of the 
Tor[o] d istrict shall be regulated by the principal European official placed in civil charge 
of the district.
5. There shall be imposed henceforth on the natives of the Torjo] d istrict the same 
tax a tio n  as in force by P roclam ation in the o ther provinces or d istricts  of the U ganda 
P ro tec to ra te ,  to  wit, the hu t  and gun tax . All revenue derived from customs duties, hu t  
taxes, salt deposits, or any o ther sources w hatever,  shall be paid direct to the Principal 
Officer in civil charge of the Torjo] d istr ic t .  No Chief in the Torjo] district shall levy on 
o ther Chiefs, or on natives, tr ibu tes  or gifts of any kind, except such as may be directly 
sanctioned by Her M ajesty ’s Principal R epresenta tive  in the U ganda P ro tec to ra te ,  and as 
are specified in this Agreement.
6. Justice  as between native and native shall be adm inistered  d irect by the 
recognised Chiefs of the six sub-divisions. In all cases where a sentence of over three 
m o n th s ’ im prisonm ent,  or a fine exceeding 51. in value, or where property over 51. in 
value is concerned, an appeal shall lie from the divisional N ative C ourts  to the Lukiko of 
the [Mukama] of Torjo], In cases where im prisonm ent exceeds the term  of one year, or 
property  involved exceeds the value of 1001., an appeal shall lie from the decision of the 
[Mukama], or his Lukiko, to  the principal European officer in civil charge of the district of 
Torjo]... .
....All cases between the natives of the d istrict of Torjo] and natives of o ther 
d is tric ts  of the U ganda P ro tec to ra te ,  or between natives and foreigners, shall be tried by 
the British M agis tra te  in the district of Torjo], and shall be removed a ltogether from 
native jurisdiction.
7. From out of the to ta l  annual revenue received in the shape of hut taxes and gun 
taxes from the six adm in is tra t ive  divisions above specified in the Torjo] d is tric t,  10 per 
cent, of the to ta l  value shall be paid to t in1 [Mukama]; and of the to tal value of the taxes 
rem itted  by the Chief of each sub-division, 10 per cent, shall be remit ted to the recognised
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Chief of such sub-division.... In addition  to the percentage of the taxes, the [Mukamaj of 
Tor[o], as [M ukamaj, shall he granted  an esta te  from out of the waste lands of the Torjo] 
sub-division of an area  of 16 square miles, provided, however, th a t  such esta te  may not 
include within its  limits any area  of forest or any sa lt  deposit. The Katikiro, or principal 
M inister of the [Mukamaj of Tor[o], shall, in his official position, enjoy the usufruct of an 
es ta te  to be allocated out of the waste lands of the Torjoj sub-division, of an area of 10 
square miles, no t,  however, to include any large area  of forest or any salt deposit within 
its limits. In like m anner, and with the same reservations, the Namasole, or the existing 
Queen-M other of K asagam a, shall receive from out of the waste lands of the Torjo] sub­
division an es ta te  of not more than  five square miles. T he recognised Chiefs of the o ther 
sub-divisions of the  Torjo] d istrict shall enjoy, in their  official capacity , the usufruct of an 
es ta te  of 10 square miles out of the waste lands in their respective sub-divisions; the 
p rivate  es tates to  be guaranteed to K asagam a. the present .Mukamaj of Torjo], shall not 
exceed 50 square miles in area, of which am oun t 25 square miles m ust be held in the sub­
division of Torjoj proper. The private  es ta te  of the Katikiro shall not exceed 16 square 
miles, those of the  Namasole 16 square miles, and t hose of each existing Chief of a sub­
division, as nam ed in this Agreement, of 16 square miles each.
In all respects the Torjo] d istrict shall lx* subjected to the sam e Laws and 
Regulations as are generally in force th roughout the Uganda P ro tectora te .
Signed by ... Sir Henry Hamilton Johnston  and the [Mukamaj and Chiefs of Torjo], 
a t  F o rt  Porta l ,  on the 26th day of June, I960.
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